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intRoduCtion Relatively Biological
Thirty- five years after its initial success as a form of technologically assisted 
human reproduction, and five million miracle babies later, in vitro fertiliza-
tion (ivF) confronts us with a paradoxical legacy. Since its controversial clini-
cal debut in 1978, ivF has rapidly become more routine and familiar, while 
at the same time also becoming, as Alice might have said, “curiouser and 
curiouser.” Conception in vitro is now a normal fact of life, yet having passed 
through the looking glass of ivF, neither human reproduction nor reproduc-
tive biology look quite the same. Among other things, human conception can 
now be looked at—and not only through the microscope. The moment of 
conception can be viewed on the Internet; it is depicted in films and adver-
tisements, and shown on the evening news. It can be downloaded in 3d from 
YouTube. This technologization of reproduction is both ordinary and curious. 
These images reflect the desire to know and understand that is conveyed in 
the normal meaning of “curious,” but it is equally curious in the sense of sur-
prising and unusual, that such images are ordinary at all. What does it mean 
that ivF has become a looking glass through which we see ourselves? What 
kind of view is on offer in the technological reproduction of human concep-
tion as a public spectacle? What species of technology is ivF? After all, it is 
not just a means of looking, or a spectacle—the point of ivF is to produce a 
new human being.
In reflecting upon the meaning of life after ivF, we must also consider the 
life of ivF—a technology that has had a complex evolution out of the study of 
natural history and the life sciences into clinical practice, and which is now 
intimately interrelated with the horizon industries of regenerative medicine 
and stem cell science. From an experimental research technique used in em-
bryology, ivF has evolved into a global technological platform, used for a wide 
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variety of applications, from genetic diagnosis and livestock breeding to clon-
ing and stem cell research. One way to view the history of ivF is as a basic 
technique that has circulated through science, medicine, and agriculture as 
part of an increasingly complex tool kit for the control of mammalian repro-
duction. From this point of view, the history of ivF is that of a stem technology 
that has become ever more thickly imbricated in the remaking of the biologi-
cal that so distinctly characterized the twentieth century—a model technique 
for remaking life.
As such, ivF is also a lens or window onto the history of the process Evelyn 
Fox Keller (2002) describes as “making sense of life”—a process that, like 
ivF, has also become “curiouser and curiouser” over time. As Jane Maien-
schein (2003) argues, ivF has changed scientific understandings of what life 
is—a question that never had a particularly clear answer to begin with. Some 
of the earliest attempts to induce fertilization in glass, such as those carried 
out in the late nineteenth century by Jacques Loeb in sea urchins, were pre-
cisely designed not only to control life, but to redefine it. Loeb’s discovery that 
eggs could be experimentally activated without sperm, by chemically induc-
ing development in vitro, was explicitly intended to confirm a new definition 
of life as mechanical, and thus reengineerable. As Maienschein points out, 
for Loeb, his manipulations were life, and thus “called into question what we 
mean by a life” (2003: 79). And as Evelyn Fox Keller similarly observes, this 
process has continued to dissolve its object precisely through the attempt to 
clarify its particularity, to define its principles, and to characterize its speci-
ficity. As Keller notes, the effort to define what life is began only two cen-
turies ago with Jean- Baptiste Lamarck’s call for a “true definition of life” that 
did not rely upon classifying things that are alive, but could determine what 
life is, or its “essence.” As Keller notes, “By far the most interesting feature of 
the quest for the defining essence of life, and surely its greatest peculiarity, is 
that even while focussing attention on the boundary between living and non- 
living, emphasizing both the clarity and importance of that divide, this quest 
for life’s essence simultaneously works toward its dissolution” (2002: 292). As 
Keller argues further, the “peculiar” process of defining life in the twenty- first 
century has cycled right back around to its pre- Lamarckian, late eighteenth- 
century form in the context of projects such as synthetic biology, which are 
aimed to demonstrate that the border between life and nonlife is entirely 
porous—and that life can be built from scratch from inorganic compounds. 
In a sense, this has already occurred in the form of synthetic chemistry, also 
known as organic synthesis, through which organic compounds are manufac-
tured out of inorganic components. The meaning of the word “synthesize” to 
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describe “making” derives from chemistry, and has equally significant impli-
cations for the meaning of “organic” in biology today.
The “greatest peculiarity,” as Keller (2002) describes it, in the history of 
defining life is precisely replicated by ivF, which has been one of the key re-
search techniques involved in the characterization of life’s defining proper-
ties in the past, and continues to shake them up in the present. Like Loeb 
in the nineteenth century, Shinya Yamanaka and his team in Kyoto discov-
ered a means of chemically reactivating cellular potency using only four tran-
scription factors to force differentiated mammalian cells back into their pre-
differentiated state—a process that is akin to making a viable developing 
embryo without either sperm or egg. They succeeded in mice in 2006 and 
in human cells in 2007, and this cell type—induced pluripotent stem (iPS) 
cells—has itself now become a new technological platform for basic research 
into the precise mechanisms of cellular development (Takahashi and Yama-
naka 2006). This “going forward by going backward” biology is typical of the 
twentieth- century discoveries that employed in vitro models and techniques 
to explore the process of biological development only to “dissolve,” as Keller 
puts it, the very concepts being explored (such as cellular differentiation).
Another peculiarity of this process involves the use of tools to remake bi-
ology—also a boundary that has been repeatedly breached in the attempt to 
define what life is, especially now that biology is itself increasingly under-
stood as a technology—and thus as something that can be made. That biology 
has become a technology is not a metaphoric description: to make iPS cells, 
viruses are used to transport the required genes, and the genes, or factors, 
themselves become tools in the process of forcing a cell to reorganize itself. 
Indeed, the use of biological bits and pieces as tools to reengineer other bio-
logical systems is so ubiquitous in biology it is completely normal to think of 
biology as a technology in this sense.1 But here too we come to another “curi-
ouser and curiouser” moment, as this also means that technology is becoming 
more “biologized.” And what might be considered particularly peculiar about 
ivF is that it not only models this process, and reproduces it, but makes new 
human beings too—and perfectly normal ones, at that. In vitro fertilization 
is at once a technique, a model, an imitation of a biological process, a syn-
thetic process, a scientific research method, an agricultural tool, and a means 
of human reproduction—of making life. It is an experimental model system 
with more than one life of its own. Consequently, one way to think about ivF 
is that it is less easy to understand than it may seem—or that it makes a very 
curious kind of sense.
This thought is the basis for this book, which does not so much track the 
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history of ivF, or analyze its present, as attempt to make a different kind of 
sense of this technique both in and of itself and as part of a wider process 
through which the biological has become a more explicitly relative condition. 
I describe this as the emergence of biological relativity, which is explored 
in this book from the point of view of ivF, using this technique as a lens to 
consider what it means not only to understand biology as a technology, but 
technology as biological. I suggest that the dissolution of the biological and 
the technical has implications that go far beyond the questions raised by ivF 
itself, but that ivF offers a unique perspective from which some of these im-
plications can be observed—a looking glass, of sorts (figure Intro.1). My aim 
in this book is to focus this looking glass not so much by following ivF around 
as by holding it still—using it as a dish model of itself, changing the filters, the 
depth of field, and the background light.
In vitro fertilization both recapitulates and personalizes a wider process 
through which biology is not only denaturalized but “cultured up.” While con-
tinuing to function as an experimental tool, ivF technology is embedded in a 
naturalized and normalized logic of kinship, parenthood, and reproduction: 
it is pursued in the hope of alleviating childlessness. It has come to be viewed 
as normal and natural in the same way that most technologies that become 
highly popular and successful are quickly taken for granted (indeed, this is 
how revolutionary technologies are now defined).2 But this too is a curious 
process—the way technology becomes, in Raymond Williams’s terms, a cul-
tural form—often associated with new social and institutional norms, and 
thus routinized. Williams urges us to read technological change neither as an 
inevitable process of historical invention nor as a response to human needs, 
but “in terms of its place in an existing social formation” (1990: 12)—taking 
into account both the intentions that produced it and its changing role as 
it evolves over time. In this way he challenges the “sterile” opposition be-
tween the view of technology as either determined by human intention, or 
determining it—as either a cause or an effect. Instead he urges us to under-
stand both the causes and the effects of technologies as component parts of 
larger wholes, within which technology is not, in his words, “isolated” as a 
“self- acting force” (Williams 1990: 6) but belongs to a “complex” of a specific 
kind (25).
In this book, I try to read ivF in this way—as a complex or matrix of a par-
ticular kind. My concern is not only to read ivF as a technologization of bi-
ology, or as a biological technology, but as a case study that asks us to consider 
in more depth how this particular technology works, exactly. The first thesis 
of this book is that ivF constitutes a most unusual technology that works in a 
FigurE intro.1. Sir John Tenniel’s illustration of Alice’s looking glass, or speculum: 
“Then she began looking about, and noticed that what could be seen from the old 
room was quite common and uninteresting, but that all the rest was as different as 
possible. For instance, the pictures on the wall next to the fire seemed to be alive.” 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass (1871).
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most unusual way—so much so that its own workings reveal a looking- glass 
view on both biology and technology in general, as well as the evolving re-
lationship between them. The second thesis of this book is that it is the very 
obviousness of how ivF works that makes it a useful case study, because by 
looking through it differently, we can see what is not obvious about its work-
ings at all. And in this way, we can perhaps arrive at a different set of starting 
points to ask questions about the evolving relationship between biology and 
technology—and more specifically between reproductive technology and the 
future of kinship.
Williams’s point returns us to the question of how ivF has become more 
routine, more naturalized and normalized, more regular and even quotidian 
or ordinary. To begin with, ivF is a technique that replicates a well- known 
biological process, namely fertilization, and confirms the ability to simulate 
this process technologically. It is thus doubly reproductive: it successfully re-
produces reproduction, and its reproductive success biologically is what con-
firms, or proves, that it works technologically. Representations of ivF typi-
cally reproduce, and condense, familiar narratives—from the naturalness of 
reproduction and the universal desire for parenthood to the value of scientific 
progress and the benefits of medical assistance—and the success of ivF is in 
turn offered as proof, or evidence, of how these logics fit together. As Foucault 
might have observed, ivF is normal because it already belongs to techniques 
of normalization—including, among others, those of marriage, kinship, gen-
der, scientific progress, experimental embryology, livestock breeding, baby 
showers, consumer culture, and medical technology, not to mention Holly-
wood cinema, Sex and the City, Brangelina, and Mumsnet.com. But as Fou-
cault also might have noted, this is what is useful about ivF as the condensed 
epistemic point of the many intersecting strands that make its logic seem so 
obvious and normal.
Primary among the norms ivF reproduces is a dominant kinship pattern, 
the logic of which ivF recapitulates exactly in its emphasis on the biologi-
cal fertilization of two gametes in glass. However, this marriage of cells now 
exists in two forms as a result of ivF—the one occurring in vivo, and the other 
in glass. In vitro fertilization thus allows a new method of conception to be 
slotted in, as it were, to an older pattern by “marrying up” a biological model 
of sexual reproduction with a biologically based system of descent and family 
formation. The normalization of ivF, as Charis Thompson points out, is a “hy-
brid culturing” (2005: 115) that allows new technology to coevolve with exist-
ing sexual, gender, and kinship norms, adding a degree of flexibility to the re-
production of reproduction, while largely keeping the structure of bilateral, 
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biological kinship norms intact. Yet it is because this logic is recursive, in the 
sense of the “strange folding” of repetition, or the “turning back” of meanings 
onto themselves, that this reproduction is not exact, but rather, as I am call-
ing it here, curious.
The manner in which ivF is embedded in, and is seemingly evidence for, 
the normalizing systems it both relies upon for its success and reproduces 
through its workings, is precisely where we encounter the curiouser side of 
ivF. Indeed, these two sides of ivF—how it is both normal and not—help 
to explain why the experience of undergoing it remains so paradoxical and 
ambivalent, despite the apparent obviousness of why ivF came into being 
to begin with. The more peculiar aspects of ivF very quickly become obvi-
ous to anyone commencing an ivF program, or entering what many women 
I interviewed for my first book on ivF described as the “intense” and “trau-
matic” world of ivF treatment (Franklin 1997: 11). Once inside this topsy- 
turvy world, a very different logic of ivF becomes visible, which is neither 
as normal nor as self- evident as that available from the other side of the door 
into the assisted conception clinic. Here, as for Alice, nothing is normal at 
all. In vitro fertilization is not a simple process of steps leading to poten-
tial success—it is a confusing and stressful world of disjointed temporalities, 
jangled emotions, difficult decisions, unfamiliar procedures, medical jargon, 
and metabolic chaos. You have to believe you will succeed even though you 
will probably fail, and the terms on which you reach either end point to treat-
ment are constantly changing. As in the context of amniocentesis, another 
form of high- tech reproductive roulette, where negative results are positive, 
the experience of ivF is full of ironies. It is a complex and daunting medical 
procedure that requires a high level of compliance and commitment, as well 
as time and resources. Even people who succeed in the effort to achieve a 
take- home baby are often left disoriented and changed by their experience of 
undergoing ivF. Some will wish they never attempted it to begin with, and 
others will try again and again until they either succeed or give up (Throsby 
2004). Few people go through ivF, in other words, without experiencing, 
either temporarily or permanently, and to a greater or lesser extent, a de-
gree of ambivalence about this procedure—a view that is widely shared by 
ivF clinicians and nurses, who know better than anyone the potentially high 
costs of ivF. This ambivalence indexes the difference between the norms that 
ivF belongs to, and the extent to which it also challenges or contradicts these 
very same conventions.
The ambivalence that characterizes the ivF encounter, while specific in 
its form to ivF treatment, is also more generic, and I refer to it throughout 
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this book as “technological ambivalence,” arguing that it is a constitutive com-
ponent of biological relativity. As many social theorists have noted, such as 
Ulrich Beck (1992), ambivalence is one of the defining characteristics of the 
modern relationship to technology—be it television or e- mail, robotics or 
biotechnology, electric kettles or plastic bags. In vitro fertilization offers a 
useful perspective on this ambivalence because it is generated out of a context 
that, like ivF itself, is becoming much more routine—namely that of man-
aging our biological relations to technology in the context of remaking life. 
This is why ivF provides a useful lens on the wider condition I am describing 
as biological relativity—because ivF is not only typical, but arguably proto-
typical of this condition and its corresponding ambivalences. The topsy- turvy 
world of ivF, in all its both obvious and not- so- obvious complexity, and pre-
cisely in its normality, thus offers us a looking glass into a looking- glass world, 
a model system of a model system, and a vivid picture of the retooling of re-
productive substance. The very recursion that makes ivF confusing—that it 
both is and is not like what it imitates—is what makes it a useful hermeneu-
tical apparatus for understanding “the age of biology.”
However, I also argue that the ambivalence so profoundly associated with 
the technique of ivF, while derivative in part of its role as a modern, syn-
thetic, high- tech procedure, also references older questions of sex, gender, 
and kinship—which ivF may help us to appreciate more explicitly. In other 
words, ivF not only offers a perspective on the ambivalence associated with 
modern technology, such as that described by Beck, but on older structures 
of sociality, including marriage and kinship. The fact that the normalization 
of ivF has not diminished the ambivalence felt by many who undergo it argu-
ably tells us something about norms and norming themselves—namely that 
these too are reproductive technologies that engender deeply contradictory 
feelings. As Michael Peletz notes in his insightful discussion of ambivalence 
(“the simultaneous experience of powerful, contradictory emotions or atti-
tudes toward a single phenomenon,” as he defines it), anthropologists “have 
devoted scant attention not only to the myriad sources of ambivalence but 
also to their implications for an understanding of structure and agency as 
well as critically important processes of sociality, domination, and resistance” 
(2001: 414). This book takes up Peletz’s challenge to examine “ambivalence as 
such” as a point of “frequently overlooked continuity between the old and new 
kinship studies” (2001: 414) in the context of being “after ivF.”
This is also why this book attempts to integrate several different kinds of 
thinking about biology and technology into a conversation about ivF that may 
at times appear to stray rather far from its object. As noted above, to under-
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stand the workings of ivF not only as a technology, but as a complex or cul-
tural form—including its past, its coming into being, the history of its recent 
present, and its evolution and dissemination, as well as its future—requires 
an account of how it works in and through other systems. This includes other 
technologies—such as technologies of kinship as well as clinical equipment, 
and technologies of sex as well as the medium of the Internet. Similarly, such 
a conversation has to ask what “technology” means, as well as what it means 
to have become “biologically relative.” There is obviously a limit to how far 
such a project can go in a single volume, so in truth this book only outlines 
one way to approach these questions. However, insofar as it successfully de-
scribes and illustrates the recognizable outlines of a problematic, it will have 
succeeded at the very least in its aim of opening a door to a different kind of 
conversation, not only about ivF but about “the question concerning tech-
nology” and its new kinship with “the question concerning biology.” These 
questions centrally concern the embodiment of technology, and the ambiva-
lence that accompanies its normalization.
This is a conversation that has already been very substantially developed in 
some areas of social theory, for example in the anthropological debate about 
technologies of kinship, and in the feminist debate about technologies of gen-
der, as well as in the responses to Foucault’s account of sex as a technology. I 
also draw attention to the extent to which Marx’s and Engels’s models of tech-
nology were suffused with analogies to organicism and biology, and to their 
account of the relation between hand and tool. This book is an attempt to re-
theorize reproduction, as well as reproductive technology, and I have given 
prominence to feminist debates on both of these topics, as well as to feminist 
science studies, drawing in particular on the work of Donna Haraway (1976, 
1997). Returning to the idiom of the frontier that I explored in my previous 
book on cloning, Dolly Mixtures (Franklin 2007b), I attempt to examine the 
role of “pioneering” in the context of experimental embryology, and to con-
trast this to the model of “moral pioneering” developed by Rayna Rapp (1999) 
in the context of contemporary reproductive biomedicine. I explore the am-
bivalence of the frontier—a place of oscillation, fluctuation, and instability—
toward the close of the book in relation to the artwork of a photographer in 
residence in the assisted conception unit (acu) where I have worked for the 
past ten years, as a way of returning to the question of embodying technology 
that I argue ivF poses in a distinctly equivocal manner.
As in my previous work, this book relies on close collaboration with scien-
tists and clinicians working in the fields of ivF, stem cell research, and re-
generative medicine, as well as patients undergoing various procedures, 
10 introduction
or active in patient support groups. Although this book is not traditionally 
ethnographic, it draws on fieldwork in clinics and labs, and the expertise of 
scientists who took the time to introduce me to their technical working meth-
ods. The analysis I offer of the visual cultures of ivF, human embryonic stem 
cell derivation methods, and micromanipulation of embryos has benefited 
from the enormous ease with which it is now possible to record fieldwork ex-
changes using a handheld video camera. In turn, this allows for a much richer 
analysis of biology in the making, some examples of which I have included 
in this book, particularly concerning the precise techniques of culturing and 
passaging human embryonic cell lines.3
As a result of its own somewhat eccentric “passaging techniques,” this 
book is composed of a series of loosely interconnected chapters that attempt 
to make sense of the social, cultural, and technological legacies of ivF through 
a series of interpretive frames that both overlap and diverge. Throughout, I 
analyze ivF as a bridge to both new life and new kinds of life, and as a lens 
through which to depict changes in the meaning of biology, technology, and 
kinship. To do this I analyze reproductive substance as technology, but also 
technology as a reproductive substance, and more broadly the merging of the 
biological and the technical that are substantialized in, through, and as ivF. 
The mixing together of these perspectives in this book—a bit like the fusion 
of biology and technology it describes—is less a properly developed narrative 
analysis than a thought experiment in the form of a mosaic. The aim is to char-
acterize the condition of being after ivF.
That mosaics are also embryonic tools (“fusion embryos”4) is apt because 
a major question this book asks is what it means that ivF has enabled a re-
tooling of human reproductive substance. Ordinarily, technology might be 
imagined as something humans make in order to achieve desired ends: it is 
traditionally defined as the application of science. However, many of the most 
influential theorists of technology have argued that technological equipment 
and agency are a form of inheritance—indeed of inherited substance—as 
much as a means of altering the conditions of human existence in the present 
or the future. This is a similar, though inverted, form of the argument from 
kinship theory that institutions such as monarchies are technologies—indeed 
reproductive technologies—aimed at the controlled passaging of human sub-
stance over time and controlling the order of succession. The lineages of tech-
nology bequeathed from the past are far more numerous and formative than 
are the novel contemporary technologies most prominently associated with 
contemporary social change or impact—such as those associated with stem 
cell science, cloning, or reproductive biomedicine. If we consider the tech-
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nologies of agriculture or domestication, for example, not to mention elec-
tricity or antibiotics (and this list could be rather long), we can see that they 
are already so much a part of who we are that we often do not even notice 
them, their pervasive structuring effects as invisible as grammar (language 
also being among the most important human technologies). Heidegger, for 
example, in The Question Concerning Technology, employed the Greek mean-
ing of the word techne as a form of exposition or demonstration: “It is as re-
vealing, and not as manufacturing, that techne is a bringing- forth” (1993: 319). 
Similarly, in “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” Heidegger argues that tools and 
technologies are the means by which the world becomes “enframed” for its 
inhabitants, shaping the “basic character” of Being or existence (1993: 350). 
This equipment, with and in which we live, is both inherited and formative, 
shaping both how we know and “do” the world. Jacques Derrida (1974), fol-
lowing the paleoethnologist André Leroi- Gourhan, more radically describes 
“man” or “anthropos” as rooted in an “originary technicity”—a position re-
cently interpreted by Vicki Kirby (2011) as one that might also allow for a 
view of “life itself” as technics. Bruno Latour (1993) has described all identi-
ties as conjunctions, hybrids, and assemblages—as consubstantial “devices.” 
Or, as Donna Haraway puts it more vividly, “chimeras of humans and non- 
humans, machines and organisms, subjects and objects, are the obligatory 
passage points, the embodiments and articulations, through which travelers 
must pass to get much of anywhere in the world” (1997: 43). We do not need 
cellular technologies to evince for us that technology is cellular. How we have 
coevolved with technology is both an obvious and an unfolding question: as 
Williams (1990) so wisely noted, it is the very obviousness of this question 
that makes it so difficult to analyze.
As well as reframing technology, this book also seeks to reframe some 
of the arguments concerning “technological reproduction” from within the 
history of social theory. For example, with the benefit of hindsight, I argue 
it is possible to read Marx’s accounts of machines and technology as more 
“morphogenetic” than perhaps even he intended. Marx repeatedly argued 
that the origins of modern technology are not to be found in the engineering 
genius of great inventors such as James Watt, whose name is now enshrined 
on every lightbulb for the eponymous energy source by which you may be 
reading this book. Although Marx’s endorsement of the value of modern tech-
nology is often opposed to Heidegger’s concern with its dehumanizing lega-
cies, the chief argument of much of Marx’s work is that technological inno-
vation is the product of history, not its material progenitor. The equipment of 
the Industrial Revolution, he argues, comes into being as a result of political 
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and economic conditions, not the other way around. He situates the evolu-
tion of machines such as the self- acting mule jenny in the context of the social 
apparatus that provided the conditions of their production, or brought them 
into existence, such as the division of labor and the fetishization of commodi-
ties. In both Marx’s and Engels’s writings, the actual equipment used in in-
dustries such as agriculture is not only an inherited condition of human exis-
tence, but a crucial force in molding the human species being.
As Marx wrote in Volume 1 of Capital, the human body itself is a product 
as much as a means of the labor process: “Labour is, in the first place, a pro-
cess in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own 
accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re- actions between himself 
and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting 
in motion arms and leg, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in 
order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants. 
By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time 
changes his own nature” (mEcw, Vol. 35, Capital, Vol. 1, Book 1, C 7, section 1). 
Marx understood the history of both technology and the division of labor not 
only in terms of how people used their bodies to do things, but in how they 
adapted themselves to the physical conditions of production and were trans-
formed by them. He also emphasized the sociality of bodies—their crucial 
interconnections with other bodies, and not only human ones. Both animals 
and tools were understood as crucial components of a systematic mode of 
production that was, in the case of industrial production, highly organized, 
and even to a certain extent symbiotic (e.g., clover = nitrogen = fodder = 
cattle = proletariat = surplus value = commodity = finance, etc.). As this book 
suggests, Marx’s model of the human- tool- machine relation was vividly bio-
logical. His picture of human thought and action is of a process of substantial-
ization through which the human is molded not only by the inherited, “given” 
(or “standing,” as Heidegger would have it) conditions of equipment of any 
historical moment but by being continually reconditioned by the evolution 
of this equipment, much as, for example, the laborer must continually adapt 
to new mechanical conditions of production. His depiction of the evolution 
of machine technology is deeply infused with the conceptual apparatus of 
organicism and biological development that became increasingly prominent 
during his lifetime.
The evolution of technological equipment is complemented by Marx and 
Engels’s view of the human as technological. This too presupposed a merging 
of biology and tool, and is described in Bernard Stiegler’s (1998) reading of 
Marx as a new theory of life as much as of technology. The evolution of the 
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human hand into tools, and later into technological systems, such as factory 
production, is central to Marx’s dialectical theory of machines and mecha-
nization, often invoking Darwin’s model of natural history (despite Marx’s 
and Engels’s critiques of Darwin as an apologist for industrial capitalism, 
they borrowed from his models of selection and adaptation to describe tech-
nology). Similarly, Marx and Engels depicted the natural and physical world 
as a tool kit made available for human use, and transformed by these uses into 
a “second nature” (Smith and O’Keefe 1980). To his tool kit, Marx added the 
legal, economic, and bureaucratic technologies through which the mode of 
production is organized and maintained. These too, he argued, provided the 
essential devices and mechanisms necessary for the machinery of industrial 
capitalism to develop, to grow, and to reproduce itself.
From this point of view, the traditional definition of a tool as a means, or 
device, that is given purpose by its user is not fully adequate—because, as 
both Marx and Engels argued, the significance of tools cannot be measured by 
their function alone. Tools, and the evolution of technology, must be under-
stood as both inherited equipment and as the molding conditions of human 
existence, constantly reshaping what the human is by what it can do, in a dia-
lectical process that extends beyond historical time into the mists of human 
species emergence. More than this, tools are never merely instrumental: as 
Heidegger insisted, they belong to the history of thought, and as Marx also 
argued, tools are the offspring of imagined worlds as much as actual ones. 
Tools are substantialized concepts.
As Donna Haraway (1997: 52) has argued, the context of contemporary 
biotechnological production is not only one that is defined by fusions of tools, 
concepts, and biological substances in the form of “living tools,” but one in 
which biological relations are “corporealized” as both a conversion of nature 
into technique and an implosion of material and semiotic technologies as new 
kinships and kinds. The transgenic mouse model, she argues, is the product 
of a “recursive miming” that positions humans and nonhumans as biotechno-
logical kin to one another—the materiality of their genomes “simultaneously 
semiotic, institutional, machinic, organic, and biochemical” (Haraway 1997: 
99). The mouse model is an “instrument built to be engaged, inhabited, lived 
. . . and so building particular worlds rather than others” (135–136), and thus 
part of “the circulatory systems that constitute kinship—replete with all of 
its transhybridities” (134). To the extent that molecular biology is premised on 
the trope of rewriting biology, its genealogy simultaneously reconfigures the 
future of “biological” kinship as a set of relationships not only to, and through, 
but of, technology.
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This brings us back to our central question, which is how to evaluate the 
significance of the fact that humans are now making tools out of reproduc-
tive substance, including our own. A question raised by the rapid evolution 
of ivF technology over the past half century, and in particular its new inter-
face with stem cell research, is what it means to consider not only reproduc-
tive substance as a technology, but technology as a reproductive substance, 
as new biological relations and relativities are literally being made by hand, 
often using handmade tools. Arguably we are not particularly well prepared 
to address this question by either Marx or Heidegger, or many other theorists 
of technology, who have not provided many theoretical resources for analyz-
ing either reproduction or reproductive substance. Indeed it could be said we 
need some new conceptual tools to describe the human conceptus as a tool.
Conventionally, reproduction has been understood in two distinct senses—
as a process of social replacement (as in the reproduction of labor power), and 
as a biological process (as in sexual reproduction). Somewhat confusingly, 
reproduction is itself a term derived from manufacturing to refer to copying. 
This is the exact opposite of what it has meant in the context of biology, where 
sexual reproduction is precisely not the same thing as copying, or asexual re-
production, also known as cloning. This confusion is compounded by others, 
and also by a general neglect of the importance of what Marx called the “mode 
of reproduction” or the sexual division of labor. Indeed, throughout Marx’s 
work the former is imagined to be largely explained by the latter. However, 
from the late twentieth century onward it has been increasingly evident that 
not only is sexual reproduction a process that can be dramatically reshaped 
by technology (which is what the phrase “artificial reproduction” means), but 
that it can be used as a technology (e.g., to produce new life forms, such as 
transgenic organisms). What ivF very publicly introduces is a form of techno-
logical transfer, or passaging, by which the technologization of biological sub-
stance becomes a mode of reproduction—including (and often uniting) not 
only sexual but also animal, human, digital, informatic, virtual, and mechani-
cal reproduction. Put bluntly, the increasing control of biological reproduc-
tion “artificially” is one of the major technological advances of the twentieth 
century, and yet one that has only recently begun to be theorized (particu-
larly in the work of Haraway). In vitro fertilization is the means by which this 
new form of technological control has been transferred into the human, thus 
confirming not only a new means of establishing a pregnancy but a new role 
for technology in making life.
One of the most helpful models for addressing the contemporary “engi-
neering ideal” of biology (Pauly 1987), or the process of “culturing life” (Lan-
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decker 2007), is that described in Adele Clarke’s (1998) account of “disci-
plining reproduction.” As Clarke notes, “the reproductive sciences have 
themselves been marginalized, and their centrality to the overall project of 
controlling life has thereby been comparatively ignored,” despite the fact, as 
she was among the first to point out, that it is “the reproductive sciences that 
have to date facilitated not only control over reproduction but control over 
heredity, and hence over life itself” (1998: 276).5 The control of reproduc-
tive substance through technologies of selective breeding is, after all, as old 
as agriculture while also more central than ever today to the production, for 
example, of new cell factories. During the nineteenth century, modern agri-
cultural methods of selective breeding began to be introduced by figures such 
as Robert Bakewell, who carefully “disciplined” the reproductive substance of 
his livestock in order to increase their economic value, using methods such as 
in- and- in breeding among close biological relatives to “fix” desirable traits—a 
process that relied, as Harriet Ritvo (1987) has shown, on new forms of stan-
dardizing animals, as well as new means of calculating their fitness, docu-
menting their reproductive performance, and devising new financial instru-
ments to market their “genetic capital.” Lineages of breed records, as well as 
still- existing Bakewell breeds (such as the Dishley Leicester sheep) continue 
this instrumental legacy (and have themselves now become valuable com-
modities). Selective breeding, which substantializes a concept in the form 
of a technique applied to animal reproduction (i.e., in- and- in mate selection 
to concentrate desirable traits), relies on a fusion of biology and technique 
to achieve the “disciplining” of reproduction (Clarke 1998). The same basic 
principle applies today at the most advanced levels of cellular reengineering, 
where both conceptualities and conceptions are being reconceived, remixed, 
and rewritten.
A different technology was invented in the nineteenth century to describe 
the organization of human reproductive substance—and the disciplining of 
reproductive outcomes—namely, the concept of kinship. In the work of Dar-
win, as both Gillian Beer (1983) and Marilyn Strathern (1992a) have shown, 
the idiom of kinship performed a function of translation—importing the aris-
tocratic technology of pedigree into natural history to ground a new theory of 
the biological relatedness of all organic life through shared descent—that is, 
through shared reproductive substance. It was by this very means, Foucault 
argues, that a new definition of life, as a natural system, acquired an organic 
and conceptual unity and gave rise to the modern scientific discipline of bi-
ology (Foucault 1973). Once it became lawlike and systemic, Foucault argues, 
biology also came to be understood as a new apparatus of social and political 
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control, at both the individual and the species level—inaugurating what Fou-
cault describes as biopower. This is the same “reproductive model” that gave 
birth to human ivF—just over a century after Darwin’s reinvention of natural 
history (via kinship) as a system of interrelated, metamorphic, biological rela-
tions (evolution). Like Darwin’s model of evolution, ivF models kin connec-
tions in a double sense: it introduces new kinds of biological relatives, as well 
as new models of biological relatedness.6 This doubling effect of ivF is one of 
the main themes to which this book returns because it replicates a wider pro-
cess I describe as “biological relativity,” through which biology now exists as 
a more explicitly contingent, or relative, condition. One of the most striking 
features of ivF is how quickly and thoroughly the explicit technologization of 
reproductive substance it makes so graphically visible, and the radical new 
models of biological relativity it introduces, have been naturalized and com-
mercialized.
One reason for the rapid adoption of ivF technology is, of course, that 
biological relativity is not so new. As Bruno Latour argues, the critical power 
of moderns is the ability to reverse their principles without acknowledging 
contradiction. How convenient it is, he notes, that “in spite of its transcen-
dence, Nature remains mobilizable, humanizable, socializable” (Latour 1993: 
37). The same is true of beliefs about biology, kinship, and shared reproduc-
tive substance—all of which are characterized by enormous flexibility in spite 
of often being tied to deterministic models. As Janet Carsten has argued, the 
term “substance” has an enormous and varied range of meanings, covering 
a full three pages in the Oxford English Dictionary. She reduces these to four 
broad categories: “vital part or essence; separate distinct thing; that which 
underlies phenomena; and corporeal matter” (Carsten 2001: 29). While on 
the one hand, Carsten surmises, the highly varied meanings of “substance” 
may be one of the reasons it is “good to think with,” this breadth has also 
introduced analytic confusion. For example, a “blood tie” is imagined to be 
at once a physical and a symbolic connection. That blood is one of the only 
substances that does not perfuse through the placental membrane, and in 
that sense is never “shared,” has not inhibited its widespread use as an idiom 
of consanguinity—or blood relatedness. But what are blood relations? Tradi-
tionally, and in a Euro- American context, these would be described as kinship 
relations that are defined not only in terms of what they “are” but what they 
“code for” in the form of conduct, obligations, and roles (Schneider 1968). As 
Carsten notes, however, such a definition both confuses and conflates two 
very different meanings of substance—as symbol and essence. This confla-
tion is also evident in Mary Douglas’s description of blood as a “natural sym-
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bol,” used in “social systems in which the image of the body is used in differ-
ent ways to reflect and enhance each person’s experience of society” (1970: 
10). A very different perspective on blood is introduced by Annemarie Mol 
(2002), who argues it is instrumentally conceptualized in ways that give this 
substance different meanings in terms of how it is “done” through various 
techniques—for example, in the context of disease. In her view, blood does 
not “code” as a unified corporeal matter but as a multiple one: it is neither an 
essential substance nor an essentialized sign, but rather comes into existence 
as “a separate distinct thing” entirely in relation to its specific sociotechnical 
milieu.
For the purposes of this book, substantialization is used much the same 
way as it has been in psychoanalysis, science studies, or anthropology, where 
similar concepts such as “sedimentation,” “concretization,” “somatization,” or 
“materialization” have been employed to describe the relationships between 
embodiment, sociality, identity, material objects, and technology. It is the in-
extricability of these interwoven forces that the breadth of definitions of the 
word “substance” usefully both expresses and confirms. At the same time, 
this term is also useful for this book because it has a much more specific 
meaning in the context of reproduction, where the term “reproductive sub-
stance” would normally refer to gametes and embryos. Arguably, one of the 
most important contemporary changes in this “specific” definition of repro-
ductive substance is that it has been vastly widened by the development of 
methods to cultivate the regenerative potential of almost any living cell. As 
the iPS cell discussed earlier confirms, regenerativity and reproductivity are 
increasingly blurred in the context of stem cell science (which is also what 
the Dolly experiment confirmed). This returns us to ivF, which today must 
be seen as an evolving technological platform, serving as a base for an ex-
panding variety of human cell cultivation methods, which are in turn linked 
to the prospect of improved human cellular replacement and repair. Human 
embryonic stem cell research is a direct offspring of the evolution of the ivF 
platform: it was derived from the same research on early mammalian devel-
opment that enabled ivF to be used in humans, and is dependent on human 
ivF for the supply of research embryos necessary to the refinement of its clini-
cal applications.7
Both the change in the meaning of “reproductive substance” brought about 
through stem cell research (so that even a skin cell can become a gamete) and 
the future translation of new cellular potentials into applications increasingly 
rely on ivF in complex ways. Much of my research preceding this book was 
conducted in a new generation of U.K. laboratories that have been designed, 
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built, and custom engineered to facilitate a more efficient interface between 
ivF and stem cell research. The axis of these labs, both architecturally and 
conceptually, is a hole in the wall, or hatch, connecting them to an adjacent 
acu. The direct transfer of reproductive substance—gametes and embryos—
can thus be more reliably, or “cleanly,” facilitated from one context to another, 
that is, from an ivF unit to a stem cell lab (and back and forth; see Franklin 
2010b). This book begins and ends in the leading U.K. lab dedicated to the 
facilitation of this novel transfer of reproductive substance, at Guy’s Hospital 
in London, where the ivF–stem cell interface offers yet another window onto 
the question of what kinship futures are being engendered in the context of 
new reproductive technologies.
The new labs connecting ivF clinics to stem cell research substantialize 
what it means to be after ivF not only in their architecture but through the 
division of labor that occurs on both sides of the hole in the wall. On one side 
are patients attending acus for a variety of procedures, including ivF. These 
patients may be seeking a specific reproductive goal—namely, biological off-
spring—but their presence in an acu is conditioned by many other factors, 
and will have additional outcomes, including a potential change in what they 
understand by “biological reproduction.” In the same way the textile industry 
cannot be explained by a desire for clothing, ivF is not simply a response to 
a desire to have children. In vitro fertilization is indexical of its modern heri-
tage, a combined apparatus of family and gender norms, scientific research 
programs, legal instruments, bureaucratic procedures, technical skills, and 
ethical codes (and so on). Now an expanding global service sector, the ivF 
industry has in turn become a generative matrix for new technologies, proce-
dures, products, and markets.8 This matrix is also the source of new biologi-
cal relations and relativities that exceed the frame of existing concepts and 
understandings, much as they also both rely upon and extend familiar models 
of biology, technology, and kinship.
These new relations and products are what are being developed through 
the hole in the wall (figure Intro.2), linking the stem cell lab to the acu, 
through a complex series of embryo transfers (Franklin 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 
2008, 2010b; Franklin and Kaftantzi 2008). In the lab, behind air- lock doors, 
the complex and delicate effort to take reproductive substance “in hand” is 
being laboriously pursued by dedicated research teams who are attempting to 
translate stem cell science into new applications, such as tissue engineering, 
regenerative medicine, and diagnostics. Here, the sophisticated handiwork 
of top- notch embryologists is not only yielding new life lines of cleanly cul-
tivated cells for a wide variety of uses, but new templates for semiautomated 
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production of cellular products as this field scales up toward biomanufactur-
ing. Similarly, at the UK Stem Cell Bank, which is the hub of a national net-
work of stem cell researchers, the basic guidelines and standards for cultiva-
tion, storage, transport, handling, and banking of human embryonic stem 
cells are being refined, along with the code of practice governing their legal 
and ethical status (Franklin et al. 2008; Franklin and Kaufman 2009). These 
new standards comprise the most elaborate quality management protocols 
ever written for reproductive substance. They are the equivalent in the con-
temporary biological sciences of Greenwich Mean Time.
The hole in the wall thus offers a window onto a new mode of reproduc-
tion, or perhaps a two- way mirror (figure Intro.3). Through it, human repro-
ductive substance is being “shared” in a way that enables an ivF embryo to 
become a tool that is embedded in a new set of codes for conduct. These codes 
of practice govern not only what happens to embryos, but the relationships 
that are established through them, thus establishing a novel system based on 
the exchange of reproductive substance. This new system of embryo transfer 
and human cell- based translation is an essential part of the equipment used 
to transform reproductive substance and to make it become differently pro-
ductive—that is, to become pluripotent in order to be able to redirect cells to 
new commercial and therapeutic purposes. It is thus also here, in the inter-
stices of codes and substance, that the meaning of “biological relations,” and 
indeed of “biological relatives,” is newly problematized, and it is this contem-
porary matrix that is the subject of this book.
technologies of Sex
A crucial resource in the effort to understand the retooling of the human em-
bryo is another twentieth- century invention, namely the analysis of sex as a 
technology. The phrase “technologies of sex” was introduced by Michel Fou-
cault at more or less the same time human ivF was perfected in the 1970s.9 
Like Marx, however, Foucault used a relatively narrow model of reproduc-
tion in his highly influential work on both the history of the human sciences 
and the birth of biopower through the technologization of sex. His work pro-
vided crucial new understandings of what is meant by technology, primarily 
through his discussions of the relationship between knowledge and power as 
a technological one. As he pointed out, the discourses of sex with which he 
was concerned composed a “strangely muddled zone” with only a “fictitious” 
relation to reproductive physiology (Foucault 1990: 54–55).10
The significance of technologies of sex for understanding both reproduc-
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tion and reproductive technology was pursued more directly within feminist 
scholarship in the 1980s. Building both on Marxist approaches and on the 
work of earlier feminists, such as Simone de Beauvoir, Ruth Herschberger, 
and Shulamith Firestone, the phrase “technologies of sex” took on new mean-
ings, in particular through the work of Teresa de Lauretis (1987) and Judith 
Butler (1990). New models of sex, gender, and reproduction began to emerge 
from within feminist anthropology, elaborating Gayle Rubin’s (1975) concept 
of “the sex/gender system” or what Shulamith Firestone (1972) before her had 
called “the political economy of sex.” The critique of the categories “woman” 
and “female” repositioned the global biologism of a naturalized, a priori pre-
sumption of an automatic sexual “base” to human social arrangements as 
itself an artifact of the system it allegedly explained.
Anthropologists such as Marilyn Strathern were among the first to begin to 
apply these insights specifically to ivF. Somewhat ironically, Strathern (1992a, 
1992b) pointed out, ivF explicitly artificialized the very facts of life that were 
formerly imagined to ground the natural origins of gender and sex: these facts 
FigurE intro.2. The hole in the wall between the ivF clinic and the stem cell 
laboratory enables the passage, or transfer, of eggs and embryos back and forth 
between two contexts of “remaking life.” Photo by the author, published with 
permission of the Guy’s stem cell team.
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were rendered contingent, or relativized, by the very technology developed 
to “assist” them. By replicating “natural” conception, ivF itself became a new 
technology of sex—oddly and exactly paralleling the feminist argument that 
it is technologies of sex and gender that produce the effect of naturalized ori-
gins, rather than biology. For the same reason, the new assisted conception 
techniques “born” of the union of reproductive substance and technological 
innovation not only produced a new kind of biological relative but revealed a 
new condition of biological relativity, through which nature and artifice be-
came interchangeable. Intended to enable a couple to reproduce biological 
offspring, ivF and its ilk paradoxically denaturalized biological reproduction 
by imitating it, or “taking it in hand.” The fertilization these techniques sub-
stantialized in the form of new offspring was not only that between egg and 
sperm, but that between technology and biology. This fecund coupling has 
quickly been translated into the twenty- first- century ethos of biological engi-
neering that now defines the fields of both genomics and synthetic biology. 
This is how ivF was transformed from “a bridge to new life” into a bridge to 
FigurE intro.3. A view of the ivF interface where the director of the Assisted 
Conception Clinic, Professor Peter Braude, explains the way that eggs will travel 
from a “dirty” ivF surgery into a clean room. Photo by the author, published with 
permission of the Guy’s stem cell team.
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new kinds of life. In sum, the bridge became a platform, a stage, and a launch 
pad by means of a translational imaginary that was animated by the prospect 
of future kinships not only between parent and child, but between technology 
and offspring. The evolving relationship between ivF and the wider context of 
biotechnological innovation of which it is a crucial part thus today poses new 
questions about the meanings of both biology and technology, as well as their 
relationships to both old and new technologies of gender, reproduction, and 
sex—all of which have become somewhat more curious.
The rapid expansion of ivF not only as a form of infertility treatment but 
as a technological platform, and now a vector to the biotechnology industry, 
is thus investigated in this book by means of the pair of related questions de-
scribed at the outset of this introduction. First, how might we think about re-
productive substance as a technology, and technology as a reproductive sub-
stance? And second, how can these related questions be analyzed together? 
As noted above, the animating technology of this book is experimental. Bio-
logical Relatives is organized as a series of close readings of texts and examples 
to offer a recursive perspective on the question of being after ivF. It is less a 
series of chapters than a mosaic, or complex of frames. Reading across several 
disciplines, I focus on the intersecting mechanics that enable the emergence 
of biology as a technology in the context of ivF, and I read ivF as both a model 
and a manifestation of this process. It is thus the role of ivF as both a working 
model and a model system that is at the heart of the thought experiment this 
book offers—which by definition is highly speculative rather than conclusive.
A result of this method and focus is that each chapter makes most sense 
in relation to the larger whole that emerges from their collective accumula-
tion. While this is always true of any book, it is particularly true of this one. 
Much is left to the reader to infer across the chapters, which together at-
tempt a serial reframing of a matrix that is still only barely sketched across 
all of them. Other books have provided much more coherent histories of ivF, 
including Robin Marantz Henig’s (2004) Pandora’s Baby, or Robert Edwards 
and Patrick Steptoe’s (1980) A Matter of Life. Similarly, there are much better 
historical accounts of reproductive biology, including Adele Clarke’s (1998) 
Disciplining Reproduction and Jane Maienschein’s (2003) Whose View of Life? 
Neither is a contemporary portrait of ivF provided in these chapters, such as 
that on offer in Debora Spar’s (2006) The Baby Business, and my aim is not to 
debate the ethical implications of new reproductive and genetic technologies, 
as has been done by Jürgen Habermas (2003), Francis Fukuyama (2002), and 
many others. In the long list of things this book does not do should also be 
mentioned that it takes a highly selective approach even to the topics it does 
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discuss in depth, such as the feminist debate over new reproductive technolo-
gies, the anthropology of new reproductive technologies, and the feminist lit-
erature on technologies of gender and sex. In sum, while drawing on a wide 
range of sources and many divergent avenues of scholarly debate, there are 
inevitably many obvious exclusions and oversights in the chapters that follow, 
and indeed within the book as a whole. It works best as an invitation to travel 
a particular journey in the effort to think through a particular problem, and 
to the extent that it achieves this aim in part by stimulating readers to iden-
tify significant resources or arguments that are inadequately presented here, 
I hope they will be motivated to contribute further to the general sociological 
problem Biological Relatives attempts to analyze.
This book also attempts to synthesize some of the ongoing themes in my 
own previous work, as I have sought to both document and theorize the 
emergence of new reproductive technologies including ivF (1997), embryo 
research (1999), preimplantation genetic diagnosis (Franklin and Roberts 
2006), and cloning (2007b), as well as visual cultures of reproduction (1991, 
1995, 2000). For example, it extends the analysis I developed with Celia Lury 
and Jackie Stacey (2000) in Global Nature, Global Culture of what we called 
“the traffic in nature,” and it is a contribution to the “reconfiguration” of kin-
ship (Franklin and McKinnon 2001) and the “remaking of life and death” 
(Franklin and Lock 2003b) in conference- based anthologies developed and 
coedited with Susan McKinnon and Margaret Lock. In places, I have returned 
to themes developed in these and other previous publications, such as the 
concept of “thick genealogies” introduced in Dolly Mixtures (2007) and the 
depiction of ivF as a “hope technology” in Embodied Progress (1997). Some of 
the ideas in this book first took shape in Reproducing Reproduction (Franklin 
and Ragoné 1999) and in Technologies of Procreation (Edwards et al. 1993), as 
well as The Sociology of Gender (1996). In the context of the contemporary 
attention to the development of ivF occasioning the award of the Nobel Prize 
in Physiology or Medicine to Robert Edwards in 2010, the question of how to 
understand its legacies has become more prominent, and Biological Relatives 
is also a contribution to that effort, organized in part as a reprise on my own 
long- standing interest in this technology since the mid- 1980s, and more re-
cently through collaborative work with Martin Johnson and Nick Hopwood 
on the British culture of mammalian developmental biology in the postwar 
period (Johnson et al. 2010).
To the extent that Biological Relatives revisits themes that were first intro-
duced in these earlier, and ongoing, projects, some material will already be 
familiar to some readers, especially where certain problems have been re-
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read and re- presented in order to develop the analysis further. The empha-
sis on close readings of key texts throughout this book is also a reproduc-
tive technology of sorts, manifesting the premise that reproduction is never 
an exact process, and that repetition is itself a generative mechanism. The 
pluricentric thought experiment that grounds this project is reflected in this 
book’s format, which is more like a series of essays than a traditional (or even 
untraditional) ethnographic monograph. As noted in the afterword, a sub-
theme of the generative relations interconnecting practices of rereading and 
re- producing permeates much of the argument presented here, at the level of 
both substance and style.
Chapter 1, “Miracle Babies,” examines ivF as a way of thinking and seeing 
reproduction, as well as of “taking reproductive substance in hand.” It reviews, 
among other things, the emergence of the ivF–stem cell interface in the form 
of a new generation of purpose- built labs in the United Kingdom, and the pub-
lic and parliamentary debate that has accompanied the introduction of a new 
generation of embryonic tools, most recently “human- admixed embryos,” 
legalized in 2010. In addition, this chapter explores the condition of being 
after ivF and attempts to characterize how it has “become genealogical.” The 
embeddedness of the logic of ivF in the pattern set by an earlier Industrial 
Revolution, also begun in the northwest of England, is combined with reread-
ings of both Marx and Foucault that build on those introduced above.
Chapter 2, “Living Tools,” reframes the overall project of Biological Rela-
tives by drawing on the work of Donna Haraway and Shulamith Firestone, as 
well as by visiting one of the new stem cell derivation labs that is annexed to 
an ivF clinic. Here we encounter stem cell science close up as it moves from 
being a still quasi- artisanal craft into a more mechanized and industrialized 
mode of reproduction. We also travel through the hole in the wall, following 
ivF eggs as they are “taken in hand” to become either potential offspring or 
living human tools. Drawing again on Marx’s analysis of machines, this chap-
ter both develops the theoretical models outlined in chapter 1 and introduces 
more empirical material to exemplify the general problems being examined 
in this book.
Chapter 3, “Embryo Pioneers,” contains an episodic tour of some of the 
instructive scenes in the history of experimental embryology that I suggest 
are helpful in appreciating the long lineage of technique that is ancestral to 
human ivF—and to understanding the effort to “mechanize” reproductive 
substance, or “put it to work.” In addition to extending the emphasis on tech-
nique that structures chapter 2, it provides some technical background to the 
birth of human ivF. The aim of this chapter is also to explore the combined 
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use of embryo transfer, artificial fertilization, and tissue culture in the making 
of what has come to be known as the “reproductive frontier” and to further ex-
plore this term. As a result, chapter 3 introduces a consideration of the work 
of the frontier idiom in the context of biology as technology (a theme that 
is developed further in chapter 7). Drawing on many of the historians who 
have addressed this topic far more cogently than I have, including Hannah 
Landecker, Scott Gilbert, and Nick Hopwood, I try to situate the history of 
human ivF in relation to the technological experiments and imaginaries that 
preceded it, conceiving of this exercise as a potted tour of various instrumen-
tal orientations that become relevant in different ways in various other places 
throughout this book.
Chapter 4, “Reproductive Technologies,” contrasts the history of “making 
sex” in the context of experimental embryology and developmental biology 
with the “exact mechanisms” of sex and gender technologies as they began to 
be theorized within feminist debates in the 1980s, and in particular within 
feminist anthropology. This chapter offers close readings of the work of both 
Gayle Rubin and Marilyn Strathern, while also rereading the emergence of 
a model of gender as a technology. The goal of rehearsing such well- trodden 
ground is a “mechanical” comparison between the technologies of kinship, 
gender, and sex, and those discussed in chapter 3—an exercise that activates 
the mosaic, recursive, comparative structure of the book as a means to reflect 
on how ivF “works.” Here, as elsewhere, the effort is not only to reread earlier 
work on kinship and gender in the light of being several decades after the 
birth of the first test- tube baby, but to emphasize how the logics of ivF both 
model and transform the structures of gender and kinship—thus potentially 
enabling us to think differently about their future manifestations.
Chapter 5, “Living ivF,” also revisits a famous feminist history, namely the 
feminist debate over new reproductive technologies in the 1980s. Again, with 
the benefit of so many excellent and insightful accounts of this history avail-
able, this rereading brings a specific question into focus, namely the turn to 
understanding the experience of women undergoing ivF—arguably one of 
the earliest empirical investigations of human reproductive biology as tech-
nology, and of assisted conception as a means of “doing gender” as well as 
“making kinship.” I argue that the early feminist analysis of women’s experi-
ence of ivF deserves to be explored in greater depth—anticipating as it does 
many of the ways in which ambivalent relationships to biological technologies 
have been theorized since the 1980s. This chapter more explicitly engages 
with the ways in which the actual nuts and bolts of ivF parallel feminist ac-
counts of gender and sex as “technologies”—and indeed as reproductive tech-
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nologies. It revisits ivF not only as a technology of living substance, but as a 
biological technology that is lived as “a way of life,” arguing that this pattern 
is now normative in ways that remain more curious than they may initially 
appear.
Importantly, this argument has already been made very elegantly by Charis 
Thompson (2005) in her pivotal study of ivF as a technology of gender, aptly 
titled Making Parents. Drawing on Thompson’s work in chapter 6 (“ivF Live”), 
I explore the question of what ivF is reproducing in addition to, or at times in 
lieu of, biological offspring. This chapter poses another variation of the ques-
tion of what ivF is “after.” How has it become such a popular technological 
convention worldwide, and what kind of new norm is ivF? To explore these 
questions in a somewhat different way, I turn in the second half of chapter 6 
to the role of ivF technology as a sign, an iconic technology that now not only 
remakes biological substance but makes visually explicit a new form of tech-
nological substance as biology. In order to understand not only the logic of ivF 
but its “call” and reach, a visual analysis is offered of the literal window ivF 
technology provides into the remaking of life, by enabling the translation of 
the retooling of reproductive substance into a circulating, public, interfaced, 
mainstream, and iconic image that is now widely and popularly legible as a 
primal (screen) scene of biological relativity.
This book closes in the ethnographic site where it began. Chapter 7, “Fron-
tier Culture,” returns to the hole in the wall, this time from within the acu, 
opposite the lab, where the British artist Gina Glover has inhabited the “lens” 
of ivF as a photographer in residence. Looking through Glover’s images en-
ables the question of ivF as a “way of life” to be expanded into a broader 
question of how biotechnology is composed, domesticated, and familiarized. 
Here, the question of the future of biology is explored more explicitly as the 
future of kinship, and the future of kinship is explored from the point of view 
of how technology itself has become a form of shared reproductive substance. 
This question is once again reframed in this chapter through a consideration 
of technological progress as a frontier, and ivF as a site of both ambivalent 
and embodied progress. Looking back once again at the historical imaginar-
ies that both preceded and engendered it, the question of being after ivF is 
explored both visually and experientially as a site of recrafted identity and 
women’s work.
The overall themes of the book are briefly summarized in the afterword 
by rereading Derrida’s understanding of the relationship between technics 
and life through the lens of ivF. Drawing also on the work of Hannah Arendt, 
the question concerning technology is here posed as one of dialogue: what 
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are the kinds of conversations we might have about the future of technology 
as biology, or the future of biology as technology—or the future of kinship 
in relation to both of these questions? By reviewing the main arguments of 
Biological Relatives in this final section, I make the case for why the history of 
reproduction—and in particular the retooling of reproductive substance in 
the context of ivF—provides an important window onto the ambivalent pro-
cess of remaking life. What resources would we need for the remaking of life 
to become more dialogic in the future? Might ivF be a context in which this 
model of “originary technics” could be productively explored?
By combining an account of the various kinds of mechanisms that are the 
necessary preconditions for a human embryo to become a tool, my overall aim 
is to offer an account of ivF that extends our ability to engage more thought-
fully with the questions posed by the future of bioscience, biomedicine, and 
biotechnology. As set out in this introduction, the aim is to provide a different 
set of starting points for addressing the relation between the technological 
and the biological as one that is lived as the remaking of life. In particular, the 
aim is to challenge the isolating models of technological impact that presume 
what Habermas (1971: 58) has critically described as the automatic model of 
technological progress. By attempting to use models from kinship and gen-
der theory to explore what it means to be after ivF, Biological Relatives pro-
vides an account of ivF and stem cell research that resists approaching these 
phenomena as embedded in a social context, or even as molded or shaped 
by social forces. As is so readily evident in the common phrases “science and 
society” or the “social consequences of technology,” an implicit separation be-
tween the domain of the social and the scientific or technological is difficult 
to avoid. Yet this separation is fundamentally misleading: science and tech-
nology are never outside the social, just as ivF did not invent itself, and stem 
cell lines did not exist before they were cultivated or forced into existence.
Of the many reasons why it has proven difficult to integrate social and sci-
entific, or cultural and material, visual and biological, or textual and physio-
logical perspectives on ivF, one of the most prominent is the difficulty of 
integrating the models of technology that correspond to contexts as diverse 
as embryology, anthropology, historiography, feminist theory, continental 
philosophy, or biopolitics. This problem is compounded by the question of 
what is meant by “technological.” Hence, for example, we might describe 
an automobile or the Internet as a technology, but be less likely to use this 
word to describe a newspaper, a child’s imaginative game, a song, or a din-
ner party. However, on second thought, we can see how all of these cultural 
forms are thoroughly technological—they depend on prior technicity, and 
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we engage them through complex techniques that include not only know- 
how but understandings of who we are, what we can do, and how we want 
to live. Kinship, gaming, and cuisine, not to mention play, child rearing, and 
sharing meals are the outcome of an accumulation of highly skilled practices 
and technical systems, such as language, writing, and cooking, that have been 
developed and passed on for millennia. Indeed, these are some of the oldest 
human technologies, and are often imagined as the technologies that make 
us human.
It might be claimed from this point of view that everything is technologi-
cal. And it is worth asking what our definition of humanity would be if it 
were denaturalized in this way. For one thing, such a thought experiment 
would require that we become both more and less precise in what we mean 
when we use the words “technology,” “technique,” and “tool”—in part by ob-
serving them close at hand, in specific contexts, and also over time, as they 
develop, change, fail, cease to exist, or expand. Techne is the Greek term for 
arts, whereas “technics” is often more narrowly used to describe methods or 
rules. “Technique” is used to describe skilled practices, whereas “technology” 
is often associated either with the application of science, or with systems of 
mechanical techniques, as in the context of industrialization. While we do 
not conventionally associate technology with gender identity or marriage, 
these too are, of course, highly organized activities that rely on prior art. Tech-
nology is derived from the Greek word tekhnologia—systematic knowledge of 
the arts, including both manual arts and skills and knowledge practices. From 
an anthropological point of view, all of human culture is composed of tech-
nics, techniques, and technologies—a marriage ceremony is no less techno-
logical than a windmill.
One reason, however, that it is not conventional to interpret marriage as 
a technology is that it is not seen as the application of science so much as an 
automatic reaction to the natural facts of reproductive biology, in essence 
merely socializing them as identity, ritual, and natural fact. In vitro fertiliza-
tion is used as a case study in this book to explore not only what it means for 
an embryo to become a biological tool, or for our understanding of technology 
to become “more biological,” but for these two perspectives to be combined in 
the form of a thought experiment through which our understandings of both 
biology and technology are both deepened and reconfigured. I argue that ivF 
reveals our biological relativity in the form of a technology employed to cre-
ate biological relatives, thus changing how we understand the adjective “bio-
logical.” Through ivF technology, reproduction becomes relatively biologi-
cal—indeed, the contingency of biology achieved through the technique of 
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ivF is its raison d’être: “failed” biology can be made to work, or repaired, by 
being “taken in hand.” The origin of ivF lies precisely in the effort to mecha-
nize biological substance, while this impetus has also been described as the 
origin of kinship—commonly interpreted as the effort to organize, facilitate, 
and activate human reproductivity, and also commonly presumed to be one of 
the oldest and “elementary” human technologies. So in another sense, these 
two technologies—ivF and kinship—are already biologically related. They 
not only share the same form but serve the same purpose: they are kindred 
technologies in the making of kin and the kinding of life. The point of this 
book is to explore this connection—one that ivF makes highly explicit, but in 
such a densely compacted form as to appear at once miraculous and ordinary, 
recognizable and unfamiliar, routine and exceptional—a curious new norm 
of civilized existence. These paradoxes are among many that make ivF “good 
to think with” anthropologically. The project of this book is to do just that. If 
it is successful, neither biology nor technology will look quite the same again 
after we have reexamined them through the looking glass of ivF, and the curi-
ouser and curiouser window its transfer “into man” has opened.

one miracle Babies
When I began my PhD research on ivF in 1986, I could not have imagined 
that a quarter of a century later I would still be writing about this technology, 
nor that I would be witnessing a whole- scale redefinition of biology as tech-
nology for which ivF provides one of the most well- known case studies. Yet 
the transformation expressed in the title of bioeconomics consultant Rob 
Carlson’s (2010) book Biology Is Technology could be described as a direct 
translation of the logic of ivF and its role as a foundational model for the 
biosociety. Since the mid- 1980s when I was a graduate student researching 
ivF in Birmingham—the second- largest city in Britain—the ivF procedure 
has rapidly evolved from what was then still known as the “test- tube baby” 
method into a major global platform for the health sector and emergent bio-
industries. Now defined as a reproductive biotechnology, ivF was a pioneer-
ing technique inaugurating what Edward Yoxen calls “the change in our rela-
tion to nature that biotechnology embodies” (1986: 9) despite the fact that he, 
like many other early commentators on the late twentieth- century explosion 
of the biosciences, was largely concerned with the field of molecular genetics.
The crucial importance of reproductive technologies to an understand-
ing of biology as technology, now defined as much through cellular as ge-
netic models, is due not only to the fact that ivF has expanded dramatically 
in both its scale and scope, becoming a platform, or stem technology, for 
myriad human and animal applications, from fertility treatment and livestock 
improvement to genetic screening and the production of cloned cell lines. 
In vitro fertilization is distinctive because this technology, and the model of 
reproduction it relies upon, have become ubiquitous and commonsensical. 
Unlike the Human Genome Project, ivF did not derive its celebrity from high- 
profile molecular genetic innovations such as polymerase chain reaction or 
gene- sequencing robotics, but from the narratives and hopes of couples seek-
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ing children—indeed from a technology that quickly became a new norm of 
family life. In addition to establishing a new method of sexual reproduction, 
and a powerful new window into the mechanisms of biological development, 
ivF has played a leading role in the establishment of new technologies of 
remaking life as a normal, familiar, and even naturalized part of human re-
production. Indeed, ivF is arguably the preeminent example of how a living 
human tool—a cultured ex vivo embryo—has substantialized an ordinary 
and intimate understanding of biology as technology. We could simply say 
that after ivF we had a new kind of biological kinship with technology.
Ironically, what has disguised the more radical implications of ivF’s rapid 
routinization is precisely the fact that it establishes a biological relation: ivF 
is a technology that substantializes scientific progress in the form of biologi-
cal parenthood. Carlson’s (2010) book does not mention ivF, or even repro-
duction. And yet the transformation from which he derives his title is rooted 
in the technologization of reproductive substance, and in particular the effort 
to take the regenerative and productive powers of reproduction “in hand.” As 
noted earlier, reproduction has been almost entirely absent from the study 
of economics, technology, and political philosophy, so in some ways it is not 
surprising that it is also absent from many discussions of biotechnology. Even 
within sociology and anthropology, reproduction has largely been treated as 
a self- evident domain of natural fact—or, as Annette Weiner (1978) described 
it, “mere biology.” Feminist scholars have done the most to analyze the social 
organization of biological reproduction, in particular as it is shaped through 
the division of labor and political economy. These are what can also be de-
scribed as technologies of gender and sex.
Today, ivF is a kind of matrix uniting these different technologies, and 
transforming them, while also doing so in a context that is highly publicly 
celebrated and acclaimed. One reason it is no longer possible to envisage re-
production as “mere biology” is because if matters were so simple ivF would 
not be necessary. In vitro fertilization exists because mere biology is not 
enough: in the context of ivF the phrase becomes nonsensical.1 This is an-
other way to describe the transformation in meanings and perceptions of the 
biological that ivF models as a “working up” of biological substance, and thus 
as both a tool- sign, and a “culture medium,” manifest as a new technology of 
sex. In vitro fertilization is one of the most prominent and highly publicized 
examples of how biology has become increasingly technologized through two 
processes that are essentially interlinked. On the one hand, biological mecha-
nisms have been broken down into cellular and biochemical components and 
replicated technologically in vitro—which is the process ivF performs, or 
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stages. Indeed, clinical ivF confirms the viability of this synthetic trajectory 
“in man”: it produces human offspring as its “proof” who embody its artifice. 
On the other hand, ivF also functions as a means of substantializing biology 
as technology—bringing into being a new human reproductive mechanism, 
which has since become established as a desirable and legitimate social norm. 
In vitro fertilization thus models what it means to claim that biology is tech-
nology not only by providing a working model, or model system, but through 
its rapid evolution into an established form of parenthood. The profoundly 
intimate artifice of ivF, now a standard medical procedure, confirms the via-
bility of a new technological ground state, or norm, of human existence and 
renewal. After ivF, in the context of new reproductive technologies, repro-
duction has become a matter of technique, and mere biology has become an 
oxymoron.
This is not the argument being made by Robert Carlson (2010: 1) in Biology 
Is Technology, in which he claims that “biology is the oldest technology” and 
that even cells are essentially technological. Carlson’s concern with the “ex-
plicit ‘hands- on’ molecular manipulation of genomes” and their implications 
for “the human condition” (4–5) makes no reference to human reproduc-
tive technologies at all. However, the importance of ivF as a template for the 
transformation Carlson describes has been noted by other, similarly minded 
biotechnology commentators such as the eco- futurist Stewart Brand. Indeed, 
for Brand (2010) it is assisted conception that most powerfully confirms the 
link between the old and new version of biology as technology precisely be-
cause ivF has grounded their union in family life. In vitro fertilization, Brand 
argues, has made the connection between new and old models of biology as 
technology more familiar, ordinary, and normal—indeed, “ivF is the big ex-
ample” of this transformation, he claims. “I remember when [ivF] was an 
abomination in the face of God’s will. As soon as people met a few of the chil-
dren, they realised that they were just as good as the ‘regular’ ones” (quoted 
in Honigman 2010).
The implication of Brand’s claim is that the reason ivF offspring are “just 
as good” as the so- called regular ones is because they are just like them. And 
of course, as anyone who has met an ivF child can easily testify, they are in-
deed just like the regular ones. But here again we reencounter the ivF para-
dox—since it is at once just like the real thing, and also not. In fact, ivF is not 
at all like regular conception—as anyone who has undergone it can confirm. 
This part of the condition of being after ivF—the way in which the expression 
“biology is technology” can be experienced as both familiar and strange—is 
also a ground state, or social norm, of being after ivF that remains to be fully 
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characterized. In contrast to the analogies employed by Carlson (2010: 47) 
to equate basic cellular functionality with synthetic biology, and the “short 
dna handles” used to redesign biological components with unassisted cellu-
lar signaling, the concept of “biological relativity” describes something else, 
namely what is not only similar, but also different, about biology that has been 
“handled.” In vitro fertilization is the “big example” not only of how this trans-
formation has become more “regular,” but, equally important, how it has not. 
It is to the two sides of this process that “biological relativity” refers—a prob-
lematic for which I suggest ivF is indeed the big example, despite rarely being 
mentioned in the context of most debates about new biotechnologies, and for 
reasons that are somewhat different from those cited by Brand.2
These two sides of ivF are the source of its ambivalence, and thus of its 
complexity. Within the expression “biology is technology” lie both a meta-
phoric equation and an assertion that this equation is beyond metaphoric. 
This is a double message that ivF repeats in its promise of delivering chil-
dren who are “just like” other offspring, but through a process of mimicry 
that is not quite the same as the original process on which it based. This am-
bivalence of mimicry lies at the heart of the paradox ivF presents, and is the 
source of the biological relativity this technique substantializes as both norm 
and novelty, and thus as both a confirmation of the norms it relies upon and 
a disruption to their authority and authenticity.3
When I was a PhD student in Birmingham researching ivF, I was not 
alone in failing to predict, or even to imagine, that within the space of a 
single human generation approximately five million miracle babies would be 
born worldwide from this technique, nor that ivF would be responsible for 
as much as 5 percent of the birthrate in some countries. I could not have 
known then that its own technological offspring would greatly amplify the 
historical importance of this technique’s success “in man,” while making its 
social or anthropological significance even harder to interpret. The transfor-
mations in understandings of heredity, development, and reproduction that 
have  accompanied the rapid worldwide spread of ivF in the postwar period 
have become so taken for granted that it can be difficult even to point them 
out. This is why it is important to emphasize that this process of transforma-
tion is not only obvious, but also curious, and in ways that deserve much fuller 
exploration.
In order to examine how being after ivF has become both more regular 
and curiouser, this chapter considers the emergence of ivF in the double 
sense of “genealogical.” It considers how we inherit the effects of routine ivF 
in direct, or proximate, historical time, while also analyzing how its logics 
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have been regularized in the Foucauldian sense of tracking the sedimenta-
tion of new norms.4 From these two points of view, the emergence of ivF can 
be analyzed as a continuous but dialectical history of biotechnical innovation 
that derives from deliberate human intentions, and responds to specific de-
sires and hopes, while simultaneously transforming the terms through which 
new aspirations are imagined, and changing the meaning of the biological 
connections such interventions are aimed to make, alter, or improve. This is 
the process the concept of biological relativity is designed to characterize by 
charting both the ambivalent genealogies of ivF and the normative paradox 
they continue to reproduce.
Revisiting iVF
The award of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine to Robert Edwards 
in 2010 offered a very public occasion to revisit the recent present of ivF, and 
to reflect on its significance. According to the press release from the Nobel 
Assembly at the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm, the award recognized 
Edwards’s contribution to the development of ivF for the treatment of infer-
tility. As Dr. Ruth Edwards described the prize at the award ceremony that her 
husband was too unwell to attend: “The award was given for the successful de-
velopment of techniques by which human oocytes were fertilized in vitro and 
then successfully returned to the mother’s womb.” And as Professor Martin 
Johnson, one of Edwards’s first PhD students and his long- standing Cam-
bridge colleague, noted in his Nobel lecture describing Edwards’s achieve-
ments (Johnson 2010), the development of these techniques required an 
unusually interdisciplinary tool kit, reflecting both Edwards’s wide- ranging 
scientific interests and his itinerant career path.5
As Johnson relates in his lecture, Robert Edwards was born into a working- 
class family in Batley, Yorkshire, to parents who worked in traditional north-
ern industrial occupations—his father on the Settle- to- Carlisle railway and 
his mother in a manufacturing mill (Johnson 2010, 2011). During the period 
Edwards received his secondary education, the family resided in his mother’s 
home town of Manchester—famously the birthplace of the Industrial Revolu-
tion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, due to the rich crossbreeding 
between agriculture, engineering, mercantile innovation, and trade, served 
by a dense transportation infrastructure comprising roads, canals, shipping 
ports, and railways. These influences strongly shaped Edwards’s own biogra-
phy, spending summers as he did on Yorkshire farms in the Dales, near his 
father’s engineering works, where he developed an early interest in the me-
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chanics of animal reproduction. Following a period in the army during World 
War II, Edwards initially pursued agricultural studies at Bangor University in 
Wales, followed by a PhD from the Animal Genetics Institute in Edinburgh, 
where the director, Conrad Hal Waddington, had cultivated an exceptionally 
vibrant and creative research culture combining developmental biology with 
modern genetics.
It was from a background of basic research in mammalian reproductive 
systems (Edwards’s model organism, like that of many of his British contem-
poraries, was the mouse), mixed with an unusual (for the early 1950s) amount 
of genetic science, that the basic problems of mammalian ivF were initially 
envisaged by Edwards midcentury. Human ivF was not his initial focus, al-
though technical means of manipulating fertilized mammalian eggs in order 
to evaluate, and alter, their genetic capacities were the subject of Edwards’s 
PhD dissertation. By his own account, the road to human ivF was “bumpy” 
(Edwards 2001)—and Edwards has written extensively, and often personally, 
on this history, including its ethical dimensions, in numerous publications 
throughout his career (Edwards 1989; and see Johnson 2011). From these ac-
counts, and the work of many other scholars on the history of reproductive 
biomedicine, it is evident that the turn to human clinical ivF was neither 
straightforward in its aims nor simple in its origin. As with all successful 
scientific projects, the road to ivF was built using tools that had been devel-
oped over centuries, by generations of investigators, across a wide range of 
disciplines, and with disparate practical and theoretical goals in mind. Like 
other frontiers, the landscape in which human ivF was pioneered was shaped 
by broad historical forces, such as international concern about population 
growth, as well as distinctive local and regional circumstances, including the 
comparative freedom Patrick Steptoe enjoyed as a provincial consultant in a 
small northern hospital (Pfeffer 1993). Like other transformative technologi-
cal innovations before it, the lengthy history of ivF tells us a great deal about 
what we can expect from its future.
the iVF Platform
Over the course of its development through invertebrates to amphibians, 
reptiles, fish, and eventually mammals, the ivF technique gradually evolved 
from an experimental scientific method into a variety of clinical and agricul-
tural applications.6 In the 1960s mouse ivF was used to create new models of 
early mammalian development for research purposes, including mosaics, chi-
meras, and hybrids. In the 1970s it took its now- famous human turn into clini-
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cal applications. In the 1980s it produced a new generation of miracle babies 
and the embryo transfer industry in livestock, while in the 1990s it provided 
the basic platform for transgenesis, cell reprogramming, and the cloning of 
Dolly the sheep. In the twenty- first century, ivF has provided the core tech-
niques for the creation of savior siblings, admixed human chimeras, and new 
cellular tools, such as induced pluripotent stem cells. In sum, for more than 
a century ivF has been the crucible for new means of reconstructing repro-
duction, manipulating development, and retooling embryology (figure 1.1). 
Since its successful clinical translation in 1978, ivF has continued to undergo 
a rapid evolution as a technological platform, yielding newer mechanisms to 
facilitate human reproduction, such as aneuploidy screening, as well as new 
means of harnessing the regenerative properties of embryos, such as stem 
cell derivation.





FigurE 1.1. Schematic illustration of the expansion of the ivF platform as it  
becomes the base, or stem technology, for a range of other human applications 
including preimplantation genetic diagnosis (pgd), somatic cell nuclear transfer, 
human embryonic stem cell derivation, and regenerative medicine. In vitro 
fertilization has also been used in agricultural applications, and basic scientific 
research on mammalian development and reproductive biology. Author’s diagram.
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the ease of cryopreservation, storage, and transport of fertilized eggs, em-
bryos, and blastocysts, has facilitated the mining of cellular plasticity, link-
ing ivF to the futures of tissue engineering and regenerative medicine. Now 
a crucial vector for these emergent bioindustries, clinical ivF generates a 
supply of research embryos in the same way this technique was used in the 
1950s to generate model “dish” systems to explore the basic mechanisms of 
mammalian conception, heredity, and development. Without ivF, human em-
bryonic stem cell (hES) research would be impossible, and basic cellular pro-
cesses, such as regulation and transcription, could not be studied (“in man”) 
during the crucial early embryonic stages of development when they are most 
accessible experimentally (in vitro). These biotranslational fields are, like ivF, 
driven not only by research priorities but by economics. Retaining a lead at 
the bioknowledge horizons of new human cell- based applications is a major 
economic priority of governments around the world, as well as an expanding 
market for large and small corporate enterprises. This too is how the legacy of 
ivF is translated into new kinds of biological relations—such as our connec-
tions to the now- vast standing reserve of carefully banked and stewarded bio-
materials and soon- to- be- marketed bioproducts on the much- vaunted hori-
zon of biotherapies designed to repair everything from macular degeneration 
to global warming. Some of these products are “purely” human; others are 
from every species imaginable, but most of them are of mixed genealogical 
and technological ancestry, and they are all forms of what Latour and Woolgar 
(1979) have named “laboratory life.”
tools in the age of machines
The question of how these new living technologies have come into being 
is a central question of this book, as is the question of how they coevolve 
with each other, as well as with their makers and their milieux. An obvious 
comparison for addressing the “reproductive revolution” that began in Man-
chester in 1978, and one that was invoked by the film and theater director 
Danny Boyle in the opening ceremony to the 2012 Olympics in London, is 
the earlier Industrial Revolution that also began in the northwest of England 
two centuries before the birth of Louise Brown, where tools were also power-
ful signs as well as means. On trend, as ever, Boyle’s highly praised didactic 
parable transformed machinery into legacy, and the eruption of industrial 
technology into a source of rebirth, symbolized by a giant baby surrounded 
by National Health Service workers. Crucial to his vision was the steam en-
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gine’s enduring popularity as an iconic technology. On a morning off from 
writing this chapter, in the spring of 2011, I visited London’s cavernous Sci-
ence Museum on Exhibition Road to see a new exhibit featuring a reconstruc-
tion of James Watt’s eighteenth- century engineering workshop. Watt (1736–
1819) was the mechanical engineer who worked with Matthew Boulton in the 
Soho Foundry in Birmingham to make fundamental improvements to one of 
the most influential species of machine ever invented (Watt’s high- pressure 
steam engine was patented in 1769). To follow the spreading paths of these 
engines on a map of Britain is to watch the Industrial Revolution unfold and 
to observe its circulatory system, connecting mines to mechanical workshops, 
manufacturing mills to waterways, and later animating the crucial railway and 
shipping systems. Watt, originally trained as an instrument maker, greatly in-
creased the efficiency of steam engines by doubling their piston action, for 
which timely ingenuity he is widely hailed as one of the heroes of the Indus-
trial Revolution.7
Among the 8,434 items assembled at the Science Museum for the Watt ex-
hibit are the ten instruments he took when he left home at the age of eighteen 
for his first apprenticeship in London. These include a hand plane, two saws, 
a former, two files, and four chisels. As if in testament to the technological 
fecundity of this period in mechanical history, this original font of hand tools 
is now situated at the center of a sprawling network of kindred instruments, 
including everything from reconstructed industrial giants such as “Old Bess,” 
the vast pumping engine that looms overhead, to the finely wrought coin- 
minting collar for stamping pennies, and the obscure collection of punches, 
counters, molds, dyes, condensers, and scale models, now displayed as hand-
made testimonials to the dawn of the machine age.
Of course, it was not only tools that made tools, or indeed machines, 
money, or models in Watt’s workshop. As the British industrial historian 
L. T. C. Rolt (1967) records in his account of the rapid mechanical progress 
that defined the “age of the machine,” Watt and Boulton’s workshop “attracted 
a galaxy of talent” including numerous energetic polymaths such as Erasmus 
Darwin, Joseph Banks, William Hershel, Joseph Priestley, Josiah Wedgewood, 
and Samuel Galton. Meeting on full- moon nights, in order to make their 
travel more efficient, these members of the Lunar Circle (or as they called 
themselves, the Lunarticks) belonged to an informal learned society based in 
Birmingham, often meeting at each other’s houses to exchange ideas. “In this 
way,” claims Rolt, “minds trained in the study, the laboratory, the business 
office, and the engineer’s workshop met and pooled their knowledge to their 
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mutual profit” (1967: 10). Out of this “rich ferment,” he claims, “the modern 
world was born,” adding that it was no coincidence that this society was me-
chanical in origin, given that “the most ingenious invention must be stillborn 
unless the tools and the techniques are available to make it” (10).
This was, after all, the era in which mechanical progress appeared to mark 
a watershed in the history of technology, during which tools and machines 
appeared to acquire a life of their own.8 It was also an age of mixed emotions 
toward new tools, new tool- making techniques, new machines, and the corre-
sponding transformation of human society—epitomized by the rapid growth 
of cities such as Birmingham and Manchester. By 1861, forty years after Watt’s 
death, William Fairburn, speaking at a meeting of the British Association in 
Manchester, could describe the evolution from hand tool to “self- acting ma-
chine tool” as complete:
When I first entered this city the whole of the machinery was executed 
by hand. There were neither planing, slotting nor shaping machines; 
and, with the exception of very imperfect lathes and a few drills, the 
preparatory operations of construction were effected entirely by the 
hands of the workmen. Now, everything is done by machine tools with 
a degree of accuracy which the unaided hand could never accomplish. 
The automaton or self- acting machine tool has within itself an almost 
creative power; in fact, so great are its powers of adaptation that there 
is no operation of the human hand that it does not imitate. (in Rolt 
1967: 13)
The depiction in this passage of the “creative power” of the “self- acting ma-
chine tool” is echoed in more explicitly evolutionary language by Karl Marx 
in the Economic Manuscripts of 1861, written in the same year as Fairburn’s 
speech, and indeed in the same city. Tellingly, as The Origin of Species had 
been published only shortly before, in 1859, Marx cites Darwin at the outset 
of his analysis of the mechanical workshop, introducing natural selection as 
an analogy for the evolution of tools and machines:
By a low level of organization I mean a low degree of differentiation of the 
organs for different particular operations; for as long as one and the same 
organ has to perform diversified work the reason for its variability may 
probably be seen in the fact that natural selection preserves or sup-
presses every little deviation of form less carefully than when the organ 
has to serve for one special purpose alone. In the same way that knives in-
tended to cut all kinds of things may be of more or less the same shape, 
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whilst a tool intended solely for some particular use must have a differ-
ent shape for every particular use. (Darwin [On the Origin of Species by 
Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the 
Struggle for Life, London, 1859, 149], cited in mEcw, Vol. 33: 387, origi-
nal emphasis)9
Marx is evoking several analogies here to explain what he, like Fairburn, de-
scribes as the “interposition” between machine and hand that defines indus-
trialism, and the vast network of “self- acting” machines and tools that took 
on the Spencerian qualities of a social organism. In his writings on technolo-
gies, the evolution of the hand tool to become part of the machine (one of 
its organs, as it were) is crucial to Marx’s model not only of machines and 
manufacturing, but of the division of labor in society. The two crucial pro-
cesses for which Marx relies on Darwin’s model of natural selection in this 
section are specialization and differentiation, thus implying that part of the 
“creative power” of machines is their capacity to evolve. Although like Rolt, 
Marx was concerned with how machines evolve, it was not his argument that 
machines made history, nor even that men like Watt invented better steam 
engines, but that history molded the machinery and the mechanic together 
with their milieu.
Marx’s emphasis on specialization and differentiation in the “organs” of 
machinery corresponds to his description of the Industrial Revolution as oc-
curring in two primary phases. The pivot of this analysis is the relation be-
tween machine and human “organs,” and in the first instance between ma-
chine and hand. Thus in the first stage, there is a “conversion of movement”: 
the hand’s power, and even its grip, is assumed by the machine, much the way 
a handheld tool can be given a longer handle to gain greater leverage. “The 
industrial revolution first affects the part of the machine which does the work. 
The motive force here is at first still man himself. But operations such as 
previously needed the virtuoso to play upon the instrument, are now brought 
about by the conversion of the movement directly effected by the simplest me-
chanical impulse (turning the crank, treading the wheel) of human origin into 
the refined movements of a working machine” (mEcw, Vol. 33: 390, empha-
sis added). For Marx, the introduction of the “working machine” itself does 
not necessarily comprise a revolutionary change—because its principles are 
evident in the very oldest technologies, such as weaving or hand milling. In-
deed, in his view, it is the simple harnessing of movement to tools that com-
prises “the first great industrial revolution”: “From the moment when direct 
human participation in production was reduced to the provision of simple 
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power, the principle of work by machinery was given. The mechanism was 
there; the motive force itself could later be replaced by water, steam, etc.” 
(mEcw, Vol. 33: 390).
This first (mechanical) revolution, which belongs to antiquity as much as 
the present, is greatly superseded in importance, Marx claims, by the second 
(motive power)—a truly revolutionary transformation that can be summed 
up in the simple word “steam.”10 After this first great industrial revolution, 
whereby the hands doing the work were replaced by the (mechanical) action 
of the tool (which replicates the work of hands), but humans (or animals) 
still supplied the “simple power,” the employment of the steam engine as a 
machine for producing movement was the second revolution—producing a 
power source that was no longer anthropomorphic in any way. Characteristi-
cally, as in his work on both agriculture and finance, scale is the crucial factor 
for Marx. The second great revolution, in his view, was one not of kind but of 
degree. It was the steam engine that could enable not one knife but a thou-
sand knives to function in a specialized manner simultaneously, thus amplify-
ing one worker into a thousand hands. The machine that made superior prod-
ucts, more efficiently, at lower cost, and in less time was almost inevitably 
(and still today often indirectly) driven by steam.
Thus, although Marx would agree with Rolt, and with all of those who de-
scribe Watt as the hero of the Industrial Revolution (figure 1.2), by pointing 
to steam power as the preeminent industrial force ushering in the modern 
technological era, he adds a crucial element to the heroic histories that posit 
either mechanical engineering or mechanical genius as the driving force of 
social change. For Marx, it is very much the other way around, for it is the 
social technology of the division of labor associated with capitalist production 
that is necessary for the machine age to be born, and with it a new form of 
social evolution driven by the historical dialectic of humans and “self- acting” 
machines.
Marx argues his points most explicitly concerning human- tool- machine 
relations in his notes on the evolution of the mechanics workshop, which later 
become part of chapter 15 of Volume 1 of Capital. Using the direct analogy to 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection cited above, Marx argues that in earlier 
periods of human history the differentiation and specialization of tools and 
techniques arose “spontaneously” through direct experience of using them, 
and “without any need for a prior insight into the laws of mechanics” (just as 
Darwin argues organs “naturally” evolve in response to specific adaptations), 
so that the evolution of tools was essentially unified with the division of labor. 
As ever, his preferred example is of mills and milling, which are gradually im-
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proved across millennia, and comprise a classic example of specialized labor 
“combined” with specialized tools and “spontaneously” adapted to a specific 
milieu. The turning point in this process—its axis—is not mechanical, ac-
cording to Marx, but historical, in the form of the great economic transforma-
tion to the capitalist mode of production and accumulation. It was, he argues, 
again a change of scale that supplies the driving transformational force: “[It 
was] only after the manufacture of commodities by machinery had attained 
a certain extent [that] the need to produce the machinery itself by machines 
[made] itself felt” (mEcw, Vol. 33: 390).
From this point of view, it is not so much the interposition of the hand 
and tool that is crucial for Marx but a new scale of motive power driving an 
increasingly specialized and differentiated machine apparatus that enables 
a new form of production—industrial capitalism. This occurs, according 
to Marx, by the replacement of the hand, tool, and worker by machines—
linked to a more efficient (better adapted) system of production on a new 
scale powered by engines (such as Watt’s). These new engines are grouped 
together in such a way as to produce enormous and continuous power—a 
power that is superhuman—which is in turn mechanically organized to en-
able continuous and superior factory production of commodities. Coinci-
FigurE 1.2. Matthew Boulton and James Watt are paired on the back of the British 
fifty- pound note, where Watt is accompanied by the caption “I can think of nothing 
else but this machine.”
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dent with colonization and the opening up of world markets, it is the result-
ing commodity economy and its new division of labor—not only between 
workers and owners, but between machines and tools—that marks a defini-
tive historical change. Marx describes this as the birth of the “automatic work-
shop,” which becomes the centerpiece of production, driven by a “great prime 
mover” such as a “reunion” of Watt’s double- action engines. “Here we have 
the correct view” of the machine- tool relation, argues Marx: “The tools with 
which the human being worked reappear in the machinery, but now they 
are the tools with which the machine works. Its mechanism brings about the 
movement of the tools (previously performed by the human being) required 
to treat the material in the manner desired or to accomplish the purpose 
desired. It is no longer the human being but a mechanism made by human 
beings, which handles the tools. And the human being supervises the action, 
corrects accidental errors, etc.” (mEcw, Vol. 33: 431).11 As later commentators 
have noted, such as the philosopher of technology Bernard Stiegler (1998), 
although Marx is critical of the technological determinism that equates steam 
power with historical progress, he nonetheless provides a compelling and em-
pirically persuasive account of the evolution of technology driven by steam. 
Precisely in order to chart the social consequences of technological change 
(while always seeking to argue these were the result not of manifest destiny 
but of commodity fetishism), Marx sought to locate, identify, and character-
ize the exact mechanisms by which machines coevolved with each other his-
torically. How these machines evolved “hand in hand” with the divisions of 
labor, and how their specialization and differentiation in turn reshaped the 
laboring and owning classes alike, were the focus of Marx’s effort to produce 
a new theory of  technology.
the age of Biology
Marx’s observations take on many new dimensions in “the age of biology,” in 
which a defining feature of human tool use is the increasing prominence of 
biological entities, such as embryos, which are, as we shall see throughout 
this book, hand tools that are already in the process of amplification and con-
version into cell- based production systems (mechanics) capable of harness-
ing new forms of biological potential (“motive power”). Made by hand in the 
craftsman- like interiors of specialist workshops, and supported by congeries 
of national legislation, public and private investment, and financial specu-
lation similar to those that were required to encourage an expanding com-
modity economy in the nineteenth century, the carefully derived and pas-
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saged human stem cell colony is today, like ivF, a bridge to a new life, a hope 
technology, a symbol, and a new kind of mechanism or device of bioindus-
trialization. These cell constructs not only model biological processes, en-
abling them to be taken in hand, harnessed, explored, or rebuilt, but manifest 
what Charis Thompson (2005) has described as the promissory future of bio-
capitalism. Thompson argues that this future will be organized around repro-
duction as “the predominant focus of value”:
Social theorists typically focus on production, whether in the service of 
the state or the market or both, to understand the social order and the 
motors of history. Even social anthropologists, who have made kinship 
central to their understandings of societies’ economies, have theorized 
kinship as a system of production and exchange rather than of repro-
duction. Critics have pointed out that production also involves repro-
duction. For example, the Marxist tradition . . . has been excoriated by 
feminists for ignoring the labor of reproduction and the reproduction of 
labor. . . . In economies and social worlds that are organized around cer-
tain biomedical conditions, including arts, I suggest that reproduction 
is becoming the predominant focus of value, exchange, emancipation, 
and oppression. (2005: 252)
Like previous machine- tool- human relations, the cell construct in the em-
bryology lab is brought into being through complex divisions of labor, which 
are variously professional, international, sexual, and now also reproductive. 
Indeed, to the extent that ivF makes visible a new reproductive division of 
labor, it is an overdue complement to Marxist approaches, in which both re-
productive labor and reproductive substance are famously undertheorized. 
The meaning of “the labor of reproduction and the reproduction of labor” 
have today taken on new dimensions, as have the implications of Marx’s em-
phasis on scale and mechanization.
Thompson’s model of “the biotech mode of (re)production” responds to 
a growing sense of the need to acknowledge the changing meanings of capi-
tal, production, labor, value, and distribution in the context of biotechnology 
shared by many scholars—but her account is particularly relevant to the an-
nexation of the assisted conception workshop to the larger scene of biotech-
nical innovation in the life sciences.12 The importance of a specifically repro-
ductive model to the project of theorizing biocapital is a theme Margaret Lock 
and I explored in our coedited volume Remaking Life and Death, in which we 
suggested that the mode of generating reproduction not only as labor, but as 
value, “is driven by a form of extraction that involves isolating and mobilizing 
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the primary reproductive agency of specific body parts, particularly cells, in 
a manner not dissimilar to that by which, as Marx described it, soil plays the 
‘principal’ role in agriculture” (Franklin and Lock 2003b: 8).
As Lock and I emphasized in our description of what an anthropological 
approach to such shifts in the meaning of reproduction might involve, “it 
is inadequate to speak about changes or transformations simply in terms of 
their following ‘after’ developments in biotechnology and the biosciences” or 
to “bookmark a space for dealing with the consequences of this technology 
[as if] society and sociality [are] after the fact of technological innovation” 
(Franklin and Lock 2003b: 4). In order, then, to ensure we do not fall into 
the habit of representing “technological innovation as the root of scientific 
progress” but instead “emphasize ways in which technology is socially in-
formed and demonstrate how specifically desired ends are built into the 
knowledge and techniques associated with biomedicine, the biosciences, 
and biotechnology” (4–5), it is necessary to turn, as Marx did, to the social 
forces shaping the composition of technological assemblages, and the struc-
tural forms determining not only the division of labor but the principles and 
values that are often (mistakenly) imagined to inhere “automatically” in such 
forms.13 We thus need to turn to a different division of labor, which rests pre-
cisely on such an unexamined principle of value, namely that of sex. As we 
shall see, the effort to extract reproductive value from sex in the context of 
biotechnology has an exact precursor in the presumption of sex as principled, 
or divided, along the lines of its corresponding reproductive outcome—a for-
mulation that relies in the first instance upon the presumption of an auto-
matic sexual mechanism (that is reproductive), to which the social order is a 
response. In the following section, then, it is useful to introduce a counter-
point to this perspective in the form of the proposal that sex itself is not so 
much automatic as organized. I pick up this theme in much more depth in 
chapter 4, but begin by turning briefly to it here.
technologies of Sex
The loss of sexual decency and propriety (and thus polarity) among the 
working poor, and the converse accentuation of femininity (the “cult of true 
womanhood”) to disguise the labor of social reproduction among the bour-
geois elite described by Marx in his account of nineteenth- century industrial 
society give a backhanded acknowledgment of industrial capitalism’s depen-
dence on what are now called technologies of gender or technologies of sex. 
But neither Marx nor Engels investigated this machinery in anything like the 
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detail provided for other instruments of capitalism, including the division 
of labor by class. Both Marx’s passing references to gender roles as a mark 
of class distinctions in Capital and Engels’s more elaborate reconstruction of 
“the world historic defeat of the female sex” as a result of the discovery of 
physical paternity ([1884] 2010) root the origins of the sexual division of labor 
in a naturalized reproductive—or biologically automatic—one. Reproduc-
tion, in sum, is the prior naturalized basis from which the principle of sexual 
division in society is presumed to have arisen “automatically.”
Yet throughout their discussions of both agriculture and livestock produc-
tion both Marx and Engels imply a more complex relation between the sexual 
division of labor and sexual reproduction: that is, they imply that sex was 
“worked” or even “made,” and to a certain degree, then, that fertility is a prod-
uct or even a sign. Darwin (1874) also theorized this sexual work of reproduc-
tion explicitly in his lengthy discussion of sexual selection in The Descent of 
Man, in which he argues that courtship work is as important as adaptation to 
the mechanics of natural selection.14 However, the machinery of gender and 
sex necessary to the production of either fertility or successful reproduction 
awaited more explicit theorization in the work of later, largely feminist, au-
thors (as we shall see in subsequent chapters). As noted in the introduction, 
the advent of not only assisted conception but the larger effort to mechanize 
reproductive substance associated with biotechnology is an effort that more 
explicitly reveals the relationship of both sex to reproduction, and reproduc-
tion to sex, as contingent and partial—indeed as variable and plastic, and thus 
significantly capable of being reworked, reengineered, and indeed remade.
It is, for example, precisely the “reengineerable” dimensions of the sexual 
division of labor, fertility, and reproduction in the nineteenth century that are 
the objects of Foucault’s account of the history of sexuality, which is among 
the first efforts to divorce sexuality from biological reproduction—and to ex-
plicitly theorize sex as a technology. Whereas for Marx and Engels, following 
Morgan, the evolution of modern society could be tracked through distinc-
tive stages identified with progressively evolving structures of kinship and 
marriage, this model is rejected by Foucault, who postulates for “the modern 
forms of society” a set of sexual arrangements that is “not governed by repro-
duction,” but is manifest instead as “an intensification of the body—with its 
exploitation as an object of knowledge and an element in relations of power” 
(1990: 107, emphasis added). This new apparatus for the production of sex 
did not replace the older system based on kinship and alliance, argues Fou-
cault, but, rather like the changed relationship of machine and tool described 
by Marx, it adds a crucially transformative layer to them. Foucault describes 
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this interposition as a new apparatus or machinery—namely a specific “tech-
nology of sex.”
Foucault argues that in the nineteenth century a new technology of sex—
what he calls sexuality—does not so much displace the “relations of sex” 
established through marriage and kinship rules as alter its mechanisms by 
adding new ones. Specifically, he claims that the “new apparatus which was 
superimposed” on the deployment of alliance “connects up with the circuit 
of sexual partners . . . in a completely different way” (1990: 106) along a 
different set of principles. I examine in more detail in subsequent chapters 
what both the “deployment of alliance” and the “circuit of sexual partners” 
refer to—especially insofar as they have been theorized (for example, by Lévi- 
Strauss) explicitly as mechanisms. Indeed, as we see in chapter 4, these “exact 
mechanisms” are precisely what Gayle Rubin (1975) and a generation of femi-
nist anthropologists have analyzed in the effort to disentangle reproduction 
from sex, gender, sexuality, and kinship—as well as all of these from biology.
The important question from Foucault, however, is how technologies of 
sex are linked to what he describes as “the birth of biopower.” For it is here 
that the substantial disconnect, or interposition, Foucault proposes between 
structures of sex and of sexuality acquires importance in relation to what he 
elsewhere describes as “technologies of self”—or more simply, identities. For 
Foucault, the important feature of kinship systems is their stability, predict-
ability, and constraint. These technologies of sex (which could also be called 
reproductive technologies) are “built around a system of rules defining the 
permitted and the forbidden, the licit and the illicit” (or what Lévi- Strauss 
defines as the “law” of exogamy that provides the “elementary structure” of 
kinship). Foucault’s technologies of sex comprise “a system of marriage and 
fixation” combined with “mechanisms of constraint”—the “chief objective” 
of which is “to reproduce the interplay of relations and maintain the law that 
governs them. . . . In a word, the deployment of alliance is attuned to a homeo-
stasis of the social body, which it has the function of maintaining; whence its 
privileged link to the law; whence too the fact that the important phase for it 
is ‘reproduction’” (1990: 107). Here, Foucault uses the word “reproduction” 
to mean what is often understood instead as replication—the maintenance 
of the same, also the sense of “reproduction” often used in accounts of social 
reproduction, such as those of Marx and Engels. This traffic—the switching 
back and forth between reproducing something that is the same, or identical, 
and reproducing something different—is a constant feature of the discussion 
of reproductive technologies in this book. Indeed, the traffic between mime-
sis and alteration is epitomized by ivF—at once intended to be just like the 
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real thing and not.15 In the context of both Foucault’s biopolitics and Marx’s 
and Engels’s accounts of social reproduction, the ambivalence of reproduc-
tion—its ability to both imitate and transform—is part of its strategic value, 
or even “magical” power, while at the same time this duality can act as cam-
ouflage, mixing together what is novel with established norms.16
In contrast to the reproductive function of alliance described by Foucault, 
namely the maintenance of rules that ensure the predictable transmission of 
status and goods over time through a fixed apparatus of kinship, the modern 
family, he argues, is based on the reverse principle. It is based not on mecha-
nisms of orderly transmission but on the “mobile, polymorphous and contin-
gent techniques of power” that engender “a continual extension of areas and 
forms of control” and are manifest “through numerous and subtle relays”—
the main vector of which “is the body” (1990: 106–107). The new family is 
based not on a marriage of order and succession symbolized by the law of 
exogamy, but on a more plastic and unstable system, driven by an amplifica-
tion of sex—a “sexing- up” of the nuclear family unit, which “since the eigh-
teenth century . . . has become an obligatory locus of affects, feelings, love” 
comprising “an economy of pleasure” (108).17 This is how, according to Fou-
cault, the “traditional technology of the flesh” in the form of Christian pas-
toral guidance, and the impetus to express penitence through confession, 
evolves into the “new technology of sex” that is both produced and disciplined 
by medicine, pedagogy, psychiatry, demography, and the state. This is how 
“sex became a matter that required the social body as a whole, and virtually 
all of its individuals, to place themselves under surveillance” (116). It is how 
the “Anglican pastoral” was replaced by nineteenth- century medicine in the 
form of “the campaigns apropos of the birthrate [that] took the place of the 
control of conjugal relations,” and similarly how “the question of death and 
everlasting punishment” became “the problem of life and illness” (117). In the 
same way that Marx describes the birth of factories by referencing Darwin’s 
comparison of tools to organs, Foucault describes the birth of a new appara-
tus of sex in this same era as “flesh . . . brought down to the level of the organ-
ism”—now a biological force to be managed, and one, as we shall see, that is 
soon brought down even further.
Sex after iVF
As the history and contemporary evolution of ivF reveal, “sex” in the form of 
reproductive biology continues to be subject to new forms of proliferation, 
regulation, and management, which also introduce new forms of biopolitics, 
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as well as identities, norms, and markets. This “disciplining of reproduction,” 
to use Adele Clarke’s (1998) phrase, has, if anything, achieved new promi-
nence in the early twenty- first century as an economic priority directly corre-
lated to a redefinition of human health in the context of a more explicit cal-
culation of the value of life and sex as both reproductive and regenerative. In 
his analysis of the emergence of the human sciences in the late nineteenth 
century, Foucault argues that a new epistemological space that took “Man” 
as its object was in part facilitated by the emergence of new biological defi-
nitions of life, sex, and population. Arguably the extension of this process is 
evident today in the effort to realign biotechnology with “the human” and its 
biological future—a process in which new definitions of these same concepts 
are once again both means and indices of social change.
What is noticeably different in the contemporary era, however, is the re-
location of this nationally governed managerial effort to manage life “down” 
to the level of sexual substance itself. It is as if the effort to produce and disci-
pline sex via the sexed body described by Foucault for the nineteenth century 
has “descended” and been refocused at the level of reproductive substance 
itself, now of course the object of a level of surveillance, management, and 
handling that is unprecedented in human history. Correspondingly, and as 
Marx would have predicted, an extension of the state apparatus now admin-
isters, polices, and disciplines the detailed biology of gametes and embryos, 
as in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. Today it is not only the 
sexed bodies of couples that are at issue in the effort to manage fertility, nor 
even their individual (or joint) sexual practices or identities. Indeed, this level 
of management is precisely what ivF technology renders irrelevant. “Sex” in 
the sense of either sexual practice or sexual identity is not so much regulated 
through the legislation governing hES research as are the “sexual” substances 
themselves, such as sperm and eggs. Remarkably today, and just as Foucault 
described the production of new sexual identities in the past, bodily sub-
stances that did not previously have a “sexual” role, such as skin cells, can now 
be made sexual through forms of experimental technology that render them 
viably reproductive: their germinal power technologically induced through 
new regimes of enhancing their potency, as in the induced pluripotent stem 
cell. Here is “sexing up” on a whole different scale—indeed precisely the kind 
of scale that would have interested Marx.
We should also note Foucault’s concern about the population—that other 
object of the technologies of sex he describes. This concept too, like Marx’s 
models of labor and value, is significantly altered in the context of biotech-
nology. If Darwin’s theory of evolution provided the logic Foucault argues was 
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required to establish the autonomous principles of “life itself” necessary to 
enable the birth of modern biology, with its account of speciation as a pro-
cess of selection across the population, Foucault’s embedding of the “ana-
tomical” human in a Darwinian concept of population that becomes newly 
manageable can be seen to have acquired a very different set of implications 
today in the context of biotechnology. The analogy of “the breeder’s hand” so 
important to Darwin’s account of biological plasticity has been considerably 
extended in the form of animal populations bred and manipulated as models 
of what this plasticity can be made to do—that is, how it can be differently 
managed or disciplined. These model populations are now the screens on 
which the effort to track biological substances, pathways, and mechanisms 
can be shown or revealed. Thus, the meaning of “the population” has been 
amplified by becoming interspecific (across species), at the same time the 
human populations that matter have been disaggregated and reconstituted 
as cellular. Moreover, neither the interspecies comparisons nor the banked 
populations of human biomaterials belong to the same “natural system” as 
Darwin’s speciating finches, or long- necked giraffes. The new biological kin-
ships forged between these populations, like their handmade genealogies, are 
technological in origin. As the Human Genome Project clearly demonstrated, 
understandings of the human are increasingly embedded in a nested system 
of comparative animal model populations that provide the syntax for under-
standing biological inscription, like so many Russian dolls (worm, fish, frog, 
mouse, sheep, human). Biomaterials, such as viruses and peptides, provide 
the handles for manipulating living connections, while reproduction provides 
the engine of growth. In order to read the principles of biological develop-
ment in the reproductive substance itself (e.g., genes), it has been necessary 
to produce the additional hardware or infrastructure in the form of mouse 
houses, nematode worm colonies, zebra fish tanks, and now also stem cell 
dish models, comprising sufficiently large populations of living entities to re-
veal life’s hidden codes. This is a very different kind of tool kit for both pro-
ducing and managing life than crop rotation or pigeon breeding.
This is of course also the new biological tool kit that, by luck as well as 
effort, delivers the ivF technique, which is a product of changing methods in 
experimental mammalian developmental biology, and the birth of new model 
systems, as we shall see in chapter 3. Ironically, it was in part a concern about 
population growth and the need for more effective contraception that moti-
vated much of the technological innovation leading to successful mammalian 
ivF. ivF is a technology of sex completely unlike that described by Foucault, 
much as his hugely original and innovative methodology is highly pertinent 
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to its historical and anthropological characterization. Nonetheless, his “gene-
alogical” model of history can allow us to see how a technology devised in the 
context of limiting the population engendered changes in how the concept 
of population is deployed. Indeed, this shift can now be seen as crucial to the 
complete reversal of the situation that gave rise to Foucault’s conception of 
sex as a “technology” to begin with: today it is not technologies of sex that 
discipline reproduction, but reproductive technologies that discipline sex.
The question of how reproductive technologies such as ivF both imitate 
and transform technologies of sex thus introduces a new meaning of this 
phrase (as Foucault might have predicted they would). This is why it is nec-
essary to combine a feminist account of technologies of sex and gender with 
an analysis of how biology has become increasingly technologized—a com-
bination I suggest is manifest in both the rise of ivF technology and its new 
biological relations with other technological innovations, such as stem cells. 
As we shall see in subsequent chapters, many of the important methodologi-
cal tools for such an investigation can be found in the extensive, but largely 
neglected, feminist literature on new reproductive technologies, and in the 
feminist analysis of sex and gender as technologies, as well as the anthropo-
logical study of kinship (to which I turn in more detail shortly). However, for 
now it may be useful to explore these themes through a somewhat more con-
crete form of exemplification.
the embryo workshop
In order to approach the evolution of ivF as a technology of sex more con-
cretely, it is useful to visit another workshop, this one in present- day Lon-
don, where a new kind of human- tool- machine relation is being forged in the 
effort to discipline reproductive substance. In the United Kingdom, where 
the research for this book was based, and where both human ivF and stem 
cell culture were initially developed, the strong government effort to pro-
mote human stem cell derivation is evident in a new generation of bespoke 
public facilities that have been commissioned and built over the past decade 
adjacent to ivF units. The new labs embody the goal of enhancing U.K. stem 
cell derivation, banking, and standardization, with a view to establishing new 
sources of living human cellular products, as well as conducting basic re-
search using human embryonic cells as research models. They manifest a na-
tional scientific ambition that is also economic and informed by a perceived 
social consensus to harness technological innovation in the interests of im-
proving the quality of human life. They are thus also part of a broad sociologi-
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cal process conjoining the management of reproductive substance to the body 
politic in the name of “future health and wealth deliverables.”
I first visited the largest and most state of the art of these new laboratories 
at Guy’s Hospital in London in the autumn of 2008 during its final postcon-
struction phase before opening the following spring. Professor Peter Braude, 
a consultant obstetrician, geneticist, and head of the lab, led the tour. The 
timing was ideal because the lab was just beginning the process of decontami-
nation, so we could see everything and wander around freely without wear-
ing bunny suits and masks. Peter’s is the largest of seven new U.K. labs that 
have been constructed with government funding across the U.K. to bring ivF 
and hES derivation physically closer together, so that any spare or clinically 
useless embryos can go straight into a quality controlled clean- room labo-
ratory if a couple decides to donate them to research (which approximately 
70 percent of those asked in the U.K. will be likely to do). The new labs are 
thus designed to join together a so- called dirty surgical room, where eggs are 
aspirated from women patients undergoing ivF, with a clean laboratory that 
complies with the highest quality standards of sterility. The two rooms are 
separated by a hatch, or hole in the wall (figure 1.3). The eggs aspirated from 
FigurE 1.3. Looking through the hole in the wall from the ivF surgery into the clean 
room stem cell laboratory. Photo by the author.
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women ivF patients go through the hatch to be fertilized, and, if they grow 
and develop normally, one of them returns through the door for embryo trans-
fer. Other fertilized eggs or embryos can be frozen for future use, donated to 
other couples for treatment, donated to research, or disposed of, depending 
on what the patients decide to do with them.
The new labs are thus seen to offer a path forward—in the current idiom 
of scientific innovation they represent the cutting edge of biomedical transla-
tion. They are where what is referred to as frontier applications and are being 
developed for what are imagined as the horizon industries of cellular replace-
ment therapies. What the Fda denominates as “the critical path” is the path 
to successful translation, and thus not only a successful passage “from bench 
to bedside” but “from bench to market.” The new U.K. stem cell labs mani-
fest this ambition as a goal- oriented, purpose- built architecture designed to 
facilitate a more efficient interface between ivF clinics and stem cell science. 
At the ivF–stem cell interface a new form of passaging human gametes and 
embryos is made possible, not only from one dish to another, or even from 
one room to the next, but from a specific clinical context (a patient having 
treatment in a surgery) to a new biological order of things (quality- controlled 
facilities that can be process- validated for the safe handling of human cells). 
This form of propagating human cells represents the latest evolution of the 
ivF platform—broadly speaking, it enables ivF to become a source of embryo 
supply for a much wider range of (nonreproductive) applications.
Following the major shift in scientific understandings of cellular potential 
emerging out of stem cell research in the 1980s—namely that even ordinary 
cells can be reprogrammed to become newly embryonic, or “totipotent,” the 
ivF–stem cell interface has become an increasingly important “contact zone” 
and thus a place where human and technological genealogies are being both 
reimagined and refashioned (as we would expect from a frontier). The view 
from the ivF–stem cell interface thus overlooks a new form of coevolution be-
tween human reproductive substance, scientific knowledge, laboratory craft-
work, and technological innovation aimed at improving control over biologi-
cal mechanisms, systems, and pathways. Although novel, the transfer of eggs 
and embryos through the hole in the wall of the clean room is only the latest 
extension to a chain of embryo transfers that define the origins not only of 
ivF and stem cell research, but experimental embryology and the study of bio-
logical development—especially in the twentieth century, especially in mam-
mals, and especially in the British Isles.18
These egg and embryo movements, or transfers, have been a staple tech-
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nique of reproductive and developmental biology since the late nineteenth 
century, and their practical applications in livestock breeding have had enor-
mous consequences for world agriculture as well as zoological conservation 
(especially in combination with cryopreservation, see Friese 2013). Indeed, 
one of the simplest means of tracking the history of ivF is by tracing the ex-
tension of these transfers from animals into humans—or indeed by consider-
ing ivF itself as a critical path of embryological knowledge transfer. In other 
words, ivF was the translational bridge that enabled the technique of embryo 
transfer to make its “human turn”—initially as a means of redressing the bur-
den of human reproductive and developmental deficits, later for stem cell re-
search, and now for regenerative medicine.
The embryo transfer of “ivF and Et,” which is used to describe the surgical 
transfer of an embryo into an ivF patient’s uterus, belongs to a long lineage 
of related, or ancestral, embryo transfers extending back at least a century.19 
Today, human embryo transfer also belongs to an expanding global diaspora 
of reproductive trafficking, or tourism, as well as to global networks of inter-
national scientific exchange, commercial transactions for research eggs and 
embryos, and stem cell banking.20 This global movement of embryos is part of 
a contemporary dialectic of biotranslation through which new cellular models 
generate new applications, and vice versa. In vitro fertilization and embryo 
transfer epitomize this process, having an equally robust importance on both 
sides of the pure and applied domains of the biological sciences. As I argued in 
my previous work on cloning, embryo exchanges continue to cement clinical- 
scientific collaborations in the busily expanding bioscientific present, just as 
they have done historically by facilitating mutually beneficial veterinary- 
scientific and agro- scientific partnerships (such as those uniting Britain and 
Australia in livestock breeding; Franklin 2007a, 2007b). These kinships of sci-
entific technique form a crucial part of the process of embryo transfer in the 
sense not only that reproductive material is being passed around and shared, 
but because they are motivated by an ethos of translation—of working up 
these substances to make them newly (re)productive, that is, translational.21 
At work propelling embryos through the doors of the new labs at the ivF–
stem cell interface, then, are historically well- established goals of maximiz-
ing efficiency through cooperation, promoting economic growth, exchanging 
scientific knowledge and materials, and generating technological progress as 
well as “paybacks” to the general public (who funds much of the research). 
The new labs express the intention to rationalize the thousands of transfers 
of research embryos all over the United Kingdom, to standardize and vali-
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date derivation procedures, to increase biosecurity and ethical oversight, and 
eventually to remunerate the British population by delivering into U.K. gdp 
a larger share of the bioeconomic pie.
For the bioeconomy to become productive, it is necessary for new sources 
of capital stock to become more streamlined in order that they can be scaled 
up, banked, and used for manufacturing new therapeutic products on a com-
mercially viable scale. Put simply, the significant appeal of human embryonic 
cell lines is their importance as the best source of capital stock available, and 
thus the most likely to repay capital investment. As the King’s College team 
based at Guy’s Hospital describes “the best stem cell model for capital in-
vestment in stem cell therapy,” “pluripotent stem cells . . . can be produced 
in theoretically limitless quantities, and [are] therefore capable of providing 
more cells than from any other source, regardless of differentiation efficacy 
and stabilization. Thus, they are the cell type likely to yield the most from in-
vested capital” (Stephenson et al. 2010: s678). Necessary to the realization 
of this yield are a number of “banking” issues including: “legislation to allow 
use of human embryos for stem cell research,” “consensus for reporting the 
quality and type of embryos suitable for stem cell derivation,” and “a regula-
tory route map to facilitate clinical application” (s678). These obstacles “have 
largely been overcome, especially in the UK” due to the collaboration of a 
large number of government agencies, again largely financed by the public 
sector. It is in this way that I have argued the U.K. is creating the equivalent 
of Greenwich Mean Time for stem cell banking, much as it has historically 
also set the standards for the global financial sector—in which it continues to 
occupy a distinctly privileged location because of global time that it stream-
lined as the first globally prominent capitalist industrial economy.
a Fertile environment
The critical path of embryo transfers and passages can be traced as a geneal-
ogy of tooling up mammalian embryos for over a century (discussed in chap-
ter 3), along which these living technologies evolved from the early inves-
tigations of heredity pursued by the early embryo pioneer Walter Heape in 
1890 to the mass standardization of hES cultivation and banking in the early 
twenty- first century. Employed in diverse model systems, across a variety 
of species, for both basic research and a wide range of actual and projected 
applications, and benefiting from an ever more sophisticated range of tech-
niques, the coupling of ivF and embryo research now serves as a core com-
ponent within what a report from the U.K. Department of Health (2011: 45) 
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describes as “a fertile environment for the development and adoption of inno-
vation and scientific advances.” The moral and legal justifications for govern-
ment protection of this sector (which it both funds and promotes in the U.K.) 
have been driven by essentially pragmatic goals over the course of the past 
century, while also becoming increasingly economically prominent. Initially 
these goals were focused on the alleviation of infertility and genetic disease, 
but today they have greatly expanded—to the point of becoming a new para-
digm for the future of health care and national economic growth. Having 
invested more than 200 million pounds (�300 million) in the stem cell re-
search and regenerative medicine pathway since 2003, the U.K. government 
describes this sector as having “the potential to provide a step change reduc-
tion in health care costs” (Department of Health 2011: 45) as well as generat-
ing new sectors of employment and new markets. The development of living 
cell technologies is hopefully imagined as “a driver for the UK economy and 
future healthcare” and as an antidote to the “patent cliff” faced by a pharma-
ceutical industry increasingly disillusioned with the blockbuster model (De-
partment of Health 2011).
As in the nineteenth century, which saw an equally significant government 
investment in industrial manufacturing and infrastructure, for similar politi-
cal and economic reasons, these pragmatic goals have been the subject of 
considerable public debate, often occasioning new public funding initiatives, 
new regulatory bodies, and new acts of Parliament. The proposal that human 
embryos should become tools lay at the heart of the protracted legislative de-
bate in the U.K. that lasted for twelve years after the birth of Louise Brown (a 
debate, it is worth remembering, that was less about clinical ivF than experi-
mental embryology). Although this debate involved considerable deliberation 
over the need to protect the rights of embryos, the hFE Act ultimately pro-
tected a collective human right to human embryos and specifically to their 
use as tools in the effort to alleviate human suffering.
As the Cabinet Minister for Women, the Right Honourable (Labour) 
mp from Barking Jo Richardson, argued in the British House of Commons 
in December 1988, as part of the debate over the first Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act: “It is of course true that the fundamental principles 
of human ivF were established with the use of animal models, but different 
animal species—including the human—differ from each other in biochemi-
cal and developmental details. That means that however much enormously 
useful information can be provided by animal models there will ultimately be 
a point in the research when the human system must be directly examined. 
That is why it is necessary that we ensure that there is an opportunity for 
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the research to continue” (December 16, 1988, hc c. 1268). Based on more 
than half a century of experimentation with fertilized mammalian embryos 
in vitro, the eventual clinical success of ivF confirmed, as Ruth Edwards de-
scribed at the outset of this chapter, that human ova could be removed from 
the body, cultured in media, fertilized in vitro, and transferred to the uterus 
to produce viable offspring. This not only confirmed a transferability of prin-
ciples from other animal models to humans, but a functional isomorphism 
between in vivo and in vitro conception. Put simply, ivF proved the viability 
of a substitution of an in vitro model for the “real thing,” and parliamentary 
decree confirmed the inestimable value of this new tool for human progress.22
a Cybrid manifesto
In order to observe how this logic of ivF has evolved in the U.K. over the past 
thirty years, and indeed how the management of reproduction, or sex, has de-
scended to the level of substance, it is useful to revisit the most recent round 
of British embryo debates, many of which were centered on the question of 
deliberately creating new embryonic tools in the form of so- called cybrid, or 
human- animal admixed embryos, for basic scientific research into the ground 
state of cellular renewal.
In the autumn of 2008, not long after I had visited the stem cell lab de-
scribed above, I attended one of the major demonstrations outside the Houses 
of Parliament in support of, and against, the new Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act at a key point during its complex legislative passage into law 
(figures 1.4 and 1.5). It was a beautiful sunny day and it was a short bike ride 
from my office at the lsE down the Embankment to Old Palace Yard in West-
minster, where I arrived just after 1 pm. In the announcement of the May 12, 
2008, pro- embryo research demonstration, Show Your Support, organized by 
the office of (Liberal) mp Evan Harris (the leader of the pro- cybrid lobby), it 
was suggested, “In recent months there has been intensive lobbying of mps, 
particularly from groups who are opposed to embryo research to continue in 
the UK, including embryonic stem cell science and the animal- human hybrid 
work. mps may not have heard quite so clearly from those who strongly sup-
port the proposals in the Bill, and know that it is vitally important that the 
legislation is not watered down.” It went on: “A YouGov poll in August 2005 
showed that 77% of people accept embryo research for life- threatening dis-
eases. But for far too long, the most prominent shows of feeling on this issue 
have come from those who wish to impede carefully regulated embryo re-
FigurE 1.4. (left) Liberal 
mp Evan Harris with 
reporters at Old Palace 
Yard opposite the Houses of 
Parliament for the May 12, 
2008, Show Your Support 
demonstration, organized 
by his office, to promote the 
legalization of cybrid embryo 
tools. Photo by the author.
FigurE 1.5. (below) Patient 
groups and families affected 
by genetic disease attended 
the Show Your Support 
demonstration in order to 
protect scientific research 
using human admixed 
embryos to improve stem 
cell techniques. Photo by  
the author.
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search and important and ethical clinical interventions like preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis.” The announcement concluded that on May 12, 2008, just 
before the start of the bill’s second reading in the House of Commons, “hun-
dreds of patient groups would join with scientists, doctors and other sup-
porters to represent the breadth and depth of support for the Bill, and in par-
ticular to confirm support for the government proposal that embryo research 
should continue in the UK, and should include animal- human hybrid work as 
well as embryonic stem cell science.”
In fact, that day fewer than a dozen patients and representatives of patient 
groups were available to comment to the assembled media—most of whom 
had left by the time I arrived. The only scientists present were some members 
of the Guy’s Hospital stem cell lab, who joined the small demonstration but 
appeared to have nothing to do. The fear that the pro- embryo research lobby 
would be swamped by a pro- life rally scheduled the same afternoon just be-
fore the start of the second reading at 2 pm proved groundless, as it too was 
poorly attended and lackluster, the weather perhaps too glorious to support 
a mood of indignation.
Riding back to my office to watch the debate on the bill live on Parliament 
tv, I reflected on what a different political climate had prevailed in the late 
spring of 1990, when the first Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill was 
at a similar stage. At that time, not so long after a Private Member’s Bill by 
Conservative mp Enoch Powell had attempted to ban embryo research en-
tirely, the question of how Parliament would vote on the amendment to allow 
embryo research was far from certain. The pro- life lobby was much larger 
and better organized. In a dramatic show of opposition to abortion, its sup-
porters had showered the chambers of Parliament with postcards showing 
aborted fetuses.
The reduced size and fervor of the demonstrations for and against embryo 
research concerning revisions to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act during its second passage through Parliament were not the only mea-
sure of the difference between 1990 and 2008. Looking back, we can see that 
although some forms of reproductive technology, such as cloning, human- 
animal hybrids, and stem cells, still engender controversy, the logic of ivF 
has been sedimented into a naturalized trajectory of intervention in the name 
of improvement, in which technological manipulation of human embryos is 
not only widely accepted as a viable alternative to natural reproduction but 
is seen as a necessary path to the continued improvement of human health. 
As Danny Boyle’s opening ceremony for the Olympics confirmed, innovative 
health technologies have become celebrated features of British national iden-
miraclE babiEs 61
tity and linked to its industrial past through the symbolic idioms of rebirth, 
creativity, and regeneration. A long legacy of increasing public support for in-
creasingly radical forms of human embryo research, combined with explicit 
cross- party government support for ongoing innovation in this field, has em-
bedded a logic that is now seemingly part of the British national imaginary, 
and is celebrated as a source of national pride. If severe, debilitating, and de-
structive diseases can be alleviated through embryo research, the reasons to 
object to these techniques appear increasingly less persuasive or even cred-
ible—especially in the wake of the rapid expansion of ivF, which was devel-
oped using precisely such methods. Over time, the connection between ivF 
and fertility—or even conception—has been superseded (as it was preceded) 
by a more general isomorphism between improvements to human life and the 
ability to culture human embryos in glass. This is the biological relation ivF 
substantializes as both a model system and an ethical consensus, and there-
fore not only as a translational path but as a public duty. This is the logic of re-
making life that appears increasingly to have become a sign of a vital, caring, 
and creative Britain. The code for conduct that inheres in this logic unites a 
belief in the value of scientific research with a duty to work up reproductive 
substance in the name of shared benefits for the body politic as a whole.
Five million miracle babies later, the basic principle of retooling human 
embryos has come to appear not only obvious but even patriotic. The British 
(non)debate over the use of cybrid embryos in 2008 indexes a striking cul-
tural shift over the intervening thirty years, during which a new understand-
ing of human reproductive substance as technology gained so much force 
it can now inspire a public demonstration outside Parliament to promote 
human- cow embryo cybrids. This cultural shift is directly related to the suc-
cess and popularity of ivF—a technique that has rendered biology newly rela-
tive in the process of making new biological relatives, and which, over time, 
has made both of these relatives more regular. Three decades post- ivF, human 
embryo technology has become a normative and nationalized project—and 
not only in the U.K. The lack of contemporary public opposition to stem cell 
research in the U.K. increasingly characterizes the dominant worldwide pat-
tern (albeit one to which the U.S. is a significant exception).23
Another significant indicator of this normalization effect is the increas-
ing public intolerance of religious denunciations of both ivF and stem cell 
research. During the high- profile U.K. debate in 2008 concerning human- 
animal hybrids, or cybrids, the Catholic right- to- life position was relegated to 
the extreme fringe of public debate. Cardinal Keith O’Brien’s strident 2008 
Easter sermon condemning the revised Human Fertilisation and Embryol-
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ogy Act was widely perceived to damage the reputation of Catholicism. His 
characterization of embryo research as “a monstrous attack on human rights, 
human dignity and human life” appeared tone- deaf, if not hysterical, to the 
wider society as well as to many of his fellow Catholics.
“It is difficult to imagine,” O’Brien claimed, “a single piece of legislation 
which, more comprehensively, attacks the sanctity and dignity of human life 
than this particular Bill”:
What I am speaking of is the process whereby scientists create an em-
bryo containing a mixture of animal and human genetic material. If I 
were preaching this homily in France, Germany, Italy, Canada, or Aus-
tralia I would be commending the government for rightly banning such 
grotesque procedures. However here in Great Britain I am forced to 
condemn our government for not only permitting but encouraging 
such hideous practices. . . . This Bill represents a monstrous attack on 
human rights, human dignity and human life. . . . One might say that 
in our country we are about to have a public government endorsement 
of experiments of Frankenstein proportion. May God indeed help us to 
be Missionary at this present time and to hand on the saving message 
of Jesus Christ in a world which does not seem prepared to receive it. 
(O’Brien 2008)
O’Brien’s attempt to provoke a sense of national shame in relation to human 
embryo research was as poorly judged and badly timed as Danny Boyle’s dis-
play of a giant national health baby was perfectly aligned with public sen-
timent four years later. The response to O’Brien’s sermon was particularly 
vehement from within the Christian community, whose members did not ap-
preciate his interpretation of “the saving message of Jesus Christ” or his ref-
erences to “public government endorsement of experiments of Frankenstein 
proportion.” Among those challenging O’Brien’s view was the prominent ge-
neticist and Anglican priest Mary Seller, whose commentary on cybrids pub-
lished in the Tablet cited the teachings of Jesus Christ as a motivation not only 
to heal the sick but to marvel at the splendor of God’s creation:
God certainly intends healing of the sick. Jesus always healed when he 
encountered a person in need: he never passed one by. Indeed he often 
flouted authority to do so: he healed on the Sabbath, he touched un-
touchables, and vociferous criticism did not stop him. Furthermore, he 
gave power and authority to his disciples to go out on the highways and 
byways to do likewise. If today we are able to heal anyone through our 
miraclE babiEs 63
new scientific endeavors, it is an expression of our discipleship, and can 
also be construed as another way in which we legitimately “play God.” 
(Seller 2008)
Seller’s pragmatic interpretation of Christ’s teaching closely follows the main-
stream U.K. position of support for science based on a sense of moral duty to 
explore new avenues for the relief of human suffering. In her view, God’s in-
tentions are consistent with instrumental intervention, including scientific 
experimentation, and the use of biology as a technology—indeed the use of 
human embryos as life- saving tools. She evokes a tradition of active, mobile 
evangelism—flouting the state’s authority to take to the road, “the highways 
and byways,” with tools to heal the sick. Scientific experimentation, in this 
view, is no less than a form of discipleship.
In their press release prepared to accompany the debate in Parliament on 
human- animal hybrid embryos, the Genetic Interest Group (gig), the largest 
U.K. organization representing those affected by genetic disease, took a simi-
lar view—describing the human in vitro embryo as “a vital tool to advance 
the progress of research into the potential of embryonic stem cells” and thus 
as “a potentially vital avenue for research which could greatly increase our 
understanding of serious medical conditions such as Parkinson’s, motor neu-
rone disease, Alzheimer’s disease and cystic fibrosis” (gig 2008). In this en-
dorsement sit side by side the two halves of biological relativity—whereby 
a very curious tool in the form of an admixed embryo comes to be seen as 
both a right and a duty. Such a statement strongly reinforces the initial U.K. 
government position set in place during the 1980s—that embryo research 
should be protected by law in the effort to provide relief from human suffer-
ing—while also confirming, as did the passage of the new pro- cybrid bill un-
amended, that this position has stood the test of time. As the (lack of) debate 
over the human admixed embryo revealed, support for the logic of pursuing 
embryo research has significantly strengthened over time, to the extent that 
the value of the in vitro human embryo culture system as both a tool and a 
way has come to occupy the moral high ground. Indeed, the pursuit of this 
path has become a public obligation. The logic of shared substance indige-
nous to the context of ivF and embryo research, now part of a high- profile 
national economic strategy, and linked to the future health and well- being of 
the nation’s sixty million inhabitants, has moved beyond becoming obvious, 
commonsensical, or regular. This logic is increasingly articulated as a code 
for conduct mandating more and better future uses of embryos as tools as a 
national way of life and a scientific duty to future generations.
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Conclusion
Although initially controversial, ivF has become an increasingly widely ac-
cepted and familiar technique, and can now be seen more clearly to belong 
to a cultural legacy it helped to inaugurate and normalize, namely the retool-
ing of human reproductive substance. To the extent that ivF substantializes 
a new reproductive model, through which reproductive substance is “taken 
in hand,” this has also taken place in a highly visible and explicit manner, not 
only through the successful worldwide marketing of ivF services, but in the 
form of wider public investment in the logic of ivF. The logic of the retooled 
human embryo is now established not only as a new norm in both public and 
private life, but as a duty to the future—an obligation to pursue the “vital 
path” for science, based on the development of a vital tool in the form of the 
in vitro human embryo. Indeed, as the biofuturist Stewart Brand suggests, ivF 
is the “big example” confirming a new paradigm of biology as technology. In 
the context of human embryo research, this suggests that shared reproductive 
substance now codes for conduct in the form of signifying a duty to pursue the 
alleviation of human suffering. Indeed, this is what stem cells increasingly sig-
nify as technologies: they hold out the promise of relief from disease, repair 
of injury, cheaper health applications, and new diagnostic models and thus a 
distinctive new form of shared reproductive substance.
Home to the development of both ivF and hES derivation, the U.K. case 
illustrates how closely linked these two technologies have been in the past, 
and how powerful their coupling is imagined to be in the future. I have sug-
gested too that the history of the Industrial Revolution that took place in the 
northwest of England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provides a 
useful lens on the trajectory of events linking human ivF to the translation of 
reproductive substance into new tools and applications. This would be a more 
superficial analogy if it were not for some of the strikingly relevant analyses 
developed by Marx and Engels from their front- row seats overlooking the dra-
matic mechanical spectacle of rapid industrialization in the mid- nineteenth 
century. Their caution that this process should not be understood as merely 
technical, but as the dialectical rolling forward of a more complex apparatus, 
which they described as historical materialism, remains highly relevant. The 
questions concerning the evolution of machines, the role of scale, the rela-
tion of humans to tools, and the substantialization of political economy in the 
“exact mechanisms” of manufacturing apparatus yield, for all of the reasons 
I have tried to outline in this chapter, an important set of concepts to under-
stand bioindustrialization today.
It is for similar reasons, I have suggested, that we can return to Foucault’s 
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model of sex as a technology to ask what further insights it can yield in the 
contemporary context of biology as a technology, or more specifically, sex 
after ivF. I suggest not only that his method of analyzing history genealogi-
cally adds important dimensions to understanding the histories of ivF, em-
bryo transfer, and embryo research, but that his model of technologies of sex 
can be productively reworked in this context as well. While Marx and Engels 
prioritize the division of labor as a crucial apparatus in the emergence of the 
Industrial Revolution, they pay little attention to the production of sex as a 
value, or its organization as a means of disciplining bodies. Similarly, Fou-
cault’s emphasis on sex as a force that is never merely biological but rather 
can be activated, amplified, and managed not only has implications for the 
sexual division of labor, but for reproductive substance itself—especially now 
that it is not the sexed body or identity, but the exact mechanisms of biologi-
cal sex, reproduction, generativity, potentiality, and so on, that are the sub-
ject of “biopower,” to use his phrase. Yet he too overlooked some of the most 
compelling questions his own analysis raises about the relationship of the 
sexual division of labor to biopower; the complex relationships between the 
reproductive sciences, gender, and kinship; the exact mechanisms of produc-
ing fertility; or the disciplining of reproductive substance in the context of 
embryology.
It is in the effort to theorize the condition of being after ivF in its double 
sense—historically and stylistically—that two workshops are visited in this 
chapter, one from the nineteenth century and one from the twenty- first. As 
we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, the self- acting power of the 
machine- tool, and its relation to both the human hand and its objects, remain 
useful places to examine the logic of biology as technology. Since this book 
is largely concerned with ivF as a technology, and as a technological plat-
form, the importance of appreciating its technical aspects—its exact mecha-
nisms—is emphasized throughout this book.
However, both the content and the form of Biological Relatives are designed 
also to emphasize the inseparability of even the most practical aspects of ivF 
from the wider context of its social logic, manifest as its relation to the body 
politic and the health of the population, and specifically the production of 
fertility through technology. In vitro fertilization came into being as a logical 
plan before it was substantialized as a reproductive model, a working experi-
mental system, or a clinical application. In the final section of this chapter I 
have argued that Stewart Brand’s claim that ivF is the big example of how this 
logic has become more familiar and regular is illustrated by the recent British 
debate about a new kind of human embryonic tool. What I argue is evident 
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from the perspective of the U.K., and which I suggest is indeed now a global 
pattern, is a growing acceptance of the logic of biology as a technology—
a logic I argue ivF has done more than any other technology to introduce. 
In vitro fertilization, to use Heidegger’s terminology, has reenframed repro-
ductive substance as a tool.
This enframing is also manifest in the widespread endorsement of hES 
research as a vital avenue of medical progress, and thus the successor “hope 
technology” to ivF. Part of my argument, then, is simply to suggest that we 
may have underestimated the importance of ivF as a technology that has 
changed not only understandings of the biological, but understandings of evo-
lution, inheritance, and genealogy. In describing ivF this way, I do not intend 
to suggest it has independent agency, but that its widespread public endorse-
ment and celebration represent a growing degree of consensus about the de-
sirability and legitimacy of mechanizing human biology (as well as the biology 
of other systems, from cloned livestock to photovoltaic bacteria). In vitro fer-
tilization is in this sense precisely a path or vital avenue, as claimed by the 
British patient group gig in their press release supporting a new form of 
embryonic tool. I have suggested too that in describing the admixed human 
embryo as a vital tool, the logic of ivF is manifest as a new code for conduct 
based on a new model of shared reproductive substance.
If so, this also reveals a more curious legacy of ivF—that it has refashioned 
the relationship between substance and code for conduct not only by making 
the substance the object of conduct, but by making conduct (e.g., scientific 
research) the origin of substance (e.g., replacement parts, artificial gametes, 
cultured hES lines, biobanking, etc.). This is also where we might understand 
the power of ivF as a technology of “genealogical translation,” because being 
after ivF has changed what genealogical and biological are, can do, and mean. 
In turn, such a hypothesis repositions both the meaning of kinship and its im-
portance to technology more prominently as a dominant sphere of public life. 
Not only the curious new kinships established through the dissemination of 
shared reproductive substance, but the biological relation to technology itself 
established through ivF and embryo research now emerge as “facts of life.” 
The coming into being of this new form of kinship, defying as it does many of 
the basic tenets of social science, such as the indivisibility of the human sub-
ject, the separation of public and private life, or the naturalness of reproduc-
tion, requires a theoretical retooling commensurate to a shift that has argu-
ably already occurred, but not yet been fully comprehended.
In turning to the work of both Donna Haraway and Shulamith Firestone 
in chapter 2, I continue many of the themes raised so far, but explore them in 
miraclE babiEs 67
more detail in relation to the actual work of making stem cells in the lab. For 
this purpose, I also draw more deeply on the insights into labor and tools pro-
vided by Marx in his analysis of an earlier period of industrialization. Thus, 
whereas this chapter has attempted to provide an overview of being after ivF 
in many of its widest senses, the next chapter looks more narrowly at the 
hand- tool- embryo relation. Here, where a kind of kinship of biological rela-
tions is more ready to hand, is also where we can begin to see through the ivF 
looking glass, thus shifting our perspective, while keeping many of the same, 
familiar objects and questions in view.
two living tools
One of the most powerful analyses of the emergence of contemporary bio-
technologies can be found in the work of Donna Haraway, whose theory of 
cyborg politics and highly influential accounts of human- animal- tool rela-
tions reshaped the agendas of feminist theory and science studies during pre-
cisely the same period that ivF technology began to become more everyday.1 
Haraway’s powerful model of material semiosis, through which technology is 
interpreted as both expressive and formative of conceptual equipment, draws 
on her training as both a biologist and a historian, and was first forged in 
the context of embryology. The question of the relationship of technology 
to human futures, or more specifically human political futures, that is the 
major focus of Marx’s analysis of historical materialism is also the subject 
of Donna Haraway’s now- iconic late twentieth- century essay “A Manifesto 
for Cyborgs,” published almost exactly a century after Marx’s death, in 1985. 
Haraway’s signature method of materialist figuration owes as much to Marx-
ist models as do her politics. But while Haraway’s focus on technology, poli-
tics, labor, capital, and the human condition shares much in common with 
the tenets of nineteenth- century historical materialism, her close engage-
ment with information technology, cybernetics, genetic engineering, nuclear 
physics, and molecular biology places her firmly in the world of twenty- first- 
century technoscience, as well as transmillennial feminist thought. She is 
thus the author of a new “biotechnology politics” based on “partial identities” 
and “ironic communication” that “refuse anti- science metaphysics” and are 
dedicated to “the skillful task of reconstructing the boundaries of everyday 
life” (Haraway 1983: 13).
As Haraway noted of the embryological debates described in her 1976 book 
on the metaphors of organicism that competed to organize twentieth- century 
developmental biology, the scientific models that inform experimental bi-
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ology inevitably also model social life. As she observed in Crystals, Fabrics, and 
Fields (following both Thomas Kuhn and Mary Hesse), science cannot func-
tion without analogies, and these are inevitably also constitutive orientations:
The traditional mechanist sees similarities between the organism and 
actual machines such as the steam engine, hydraulic pump, or a system 
of levers and pulleys. The neomechanist builds a similarity set from 
codes, the molecular basis of genes, language, computers, and the or-
ganism. . . . The organicist tends to see similarities in the structure 
of molecular populations, the cell, the whole organisms, and the eco-
system. . . . Concrete analogies are drawn from models, gestalt phe-
nomena, fields, liquid crystals, and also computers. These lists suggest 
that persons holding one of the three perspectives would be inclined to 
work on different experimental problems and to interpret the results in 
a different language. (Haraway 1976: 205)
The scene Haraway describes here, of the enframement of experimental prob-
lems, is what has since come to be known as “science in action” (Latour 1987), 
“laboratory life” (Latour and Woolgar 1979), or “sorting things out” (Bowker 
and Star 1999). Here too is Haraway’s first cyborg figure—the cyborg embryo, 
not yet denominated as such, but as surely a product of “worlds ambiguously 
natural and crafted” (1991: 149), “couplings between organism and machine” 
(150) and a “condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the 
two joined centres structuring any possibility of historical transformation” 
(150) as the chip, fetus, gene, seed, database, bomb, race, brain, and ecosys-
tem of her later work (1985, 1991, 1997).
Three and a half decades later, Haraway’s cyborg analysis speaks even 
more cogently to the embryo- strewn world of the twenty- first century. The 
anxious attention so often directed at “the” embryo, as in the perennial debate 
over “the moral status of the human embryo,” forgets that human embryos are 
now a vast and diverse global biological population, imaged, imagined, and 
archived in media as diverse as liquid nitrogen, mouse feeder cells, dvds, vir-
tual libraries, websites, T- shirts, logos, Hollywood cinema, and brand names. 
Never very precise, the term “embryo” is ever more of a basket category, now 
describing everything from a conceptus, a zygote, an “admixed human hybrid 
cell,” or a blastocyst to a reconstructed cell, a fertilized egg, or an embryoid 
body. We cannot map the complicated social, political, scientific, medical, or 
ethical lives of human embryos, with all of their increasingly prominent civic 
and legal entanglements, without the kind of material semiology, or grammar, 
of the biological that Haraway, uniquely, provides.
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As in many other chapters in the history of biological control, the idiom of 
improvement—and specifically of merging nature with progress—is central 
to the increasingly prominent role the extracorporeal embryo has played in 
the reengineering of the facts of life. The cyborg embryo, itself the offspring 
of a union between reproductive failure and scientific hope, has become, like 
natural conception before it, something that is seen to be in need of care-
ful management in order to be properly domesticated (Franklin 1995, 1997; 
Thompson 2005; Throsby 2004). Couples who pursue the assisted concep-
tion route can, in a complicated act of affinity with scientific progress and 
potential communities of future beneficiaries, now also donate their surplus 
embryos to research to make colonies of immortalized, regenerative, anony-
mized, and totipotent cells, which will be banked in the aid of an improved 
human future. This biological reserve, archive, bank, or master stock can be 
directed to transform into specific types of cell and, in theory, is the seedbed 
for a previously untapped source of human repair. The improved biology of 
the future will be more reliable, routinized, and standardized both because 
technological control of biology is being built into the biological itself, and 
because other forms of control are being introduced to stabilize and govern 
the cultivation of these new, rebuilt biologies—such as process validation, 
good manufacturing practice (gmp), accreditation requirements, and risk as-
sessment strategies.2 As we shall see in the second part of this chapter, this 
process now constitutes a specialized form of scientific labor that is in the 
process of attaining a new scale of application on the verge of becoming in-
dustrialized.
In writing of the turn- of- the- century embryo, Haraway demonstrated 
that we cannot even look at the embryo—objectively, scientifically, in the 
laboratory, under a microscope—without seeing it through the lens of pre-
fabricated, culturally inherited, constitutive, real, and inescapable frames of 
reference that incorporate the “external world” into what Evelyn Fox Keller 
(1996a) describes as “the biological gaze.” Nor, as Haraway demonstrated in 
her work on primatology (1989), is it possible for scientific understandings to 
escape the interpretive devices, taxonomic conventions, or situated and his-
torically specific conditions enabling us to know anything at all. Today, the 
evolution of ivF offers similar lessons, not only about how socialized (and 
socializing) scientific understandings always are, but now also, and ever more 
visibly, how social values, systems, and aspirations are being engineered and 




The biologization of human values is as old as horticulture, when human pref-
erences began to be nudged into seedlings, and mutated corn began to be 
selected for its ears, but the antiquity of bioartifice does not mean that the 
contemporary transformation of human reproductive substance into tech-
nology lacks either specificity or novelty. In showing us a new set of impli-
cations of the bioinformatic implosion that enabled the gene to become the 
master molecule and ultimate coding mechanism, embedded in a “command- 
control- communication- intelligence” infrastructure that belongs to nasa 
as much as the National Institutes of Health, Haraway’s (1983: 3) work has 
chronicled a change of kind as well as degree. As we observe the growing 
population of living human tools, such as reconstructed embryos, in which 
it is a logic of engineering that guides a project of biological redesign, we are 
also observing a shift away from “the translation of the world into a problem 
of coding” (Haraway 1991: 165) and toward a translation of the problem of 
coding into one of synthesis (a key point throughout all of Haraway’s work, 
and one that could be described as thoroughly embryological). According to 
this logic, which is also the logic of ivF, “any objects or persons can be reason-
ably thought of in terms of disassembly and reassembly,” and there are conse-
quently “no ‘natural’ architectures that constrain system design” (1991: 162). 
The interplay of these two principles, of assembly and disassembly, could be 
described as the core modeling ethos guiding the effort to take reproductive 
substance in hand.
Although absent from the final draft of Haraway’s most famous article, 
published in Socialist Review in 1985, the logic of ivF played a prominent role 
in an earlier version of “A Manifesto for Cyborgs” submitted to Das Argument, 
the influential German Marxist journal, in 1983 for a forthcoming volume 
titled “Orwell 1984.” It was in an earlier incarnation of her now- classic mani-
festo, to which the analysis of both ivF and prenatal screening were central, 
that the unnatural futures promised by the collapse of the nostalgic nature- 
culture dualism were first celebrated as part of an “ironic dream.”3 Like other 
feminists in the 1980s, Haraway was highly skeptical about the various “forms 
of reproductive technology linked to in vitro fertilization (ivF)” and their 
links to the evolving “infra- structure of genetic engineering” (1983: 6). She 
is acutely conscious of the capacity for the introduction of new reproductive 
technologies such as ivF to reinforce existing forms of inequality. However, 
she is equally skeptical about the political viability of outdated organicist ap-
peals to a pretechnologized nature or body, arguing that these are “kinky mys-
tical illusions” and “illusory” (7). “I think it is not now possible to live in a 
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‘natural’ world, and that our most powerful social movements will not grow 
from such appeals. . . . For better or worse, our form of social existence has 
permanently displaced the dualisms of nature and science, natural and arti-
ficial. . . . It is not clear who makes and who is made in the relation between 
human and machine” (8, 12). Far from denigrating human- machine coupling, 
Haraway embraced the possibilities it offered of an alternative hybrid, mosaic, 
chimeric politics: “I maintain that in so far as we know ourselves in both 
formal discourse (e.g., biology) and in daily practice, we find ourselves to be 
cyborgs, hybrids, mosaics, chimeras. . . . There is no fundamental, ontological 
separation in our formal knowledge of machine and organism, of technical 
and organic” (12).
Arguing for a political reembrace of the creative connections uniting 
mind, body, and tool, Haraway argues that biotechnology offers a newly inti-
mate figuration of the machine as us (“it is not clear who makes and is made 
in the relation between human and machine,” 1983: 12), accompanied by a 
newly potent understanding of ourselves and our own biology as tools: “One 
consequence is that our sense of connection to our tools is heightened” (12), 
she claimed.
This new technological, machinic, or “cyborg” consciousness might be 
particularly important for women, Haraway suggested, given that “up till now 
. . . female embodiment seemed to be given, organic, necessary; and female 
embodiment seemed to mean skill in mothering and its metaphoric exten-
sions. Only by being out of place could we take intense pleasure in machines, 
and then with excuses that this was organic activity after all, appropriate to 
females. Cyborgs might consider more seriously the partial, fluid, sometimes 
aspect of sex and sexual embodiment. Gender might not be global identity 
after all” (1983: 12). This reference to gender not being a global identity refers 
to both its conventional biologism and its traditional binarism—both implicit 
in gender’s relationship to sex, with its global presumption of the two sexes, 
and the necessity of their complementary polarity for sexual reproduction. 
But what if genetic engineering is, as in Haraway’s ironic dream, not only a 
new sex, but a more radical, more pleasurable, and politically improved sex 
that could change the very meaning of sexual reproduction? And what if ge-
netic engineering is inherently “a technology for the production of mean-
ings, as well as for the production of bodies” (Haraway 1983: 6) and one in 
which “our sense of connection to our tools is heightened” (12)? If so, Har-
away claims, “intense pleasure in skill, machine skill, ceases to be a sin, but 
[becomes] an aspect of embodiment. The machine is not an it to be animated, 
worshipped, and dominated. The machine is us, our processes, an aspect of 
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our embodiment” (12). Consequently, Haraway argues, a refashioned feminist 
politics must imagine a new kinship with technology, and indeed celebrate 
this new “ironic” model of kinship as the ground for a different version of 
sisterhood, to which a conventional gender politics is no longer central. Link-
ing the politics of gender, kinship, and race directly to those of science and 
technology, Haraway calls for a refashioned socialist feminist politics that will 
“tak[e] responsibility for the social relations of science and technology [and 
refuse] an anti- science metaphysics, a demonology of technology, [by] em-
bracing the skillful task of reconstructing the boundaries of daily life, in par-
tial connection with others, in ironic communication with all of our parts. . . . 
Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we 
have explained our tools to ourselves. This is a different dream of a common 
language” (1983: 13).
In such arguments for a new politics of gender, kinship, and race via sci-
ence and technology, Haraway is much closer to Shulamith Firestone than to 
any of the feminist writers addressing assisted reproductive technologies and 
ivF in the 1980s (whose work is discussed in chapter 5). Like Firestone, Har-
away advocates not only the embrace of transgressive technological pleasure 
and connection, but a transcendence of the binding naturalisms inevitably 
associated with “global” (fixed, binary, permeating) models of sex and gender. 
For Haraway, as for many feminist science fiction writers, there is a revolu-
tionary purpose to be achieved through tools, machines, instruments, and bi-
ology, and indeed through their union—they are not the enemy but the path 
to “a different dream of a common language” and to a radical rescripting of 
technologies of gender and kinship—indeed to “the material power to draw 
our own lines in the world” (1983: 7). We would be better off if we reimagined 
ourselves through these transgressive idioms to begin with, rather than re-
sisting them, she suggests, adding that we need to make better personal and 
political use of our lively, and often queer, equipment. This sexual politics not 
only is more pleasurable than purity, wholeness, or back- to- nature nostalgia, 
but it has a better sense of humor: it is ironic, parodic, impertinent, playful, 
noncompliant, and unpredictable.
Feminist Biofuturism
For Firestone, who similarly proposed a controversial technological embrace 
in the 1970s, the importance of technology to assist women to gain control 
over reproduction, and thus to challenge the fixed biological model of binary 
sex, was the self- evident starting point of modern, twentieth- century femi-
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nism. Since the origin of the sex distinction, in her view, was “biology itself—
procreation,” its elimination required technological control of the means of 
reproduction in order for the tyranny of biology over women to be ended.
Just as to assure elimination of economic classes requires the revolt of 
the underclass (the proletariat) and . . . their seizure of the means of 
production, so to assure the elimination of sexual classes requires the 
revolt of the underclass (women) and the control of reproduction. [This 
will require] not only the full restoration to women of ownership of 
their own bodies but also their (temporary) seizure of control of human 
fertility—the new population biology as well as all the social institu-
tions of childbearing and childrearing. And just as the end goal of the 
socialist revolution was not only the elimination of the economic class 
privilege but of the economic class distinction itself, so the end goal of 
feminist revolution must be, unlike that of the first feminist movement, 
not only the elimination of male privilege but of the sex distinction 
itself. (Firestone 1972: 11)
The “new population biology” invoked by Firestone in this passage, and else-
where in her highly influential 1970 manifesto, refers to the new sciences 
of reproductive endocrinology, reproductive physiology, and reproductive 
biology that all emerged during the first half of the twentieth century, and 
gained momentum in the postwar period, fueling hopes for many applications 
related to both agriculture and medicine. To Firestone, the pace of develop-
ments in the life sciences, and in particular understandings of the reproduc-
tive process, was both breathtaking and full of promise. For her, like many 
of the British “biofuturists” of the pre- and interwar periods, the promise of 
reengineering reproductive substance was at one with the broadly confident 
empiricist goal of deciphering the secrets of the universe. The triumph of 
Cartesian mechanism was at hand, offering a “full mastery of the reproductive 
process” no feminist worth her Ringer salts could fail to celebrate.
Now, in 1970, we are experiencing a major scientific breakthrough. The 
new physics, relativity, and the astro- physical theories of contempo-
rary science had already been realized by the first part of this century. 
Now, in the latter part, we are arriving, with the help of the electron 
microscope and other new tools, at similar achievements in biology, 
biochemistry, and all the life sciences. Important discoveries are made 
yearly . . . of the magnitude of dna . . . or the origins of life. Full mastery 
of the reproductive process is in sight, and there has been significant 
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advance in understanding the basic life and death process. The nature 
of aging and growth, sleep and hibernation, the chemical functioning 
of the brain and the development of consciousness and memory are all 
beginning to be understood in their entirety. This acceleration prom-
ises to continue for another century, or however long it takes to under-
stand the goal of Empiricism: total understanding of the laws of nature. 
(Firestone 1972: 180)
At the same time that Firestone advocated a much greater feminist engage-
ment with technological progress as a means of overcoming female subordi-
nation, she was equally concerned by the rampant sexism within the sciences 
and made it perfectly clear that a technological revolution would be impos-
sible without a cultural one to match. As Firestone writes in The Dialectic 
of Sex,
The absence of women at all levels of scientific disciplines is so com-
monplace as to lead many (otherwise intelligent) people to attribute it 
to some deficiency (logic?) in women themselves. Or to women’s own 
predilections for the emotional and the subjective over the practical 
and the rational. But the question cannot be so easily dismissed. It is 
true that women in science are in foreign territory—but how has this 
situation evolved? Why are there disciplines or branches of inquiry that 
demand only a “male” mind? . . . When and why was the female ex-
cluded from this type of mind? (1972: 154)
Although inspired by figures such as Gregory Pincus, and motivated by 
a Marxist- based scientific humanism similar to that of Waddington, J. D. S. 
Haldane, the Huxleys, Naomi Mitchison, and H. G. Wells, Firestone was, like 
them, all too conscious that although technology could play a role in social 
change, the relationship was dialectical: only in a radically changed society 
could new definitions of technology be born. In contrast to the oft- repeated 
characterization of Firestone as having put too much faith in the capacity of 
new reproductive technologies to liberate women, her assessment of their 
potential precisely anticipated that they would reinforce existing inequalities 
if their use were not accompanied by a radical redefinition of gender, sex, kin-
ship, parenthood, and the family. As she presciently warned, “in the hands of 
our current society and under the direction of current scientists (few of whom 
are female or even feminist), any attempt to use technology to ‘free’ anybody 
is suspect” (1972: 206).
Indeed, on the topic of the “revolutionary” consequences of new repro-
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ductive technologies, Firestone is most accurately prescient in her predic-
tion that they were instead much more likely to reinforce the status quo. 
Technology alone, however radical its possibilities, would not itself eliminate 
patriarchal family structures, the sexual division of labor, or the institution 
of marriage. And as long as these technologies of sex remained in force, em-
bryology was likely to follow suit. Wrongly often characterized as naive, Fire-
stone’s arguments about technology (like those of her bellwethers Marx and 
Engels) are as focused on its propensity to fail as its potentially transforma-
tive capacities.4
Firestone was equally conscious of the complicated place of the female re-
productive body in relation to masculinist science. It was as unlikely in her 
view that scientific research would become more feminized as it was that sci-
entific research agendas would prioritize female concerns. As she noted of 
the history of birth control (a topic that concerned her far more than the dis-
tant prospect of cybernetic reproduction), “the kinds of research [for which] 
money [is] allocated . . . are only incidentally in the interests of women when 
at all” (1972: 197–198).
Haraway is similarly cautious about the possibility of radical scientific or 
technological change occurring without a corresponding transformation of 
social values, which is why, like Firestone, Haraway’s politics explicitly fore-
ground and prioritize a more potent and explicit feminist engagement with 
science and technology:
Active feminist reconstruction of science and technology requires im-
mersion in forms of knowledge and practice not now friendly to most 
women, feminist or not. But we are present and active in constructing 
the social relations of science and technology, like it or not. By the late 
20th century, there is no choice in this matter. Our politics and liveli-
hoods are significantly determined by science- based social orders—
whether we are a clerical worker at the Lawrence Livermore weapons 
laboratories, an engineer on the mx project, a witch in Santa Rita jail 
for blockading a weapons lab, or a grocery clerk using automated inven-
tory and check out systems. Our problem is to be less serviceable and 
more determining of the structure of objects of knowledge and of forms 
of scientific social practice. (1983: 10–11)
Haraway was initially trained as a biologist, and has often referred to the 
biology lab as the origin of both her love of biology and her inability to con-
ceive of any life form as purely natural:
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Politically and historically, I could never take the organism as some-
thing simply there. . . . I was extremely interested in the way the or-
ganism is an object of knowledge as a system of the production and 
partition of energy, or as a system of division of labor with executive 
functions. This is the history of the ecosystem as an object that could 
only have come into being in the context of resource managements, 
the tracking of energies through trophic layers, the tagging apparatuses 
made possible by the Savannah River Nuclear facilities, and the emer-
gence of war- time inter- disciplinarities in cybernetics, nuclear chemis-
try and systems theories. (2006: 136)
Haraway’s early penchant for unnatural histories, in other words, was po-
litically and intellectually materialist: it stemmed from her inability to per-
ceive ecosystems or organisms as separate from the laboratory context, or 
the worldly context of the lab, in which they were identified through specific 
means of intervention and denomination. To think otherwise proved impos-
sible: “It was never really possible for me to inhabit biology without a kind 
of impossible consciousness of the radical historicity of these objects of knowl-
edge. . . . For me it was always about the materialities of instrumentation of 
organisms and laboratories” (2006: 136, emphasis added).
Importantly for Haraway, these materialities are never “things in them-
selves,” but always constituted through relationships—what she calls “con-
stitutive relationalities.” Everything in the lab comes into being in this way—
as Latour (1987) also shows so consistently in his work.5 These constitutive 
relationalities demonstrate the inextricability of the human—as a popula-
tion, as individuals, or as a species—from other companion realms, includ-
ing the nonhuman, the nonliving, and the machinic or synthetic domain of 
what Haraway calls “the built world.” In this way too, technologies themselves 
are always already socialized—they are crucially, unmistakably, and dialec-
tically agentic nonhuman “actants” in the lab and its hybrid onto- epistemic 
bench life composed of Bunsen burners, petri dishes, and the proprietary cul-
ture medium that serves as soil for the cultivation of new, increasingly quasi- 
human, bioproducts.
Culture media
A good sense of the integration of living entities, including living human enti-
ties, with their tools and machines in the lab can be derived from almost 
any visit to one. Also notable to a novice lab visitor is the enormously disci-
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plined choreography governing not only the use of space, equipment, and 
materials, but the intense attention to technique. Here, at a remove from the 
manifesto, and more closely in touch with the laboratory manual, a different 
kind of biofuture is being forged, in the context of a more quotidian kind of 
affinity. At the same time, the lab is a very sociable place. The most ordinary 
thing about these otherwise very unfamiliar settings is the banter among the 
staff, who, especially if they are in a clean room, inhabit each other’s space 
like the long- term, cloistered crew of a submarine. Like artisans, they know 
their equipment intimately, their workshop like an extended pair of hands. 
Far from being excluded, in many of the stem cell labs in the United King-
dom and elsewhere in which new embryonic tools and lines are being cul-
tivated, women scientists and lab technicians often predominate in what is 
a noticeably feminized arena of highly specialized bioexpertise. The culture 
of embryo culture in the stem cell lab is by definition highly routinized and 
regimented, its discipline second nature to its inhabitants. Paradoxically, it is 
highly sterilized, while also being dedicated to the cultivation of cellular fer-
tility—both in terms of handling eggs and embryos that will potentially be 
used for treatment, and in coaxing those that have been donated to research 
into successful colonies of healthy stem cells. In the following extract from 
my field notes, I describe my first visit to the fully functioning stem cell lab at 
Guy’s Hospital, where I was introduced to the culture of embryo culture by 
observing some of the basic procedures that are undertaken on a daily basis.
Field Notes, Guy’s Stem Cell Lab, March 12, 2010
I arrive at the lab with my camera and am escorted in by Emma, a post-
doctoral researcher, through several air locks, discarding my “street” 
clothes in the first one, acquiring a new sterile lab suit in the second 
one, and finally stepping into my new shoes. Everyone is wearing blue 
bunny suits, hats, masks, gloves, and sterile plastic clogs. They sterilize 
my camera with a special spray. It’s very hot and hard to hear because 
of all the noisy hoods sucking in air. We go from the main (clinical) area 
into the smaller derivation space, known as Research Lab One, where 
the filtered air is even purer.
Vicky is about to show me how she amplifies the feeder cells they are 
using to grow the human stem cell lines they have successfully derived 
from embryos donated by patients in the adjacent clinic. The wells con-
taining the feeders are kept in the incubator and Vicky is just about to 
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get some out when another lab technician arrives at the door to the lab 
directly behind her. “Helen is coming in,” warns Emma. (Helen enters 
very carefully, holding a dish of cells.) Incongruously, the incubator looks 
like a small refrigerator. Helen opens the door very gently and deposits 
her dish in one of the six heated compartments, each with its own mini-
door, and swaps it for another, which she removes with the same very 
slow, deliberate, and concentrated comportment with which one would 
handle a hot bowl of soup (which it sort of is). She closes the door with 
one hand, holding the dish protectively with the other, and exits back-
wards through the lab door to cultivate her carefully guarded colony.
The six compartments in the incubator each have a separate line in 
them to avoid cross- contamination. The feeder plates for each line are 
also kept in their respective sterile quarantines. Vicky stops talking as 
she removes two feeder plates and a small vial of media from the incu-
bator, moving so cautiously it looks like she is in slow motion. On the 
front of the incubator are magnets made of square colored photographs 
of embryos attaching paper notices to the top rim of the hood, beneath 
which Vicky seats herself, while gently setting down her plates and 
vial. She settles herself on the stool in front of the hood. Its glass front 
reaches down almost to the bench top, leaving only a few inches for her 
hands to go through into protected airspace. The binocular scope of 
the manipulation bed protrudes through the glass—separating but con-
necting her to what lies beneath the hood. Vicky drops her vial of fresh 
nutrient media into a red holder, which already holds another empty 
vial for the used media, and positions the dish of feeder cells in the bed 
of the microscope. The metal base of the hood—the bench—is heated 
to match the incubator temperature, as is the culture media in the vial, 
so that the cells do not experience a change in temperature (which 
they do not like). At the front of the bench is a vent, drawing air down 
through the hood, which has a higher air pressure inside, to minimize 
the risk of contamination.
Each dish contains four wells of feeder cells. The cells are stuck to 
the bottom of the well, and the media is on top. As the cell lines grow, 
they need to be passaged, namely cut into pieces and transferred to 
new wells with more room and new media. This is how cells are ampli-
fied—through the extremely laborious and time- consuming process of 
passaging them, also referred to as propagation.
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Vicky opens a yellow box of fresh pipette tips and snaps one on by 
stabbing it with the end of her pipette. She is now going to remove the 
used media to discard it—one well at a time. With the pipette clamped 
in her right fist, she unscrews the top of the empty vial using her thumb 
and index finger. She then repositions her right hand to begin removing 
the used culture media, holding the pipette like an ice pick, her thumb 
on top to operate it, while with her left hand she holds the dish. Tipping 
the dish forward to pool the liquid media at the front of the tiny cham-
ber, she takes three delicate sips of used media, dumping each one in 
the waste vial. She then removes the tip, discards it, and opens the vial 
of new media to begin the process of replenishing the feeder cells with 
fresh, carefully heated, and meticulously standardized nutrients.
“Do you have a favorite type of pipette?”
“Um, the p1000 is very handy,” she says, laughing. “But we’ve run out 
of them at the moment.”
“What do you like about those?”
Speaking slowly as she concentrates on transferring new media into 
the well, using a new tip, and holding the media- filled vial close to the 
dish with her left hand, she explains, “They’re just easier because you 
can fit up to 1 ml in them, so you have a lot more range to work with.”
“Oh, right, the other ones have less, so you keep having to go back 
and forth with them.”
“Right, exactly,” she says, changing tips again, and beginning the 
process of removing the used media from the second well, working left 
to right, while tipping the dish forward with her left hand.
“So each time you switch media you throw out the tip?”
“Yes, to avoid contamination, just general contamination, I use two 
pipette tips per well.”
“It’s quite handy they stick to the bottom of the well, so you don’t 
have to worry about inhaling them.”
Vicky is now working slightly faster and is on to the third well, 
emptying it, and then adding two big dollops of new media. Her manual 
dexterity is impressive: fast, confident, precise, and practiced. But the 
work is obviously laborious and fiddly.
“So how long have those cells been in there?”
“They have been on these plates just since yesterday. So they were 
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plated just yesterday afternoon. They were just growing in a big flask, 
and then we plate them out.”
“So how long will it take you to harvest these cells?”
“It takes about four–five days to get them confluent enough to make 
enough dishes that we need so I’ve got about twenty dishes out of four 
days’ growth of a t75 flask.”
“So this is a constant activity.”
“Yeah, every week.”
“Growing the food for your lines.”
“Yeah, keeping them happy.”
keeping them happy
Even this very brief glimpse of daily work in a stem cell lab gives a clear sense 
of the inextricabilities described by Haraway—the radical sense of context 
that makes it impossible for her to imagine organisms as “simply there,” only 
inhabiting their own pure, singular, and unadulterated ontology. The complex 
bench sociality involving living, human, nonliving, nonhuman, and machinic 
“companion” entities has as its animate metronome the ticking metabolisms 
of the bespoke colonies of human cells that are being carefully tended in this 
state- of- the- art propagation lab—or human hothouse. The lab is dedicated 
to making cell lines that can model human diseases, while also establishing 
a viable procedural infrastructure, standardized techniques, and quality con-
trol criteria for this production process. It is like a giant human petri dish. The 
viability of these interlinked projects both emerges from and relies upon a 
continuous evolution of technique maintained through effort, discipline, and 
diligence. This advanced lab, in a state of permanent symbiotic innovation 
and evolution, is thus both the offspring and the matrix of accumulated high- 
specification culture techniques, while its daily life remains largely focused 
on repetitive, routine, and uniquely skilled manual labor.
At one level the lab is designed to cater to the needs of cells—with its in-
cubators, heated benches, specially prepared nutrient media, graded air, and 
specialized equipment. But the propagation of cells that might be used for 
clinical purposes also requires the cells to be subjected to procedures they 
“don’t like,” such as being moved about, exposed to light, cut up and replated, 
and potentially contaminated. What Haraway calls the “constitutive relation-
alities” of the lab are thus not only disciplined, standardized, and highly con-
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trolled (this is a world- class, bespoke laboratory incorporating state- of- the- art 
equipment and there is a comparatively large, very highly trained staff work-
ing here with donated human material), but these relationships can also be, 
by turns, intense, intimate, unpredictable, personal, boring, or exciting. Also, 
they frequently fail: lines go off or die, equipment gets contaminated, and 
computer backup systems crash. The choreography of the lab is highly spe-
cialized, rigorous, and demanding—precisely because it is dealing with the 
familiar trio of known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns. 
Every single thing that is moved into or out of the lab has to be specially 
selected, prepared, cleaned, and logged, using equipment that is also pre-
cisely designed, built, decontaminated, documented, and coordinated. Every-
thing in a gmp lab has to be quality controlled (maintained to strict standards) 
and “process validated” (i.e., performed to a documented and reproducible 
protocol that is part of the lab’s accreditation, and thus of the lab products’ 
scientific, clinical, and commercial viability). At the end of the day, biological 
control in a gmp lab is quality control: quality- controlled biology is the name 
of the game in tissue engineering and regenerative medicine. The engineering 
model that drives this workplace requires maximum predictability and con-
trol. Even the plastics have to be low emission.
Such quality control requires constant attention to the maintenance of 
the highest compliance standards, in terms of not only the sterile dress code 
and tight protocols that must be followed by lab personnel, but also the em-
bryologists’ comportment in the lab. The adherence to a strict discipline of 
movement is very evident to anyone observing routine procedures in a stem 
cell lab, where even ordinary movements such as opening a door require in-
tense concentration. Awkward new habits have to become ingrained through 
constant repetition and practice (such as performing delicate tasks wearing 
gloves, communicating over the noise of hoods, and breathing through face 
masks). This constantly evolving choreography is one in which human activity 
is being tightly coordinated with that of cells, machines, and tools, which 
all have well- established roles in the daily life of the lab’s elaborate ecosys-
tem. This is the culture of cell culture described so beautifully by Hannah 
Landecker (2007) in her account of “how cells became technologies.” It is 
the legacy of what Philip Pauly (1987) describes as the “engineering ideal in 
biology,” or Adele Clarke (1998) calls the “disciplining” of reproduction. The 
cells, the cultivation of which is the lab’s main function, are both instruments 
and products: the feeder plates are the carefully prepared soil on which the 
human embryonic cell lines will be propagated. The clean human stem cells, 
which are the viable offspring of highly evolved techniques, themselves be-
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come tools when they are employed to model rare human genetic diseases 
such as Huntington’s or Tay- Sachs. The complex quotidian labor of lab tech-
nicians, with their stylized, repetitive, slowed- down, tooled- up, bespoke sys-
tems and cycles, connecting humans, cells, and machines, is both thoroughly 
technoscientific and thoroughly human. Even the tools are human in this bio-
technological ecosystem, where life is being grown to order, just like forced 
rhubarb in a heated potting shed.
It is noticeable too how even in this ultramodern lab, full of noisy re-
spiring machinery, there is also a profound sense of craft—indeed traditional 
manual craftsmanship, in the sense Richard Sennett (2008) discusses in his 
monograph widening our awareness of the still- pervasive artisanal culture of 
craftwork even in the high- tech industries where it is imagined to have dis-
appeared. The art of propagating cell cultures evokes a sense of both tradi-
tional and communitarian pride in work that depends for its success on being 
undertaken to the very highest standards by a team, and thus, to a certain ex-
tent, and in spite of the rampant commercialism of high or late capitalism, for 
itself. A sense of satisfaction in what the practiced “green” hands of a skilled 
propagator can do (with or without a p1000) is constantly evident in the stem 
cell lab, where, as we shall see below, live toolmaking over the forge is still 
routine. Such handmade tools are crucial to the ultraprecise work of lab tech-
nicians, whose care for the cells, and skilled manipulation of them, is ideally 
manifest as successful growth—as in horticulture.
Field Notes, Guy’s Stem Cell Lab, March 12, 2010
Emma next shows me how to passage a cell line, initially by placing it in 
the bed of the bench microscope, which is attached to a video screen. 
Pointing to the sea of blue on the screen, she explains her procedure, 
pointing out the feeder cells, the colonies of stem cells, the dead cells 
that are coming off the established colonies, and the method she will 
use to cut these up with a handmade microtool to establish new colo-
nies in new plates.
“So every day we come in to inspect our cell lines, to see if they need 
any care or attention. We come in and check them daily. On the screen 
you can see the feeders all the way around the edge here. And then the 
colonies of stem cells growing on top of those feeder cells. The feed-
ers are these long, thin cells, all around the outside, and then you can 
just about see there the defined edge of a colony. That’s one colony, and 
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that’s another there (she points to lumpy, round islands of stem cells). 
One here, and one there. So the dark bits that you can see are cells that 
are beginning to die, and they curl up, lift off, and go into suspension. 
And that happens when the colonies get big enough to be cut up and 
moved onto fresh feeders. So I’m about to passage these, and what I will 
do is use a glass pipette, and I will score through the colonies like that 
(she traces a cross- hatch pattern with her index finger on the screen), 
and then each of those separate sections gets put into a fresh dish to 
regrow again, exponentially, to give me, hopefully, six colonies out of 
each one.”
“So how old is this line?”
“This line? This line was derived in about June last year. So it’s only 
eight months old.”
“And how come there are four colonies?”
“We replate, so, once I chop this one up into maybe six, I’ll move 
all of those into another well, so all six of those will grow and give me 
another colony.”
“So, did this start out as six pieces and now it is four pieces? Or there 
were only four pieces to begin with?”
She scans the well for other colonies. “I think in this one there were 
only four. So it was probably a smaller colony that we didn’t cut up quite 
so much.”
“I see, I see, because they grow at different rates, so . . .”
“Yes.”
“I guess that’s part of the art—you know how many pieces to cut it 
into.”
“It does take time, yes, to see what they’re doing, knowing when 
they’re happy, knowing when there’s something wrong, when to cut 
them, when to leave them, when to add a bit of extra something in the 
media.”
“Is this a happy one?”
“This is a happy one, yes.” She pauses, nodding, looking at the screen. 
“Yep, this one. Because we, ah, try whenever possible,” she pauses and 
turns to look at me, somewhat self- consciously, “not to come in every 
weekend. So I am cutting this one up today, so it will be happy for a 
couple of days, so when I come in on Monday, it will be ready to go 
again.”
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“So they are happy because they are growing steadily and regularly.”
“And the morphology is very good.”
“Right.”
“So I am just going to pop these in again, while I get ready to pas-
sage them.”
She picks up the two dishes and puts them very carefully back into 
the incubator.
“So they are probably not happy if they get moved around too much?”
“When you have just passaged them, they really are very delicate, 
but once they’re attached to the plate like that, they’re not so sensitive. 
But because we have got so many lines growing, and people are passag-
ing on different days, it’s best practice just to always be very careful. 
Like even just shutting the door very carefully (she makes a very slow, 
gentle movement with her arm, as if shutting the door in slow motion), 
so you don’t disturb anything that’s growing.”
“So you always have to be very gentle.”
“Yes, always assume there is something in there that needs extra 
attention.”
“Well you are obviously very good at it, because you get a lot of lines.”
Emma’s knowledge of her lines, and their needs, is crucial both in order to 
grow high- quality cells, and to give her some control over her own time. She 
and her team check their cells daily in order to see “if they need any care or 
attention.” But she also needs the cells to be especially “happy” over the week-
end so she can have some time off herself. She knows when they are happy, 
or not, both by their appearance and through her own experience over many 
years of cultivating cells under tightly controlled conditions. Consequently 
she is also aware of how much she doesn’t know about their needs, and for 
both of these reasons much of her work is performed as an extreme discipline 
of care: “it’s best practice just to always be very careful,” and to assume that 
some of the cells might need “extra attention.” It takes time to develop this 
sort of relationship with the cells—to come to know and understand their 
likes and dislikes. As in any relationship, it is important to know when they 
need a bit of attention and when they need to be left alone (and especially 
how to treat them right if you are going to abandon them for the weekend).
Emma’s relationship to the cells is heavily mediated by machinery, includ-
ing the incubator, the bench, and the microscope. Her ability to culture her 
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lines successfully depends on all of these, and in particular the video screen 
that is attached to the microscope. Although sophisticated—indeed, state of 
the art—the machinery is also crude: she can see the outlines of the cells, and 
enough to cut up the colony into pieces to replate it, but she cannot see any 
of the crucial metabolic processes that would tell her if the cell is truly happy.
In a sense, Emma can know her machines better than her cells: she can 
diagnose and repair a broken incubator more easily than a contaminated cell 
line, or one that simply fails to thrive. Similarly, she can know her lab team 
well enough to diagnose changes in their routine that might be necessary, and 
these can be communicated, implemented, rationalized, debated, changed, 
or written down as instructions. The relationalities of the clean lab are all 
about this kind of intense coordination between humans, their machines, and 
their work objects—indeed it is the fusion of these three that creates what 
Landecker describes as “technologies of living substance” (2007: 1).
lively Relations
For Haraway, as for Marx, it is the situated character of the “constitutive re-
lationalities” out of which new entities, such as human stem cell lines, make 
“the human” a necessarily historical category, but by its very hybridity also 
establishes new forms of “kinship” connecting humans, organisms, tools, “and 
much else.” As Haraway claims: “‘Human’ requires an extraordinary congeries 
of partners. Humans, wherever you track them, are products of situated re-
lationalities with organisms, tools, much else. We are quite a crowd, at all of 
our temporalities and materialities. . . . How many species are in the genus 
Homo now? Lots. And there are several genera for our close and ancestral par-
allel kin as well” (2006: 146). Haraway’s emphasis on the hybrid historicity of 
the human acknowledges both novelty and continuity. Recollecting the sense 
of the liveliness of tools, tool use, and technique that pervades the writing of 
both Marx and Haraway, we might note this is a crucial feature of how they 
both theorize technology—and thus be reminded that this is why the evolu-
tion of technique reveals deep historical continuities despite the fact that it 
is often changing radically. In the same way that relationality is described by 
both Haraway and Marx as the smallest unit of analysis in the study of human 
sociality, so too this could be said of technological devices, which are always 
part of larger systems—the vital linchpins, cogs, crankshafts, axles, or pumps 
always already interrelated through a kinship with their wider machinic en-
vironment. In terms of the “exact mechanisms” by which the stem cell lab 
functions, what is notable is the tight integration between them—uniting 
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human gestures and tools, tools and cells, machines and equipment, and the 
calibrating of the timing and sequence of their functions.
The manual labor of the lab workers is also reminiscent of the synergy 
between the human body and the machine described earlier by Marx. This 
proximity is one of the original contexts of posthuman anxiety, as it also is 
for transhuman or cybernetic optimism. For Marx, the situation was unques-
tionably human—no less than heroic, even—but also almost superhuman in 
its symbiotic vigor.6 Indeed, it is the liveliness and vitality of the lab environ-
ment that recalls the way in which Marx conceived of technology both as a 
kind of organism and as alive, which in turn comprise core elements of his 
(very early) theorization of the human as a technology. “He opposes himself 
to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and leg, head and 
hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s produc-
tions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world 
and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature” (mEcw, Vol. 35, 
Capital, Vol. 1, Book 1, C 7, section 1).
According to the technological dialectic at the heart of Marxist theory, 
humans are allied with their environment through tools; the environment 
is revitalized through human activity; and both are substantially reshaped 
as both nature and human nature are remade and instrumentalized. (There 
could hardly be a better description of a stem cell lab.) In the Marxist model 
of labor, humans are part of the force of nature, but in turn humanize nature, 
by adapting it to their own wants, thus also changing themselves (add instru-
ments, raw substances, and machines and you have the basic ecosystem of 
historical materialism). Had Marx, instead of Foucault, coined the phrase 
“life itself,” it would have described the fusion of human and tool, rather 
than of human and animal (indeed, this is arguably what he did, according to 
Bernard Stiegler [1998]). In contrast to the anthropocentrism of some of his 
depictions of the human- machine relation, there are hints in other passages 
of the greater emphasis on the agency of objects too, as has been emphasized 
within some branches of science studies (such as the work of Latour). As 
noted in the introduction to this volume, Marx describes the earth as both an 
organ and a tool house annexed to his own organs:
Thus Nature becomes one of the organs of his activity, one that he an-
nexes to his own bodily organs, adding stature to himself in spite of 
the Bible. As the earth is his original larder, so too it is his original tool 
house. It supplies him, for instance, with stones for throwing, grind-
ing, pressing, cutting, etc. The earth itself is an instrument of labour, 
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but when used as such in agriculture implies a whole series of other in-
struments and a comparatively high development of labour. No sooner 
does labour undergo the least development, than it requires specially 
prepared instruments. Thus in the oldest caves we find stone imple-
ments and weapons. In the earliest period of human history domesti-
cated animals, i.e., animals which have been bred for the purpose, and 
have undergone modifications by means of labour, play the chief part 
as instruments of labour along with specially prepared stones, wood, 
bones, and shells. (mEcw, Vol. 35, Capital, Vol. 1, Book 1, C 7, section 1)
Contrary to Scripture, according to Marx, the earth is a paradise for homo 
faber—the earth “his original larder” and itself “an instrument of labor.” Yet 
his description also moves beyond the notion of nature as mere supply, in par-
ticular in his reference to the increasingly complex “development” of labor’s 
relationships to its instruments and objects. In a distinctly anatomical idiom, 
which acquires new implications in the context of regenerative medicine 
and stem cell science, Marx describes mechanical tools as the “bones and 
muscles” of production, and more primitive tools, such as baskets and jars, 
as its “vascular system”—thus imagining the productive economy as the out-
come of increasing development and specialization of organs. “Among the in-
struments of labour, those of a mechanical nature, which, taken as a whole, 
we may call the bone and muscles of production, offer much more decided 
characteristics of a given epoch of production, than those which, like pipes, 
tubs, baskets, jars, etc., serve only to hold the materials for labour, which 
latter class, we may in a general way, call the vascular system of production. 
The latter first begins to play an important part in the chemical industries” 
(mEcw, Vol. 35, Capital, Vol. 1, Book 1, C 7, section 1).
Widening his evolutionary vision to include the “conductors of activity” 
necessary for the labor process to function, Marx describes the earth not only 
as a larder but as an instrument—a prosthetic technology functioning as a 
“locus standi to the laborer and a field of employment for his activity”: in sum, 
less a “standing reserve” in the Heideggerian sense than a live earth stock 
ready to be quickened into productive purpose by the laborer’s activity.7
In a wider sense we may include among the instruments of labour, in 
addition to those things that are used for directly transferring labour to 
its subject, and which therefore, in one way or another, serve as con-
ductors of activity, all such objects as are necessary for carrying on the 
labour- process. These do not enter directly into the process, but with-
out them it is either impossible for it to take place at all, or possible only 
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to a partial extent. Once more we find the earth to be a universal instru-
ment of this sort, for it furnishes a locus standi to the labourer and a field 
of employment for his activity. Among instruments that are the result of 
previous labour and also belong to this class, we find workshops, canals, 
roads, and so forth. (mEcw, Vol. 35, Capital, Vol. 1, Book 1, C 7, section 1)
In a particularly notable passage referring to “labor’s organism,” Marx de-
scribes the extraction of use value out of brute nature as regeneration, and 
imagines the living laborer rousing the rusted machine from its “death- 
sleep” through his “fire.” This aspect of labor—its role in activating both ma-
chines and materials—describes not only the outcome of the labor process, 
but its “elementary constituents.” It is out of these connections—between 
labor, technology, its energy, and its objects, that “things” are “made alive” by 
“labor’s organism”:
A machine which does not serve the purposes of labour is useless. In 
addition it falls prey to the destructive influence of natural forces. Iron 
rusts and wood rots. Yarn with which we neither weave nor knit, is cot-
ton wasted. Living labour must seize upon these things and rouse them 
from their death- sleep, change them from mere possible use- values into 
real and effective ones. Bathed in the fire of labour, appropriated as part 
and parcel of labour’s organism, and, as it were, made alive for the per-
formance of their functions in the process, they are in truth consumed, 
but consumed with a purpose, as elementary constituents of new use- 
values, of new products, ever ready as means of subsistence for indi-
vidual consumption, or as means of production for some new labour- 
process. (mEcw, Vol. 35, Capital, Vol. 1, Book 1, C 7, section 1)
At the heart of this complex set of analogies, in which machines are de-
picted as prey to the destructive, passive, entropic waste imposed by nature, 
against which living labor is depicted as rousing and seizing the machine to 
make it live again, is a vivid reproductive imagery, in which it is the coupling 
together of things with labor that produces a new kind of life. This feature of 
Marx’s depiction of labor’s connection to its objects is most explicitly cap-
tured in the semimythic, quasi- procreative image of the blacksmith at his 
forge. As Marx puts it succinctly: “The blacksmith forges and the product is a 
forging” (echoing Engels’s [1962: 81] similar claim that the human hand is not 
only an organ of labor but a product of it). In Marx’s archetypal, neoclassical, 
and pre- Christian image of the forge, “labor’s organism” is depicted not only 
as the offspring of a historical materialist system, but of a natural historical, 
90 chaptEr two
or even biological one (not unlike Darwin’s) in which machines, instruments, 
materials, and tools are “made alive” again through use (as he notes later in 
Volume 1 of Capital, “labor- power in use is labor itself,” Marx [1990]: 283). 
“In the labour- process, therefore, man’s activity, with the help of the instru-
ments of labour, effects an alteration, designed from the commencement, in 
the material worked upon. The process disappears in the product, the latter 
is a use- value. . . . Labour has incorporated itself with its subject: the former 
is materialised, the latter transformed. That which in the labourer appeared 
as movement, now appears in the product as a fixed quality without motion. 
The blacksmith forges and the product is a forging” (mEcw, Vol. 35, Capital, 
Vol. 1, Book 1, C 7, section 1). The power to give life through movement is 
analogized to the blacksmith’s ability to forge new tools in this figurative com-
parison representing the laborer’s ability—indeed imperative—to “take in 
hand,” to mind, to shepherd the idle, wasted natural potential that is equated 
with death.8 In this version of labor as reanimation there is a continuum be-
tween anthropocentrism (function, efficiency), instrumentality (tools), na-
ture (resources), and generativity (animation, development). As Marx makes 
clear, the action (force, cause) is dialectical—humans are reshaped by the 
reshaping they do, ditto the machines, the material, and the environment. 
And this process is also situated, or concretized: each tool is made as part of 
a larger system and as the outcome of a specific history, the traces of which it 
bears, and which hold it in place, giving it its biology, or genome, as it were.
Marx’s model of the living labor that quickens nature’s elementary re-
sources into useful animate existence is historically cumulative, and, like 
Darwin’s model of natural history, tools, bodies, and materials are molded 
and adapted through live action. Concrete technological forms, like species, 
evolve in this process of gradual transformation through the filter of labor:
Though a use- value, in the form of a product, issues from the labour- 
process, yet other use- values, products of previous labour, enter into 
it as means of production. The same- use- value is both the product of a 
previous process, and a means of production in a later process. Products 
are therefore not only results, but also essential conditions of labour.
With the exception of the extractive industries, in which the material 
for labour is provided immediately by Nature, such as mining, hunt-
ing, fishing, and agriculture (so far as the latter is confined to breaking 
up virgin soil), all branches of industry manipulate raw material, [in-
cluding] objects already filtered through labour, [or] already products 
of labour. Such is seed in agriculture. Animals and plants, which we 
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are accustomed to consider as products of Nature, are in their present 
form, not only products of, say last year’s labour, but the result of a grad-
ual transformation, continued through many generations. (mEcw, Vol. 
35, Capital, Vol. 1, Book 1, C 7, section 1, emphasis added)
In this passage, both the materials and the instruments of “living labor” 
are depicted as evolving “through many generations” so as to acquire their 
present form. This sense of the traces of the human hand can likewise be seen 
in the Darwinian model of natural selection, which was derived less from his 
account of either sexual selection or competition than from selective breed-
ing—or what he called the influence of “the breeder’s hand.” Likewise, it is 
the propagator’s hand in the stem cell lab that is refashioning natural organ-
isms as tools, in what is an increasingly hybrid technological matrix. Against 
the image of the “invisible hand” of economic competition proposed by Adam 
Smith, Marx offers the forge at work making forgings, the blacksmith’s hand 
at work leaving traces, echoed today by the handmade cells fueling the micro-
scopic productive economies of bioindustrialization.
Field Notes, Guy’s Stem Cell Lab, March 10, 2010
While the colonies waiting to be passaged sit in the incubator, Emma 
prepares her tools. She is standing in front of an eleventh- floor win-
dow overlooking south London in her clean room uniform: dark blue 
body suit, white- gloved hands, light blue head cap and mask, blue lab 
shoes. Several boxes of pipette tips and a small forest of vials in stands 
adorn the shelves beside her, while a cluster of electric appliances and 
a pile of spiral- bound notebooks sit on the countertop below. Emma re-
moves a small glass alcohol burner from the shelf and casually ignites 
it with a plastic cigarette lighter. “So there are various ways to passage 
the cells,” she begins, explaining that: “Passaging means lifting them up 
off their current feeder layer and placing them onto a fresh one. I pre-
fer to use a glass pipette. Other people will use some other tool, some 
tips, or needles; there are various methods that have been developed 
in different labs.” As she speaks she inserts a thin glass tube into the 
flame and begins heating it until it is soft enough to pull into an even 
thinner strand.
“Do you like to make your own pipettes?”
“I prefer it because your end is really, really fine” (she inspects the 
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end of her newly made pipette and delicately props it into a plastic 
stand alongside three others). “And when you have pulled about 400 
and you’re quick at it (she caps the flame, extinguishing it, and replaces 
the burner on the shelf) you can get a whole range of tips—some with 
very sharp corners on them, some that are slightly fatter or some that 
are slightly thinner, so that I can use the one that’s most appropriate 
for the cells I am cutting.” She picks up the pipette stand carefully with 
both hands and turns around to face the hood.
“So is it a little old fashioned to make them that way? Is that consid-
ered what you might call a traditional way to do it?”
“I think it’s fairly common, and I think probably for me, coming from 
embryology, [it’s normal] that you make your own pipettes. The prob-
lem we have with all of the methods people use at the moment is none 
of them qualify for gmp. Because it has to be a medical product, and if 
you can’t record [exactly what] it [is] (she gestures to the pipettes) it’s 
no longer a medical product. So we are going to have to find a different 
way of doing this, for gmp.”
“If you pulled one yourself that you quite liked, could you then give 
it to a company and they could manufacture one just like it?”
“We have done that actually, um, there was someone who worked 
with a company to make tips like the biopsy and the icsi pipettes, 
[which] are made by a company now. We don’t make our own, but it 
is the same idea. If we can make them in a standardized way, we could 
overcome the problem of their not being a product. The problem is 
that not enough people are buying them. So they cost about six pounds 
each. And I’ve got four there, to do one plate, and you multiply that by 
the number of plates you’re going to use (she starts shaking her head) 
and it’s just going to get astronomical. But the idea is spot on. That’s 
what we are trying to do. So it is in a packet, and sterilized.”9
“Because to process validate it for gmp you have to document its 
origin.”
“What has happened to it, where does it come from.”
“So I am just going to get that dish again.”
She walks to the incubator and carefully removes the dish of stem 
cells from the top right- hand corner compartment, and a feeder dish 
from the bottom left, closing the doors to each compartment, and the 
unit, with almost glacial slowness.
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“So I have the dish with the stem cells, and the dish with the feeder. 
And everything stays within the heated area of the surface so that they 
stay warm. And we have the phenyl red indicator in the media so that 
we can see if they have been out too long. Because if it goes really, really 
pink we know it is time to put them back in. It means that they are be-
coming too alkaline because you are losing the CO2. So it’s coming back 
out. Because they are in 6 percent in the incubator. So they lose their 
CO2 after a while.”
She focuses the microscope on the dish, which is illuminated from 
below by a light built into the bench—a well beneath a well. Turning 
away from the microscope view piece, she carefully inspects her pi-
pettes, examining them with her naked eye, and putting two back be-
fore settling on a third—a bit like a snooker player selecting a cue.
“So I just pick the one I like the look of most to start with.”
She is stabilizing the dish with her left index finger and thumb, while 
holding the chosen pipette in her right hand like a pencil. She could be 
about to sign her name on the stem cell colony.
“And I go in and score them into pieces that I think are the right size. 
And then because the pipettes are in the shape of a hook, I can use the 
bottom of the hook to gently lift them off the feeders.”
“Right. So you can score and hook with the same tool?”
“Yep, that’s why I like using them.”
“So do they stick to the feeders?”
“If they are beautifully undifferentiated and good- quality colonies, 
then they generally come off very easily. If they’ve started to differen-
tiate then because the cells—if they start making contact with each 
other, and start making contact with feeders, and the intracellular 
matrix becomes quite strong, then they become very sticky.”
“So you can almost also begin—not to characterize them exactly, but 
to learn about them by the feel of how much they stick?”
“Yes, for me it is definitely a fifty- fifty combination between how do 
they look and how do they feel. And then I know if they are good quality 
or not, and then I know what to do with them.”
“So it is partly what you can see and it’s partly what you just get a 
sense of by manipulating them.”
“Yes, and then the ones that are, generally, the ones that come away 
really nicely and [are] good quality I put in a well together. The ones 
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that aren’t so nice go in a well together, so that you know where your 
perfect ones are.”
“So you are kind of sorting them as you go along.”
“Yes. So then if you get some with not such good growth in one of 
your wells you know that it’s because you didn’t start off with particu-
larly brilliant cells. So the ones I’ve just cut I’m going to transfer into a 
fresh feeder plate. So we label the plate with the id of the cell line, and 
the date, and the passage number. And these were passage 6, so they 
are now passage 7. That gets labeled first. And then we just use a yellow 
tip. And suck up the pieces one by one.”
“And move six pieces to each well?”
“Yes, we will put them all in here together. And then I would repeat 
that for all of the colonies that are ready in that batch. Then they go 
back in the incubator. And we leave them untouched for about forty- 
eight hours. So they have plenty of time to stick, spread out, be happy. 
And then we check them, and we feed them and keep our records in 
our lab books.”
“So they won’t be hugely happy right now. But they might get quite 
happy over the weekend?”
“Yes. Yes.”
“And by Monday they should be very cheerful.”
“Yes, by Monday they should.”
“Great, and then you can start again!”
“It is continuous!”
In the same way the organism was reenvisaged as a lab at the origins of syn-
thetic chemistry (and the cell as a technology at the dawn of tissue culture), 
so too in stem cell labs today are some of the oldest manufacturing processes, 
such as the forging of tools, still in use in the context of contemporary bio-
science. The primordial arts of forged tool manufacture aid the propagator’s 
hand in what has become a vast project of recultivating human cellular effi-
ciency—a key sector of today’s bioeconomy. This neoagricultural technology 
of assisted generation is not one in which either tools or materials exist inde-
pendently of their histories or immediate, and more distant, contexts of use.
The hand- forged hook pipettes evoke the early agricultural tools so crucial 
to Marx’s definition of capital as stock, and of capitalism as the linkage of in-
animate stocks of techniques, machines, devices, and tools to the live stocks 
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of selectively bred crops (cotton, corn) and domesticated animals (cattle). 
The lifeblood of this system was human labor and the accumulated technical 
expertise needed for manufacture. Its vasculature was the infrastructure of 
roads, buildings, canals, storehouses, and transport vehicles. This is exactly 
what is happening in the bioindustrial revolution today, in which new auto-
mated machinery plays a crucial role alongside delicate, bespoke, handmade 
surgical tools for micromanipulation and cellular reconstruction. The crucial 
shift that will next take place will be successful financialization of this sector, 
and thus commercialization. dhl and FedEx will be as crucial to the regen-
erative medicine market as proprietary culture media and p1000 pipettes. 
Already the hospital infrastructure for replacement parts markets is being 
established in the form of new telerobotic virtual surgeries that can oper-
ate on a global scale. This too will be part of the crucial step change in scale 
needed to fully industrialize human biological products, just as it was for cot-
ton and wool in the 1800s.
Fueling this scale- up in the ability to rebuild human beings will not be any 
one particular sector or component or entrepreneur or technique, but their 
integration. The quasi- organismic quality of successful industrial systems, 
which become increasingly systemic as they develop in scale and degree of 
FigurE 2.1. The author with Emma in the lab. Photo by the author.
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internal organization, is not a new phenomenon—as Marx’s eyewitness ac-
counts of an earlier period of intense industrialization attest. Neither are the 
outcomes of such dramatic changes in mode of production unprecedented—
indeed they are by now cliché.
The main difference in the stem cell lab is that “labor’s organism” is being 
forged through a new fusion of the human and human reproductive substance 
as equipment. Not only are living human laborers making live human tools 
out of living human colonies of cells, but this project, and myriad like it all 
over the world, is being undertaken in the name of the most humanitarian 
of purposes—to provide improved health for future generations. In Marx’s 
terms, this task is also being undertaken for the purpose of “labor itself”—still 
a very relevant model, since cells in general, and human cells in particular, are 
increasingly being recruited for their untapped labor power. Indeed, the new 
lab is exclusively dedicated to their preservation, in order that they be more 
efficiently harnessed into service for an ever- widening range of purposes.
These purposes include the effort to establish new markets, as chapter 1 
demonstrated, by emphasizing government support for this new industry—
as yet not a major, or even significant, source of new commodities. It will 
remain to be seen how effectively the development of new human tools pur-
pose built to improve human health or new human stem cell labs designed 
to convert human reproductive substance into marketable products can be 
converted into a successful integration of public health objectives supported 
by private sector markets. For now, in the absence of a market in human stem 
cell products, the empirical question that is arguably part of the effort to chart 
the emerging political economy of biocapital is simply the relationship be-
tween tool, labor, and stock.
This is where both Marx and Haraway’s perspectives are especially helpful 
in identifying the kinds of questions we might ask of the new living human 
tools being manufactured in laboratories worldwide. In particular, what is 
helpful to understand about these newly technologized substances is their 
complex biological relations, manifest as both specific modes of reproduction 
and renaturalization as technologies of kinship. In order to parse the complex 
moral, economic, and political questions that will attend to the mass market-
ing of human stem cell products, and other tissue and cell commodities, it is 
arguably important to recognize how much this economy depends upon a re-
tooling of kinship and reproduction, as well as of cells and substances.
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“the Best tool You Can get”
As Haraway notes in her account of new genetic technologies, one of the 
most important tools at work in the conversion of living substance into either 
a commodity or tool is the scientific model. “Models,” she argues, are power-
ful conversion devices, “instruments built to be engaged, inhabited, lived” 
(Haraway 1997: 135). It is a similarly central premise of this book that the 
logic of ivF is powerful not only because ivF provides a working model of a 
reproductive mechanism, or because this model is itself productive of new 
offspring—and thus a means of reproduction, as well as a depiction of it. In 
vitro fertilization is a powerful model in the synthetic sense, in that it is not 
only a bridge between theory and practice, between in vivo and in vitro, be-
tween imagining and touching. It is a model that has become a platform—a 
globally disseminated platform with a life of its own, now serving science, 
medicine, industry, the media, government, and even the entertainment in-
dustry. Through this model a kinship is established also to the most intimate 
features of family life—indeed the basis of family life itself, in the form of 
producing biological offspring.
Yet while the modeling role of ivF is already, for all of these reasons, a sin-
gularly compelling example of Haraway’s claim that “fundamentally, models 
are more interesting in technoscience than metaphors” (1997: 135), there is 
still more to its significance in the realms of bioscience, where the connec-
tions between ivF and modeling appear to grow ever more complex. More 
than a model either “of” or “for,” in Clifford Geertz’s (1966: 56) terms, ivF is 
a source model, or stem, for new generations of models and modeling. It is 
an example of what Haraway (1997: 135) describes as one of the “lively matri-
ces” of technoscience. At the ivF–stem cell interface are new connections of 
shared reproductive substance to both tools and the ethical protocols that 
govern their use to intervene in genetic diseases. The new dish technologies 
being manufactured in labs connected to ivF clinics rely not only upon new 
biological connections to tools as offspring, but new technological definitions 
of being human. At the same time, tools are differently humanized through 
this process. As we trace the provenance of a human dish model of disease, we 
thus follow an increasingly familiar path of engineered human reproductive 
substance—brought into being, as before, through a union of reproductive 
hope, future promise, and scientific innovation. To make what the scientific 
director of the Guy’s Stem Cell Lab describes (below) as “the best tool you 
can get” to develop cures for genetic disease, a dish model of that condition 
derived directly from an affected human embryo is beyond compare.
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Making Natural Human Mutation Models for Science and Industry
Dr. Dusko Ilic, senior lecturer in stem cell science in the Guy’s Stem 
Cell Lab, explains to me why human embryonic stem cell models of dis-
ease (“dish models”) are “the best tool you can get.”
sF: So maybe if you could just give me an idea of what the advan-
tages of a dish model would be, say compared to an animal model?
di: So if you are talking about different monogenic diseases, they 
can be modeled the best with human embryonic stem cells or induced 
pluripotent cells. These cells can be differentiated into different cell 
types such as neurons, muscle cells, or whatever is the cell type that 
carries the most pathology. With these cells we can then model disease 
in vitro, in the laboratory. The advantage of this system when compared 
with animal models is working in the human system avoids species- 
specific differences. Although animal models are invaluable and irre-
placeable for studying disease in a whole- body context, they provide 
a limited representation of human pathophysiology. In addition, stem 
cells are an ideal tool to reduce the number of animals, complexity, 
and costs associated with animal experiments in drug development and 
toxicology.
sF: So if you were looking at a particular mutation, would it be an 
advantage that the mutation was, as it were, a natural mutation as op-
posed to say a knock- in mutation in a mouse?
di: It would from one point. I mean, there is no difference whether 
mutation occurs naturally or it is generated in the lab. As I mentioned, 
animals cannot replicate everything that is going [on] in the humans 
and obviously the best way that you can do lab work is with a human 
source of cells. It is still technically challenging to make specific mu-
tations in human embryonic stem cells. This is easy to do in mouse, 
because mouse embryonic stem cells are more prone to homologous 
recombination, et cetera. You can do knock- in technologies or knock 
out genes. In human cells it is almost impossible and has a very, very, 
very [much] lower efficacy, so that is why we are aiming to get natural 
mutations.
sF: Right, right, right. So that is why you would be using pgd [pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis] embryos.
di: Absolutely. Absolutely. So those embryos, and cells from those 
embryos, they can be used. They are clinically unsuitable, and they are 
living tools 99
not used. And so the other option would be just discarding them. Like 
this they can be converted into very, very useful tools to address mecha-
nisms of disease and also be a very good model for potential drug dis-
covery. If you get a new drug, develop a new drug, you want to see 
how harmful or how beneficial the drug is, for this particular disease. 
Currently tests are done in animal cell lines, which are not the same as 
humans, as I mentioned before, or in human lines that are transformed 
that carry various mutations and that are more closer to malignant cells 
than to normal. Thus, the data may not be as clear and strong as one 
would wish. Therefore, cell lines derived from pgd embryos are actu-
ally the best tool that you can get.
At work in this description of why harnessing natural mutations is far pref-
erable to using animal cells or microbiology models are both a highly tech-
nical and a commonsense logic—just as in the case of ivF, which relies on 
a similar combination of obvious mimesis and alteration. Not surprisingly, 
models of genetic disease made from embryos donated by couples undergoing 
pgd, in order to avoid commencing a pregnancy with an embryo affected by 
serious genetic disease, are superior to those using either nonhuman animal 
cells or subcellular protocols. It is precisely this logic that compels many pgd 
patients to donate these embryos to research scientists working on means to 
treat serious genetic diseases that are often fatal. Most of Emma’s lines are 
thus derived from the context of pgd—a technique that was developed via 
ivF, but also a therapeutic procedure that was crucial in the social legitima-
tion of ivF in the U.K. (its potential use for the alleviation of genetic disease 
as well as of infertility strengthening the case for the legalization of human 
embryo research in the 1980s; see Franklin and Roberts [2006]).
People working in the lab are very conscious of the combined reasons why 
the human reproductive substance they are using is “special”: it is scientifi-
cally unique (“the best”) and also personally unique (it comes from a couple 
having treatment). At the heart of the merging of the world of ivF (its history, 
its logic, its technical pedigree, and its evolution as a research platform) with 
stem cell research, in a future- oriented lab built like a giant human petri dish, 
to hothouse new mechanisms for human repair, is thus a new kind of kinship 
linking reproductive substance to regenerative medicine—a biological kin-
ship through which this substance is shared, cultured, and reproduced tech-
nologically. The dish model of disease that results—the human model that is 
100 chaptEr two
better because it is naturally human, the model that is “the best tool you can 
get”—is not just a model of molecular pathways, or a model of human disease. 
It is a model, and even a proof, of a promissory future, in which the tool kit of 
human biology is put to work more efficiently and economically. It is thus not 
only a model tool, but a conception model of the visionary promise of human 
repair forged in human cells (Franklin 2013). If it is thus also a new model of 
technology as kinship, and of kinship as technology, it might also be a useful 
looking glass into the question of what it means to be “after ivF” in all of the 
senses of this term.
Conclusion
From all of the perspectives rehearsed in the past two chapters, we can see 
how the logic of ivF is at once that of technology and yet also transformative 
of how we understand this important term sociologically and historically, as 
well as philosophically. Echoing many of the arguments within science and 
technology studies, ivF emerges as a case study in both biosociality and bio-
power, while also extending some of the more established meanings of these 
terms. Similarly, “reproductive technology” is widened to include more than 
fertility treatment, to encompass a process that can be instructively observed 
both close up and from the distance of as far away as Marx’s understandings 
of the human- tool- substance relationships that informed his account of the 
emergence of industrial manufacturing technologies. As Haraway’s descrip-
tion of technoscience as a world dependent upon, and emergent through, the 
formation of newly hybridized historical kinships of biological connections 
and living tools suggests, the social relationships that comprise the smallest 
unit of analysis are never separate from the workings of the technological sys-
tems that may appear to have an independent, reified existence as forces in 
the world.
If, as I have attempted to show in this chapter, the ivF–stem cell inter-
face reveals not only how new technologies of reproductive substance emerge 
out of established norms, but also how the logics of these norms evolve and 
change. A more specific question is how the traffic through the hole in the 
wall can yield some insight into what kind of making of what kind of life is oc-
curring as this novel gateway delivers new biological technologies. How does 
the life of the lab relate to the life being cultured inside it—what originary 
technics animate the reproduction of living tools? How are these received 
and translated, and what are they pointed toward? In the following chapters, 
some of the exact mechanisms by which we might begin to approach these 
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questions of technological life are explored with a view to foregrounding a 
richer intersection between them. It is from these perspectives that the prom-
ise of both Haraway’s and Firestone’s technological politics can be more fully 
realized, particularly in terms of their attention to the intersections of sex, 
gender, kinship, reproduction, and science. It is in the space of the widened 
biological relations these entail that we can better understand and character-
ize the condition of being after ivF.
FigurE 2.2. All members of the lab have their own clean shoes that are left in the 
changing area when they leave the lab. Photo by the author.
thRee embryo Pioneers
On November 17, 1944, U.S. president Franklin Delano Roosevelt commis-
sioned a report from the Office of Scientific Research and Development in-
tended to “make known to the world as soon as possible the contributions 
which have been made during our war effort to scientific knowledge.” His in-
tentions were both reparative and translational. As one of his last acts in office, 
the author of the New Deal sought to turn swords into plowshares by bring-
ing the science of war into the service of peace, “with particular reference to 
the war of science against disease” and an emphasis on “what the government 
can do now and in the future to aid research” (Roosevelt 1944). The resulting 
report, “Science—the Endless Frontier,” authored by Vannevar Bush, head of 
the Office of Scientific Research and Development, was published in Washing-
ton in 1945, shortly after Roosevelt’s death and just before news of the atomic 
bomb was released to the American public.1 An “instant smash hit,” as one of 
Bush’s colleagues is reported to have remarked on the day following its release 
(Kevles 1977: 23), the report’s contents would not only guide science policy 
in the United States throughout the twentieth century and beyond, but would 
define an enduring worldwide ethos—and lasting idiom—for the scientific 
pursuit of the unknown in the name of the public good.2
Roosevelt’s letter introduced the now- famous frontier analogy that would 
guide his final mission on behalf of science. Evoking the spirit of national re-
pair that infused many of his speeches during the Depression era, he imag-
ined the progress of science as a new American frontier. The letter ended with 
a call for a new kind of pioneering on the “frontiers of the mind”: “New fron-
tiers of the mind are before us, and if they are pioneered with the same vision, 
boldness, and drive with which we have waged this war we can create a fuller 
and more fruitful employment and a fuller and more fruitful life” (Roosevelt 
1944). Bush began his ensuing report with reference to the defining historic 
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role of the U.S. government of protecting access to new frontiers, claiming it 
was an “American tradition” that “has made the United States great”: “It has 
been basic United States policy that Government should foster the opening of 
new frontiers. It opened the seas to clipper ships and furnished land for pio-
neers. It is in keeping with the American tradition—one that has made the 
United States great—that new frontiers shall be made accessible for develop-
ment by all American citizens” (Bush 1945).
Bush was an engineer from New England, educated at mit, and deeply 
involved in the scientific contributions to U.S. military efforts during both 
world wars. He later became the first director of the National Science Foun-
dation in 1950, on which organization’s website his famous report remains 
prominently accessible more than half a century later. The American frontier 
analogy he was bequeathed by Roosevelt to guide his task of redefining the 
postwar role of American science would quickly become one of the most fre-
quently employed idioms to describe the pursuit of scientific knowledge and 
discovery, as well as the translation of science into useful applications, now 
defined by the National Science Foundation as the “critical path.”3 Today the 
frontier analogy is ubiquitous in descriptions of scientific exploration, and 
is virtually synonymous with scientific discovery. It is the dominant trope of 
many countries’ science policy discourse, and much academic scholarship on 
science as well as media coverage, corporate mission statements, and product 
advertising. Everything from stem cells to nanotechnology is today described 
as a new frontier—indeed it might be even argued the concept of the frontier 
has been reborn in these contexts (see figure 3.1).4
the Reproductive Frontier
Reproductive biomedicine is a good example of a twentieth- century science 
that came of age on the postwar scientific frontier mapped out by Bush. In-
deed, given its agricultural origins and often pragmatic aims, reproductive 
biology could be a poster science for the frontier ethos on which Bush’s re-
port is based. Control of reproduction, or what Philip Pauly calls “culturing 
nature,” was a prominent American frontier concern because of its impor-
tance to both horticulture and husbandry during the transition from settle-
ment to industrialization.5 To a large extent it was an experimental science 
that began on the farm in the form of agricultural improvement—or what 
Deborah Fitzgerald (1990) calls “the business of breeding.” Both plant and 
animal reproduction were dominant concerns at newly formed, postsettle-
ment Midwestern U.S. colleges such as the University of Illinois—founded in 
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1867 and originally named Illinois Industrial University. The founding of the 
Society for the Study of Reproduction at the University of Illinois at Urbana- 
Champaign in 1967 reflects the field’s significant and ongoing links to the land 
grant universities established to provide education in the settlement areas, 
with their prominent emphasis on agricultural improvement, the veterinary 
sciences, and medicine—as well as industry.6 Postwar reproductive biosci-
ence, as both Adele Clarke (1998) and Evelyn Fox Keller (2002) have shown, 
was part of the shift to biology that characterized the second half of the twen-
tieth century, with its emphasis on the logics of life rather than the physics 
of death—thus in some ways confirming exactly the transfer Roosevelt envis-
FigurE 3.1. In this 
editorial from May 20, 
2005, the Guardian 
emphasizes both the 
desirability and the 
legality of pioneering 
human embryonic stem 
cell research involving 
the cloning of human 
embryos using the 
“Dolly technique.” As 
the editorial points 
out, the goal of this 
initiative was primarily 
technical—and there 
remains a “long road 
to travel before there 
will be viable treatment 
procedures.” Copyright 
Guardian News 
and Media Ltd., 2005 
(www.guardian.co.uk).
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aged from the sciences of war into a war on disease. The development of ivF, 
like the earlier introduction of artificial insemination into livestock breeding, 
recapitulates many of the definitive features of technological innovation that 
characterize postwar reproductive biology and its translation into more wide-
spread commercial and industrial applications.7
However, and as this chapter charts, the evolution of ivF was also— 
perhaps more like an actual frontier—often haphazard and fortuitous (as is 
the business of breeding). Among other reasons for its meandering path, its 
history can be read as the evolution of technique through hands- on explora-
tory experimentalism, as much as the advance of basic scientific understand-
ing or clearly specified practical goals.8 Not a few of the major techniques 
used in reproductive biomedicine were discovered by accident, such as intra-
cytoplasmic sperm injection and the ability to freeze mammalian gametes 
(Gordon 2003). It is, as noted earlier, one of the most prominent historical 
ironies of ivF that much of the research leading to its eventual transfer “into 
man” was originally intended to restrict, not promote, fertility. As we shall 
see in this chapter, several of the most prominent figures associated with the 
development of human ivF, including Robert Edwards, were funded by phil-
anthropic institutions such as the Ford Foundation in order to improve the 
efficacy of contraception. The “developments in embryology” referred to by 
Shulamith Firestone (1972) in chapter 2, for example, were aimed at popu-
lation control—a topic that she, like many political activists and social com-
mentators in the 1960s and 1970s, considered to be the single most important 
issue facing the human race.
Although the frontier idiom as it is used to describe scientific progress is 
associated with the steady march of knowledge “forward,” other definitions 
of the frontier, like many frontier histories, emphasize the opposite—namely 
the frontier as a site of confusion, hybridity, destruction, and conflict. Both 
meanings of the frontier have relevance to the history of disciplining repro-
duction. In attempting to depict the early history of ivF in this chapter, I have 
emphasized both the search for knowledge that would offer a critical path 
to applications, and the haphazard quality of research in the area of human 
reproduction—arguing this was preceded by a similar pattern within experi-
mental embryology. Generally lacking a unified hypothesis or theory, the 
history of embryology was characterized by Joseph Needham in the 1930s 
as largely “ad hoc” (1935: 17). In part this is because embryology, like most 
experimental sciences, is highly tool dependent. Episodes from the history 
of experimental embryology are thus presented in this chapter not only be-
cause they illustrate the technologization of reproductive substance that pre-
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cedes clinical ivF, but because they confirm the importance of what Clarke 
and Fujimura (1992) describe as “the right tools for the job.”9 Even Wilhelm 
Roux’s work on “developmental mechanics”—often cited as the origin of ex-
perimental embryology—is more often celebrated for the innovative experi-
mental technique he introduced than his often inconclusive scientific re-
sults.10 This emphasis on the importance of technical skill, and the invention 
of new tools, is very striking in the history of the reproductive frontier, and 
is defined by Needham (1935: 17) as the core “limiting factor” in the advance 
of embryology.11
Of course the interdependence of knowledge and technique characterizes 
all sciences, and it is not uncommon for technological discoveries encoun-
tered either by accident or by sheer luck to redirect scientific inquiry down 
new paths—paths that emerge in the wake of technological advances that 
make them both possible and passable, only acquiring a direction in retro-
spect. Interestingly, some of these new paths appear because technologies 
are passed around, being put to new uses that expand their remit, and thus 
acquiring value, like capital, through circulation. A chief means of technologi-
cal passaging or transfer in embryology is the movement of technique across 
species—through interspecific technology transfer. For example, in the long- 
unsuccessful effort to fertilize a human egg in vitro, Robert Edwards eventu-
ally borrowed the culture media one of his graduate students (Barry Bavister) 
had developed for hamsters. Following its success with human ova, Edwards 
described this medium as a “magic fluid” that had helped not only to pave the 
way to human ivF but to topple scientific orthodoxy: “Once again orthodox 
scientific opinion had been proven wrong” (Edwards and Steptoe 1980: 82). 
Here, as is typical of the history of embryology, and of ivF, is the sequence 
whereby a cherished hypothesis falls in the wake of a successful, application- 
led, technical breakthrough.12 In vitro fertilization is not unusual in having a 
rather fumbling as well as an eventually distinguished scientific ancestry. This 
is what arguably makes it interesting from the point of view of understanding 
both science and reproduction as frontiers that are shaped by open- ended ex-
ploration largely based on the use of handmade and hand- held tools.
This chapter thus addresses “the question concerning technology” in re-
lation to ivF by using the frontier idiom to explore what is meant by tech-
nological pioneering, manifest as the technical exploration of reproductive 
mechanisms. While offering a background of technique to ivF and embryo 
transfer, this chapter also focuses on what the terms “frontier” and “tech-
nology” mean in relation to each other, and what happens to this relationship 
when it is reproductive interiority that is being charted, mechanized, and 
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domesticated. How do we understand the concept, for example, of embryo 
pioneering? What does it mean for reproduction to be “made available for 
development” in order to produce a more “fruitful way of life”? What work 
does the frontier analogy do in the context of experimental embryology, and 
what kinds of contact, conversion, and contingency does an analysis of this 
analogic idiom reveal?
Like Marx, Joseph Needham argued that “the Carlylean tendency to regard 
the history of science as a succession of inexplicable geniuses arbitrarily be-
stowing knowledge upon mankind has now generally been given up as quite 
mythological. A scientific worker is necessarily a child of his time and the in-
heritor of the thought of many generations” (1935: 1). More recent science 
studies scholars, such as Joan Fujimura, similarly argue that the “problem 
path” of any particular experiment evolves through “situated interactions,” 
emphasizing, like Needham (1935: 7–8), that experimental embryologists’ 
problems coevolved with their instruments (Fujimura 1996: 156; and see also 
the work of Suchman 1987, 1995, 2007). Technology, in these models, cannot 
be separated from conceptual equipment, historical conditions, cultures of 
the workplace, or the wider social milieu. Scientific apprehension is based on 
a prosthetic imagination: experimental practice relies on inherited cultures 
of technique, and the maintenance of the traditional artisanal skills needed 
to reproduce vital equipment and devices. Inevitably, technological “probing” 
or “reaching” also implies a gap between the immediate conditions of work 
and a future yet to be shaped. As the British social anthropologist Alfred Gell 
pointed out in his essay on technology in 1988, “technology is coterminous 
with the various networks of social relationships that allow for the transmis-
sion of technical knowledge, and provide the necessary conditions for co-
operation between individuals in technical activities” and these conditions, he 
adds, by definition involve “a certain degree of circuitousness.” He continues: 
“Techniques form a bridge, sometimes only a simple one, sometimes a very 
complicated one, between a set of ‘given’ elements . . . and a goal- state that 
is to be realised making use of these givens” (Gell 1988: 6). In other words, 
“technical means are roundabout means of securing some desired result” and 
“tools . . . are an important category of elements which ‘intervene’ between 
a goal and its realization” (6). In chapter 4 I return to Gell’s analysis of tech-
nology in the context of what he describes as “Technology of Reproduction,” 
namely kinship—“a set of technical strategies for managing our reproductive 
destiny via an elaborate sequence of purposes” (7). For the purposes of ad-
dressing ivF as a technology in this chapter, however, it is his discussion of 
technology’s connection to magic and free play that concern us first.
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Following both Malinowski and Lévi- Strauss, Gell defines magic as a form 
of free play: “Magic consists of a symbolic ‘commentary’ on technical strate-
gies,” he suggests, comparing it to the spontaneous imaginative play of chil-
dren’s pretend games. This type of play is characterized by its imaginative 
projection (“Look, I am an airplane!”) that reaches “beyond the frontiers of 
the merely real” (Gell 1988: 8). Play, in this sense, is a prosthetic—a reaching, 
probing, exploratory exercise—to engage with what is beyond its actual con-
ditions. Like magic, it “sets an ideal standard, not to be approached in reality, 
towards which practical technical action can nonetheless be oriented.” Gell 
continues:
Technology develops through a process of innovation, usually one 
which involves the re- combination and re- deployment of a set of exist-
ing elements or procedures toward the attainment of new objectives. 
Play also demonstrates innovativeness—in fact, it does so continuously, 
whereas innovation in technology is a slower and more difficult pro-
cess. Innovation in technology does not usually arise as the result of the 
application of systematic thought to the task of supplying some obvious 
technical “need,” since there is no reason for members of any societies 
to feel “needs” in addition to the ones they already know how to fulfil. 
Technology, however, does change, and with changes in technology, 
new needs come into existence. The source of this mutability, and the 
tendency toward ever- increasing elaboration in technology must, I 
think, be attributed, not to material necessity, but to the cognitive role 
of “magical” ideas in providing the orienting framework within which 
technological activity takes place. (Gell 1988: 8)
One way to understand the frontier idiom, according to Gell’s description, 
is as a form of magical thinking, which sets an orientation to the task of ex-
ploration beyond the reach of existing elements or procedures “toward the 
attainment of new objectives.” This orientation is what directs the frontier ex-
ploration toward a reconciliation of mental and material equipment. Notably, 
as an orienting framework, the frontier is by definition temporary: eventu-
ally, frontiers become something else. An important feature of the frontier is 
that it is, like the horizon, a temporary line, establishing a relationship rather 
than a place—indeed its definition has less to do with an actual place than 
an imagined space. Above all the frontier describes a set of possibilities: like 
Gell’s imaginative play, it is a magical idea. Unlike the reach of Gell’s imagina-
tive play, however, the frontier can be used to reimagine both the future and 
the past—thus functioning as a kind of conversion device, in both time and 
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space. The frontier idiom is most specific or real when it is imagined in the 
past, invoking an actual historical scene that serves as an originating ground 
of present- day conditions. This has been especially true of the frontier narra-
tives of the New World, such as in the United States and Australia, where the 
frontier idiom has been accompanied by a distinctive national ethos. Here, 
the frontier idiom is at its narrowest and least imaginative—functioning as 
a defensive panacea or apologetic myth.13 At the other end of the spectrum 
is the translation of the lost frontier that is behind into a future- oriented 
idiom—such as that of endless scientific progress that lies ahead. In this con-
text, the frontier that is still ahead is recharged with the promise of unex-
plored territory offering an open- ended prospect onto a promising unknown, 
the core symbol of which is discovery.
The translation of a historic frontier narrative into a future- oriented invi-
tation is one reason why, despite its parochial and ideological American ori-
gins, the endless frontier analogy is today equally British and European in its 
widespread use as an aspirational discourse of scientific innovation. Indeed, 
the frontier analogy is among the paramount examples of idioms that have 
traveled back to Europe from the colonial context.14 The same can be said of 
the “manifest destiny” ethos that the frontier idiom expresses—the moral im-
perative to defend technological progress in aid of human betterment, also 
a colonial Americanism.15 Like the Californian vines expatriated to restock 
their terroir d’origine on the Continent in the wake of phylloxera, the American 
frontier analogy has gone inconspicuously native, even (and perhaps espe-
cially) in Europe.
The colonial connotations of the frontier idiom are, of course, not entirely 
absent from its current usage as an idiom for scientific progress. The image 
of “walking hopefully into the scientific foothills” is one that still carries with 
it the sense of duty and conquest that is as recognizably British or European 
as American, especially when it is used to describe medical or scientific ex-
ploration of the unknown. We need only listen to Sir Ian Lloyd in the British 
House of Commons in the spring of 1990, as Parliament debated the future 
of embryo research, at a turning point in the passage of legislation that has 
since made the United Kingdom a leading center of innovation in the life sci-
ences, to be reminded of how seamlessly a moral sense of necessity, respon-
sibility, obligation, exploration, and progress can be woven together by using 
the frontier idiom to evoke a sense of both destiny and duty. Describing the 
technologization of reproductive substance as a map, Lloyd argues its comple-
tion signifies no less than the successful passage into a new phase of human 
civilization:
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The discovery of dna, the very blueprint of life, is certainly awe- 
inspiring, and when the full map of the human genome is known . . . 
we shall have passed through a phase of human civilization as signifi-
cant as, if not more significant than, that which distinguished the age 
of Galileo from that of Copernicus, or that of Einstein from that of 
Newton. . . . We have crossed a boundary of unprecedented impor-
tance. . . . There is no going back. . . . We are walking hopefully into the 
scientific foothills of a gigantic mountain range. Hitherto, man has had 
no option but to come to terms with a serious burden of human im-
pairment, but now he can look ahead, perhaps a long way, to its even-
tual elimination. . . . For us to forswear the assistance which science 
can provide in modifying that code to the advantage of the human race 
would be an indefensible abdication of responsibility. It would cross the 
portcullis of this place with a most sinister and destructive bar. (Sir Ian 
Lloyd, hc, 23.4.90, cols. 96–98)
Significantly, the image of “walking hopefully into the scientific foothills 
of a gigantic mountain range” evokes the quintessentially American frontier 
landscape with figure (in Europe a frontier is a border between two nation- 
states).16 It invokes the equally American manifest destiny model of future 
progress to be gained through the risks and potential costs necessary to 
chart the unknown. Importantly, it is not only the process of discovery that 
is being evoked here, but its reward in the form of scientific and technologi-
cal progress: in this case the “awe- inspiring” full map of genetic interiority 
that will inaugurate a significant new phase of civilization. The progressive, 
linear conception of history evoked in the image of looking ahead, “perhaps a 
long way,” conflates the time and space of progress into the single figure of a 
forward- marching pioneer, who in turn invokes the custodial, protective duty 
of Parliament. It is on behalf of both the lone explorer and the lives of future 
generations that Parliament must perform its forward- looking duties. Indeed, 
there is no going back.
As this chapter argues, there are many reasons why the history of ivF is 
imagined through the frontier idiom, particularly in its American form, in 
which the frontier is a crucible of rebirth. This was the meaning of the frontier 
that was pivotal to Frederick Jackson Turner’s influential hypothesis estab-
lishing the American frontier as the soil out of which a new kind of man was 
reborn—a man with his back to Europe, a new outlook, and a distinctive 
intellect (essentially that of an enterprising engineer). In the contemporary 
period, as we shall see, it might be argued that the frontiers of reproduc-
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tion and regeneration have become yet again a different kind of crucible, in-
deed a literal set of containers for rebirth—the test tubes, petri dishes, and 
new labs in which the future of humanity is being regenerated and remade, 
in order to enact a duty, once again, of cultivation in the name of human 
progress. It is here too that we see in the idiom of the frontier the clear out-
lines of a model of technology as kinship, providing both the ethos and the 
map of civilized  regeneration manifest as the cultivation of human reproduc-
tive  substance.
Cultivating technique
As well as providing an instrumental means, a cognitive orientation, and a 
kind of prosthetic reach, technology is a form of material culture—a legacy 
of technique as substance, inheritance, or stock. Just as the tools by which the 
soil is cultivated in any particular field or region of settlement are inseparable 
from its more general mode of reproduction, so any form of cultivation can 
be characterized, in part, by its technological culture—the specific form of 
its technological arts, tools, and devices. The history of embryology is not dis-
similar to agriculture in having evolved as a tool culture as well as a concep-
tual one: its technical characteristics and its craft have developed inconsis-
tently, and variously, but cumulatively and interactively across diverse fields 
of innovation and experimentation—not unlike viticulture, milling, or weav-
ing. Although technological evolution is never purely technical, there is none-
theless a genealogy of technique that can be followed, in the form of a sub-
stantialized legacy of skill and knowledge—and one that is passed around as 
well as passed down. Such genealogies of technique can be seen in the devel-
opment of experimental embryology as it is employed variously to investigate 
reproduction, heredity, animal and plant breeding, development, determina-
tion, growth, and myriad other topics on its way to generating the possibility 
of ivF “in man.” As noted earlier, this evolution is not simply linear but circu-
latory—we might even think of experimental embryology as an accumulation 
of techniques that evolve through circulation, as they are passaged through 
a range of contexts, becoming interwoven with a diverse set of fundamental 
and practical problems in the process. This is also how we might approach the 
sociology of technology: in the same way that Lévi- Strauss (1969: 479) bor-
rows Maurice Leenhardt’s image of “the action of the needle for sewing roofs, 
which, weaving in and out, leads backwards and forwards the same liana, 
holding the straw together,” so do the tungsten steel needles and Spemann pi-
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pettes of the embryologists (figure 3.2) substantialize a technological kinship, 
or tool genealogy, uniting nineteenth- century science with techniques that 
are still in use today, and agricultural applications with those of clinical medi-
cine. The historical examples presented to illustrate this interwoven fabric, 
or texture, of technique in this chapter are thus not meant to imply that there 
is, in the conventional progressive sense, a linear process of embryo research 
culminating in the triumph of the miracle baby. Rather, in a more anthro-
pological style of episodic or indicative description, and with Gell’s sense of 
play in mind, the techniques of embryology can be observed, like the famous 
circulating connubium, as transferable, interspecific relations that together 
substantialize a kind of technological kinship.17
In an attempt to explore these kinships of embryological technique as a 
background to contemporary ivF and embryo research, the following de-
scriptions are intended to provide neither a Darwinian narrative for tech-
FigurE 3.2. Embryological 
tools including a Spemann 
micropipette. From 
Keen A. Rafferty Jr., 
Methods in Experimental 
Embryology of the Mouse, 
p. 3. Copyright 1970 by The 
Johns Hopkins University 
Press. Reprinted with 
permission of The Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
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nology nor a progressive chronology of innovation driven by necessity and 
utility. The effort instead is to put under closer inspection the development 
of specific cultures of embryological technique, such as those discussed in 
chapter 2, in the depiction of how to passage a stem cell line, and to mine 
these examples for resources that are pertinent to the question of what it 
means to be after ivF.18 This chapter thus also emphasizes that despite its 
association with contemporary biomedical novelty, many of the basic tech-
niques involved in ivF can be traced back to the nineteenth century and be-
yond. In terms of their development over time, what we can observe in the 
history of ivF is a pattern of technological transfer that circulates through di-
verse model organisms and animal models, creating a distinctive animal- tool 
interface in this interspecific field by interconnecting reproductivity across 
widely disparate sites of intervention. It is on the basis of this accumulated 
experimental and technical knowledge—of what works in one model system, 
and the extent to which it can be transferred (by analogy, model, or tool) to 
another—that much of the work leading to human clinical ivF was founded. 
This “inter” work principally involved the removal of mammalian ova, their 
culture in vitro, in vitro fertilization of the egg, and transfer of the resultant 
embryo either to a recipient uterus or to another glass container.
The process we can thus observe is one of building up an interspecific 
system of reproductive workings that combine technology with substance 
in the name of both exploration and control. As a work object, reproduc-
tivity thus acquires a new meaning and scale as a biotechnical entity that is 
at once both sub- and suprahuman, while technology in this system becomes 
a shared substance that can no longer be seen as separate from reproductive 
matter. One of the reasons it is in some ways surprising that ivF was not ap-
plied to humans much earlier is because of the intensity of research in the 
field of embryology in the first part of the twentieth century, followed by an 
equally striking concentration on early mammalian development in the post-
war period. But human reproduction per se was not the primary goal of much 
research leading up to human ivF. At issue was the constitution of a much 
larger system of biotechnical reproductivity—and not so much a mode of re-
production as a model of it. It is in the context of this more general effort to 
model reproductivity that the unity of biology and technique are substantial-
ized as its workings or mechanics.19
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century are renowned as a dense 
period of embryological investigation, conventionally associated with the 
technological and conceptual shifts that give rise to experimental embryology 
as an emergent modern scientific field (later giving way, as Haraway [1976] 
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chronicles, to the organicism and cybernetic feedback loops of the systems 
analogy that still predominate in biology today). It is during this period that 
the tool kit of embryology underwent one of the most important changes that 
would later enable the development of a huge variety of practical reproduc-
tive applications, as well as fundamental research experiments, namely the 
process through which the embryo is transformed from an object of study 
into a means of intervention. Rather than being simply passive unexplored 
anatomical terrain, which could be mapped and charted in the manner of a 
newly discovered geographic region, the interior of the embryo comes to be 
seen during the late nineteenth century more in terms of an organized me-
chanical system—subject to dis- and reassembly, with parts that can be ex-
tracted and transferred into other embryos.20 In other words, this is the point 
at which parts of embryos themselves become tools, a new species of inves-
tigative apparatus: they are no longer simply worked on or even worked up 
but become recombinant working models of themselves.
The shift away from mere description is conventionally associated in the 
history of embryology with the Entwicklungsmechanik, or “mechanics of devel-
opment,” of the German zoologist Wilhelm Roux, or the Swedish anatomist 
Wilhelm His—both of whom were inventive technicists as well as theorists. 
The shift was codified by turn- of- the- century biologists such as Oxford’s J. W. 
Jenkinson, who began his 1909 textbook Experimental Embryology with an ac-
count of “a new branch of biological science,” concerned with “the origin of 
form,” which the author dates back to a specific experiment: “It is with the ori-
gin of form that [experimental embryology concerns itself], and in particular 
with its origin in the individual. The endeavour to discover by experiment the 
causes of this process—as distinct from the mere description of the process 
itself—is a comparatively new branch of biological science, for Experimental 
Embryology, or, as some prefer to call it, the Mechanics of Development . . . 
really dates from Roux’s production of a half- embryo from a half- blastomere, 
and the consequent formation of the ‘Mosaik- Theorie’ of self- differentiation” 
(Jenkinson 1909: iii).
In contrast to the “mere description” of embryos via dissection, or classi-
fication of embryological processes via observation, experimental embryol-
ogy is distinguished by its emphasis on direct interference with the internal 
mechanics of the embryo using manual or chemical intervention, such as in-
vestigation through fusion, stress, constriction, grafting, or recombination.21 
Experimental embryology is also characterized by the attention paid by its 
practitioners to deviant, monstrous, and pathological formations—an inter-
est that early on is envisaged as a means of exploring not only part- whole re-
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lations but the extent and character of innate organic plasticity. It emerged in 
the period during which Darwin’s, Weismann’s, and later Mendel’s models of 
inheritance were being debated in relation to morphogenesis—the acquisi-
tion of form—with an emphasis on experimental means of identifying causal 
mechanisms and thus the workings of heredity. Much of the experimental 
work in experimental embryology was thus also highly conceptually—indeed 
to many philosophically—motivated, while at the same time becoming more 
boldly instrumental in disrupting natural trajectories and inventing, or forc-
ing, new recombinant ones. New microsurgical tools and techniques were 
developed as part of an expanding culture of wrench- in- the- works experi-
mentalism based on the transfer of substances between whole organisms in 
order to study the parts of organisms, or to create new mosaic organisms that 
were deliberately designed to be different from what would emerge normally. 
This newly interventionist embryology enabled mechanical parts of embryos 
to become tools of investigation to understand, or probe, the causal dynamics 
of morphogenesis, reproduction, regeneration, development, and heredity.22 
Experimental progress could be made either by putting cells together or 
taking them apart—a constructivist ethos that was designed to elicit and 
explore the forces that controlled embryonic organization, growth, and the 
acquisition of form. Naturally existing forms and substances were increas-
ingly viewed as biological mechanisms that could be imitated, inverted, re-
assembled, reverse engineered, or otherwise manipulated, while new things 
that had never existed could be created and observed in vitro in order to iso-
late individual controlling variables, units, or factors through the artifice of 
experimentation.
The ethos of experimental embryology, then, was not so much one of 
understanding how form followed function, or vice versa, as of manipulating 
both, often by transposing them—thereby converting the resulting organism 
into a double window onto development: the object of study (e.g., a fertilized 
egg) in its controlled environment (the experimental system) was one win-
dow, whereas what went on inside the entity (e.g., the mechanics of embryo-
genesis) became another. In the same way the in vitro dish renders entities 
that would be invisible in vivo amenable to observation and manipulation, so 
too do such entities themselves become in vitro containers for experimen-
tation (its “vasculature,” as Marx might have said).23 Thus, Wilhelm Roux, a 
student of Haeckel, conducted experiments with amphibian embryos by re-
combining their parts to make new wholes (mosaics), while Hans Driesch, his 
contemporary, separated two sea urchin cells to demonstrate they could pro-
duce two independent organisms—manually splitting a whole entity to reveal 
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its innate properties of regeneration.24 The once- flat world of embryological 
observation had erupted: it was now a tooled- up experimental vivarium. As 
well as a looking- glass world, in which the workings of morphology were sub-
ject to remechanization, this is equally a push- me- pull- you experimental field 
of entities built through collision in order to model the invisible, otherwise 
imperceptible forces at work in the processes of reproduction, regeneration, 
and development.
embryo Pioneers
As late nineteenth- century embryologists increasingly sought to tackle ques-
tions of organization, morphogenesis, differentiation, and recapitulation, em-
bryological experiments became more technically ambitious and more pro-
longed over time—eventually leading to the in vitro dish window of tissue 
culture in the early twentieth century. As well as being tedious and time con-
suming, such experiments were in other respects also similar to highly skilled 
manual crafts—based on precise, repetitive techniques and prolonged ex-
posure to specialist tools and familiar research materials. Like that of jewel-
ers, embryologists’ labor required excellent eyesight, dexterity, practice, and 
tenacity. As in other mechanical workshops, embryological artisans required 
tools to make tools, as well as accumulated knowledge about how to use them, 
often acquired through lengthy apprenticeships through which such knowl-
edge was passed on to a new generation of experimentalists. A wide variety 
of optical techniques were used to visualize embryos, and new instruments 
were constantly being developed to manipulate them, as well as containers 
and solutions in which to keep them (figures 3.3 and 3.4). Chemical forms of 
preservation, marking, labeling, and interference were used, as well as hand- 
held microtools. Equipment derived from watchmaking and eye surgery was 
adapted to embryological experimentation, and remade by hand. Staining, 
dyeing, and tattooing techniques were used, as well as wax modeling and sec-
tioning. Passed on, remastered, and handed down again, these genealogies 
of artifice composed the technological infrastructure of increasingly adept 
manual control of reproduction.
These accumulated techniques can be interpreted in more Marxist terms 
as means of getting a better handle on reproductive substance, achieved 
through mechanical evolution. The constant redesign of specialist tools in 
the embryology lab is in this sense no different from any other artisanal set-
ting, where practical and spontaneous innovations are constantly being made 
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with a view to securing more purchase on the object being worked. Simi-
larly, we can also approach these techniques, and their relations to their ob-
jects, as frontiers insofar as they constitute a zone of encounter character-
ized by contact and conversion—themselves also generative processes. From 
this perspective, we can appreciate why the idiom of the frontier—of open- 
ended exploration, unknown territory, and unexpected encounters—usefully 
emphasizes the fruitfulness of indeterminacy, particularly in the context of 
experimental science. From the point of view of the artisan, technician, or 
experimentalist, in other words, the frontier is never “toward”—for it is pre-
cisely the indeterminate nature of experimental outcomes that gives them 
value to the scientist. If, in other words, the idiom of science as a frontier as 
used in the British Parliament to describe “walking hopefully” into “a gigan-
tic mountain range” conveys the helicopter view of science that is external 
to it, the experimentalist’s much more constrained outlook can only barely 
FigurEs 3.3 and 3.4. Techniques for the hand- forging of microtools, such as those 
described in chapter 2, are passed down over time through lineages of technique for 
handling cells, as is here illustrated in the preparation of different types of “Pasteur” 
pipette. From Keen A. Rafferty Jr., Methods in Experimental Embryology of the Mouse, 
pp. 16 and 17. Copyright 1970 by The Johns Hopkins University Press. Reprinted with 
permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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perceive the immediate territory at hand, in other words, the experiment. No 
airy, Archimedean panoptic is available to the lone experimentalist—whose 
tools themselves are always part of what is being explored, and who is often 
working by habit rather than sight.
This internal sense of the frontier—the frontier as it is encountered from 
within science—and its equation with not only the exploration of objects but 
the technical means of doing so, is substantially evident throughout the his-
tory of experimental embryology, where scientific pioneering is closely asso-
ciated with both the mastery of existing techniques and the development of 
new ones. Contrary to the view of the scientist as explorer walking hopefully 
into unknown lands, to discover and chart their interior (although not incon-
sistent with this depiction), is the pioneer embryologist as toolmaker—whose 
tools are themselves the path forward—or even the frontier being worked. 
Hence, for example, the biologist and historian Scott Gilbert, in his introduc-
tion to A Conceptual History of Embryology, writes that developmental biology 
is the offspring not only of “embryology’s concepts, organisms and sense of 
wonder” but of the “new set of tools with a resolving power far greater than 
what was available a generation ago.” Deploying a developmental analogy for 
the science itself (and echoing the reproductive double entendre of his book’s 
title), Gilbert describes the increase in “resolving power” available to a new 
generation of experimentalists as the result of a combination of new model 
organisms, new tools, and new molecular methods: “Frogs, chicks and sea 
urchins (along with nematodes, flies and leeches) are now being dissected 
with monoclonal antibodies, antisense mRNAs, and confocal microscopes. 
We are presently seeing a return to those old embryological enigmas that 
were abandoned for lack of such specific tools. The morphogenesis of the 
discipline continues. . . . Glory, indeed, to the science of embryology” (Gilbert 
1991: ix).
The sense of the tool itself as a frontier is similarly captured by the use 
of the adjective “pioneering” to describe the development of tools and tech-
niques in science—hence, for example, the description of Patrick Steptoe as 
the “laparoscopy pioneer” on his Wikipedia page. Thus also the frequent ref-
erences to technical advances that open up new research opportunities and 
pathways forward in understanding. The pioneer awards common to scien-
tific societies, health organizations, and academia are commonly associated 
with the development of new technology.
The annual Pioneer Award of the International Embryo Transfer Society 
(iEts), established in 1982, provides a useful picture of the range of em-
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bryological techniques that have been seen to pave the way to new research 
advances in this field, as the frontiers of knowledge yield to new working 
methods. Specifically chosen for their technical contributions to science, the 
current list of thirty Pioneer Award winners includes many of the most emi-
nent figures in modern reproductive and developmental biology (table 3.1). 
As can be noted from this list of the iEts embryo Pioneer Award winners 
from the 1980s and 1990s, advances on the reproductive frontier were often 
achieved in the form of both technological innovation and technology trans-
fer. Although celebrated for the paths they individually opened up to other 
researchers, the general pattern of advance can equally be characterized as 
one of technological exchange—of sharing and comparing techniques to ex-
plore different biological mechanisms, at different stages of development, 
under varied conditions, and across a wide range of different animal species 
or models.
Also notable from this list is the striking number of Pioneer awardees 
who were centrally involved in the development of human ivF. Indeed, in its 
award to Robert Edwards in 1993, the society noted that it is “no accident that 
human ivF clinics are well populated by scientists and technicians who began 
their work with members of [the iEts]” (iEts 1993). As Edwards himself has 
noted, the road to ivF was not only long and bumpy, but also often haphazard 
and even directionless. As noted in chapter 1, Edwards did not initially set out 
to achieve human ivF, just as Chang did not originally intend to pursue ivF in 
rabbits. Indeed few of the scientists listed in table 3.1 had a clear path ahead of 
them as they moved forward, often instead being redirected as technical ob-
stacles were overcome, opening new instrumental possibilities, and—equally 
haphazardly—new and unexpected avenues of inquiry.
Of the many questions that can be asked about the depiction of science 
and technology as frontiers, then, is how many there are. Taking the frontier 
to comprise a set of relationships, for example, we might consider at least 
three primary frontiers: between tool and object, object and knowledge, and 
knowledge and tool. Pioneering can occur in any one of these contexts, open-
ing a way for others to follow or a new avenue of inquiry. A breakthrough can 
similarly transform any one of these frontiers, or more than one of them, in 
the way that the discovery of a viable culture medium for an embryo can en-
able it to be grown in vitro, cultured, transferred, frozen, or stored. What 
is made visible in the context of embryo pioneering, in other words, is the 
necessity for constant circulation of technique across a series of frontiers. 
More important, it is the inextricability of tools and objects that make of re-
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productivity a complex work object in which tools themselves become work-
ing model systems.
hair loop
Hans Spemann’s experiments, conducted in close cooperation with his doc-
toral student Hilde Mangold, are often used to illustrate the importance of an 
evolving conceptual and technical experimental approach during the period 
tablE 3.1. Selected embryo Pioneer Award winners 1983–1999 whose work 
contributed to the successful development of human ivF.
award winnEr contribution yEar awardEd
Min Chueh Chang, 
Worcester Foundation  
for Experimental Biology
First successful ivF in mammals 
(rabbits, 1959) using capacitated  
sperm; codeveloper with Pincus  
of the contraceptive pill.
1983
Lionel Rowson, arc Unit 
of Reproductive Physiology, 
Cambridge University
Use of rabbit incubator for  
long- distance transport of  
sheep embryos; development  
of media for bovine eggs.
1985
Christopher Polge, arc Unit 
of Reproductive Physiology, 
Cambridge University
First successful cryopreservation  
of sperm and embryos; founder  
of the science of cryobiology.
1987
Anne McLaren and Donald 
Michie, Institute of Animal 
Genetics, University of 
Edinburgh
Refinement of embryo transfer  
methods to explore uterine effect on 
genetic development (epigenesis).
1988
John Biggers,  
Harvard University
Contributions to embryo culture,  
first mammals born using cultured 
embryos (with A. McLaren).
1990
Andrei Tarkwoski,  
Warsaw University
Development of micromanipulation 
techniques; transfer of half- blastomeres; 
production of mammalian chimeras. 
1991
Embryo pionEErs 121
when embryology began to focus more intensely on causal mechanisms, such 
as induction factors—that is, how particular organizational steps were trig-
gered by either internal or external stimuli guiding overall development of 
the early embryo. In 1906 Spemann developed a glass needle for surgery that 
has since proven a versatile and indispensable tool that is still in use. He also 
invented a microburner for pulling the glass tubes such as the capillary pi-
pettes used for microtransfers in vitro. In a modification of his earlier con-
striction methods, Spemann famously designed a hair loop by threading both 
award winnEr contribution yEar awardEd
Ralph Brinster, University  
of Pennsylvania
Development of embryo culture 






First ivF of human ova (1969); 
development of human ivF and 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis.
1993
Neil Moore, Department 
of Animal Husbandry, 
University of Sydney
Live offspring from frozen sheep, goat, 
and cattle embryos; zona drilling and 
microinjection of sperm to assist ivF.
1994
C. R. “Bunny” Austin, 
Physiological Laboratory, 
Cambridge University
Codiscoverer (with Chang, but 
independently) of sperm capacitation; 
confirmation of the mammalian 
acrosome reaction.
1995
Wes Whitten, University 
of Sydney and Australian 
National University
Contributions to embryo culture 
media; twins by blastomere splitting; 
contributions to reproductive 
endocrinology.
1996
R. M. Moor, arc Unit of 
Reproductive Physiology and 
the Babraham Institute, of 
Cambridge University
Improvement of superovulation, 
in vivo follicular signaling, oocyte 
reprogramming and maturation, 
maternal messaging.
1999
Source: Compiled from the records of the International Embryo Transfer Society.
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ends of a single human hair into a specially fashioned capillary tube and fix-
ing them in place with wax. Mounted on a handle, this microtool could be 
used to move, flip, or roll eggs and embryos during experimental procedures, 
thus itself coming to play a developmental role in the biological workings of 
his model system.
Spemann also developed round molds to impress wax holders for eggs and 
glass microapparatus to facilitate grafting. These handmade microtools and 
associated techniques, including an early form of nuclear transfer, facilitated 
the exploration of individual differentiation for which Spemann was awarded 
the Nobel Prize in 1935, recognizing his efforts to experimentally chart the 
organizer effect by grafting part of one embryo onto another. Spemann’s ex-
periments are in many ways the archetypal example of the importance of 
transplantation and transfer to experimental embryology and developmental 
biology, and the corresponding epistemic shift described by Jenkinson from 
anatomical description to experimental interference that marks the emer-
gence of a field that relies more fully on techniques that today would be de-
scribed in terms of bioengineering. Since the logic of this shift remains fun-
damentally embedded in modern reproductive biology, it is worth revisiting 
one of these now- celebrated classical embryological experiments that took 
place in Germany in the first half of the twentieth century.25 Importantly, Spe-
mann’s grafting experiments involved the fusion not only of different parts of 
embryos, but of tools with reproductive substance.
The manual mastery of fine tools necessary for microsurgery, and the in-
genuity involved in devising new experimental techniques, are often empha-
sized in textbook reproductions of Spemann’s famous constriction experi-
ment (a predecessor to his grafting work), undertaken in three stages and 
published in 1904. “Developmental Physiological Studies on the Triton Egg” 
begins with a technical description of the methods and materials used in 
a series of experiments designed to bisect fertilized amphibian eggs at the 
early blastocyst (two- cell) stage using fine hair loops (in Spemann’s case using 
strands of hair from the head of his infant daughter Margrette; figure 3.5).26 
The aim of the experiments was to characterize the relationship between the 
differentiation of structures (in particular the axial organs) by manipulating 
the interaction of their component parts. In order to understand how a radi-
ally symmetric egg acquires axial polarity and bilateral symmetry (and also 
switches from one to the next), Spemann devised a series of interventions 
into the earliest stages of development using constriction to explore axis for-
mation by manipulating it.
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Largely by perfecting techniques that had been less successfully employed 
by previous experimentalists, Spemann showed that by constricting newt 
(salamander) embryos at different stages of development with his hair loops, 
he could create wholly separate organisms, partially separated organisms, and 
a variety of asymmetrical organisms. In his hand- tied embryo experiments, 
Spemann observed that both the timing and the plane of constriction (median 
or sagittal) played a role in determining which kinds of developmental modi-
fications could be induced by his precise micromanipulations. By so doing he 
elaborated one of the basic principles of experimental embryology described 
earlier by Jenkinson, namely that reproductive substance could be mechani-
cally manipulated not only with tools, but as a tool. For Spemann, the con-
stricted newt egg was a probe, a device, and a crucial piece of equipment. 
More than a model in the sense of being a static replica, the tied egg system 
functioned over time to enable—indeed to produce—visual data that yielded 
insights into the causal bases of morphological plasticity. Growth became a 
means to test the limits of form.
In his detailed reconstruction and analysis of Spemann’s experiments, 
FigurE 3.5. Illustration of the hair loop methods used by Spemann to produce 
“dividuals” using a ligature made of his infant daughter’s hair. Illustration taken from 
Viktor Hamburger, A Manual of Experimental Embryology, rev. ed. (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 81. Reprinted with permission of the University of Chicago 
Press.
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the biologist and historian Victor Hamburger (who was Spemann’s student 
at the University of Freiburg) describes his findings as “a graded series of 
anterior duplications” that corresponded to different types of manual con-
striction:
A medium deep constriction in the median plane gives two heads; if 
the constriction is somewhat deeper, there may also be two pairs of 
fore limbs and a merging of the two parts in one posterior trunk and 
tail with a single pair of hind limbs. If the constriction is very slight, 
then only the anterior head is duplicated. . . . On the other hand, if 
the constriction cuts very deep, and only a narrow bridge connects the 
two blastomeres, then the two embryos are fused only at the region 
of the anus. [A] complete separation of the two blastomeres results 
in identical twins. . . . Whereas constrictions in the early gastrula still 
produced anterior duplications, the capacity for regulation decreased 
with the progression of gastrulation, and constrictions in the early neu-
ral plate stage resulted merely in an indentation without duplication. 
Since regulation implies that embryonic parts can give rise to struc-
tures different from those they would form in normal development, 
the loss of regulation capacity at the end of gastrulation means that 
the axial organs become irreversibly determined during gastrulation. 
(Hamburger 1988: 17)
In this description are evident the two planes of force being explored in re-
lation to one another through the coupling of the tool and organism to re-
veal form through growth. The interpretation of results relies upon a contrast 
between the inside and the outside of the model system. On the one hand, 
the developing embryo is subjected to a range of carefully controlled surgical 
forces, such as constriction, the results of which are observed over measured 
periods of time through visual inspection. On the other, this handmade model 
system is designed to explore the inaccessible, invisible, or hidden mecha-
nisms of development or organization, described by Hamburger as regulation 
or regulation capacity—the factors or variables that are presumed to exist 
within the embryonic structures but cannot be observed. Like hand shadows 
projected against a wall, the precise manual micromanipulations are designed 
to reveal the workings of internal, invisible forces (factors) that cannot be 
observed directly but can be made to appear as biological form by rework-
ing them. The retooled organism thus models, in sum, not only the outcome 
of these invisible factors but a new kind of biological control that employs 
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the mechanics of reproductive substance as both its means and proof, and in 
which the tool itself plays a developmental role.
While much commentary continues to surround the significance of Spe-
mann’s experiments, the simple point for our purposes here concerns the 
shift they are understood to exemplify to commentators such as Jenkinson 
(1909)—which is not only a change in the understanding of the role of tech-
nology in manipulating an object, or its use as an extension of the microscopic 
gaze as a kind of probe, but the fusion of tool and object into a live model sys-
tem. The second important point to notice in the context of understanding 
how technology comes to be merged with reproductive substance, as in the 
example discussed in chapter 2 in a contemporary stem cell lab, is the com-
plex technological layering—or archaeology—here made visible, whereby 
tool, organism, and experimental system perform the work of modeling the 
fusion of internal organizing forces and externally imposed mechanical tech-
nique. It is because it is not the model organism per se, but the fusion of 
organism and tool into a model system that functions as a live apparatus, in 
effect, for recording life, that the question of what, exactly, the experiment 
represents becomes rather complicated. As noted earlier, the artificial gen-
eration being modeled here as a working system is always recursive, serving 
as a model in which the workings of technology and reproductive substance 
are fused to reveal their combined agency as biology. Yet the biotechnical arti-
facts that are produced by this method complicate the meaning of “biological” 
in the very effort to reveal the principles guiding the underlying mechanics 
of development. What are revealed instead are the results of fusing tools with 
reproductive substance.
As Nick Hopwood has illustrated in his analysis of the nineteenth- century 
embryological studies of Wilhelm His, the concept of development was as 
much a product as a precursor of experimental studies such as those of Spe-
mann—it is in part what he worked to produce. Whereas “development is 
often taken for granted as what embryologists study,” argues Hopwood, it is 
instead what researchers such as His “labored to produce” (2000: 31). The ac-
count of ivF offered in this book shares Hopwood’s contention that the mun-
dane practices and routine work of embryology cannot be separated from the 
material production of ideas that might otherwise appear entirely prior to 
these labors. Indeed it is a central argument of this chapter that the human 
application of ivF is as much a product of its history as a working model in 
the effort to work up reproductivity as of a guiding vision of this end during 
most of its development. As we shall see, the history of ivF as a technique is 
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both continuous and inconsistent, translational and transient, migratory—
but perhaps above all it was “handy,” which is equally the appeal of this tech-
nique today.
In the same way that Spemann’s laborious study of constricted and re-
combinant embryos coupled technology and biological substance in order to 
explore the frontiers of organization, so too were concepts of heredity being 
manually and analytically refashioned during this period using a wide variety 
of embryological methods. Not all of these were directed at either develop-
ment or organization. Some were directed to questions of heredity, while 
others had practical, agricultural applications (or combined the two, as had 
Mendel). Spemann’s grafts and constrictions concerned the origin of form, 
or morphogenesis, as well as the internal mechanics of these forces, which he 
investigated both by fusing parts of embryos, and by manually manipulating 
development, using tools. For other researchers, reproductivity was more ex-
plicitly engaged as itself a tool in the process of experimental proof. In turning 
to this context of more explicit reproductive technologies, we also observe the 
principle of biological transfer reworked somewhat differently.
maternal models
Among the embryo pioneers who are most directly relevant to the history 
of ivF (much as they might not have expected to have been) is the English 
embryologist Walter Heape. In his account of Heape’s now- celebrated em-
bryo transfer experiments, undertaken between 1890 and 1899, the reproduc-
tive biologist and contemporary embryo pioneer John Biggers (1991) empha-
sizes their relationship not only to the conflict between Darwin’s Lamarckian 
model of pangenesis and the theory of germ line independence propounded 
by August Weismann, but to the much older debate that epitomized this con-
flict—namely that concerning “telegony,” the effect of prior fertilization upon 
reproductive outcome, or the ability of offspring to inherit the characteristics 
of their mother’s previous mates. “Many biologists of the time,” Biggers writes 
of Heape’s contemporaries, “including Darwin, believed that ‘if the male ele-
ment can act directly on the female form,’ it would provide strong evidence 
for the inheritance of acquired characters” (1991: 179). The theory of tele-
gony, in circulation since antiquity and propounded by Aristotle, remained 
influential well into the twentieth century. Its most celebrated airing is a fa-
mous letter by Lord Morton to the Royal Society in 1821 concerning his prize 
thoroughbred mare’s pairing with a quagga (a now- extinct equine species), 
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causing all of her subsequent offspring (sired by horses) to bear striped coats, 
stiff hair manes, and thus signs of the “preponderance” of her original mate.
The persistence of traits from a prior coupling, also referred to as “infec-
tion of the germ,” “fetal inoculation,” or “saturation,” exercised widespread 
concern among livestock breeders because of its deleterious consequences 
for otherwise valuable female stock. However, the controversy over Mor-
ton’s mare’s offspring gained disproportionate significance in the context of 
late nineteenth- century debates about inheritance because of the extent to 
which telegony served as a placeholder for much wider disagreements over 
the precise mechanics of conjoined reproductive substances in vivo (or, in 
this case, in utero). This question encompassed a broad area of uncertainty, 
namely how fertilization affected hereditary transmission of traits. Whereas 
Darwin had earlier advocated a model of heredity based on diffused particles 
(pangenesis) that allowed for the inheritance of acquired traits (according 
to which telegony was a plausible theory), Weismann proposed his doctrine 
of the continuity of the germplasm in 1893, insisting upon the absolute inde-
pendence of the reproductive cells, as well as their immortality. Weismann 
used the theory of telegony specifically to denigrate “the doubtful effects of 
heredity” he claimed his experiments had disproved, arguing that the “throw 
back” model was, in effect, mythological. Herbert Spencer, whose theory of 
evolution preceded Darwin’s and was much more strongly Lamarckian, was 
one of many prominent nineteenth- century figures for whom the telegony 
debate took on great importance, for social as well as scientific reasons, in a 
debate that has been the subject of both enlightened and entertaining com-
mentary by many historians of biology.
Heape’s experiments, like those of Spemann, employed a type of part- 
whole dis- and reassembly, similarly harnessing transplantation as a method. 
His scientific goal was to disprove telegony, but he also sought to confirm a 
new means of investigating it using what is now known as embryo transfer. 
Unlike Spemann, Heape’s part- whole transplantation involved the surgical re-
moval of an intact fertilized egg from a rabbit and its transfer into the uterus 
of a hare—thus using the uterine environment as his experimental crucible. 
Like Spemann, Heape relied on the bodies of his experimental offspring as 
his morphological map or proof to reveal the internal forces he was investi-
gating—thus employing reproduction in a working (animal) model system to 
reveal heredity forces. He was also instrumentalizing the species boundary 
between two model organisms as part of the research design for his novel and 
laborious test cases.
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The Heape technique for the recovery of fertilized ova from the fallopian 
tube was developed at the Morphological Laboratory in Cambridge, where 
Heape both trained and worked as a demonstrator under Michael Foster and 
Francis Balfour.27 To complete his project, Heape combined delicate manual 
technique with sophisticated animal husbandry in his hometown of Prest-
wich, near Manchester, where his technically demanding and unprecedented 
series of embryo transfers were conducted between 1890 and 1899. In a series 
of papers read to the Royal Society (which funded his work), Heape described 
the outcome of his experiments as a success, both in terms of producing viable 
offspring and confirming an absence of uterine effect (no telegony). He con-
cluded his 1897 Royal Society paper on a technical as well as scientific note, 
suggesting, “It is possible to make use of the uterus of one variety of rabbit as 
a medium for the growth and complete foetal development of fertilized ova 
of another variety of rabbit.”28
Although Biggers emphasizes that Heape did not envisage any practical ap-
plication of his experimental methods (in the sense of using embryo transfer 
for livestock breeding, for example), his lasting contribution has in fact been 
a highly practical technical innovation for the pursuit of experimental science 
as well as the business of breeding.29 Heape is today celebrated as a pioneer-
ing technician. F. H. A. (Francis Hugh Adam) Marshall, whose 1910 textbook 
The Physiology of Reproduction is considered to mark the emergence of the new 
discipline of reproductive biology, draws heavily on Heape’s work and cites its 
pivotal importance in linking the study of animal breeding to the experimen-
tal study of reproduction—or what he denominated as a new field of science. 
Marshall, who wrote Heape’s obituary in 1930, dedicated his landmark text-
book to him in recognition not only of his innovative and technically demand-
ing experiments combining the analysis of reproduction and heredity, but for 
his substantial contribution to embryological methods.30 Despite his primary 
orientation toward a purely scientific question, Heape’s work, in a migration 
that is typical of embryological techniques, has become the foundation for the 
embryo transfer industry, which is currently the world’s largest embryological 
enterprise—and one of the closest kindred sectors to the global market in ivF 
(Gordon 2003). Indeed he is today acclaimed as the Patron Saint of embryo 
transfer and responsible for the twentieth- century “rekindling of interest in 
artificial insemination and the laying of a scientific foundation to the animal 
breeding industry with emphasis on its economic importance” (Betteridge 
1981: 1). In the making of modern reproductivity, embryo transfer is a foun-
dational technique that, along with the airline industry and cryopreservation 
methods, facilitates the purposeful and profitable circulation of reproductive 
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substance, passaging it across both time and space to maximize the benefit of 
prized genetic stock.
Stem technologies
An important feature of Heape’s embryological experiments was not only 
that they combined an interest in heredity and reproduction, and pioneered 
a new technological means of transferring reproductive substance, but that 
they were conducted in mammals. From an embryological point of view, de-
tailed knowledge of the events involved in the earliest stages of reproduc-
tion and development is more difficult to obtain in mammals for the simple 
reason that these events take place inside a living body. Unlike salamanders, 
frogs, axolotl, chickens, sea urchins, worms, tortoises, fish, or other common 
model organisms in embryology, the majority of mammals are distinguished 
by hemotrophic viviparity, or development of the embryo within the mother. 
Heape did not use specialist culture media, and he was not seeking to remove 
particular mechanisms, parts, or processes from the interior of live mam-
malian bodies in order to examine or observe mammalian development or fer-
tilization through an in vitro window.31 This effort would await a later period 
and in particular, as is discussed below, the improvement of in vitro culture 
methods. Heape’s contribution had been to introduce a different medium in 
the form of another animal’s reproductive system, and to prove the viability of 
this system for experimental purposes. His contribution could be described as 
the generation of a new species of technique—a technique that has acquired 
a life of its own, so to speak, and is now so widespread and fundamental in its 
uses as to be considered a stem technology.32
The role of stem technologies in the evolution of technique that Heape’s 
contribution exemplified in the form of embryo transfer similarly character-
izes the development of ivF techniques, which can be viewed as sharing a 
technological kinship with each other, in spite of their enormously varied 
uses. As Barry Bavister notes in his account of the history of ivF, it begins its 
life as a specific kind of experimental technique: “A potentially useful tech-
nique is to recover fertilized eggs or early embryos from the female repro-
ductive tract, and to study their subsequent development in vitro” (2002: 
182). This technique becomes particularly useful in mammals by enabling 
the ex vivo modeling of reproductive events. In vitro culture of mammalian 
eggs, Bavister explains, allows for continuous and close observation of events 
that would be inaccessible in vivo both by replicating them artificially and 
by introducing systemic control mechanisms. “Information can be derived 
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much more readily from the study of eggs that are fertilized and then devel-
oped in vitro. Not only can the process of fertilization be closely observed, but 
factors contributing to normal and abnormal fertilization and development 
can be examined. The progress of fertilization or embryogenesis can be fre-
quently, if not continuously, observed and the conditions of culture can be 
varied to examine their effects on development. Thus a wealth of informa-
tion is available from studies in vitro, given the technical ability to accomplish 
them” (2002: 182). As Bavister, whose “magic” culture medium enabled the 
first successful fertilization of a human egg in vitro in 1969, notes in this de-
scription, the wealth of information that can be gained from in vitro studies 
depends primarily on “the technical ability to accomplish them.” The tech-
nical ability to experimentally manipulate mammalian reproductive sub-
stance within the in vitro observation chamber became increasingly various 
and sophisticated during the twentieth century, confirming the increasing 
inseparability between reproductivity and tools. In the case of ivF, it cannot 
simply be said that reproduction is assisted by tools, since the tools are part 
of the reproductive process—they are how it works. Predictably and, as Marx 
would probably have said, spontaneously, the experimental use of in vitro 
model systems for the study of mammalian development became increasingly 
intimately interrelated (or we might even say crossbred) with another crucial 
stem technology, namely cell culture methods. Versions of these methods, as 
noted earlier, were already part of late nineteenth- century embryology in the 
form of the various solutions that were used to maintain live cellular material 
in vitro, such as the salt solution developed by Sydney Ringer using the chlo-
rides of sodium, potassium, calcium, and magnesium. Wilhelm Roux had also 
developed an early cell culture method using a mineral salt bath in a watch 
glass.
In the early twentieth century the American embryologist Ross Harrison, 
based at Johns Hopkins University, improved these methods substantially, 
demonstrating that live tissue fragments could be sustained in culture media 
for weeks at a time, through what is now known as tissue culture. As Hannah 
Landecker writes of Harrison’s work in her account of how cell culture sys-
tems became independent and autonomous “living technologies,” he estab-
lished new methods to observe, control and manipulate living matter in vitro, 
thus “proving the possibility of observing internal body events without the 
body itself—observations that had been previously assumed to be impossible” 
(Landecker 2007: 15). She describes Harrison’s contribution to the develop-
ment of in vitro systems as continuous with the “increasing emphasis on arti-
fice in science” that is the hallmark of “what Philip Pauly has called ‘biologi-
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cal modernism’” (16). This means of cultivating life ex vivo in its own media 
required a working in vitro system combining control of temperature (incu-
bation) and of infection or contamination (asepsis), as well as housing this 
controlled system in glass apparatus facilitating both manipulation and ob-
servation to make a looking- glass world. Like the development of dyeing and 
staining techniques in an earlier period, the goals of tissue culturists such 
as Harrison were essentially technological—to devise methods of seeing life 
develop within a controlled, external, closed, and transparent experimental 
system.
Prior to the ability to observe mammalian embryos in vitro, the main ap-
proach to understanding their early development was derived from the pro-
cedures introduced by experimentalists such as Spemann—which were not 
viable for mammals. As Waddington and Waterman note at the outset of their 
1933 article “The Development in Vitro of Young Rabbit Embryos”: “Very little 
experimental work has as yet been performed on the early stages of the mam-
malian embryo. The two main methods of experimental analysis, isolation 
of the primordia and transplantation of fragments into different situations 
in the embryo, which have been applied with such success in the Amphibia, 
both present great technical difficulties when applied to the embryos of warm 
blooded animals” (1933: 355).
While Waddington and Waterman experimented in the 1930s with explan-
tation of rabbit blastocysts to analyze early mammalian development in vitro, 
Gregory Pincus, while visiting Cambridge in the same period, took a different 
approach by revising Heape’s methodology of embryo transfer and combin-
ing it with in vitro culture methods more similar to those developed by Har-
rison to study extracorporeal mammalian fertilization. Whereas Heape had 
devised embryo transfer methods to investigate the relationship between ges-
tation and heredity, by analyzing the effects of maternal environment upon 
transplanted offspring, his techniques were redeployed by Pincus using ivF 
as well—thus coupling together three stem techniques to create a power-
ful experimental platform. Substituting unfertilized mammalian eggs for em-
bryos, Pincus attempted to achieve mammalian fertilization in vitro. Unlike 
Waddington and Waterman, who, like Harrison, sought to understand pro-
cesses of “self- differentiation” and morphological development through an 
early method of cell culture, Pincus sought both to observe and to success-
fully replicate the entire process of mammalian fertilization, using surgically 
recovered rabbit eggs that, after what he mistakenly presumed to have been 
successful ivF, he then transferred to host rabbit does to obtain proof of his 
success in the form of viable offspring, just as Heape had done.
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Pincus’s early attempts at ivF in mammals in the 1930s, and his later 
success in producing “fatherless offspring” via parthenogenic reproduction 
(dubbed Pincogenesis), provide useful examples of the modern biological 
study of reproduction as it emerged in the first half of the twentieth century 
and was transferred into mammalian systems by fusing together an increas-
ing number of stem technologies. The effort to replicate the process of fer-
tilization in glass reflects the continuing emphasis on combining biological 
substance with technology that had become more common during the last 
decade of the previous century, now adding the traction gained through ex-
perimental embryological studies that employed improved cell culture meth-
ods. These models both worked better and could do more work. They also 
circulated more widely across both species and continents, as well as lines of 
experimental investigation. From the perspective of the history of technique, 
a noticeable feature of the evolution of human ivF out of studies such as those 
conducted on both sides of the Atlantic by Pincus between the wars is their 
complex imbrication within so many otherwise unrelated experimental tra-
jectories, or what we might call their very mixed, or hybrid, technical parent-
age.33 These thick genealogies of ivF, while intriguing in and of themselves, 
are also helpful in illuminating the instabilities that remain at the heart of 
human ivF today—for example in terms of what is meant, exactly, by fertil-
ization, epigenesis, potentiality, or, for that matter, biological reproduction at 
all, once these workings have been increasingly technologized.
It is the technological kinship established through both meticulous train-
ing in received technique and the passing around of these experimental 
methods into different hands that enables experimental innovation to pro-
ceed along its continually meandering path—just as Needham described for 
the ad hoc embryology of an earlier period. What is visible from this point 
of view are the complex relationships linking ideas or concepts (experimen-
tal questions) with technical means (tools, technologies, or technics), and 
their various milieus—including both those that are inside the experimen-
tal system (e.g., culture media) and those that condition the experimentalist 
within a specific culture of science (e.g., developmental biology). These are 
what Andrew Pickering describes as “the continual reconfigurations of the 
material, conceptual and social strata of science that make it impossible to 
specify the relativity of scientific knowledge to any substantive variable”—a 
pattern that constitutes the “structure of practice” in science, and which he 
describes as “path dependency” (1995: 208–209). Thus we return again to 
the “magical” frontier space of a reaching beyond both the substance and the 
Embryo pionEErs 133
technology at hand—a practice that arguably takes on additional importance 
when the frontier is the human conceptus in vitro.
taking Fertilization in hand
Gregory Pincus had been a student of W. Z. Crozier, who in turn had been 
trained by Jacques Loeb, the German American scientist who developed “arti-
ficial parthenogenesis” at the Zoological Station in Naples in the 1890s, dur-
ing the same period Heape was conducting his embryo transfer studies in 
mammals in Prestwich.34 Working with the traditional embryological model 
organism, the sea urchin, Loeb had sought to use experimentation as a more 
direct means of biological translation—driving biological processes forward 
to new speeds, as it were, by not only exploring but harnessing the develop-
mental mechanics of eggs and embryos. Loeb pursued a philosophy of biologi-
cal invention based on forcing biology into new shapes—much as a breeder 
might attempt to shape or mold an organism to develop to order. In pursuit 
of his bioartifice, Loeb developed experimental methods (based on botany) 
enabling him to chemically induce parthenogenetic division in sea urchin 
eggs by modifying the salt content of their nutritive medium—that is, by 
controlling internal events via manipulation of the milieu exterieur in an early 
version of what later became known as cell or tissue culture. Unlike Heape, 
whose interests lay in elucidating the basic principles of heredity as they 
would have occurred naturally and internally, Loeb’s experiment has been 
described as a more explicit turn toward an engineering ethic in biology that 
had the production of novel, synthetic, and unnatural biological forms as its 
goal. As the historian Philip Pauly describes Loeb’s interest in the artificial 
induction of parthenogenesis, it made manifest a new role for science and a 
new self- image of the scientist as the origin of biological control: a “conscious 
engineering standpoint” that “considered the main problem of biology to be 
the production of the new, not the analysis of the existent” (1987: 8). The 
author of The Mechanistic Conception of Life (1912), Loeb sought to exploit the 
analogy of mechanics from the problem- solving vantage point of a creative 
engineer: like the successful agricultural biotechnologist he later became, 
Loeb was less concerned with what biology is than what it could be made to 
become or do. He considered “successful experimental control [to be] func-
tionally equivalent to scientific explanation” (Loeb, quoted in Pauly 1987: 9). 
He similarly considered audacious pioneering to be the best way forward on 
the uncharted biological frontier of the early twentieth century—an analogy 
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he saw as properly American, and through which he believed biology could 
be rendered more thoroughly technological.
Pincus was a scientist very much in the Loebian tradition, and Pincogene-
sis exemplified the engineering mentality described by Pauly, which priori-
tized the isolation and observation of a specific mechanism in order to estab-
lish “a constructive or engineering biology in place of a biology that is merely 
analytical” (Loeb, cited in Pauly 1987: 93). Whereas amphibian model organ-
isms, with their useful capacity for regeneration, were well suited to illustrat-
ing the complex developmental mechanics of Roux, His, and Spemann, the 
ability to manipulate fertilization held out a more pragmatic promise to Loeb, 
who compared the production of whole, new, manmade biological construc-
tions to the bold and unprecedented tunnels and bridges built by heroic Vic-
torian engineers such as George Stephenson or Isambard Kingdom Brunel (or 
the steam engines designed by Watt). As Landecker points out in her account 
of the history of “culturing life,” Loeb argued that such experiments held out 
the promise of “a technology of living substance” (Landecker 2007: 1), the 
deliberate, creative redesign of which was no more unnatural or monstrous 
than motorcars or telegraphic communication. In this model, technology did 
not assist biology so much as produce a new definition of biological control. 
As Pauly stresses, Loeb was explicit in his goal of creating “new forms whose 
properties depended solely on scientific action” (Pauly 1987: 51). He was less 
interested in the character or properties or principles of biological entities 
and processes in themselves than what could be achieved through manipulat-
ing them toward specific ends—a position that, as Pauly observes, “reversed 
the priorities of analysis and control” (51). As a consequence, argues Pauly, 
Loeb sought to engineer biological substance beyond its merely natural limits 
purely in order to see how far it could be reengineered: “Loeb’s project was 
not applied science. It was a refocusing of biological inquiry itself around 
what Loeb conceived as the activity of the engineer. . . . He considered the 
distinction between natural and pathological irrelevant. . . . Breaking down 
the distinction between natural and monstrous would be a necessary prelimi-
nary to the development of an engineering biology” (51).
As Hannah Landecker has observed, this definition of biology as engineer-
ing emphasizes the importance of the tools and techniques the experimental-
ist can use to manipulate synthetic living systems, with the express purpose 
not only of observing their mechanisms or mimicking their functions but of 
redesigning and remaking new biological systems and tools. It is not only 
the difference between the natural and the pathological that is irrelevant to 
such a pursuit. Crucially, it is also the importance of the synthetic or artifi-
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cial that is emphasized in and of itself as a singular goal. In other words, it is 
the collapse of a distinction between biology and technology that specifically 
distinguishes the mode of reproduction this definition of biology as artificial 
synthesis prioritizes. As a consequence, the differences between what is bio-
logical, what is a biological mechanism, what is an experimental apparatus, 
and what is an experimental tool are deliberately rendered opaque. In a word, 
biology is relativized. Within an artificial, handmade in vitro system such as 
Harrison’s hanging drop experiment, in which a fragment of tissue is enclosed 
in a droplet of lymph on a glass cover slip, inverted over a hollowed- out slide, 
sealed with paraffin, and incubated at the correct temperature to allow the 
tissue to grow for up to a month, it becomes entirely unclear where the bi-
ology ends and the technology begins. Self- evidently the entire setup is simu-
lated: a bespoke synthetic, in vitro propagation of an organic mass that serves 
as a model biomimetic system. It no longer matters whether this bioartifice 
is about seeing or making, being or doing, knowing or controlling, or nature 
or culture—the point of this working model of life is that it is viable and ac-
cessible, that it can be observed and manipulated, and thus that it can be re-
worked. Such a system exemplifies the principle Hannah Landecker describes 
in her account of how living substance comes to be taken in hand, which is 
not only that life or biology come to be regarded differently in vitro, but that 
biology is changed by becoming a component within an artificial system. As 
she puts it more concisely, “biotechnology changes what it is to be biological” 
(Landecker 2007: 223). Arguably, as we shall see, what the history of experi-
mental embryology and ivF also demonstrate is the extent to which biology 
changes what it is to be technological.35
Indeed, the process by which biology changes what it is to be technologi-
cal is exactly what both ivF and embryo transfer model as technologies of 
reproductive substance. Arguably what is also evident is the extent to which 
technology is biologized in the form of new living tools—a new species of 
tools that comprise a distinctive form of technological evolution. From the 
point of view of the evolution of technique, it is irrelevant that much of this 
work was experimentally inconclusive, misleading, or failed—because much 
of it was not result but technique driven to begin with. Its larger object was 
not only modeling biological mechanisms, or for that matter reworking them, 
but building a new biology in which tool and substance work together biologi-
cally. Gregory Pincus and Robert Edwards were remarkably similar in this re-
spect—both were iconoclastic, antiestablishment, and controversial biologi-
cal engineers, very much in the Loebian tradition of seeking social progress 
through controlling life. Pincogenesis, for example, was most successful tech-
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nologically, establishing the viability of an ex vivo model system to replicate 
a biological process, despite the fact that it ultimately failed to demonstrate 
successful ivF. Biologically, in terms of what this term generally refers to at 
the level of fundamental biological processes, it remains unclear today what, 
if anything, Pincogenesis revealed about the primal scene it was designed to 
illuminate. What it confirmed instead was how different species of technique 
could be successfully crossbred in the effort to manipulate life more skillfully.
Pincogenesis
Ironically, it is precisely the technological success of Pincogenesis that ob-
scured the very process Pincus was trying to observe in a telling example of 
how technology cannot reveal the workings of biology, because it changes 
them. In his 1961 reassessment of the literature on mammalian ivF, Austin 
cites thirty- five articles by twenty- one authors dating back to 1878. In only 
three of these studies were live offspring obtained, the earliest of which were 
the experiments by Pincus and Enzmann in rabbits in 1934. As Chang writes 
in his 1968 appraisal of these three experiments, none could reliably be con-
firmed to have been successful. “Due to the technical difficulties involved in 
conducting such studies [of mammalian ivF] and lack of confirmation of [the 
results of] these experiments by others, together with the unreliability of the 
criteria of fertilization used by some investigators, the evidence for fertiliza-
tion of mammalian eggs in vitro even at present may still be in doubt, and it 
becomes to some extent a controversial issue” (Chang 1968: 15).
Ostensibly, part of the confusion concerned the precise mechanisms of 
fertilization and how they should be characterized, but much of it inevitably 
concerns the technical means by which this process is documented and ana-
lyzed. For example, in the early studies of both in vivo and in vitro fertil-
ization, as Chang points out, “most investigators considered fertilization to 
mean the penetration of a sperm into the cytoplasm of an egg, but in reality 
this phase is only the beginning of fertilization” (1968: 15). “Biologically,” he 
continues, “fertilization is a physiological process, which starts with the pene-
tration of sperm into the cytoplasm of the egg, and includes the subsequent 
formation, development and syngamy of the male and female pronuclei until 
the union of maternal and paternal genetic materials” (1968: 15, emphasis 
added). Austin, in his 1961 review, further emphasizes that the egg can only 
be considered to have been fertilized when it has begun to cleave. Pincus, in 
his early experiments on fertilization in the rabbit (1930) had observed not 
only cleavage but penetration of the spermatozoon into the vitellus, as well 
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as the existence of two polar bodies, although he did not claim at the time to 
have achieved fertilization in vitro. Both lack of sufficient knowledge of the 
definitive criteria for confirming fertilization, and inadequate technological 
control of the in vitro model system (it is very difficult to determine by sight 
alone if the spermatozoon has passed fully through the zona pellucida, for ex-
ample) created uncertainties.
Serial failure, as much as serial success, then, was required to bring bi-
ology and technology sufficiently into alignment in order to both identify and 
achieve all of the necessary steps in the process of in vitro fertilization.36 In 
his later experiments with Enzmann, Pincus claimed to have successfully ob-
tained live offspring using ivF and embryo transfer in mammals for the first 
time. However, since they only mixed the eggs and sperm together in vitro 
for half an hour, and then washed the eggs before transferring them to a sur-
rogate doe, it is likely the offspring were the result of undetected sperm cling-
ing to the eggs’ surface, which were then able to capacitate and fertilize the 
egg in vivo (an early version of what is now known as gamete intrafallopian 
transfer). Indeed, it would not be until the successful codiscovery, separately 
by Austin and Chang, of sperm capacitation (the need for mammalian sperm 
to be exposed to the female reproductive tract for a period of time before they 
are capable of fertilizing an egg) that successful mammalian ivF could be con-
firmed by Chang in 1959. Over time, the fertilization of mammalian eggs was 
only fully characterized and successfully confirmed as a result of a lengthy 
process of experimental repetition and innovation. Successful ivF in mam-
mals resulted from the intergenerational acquisition of sufficiently elaborate 
knowledge and technique necessary to model the event in question. In other 
words, the ability to replicate the union of egg and sperm depended upon the 
success of a prior union between biology and technology, and this synthetic 
modeling project was itself an offspring of combined lineages of scientific 
expertise. The elaborate apparatus required to induce ovulation, surgically 
remove a ripe egg from the reproductive tract, culture it in vitro, fertilize it 
in vitro, and transfer it back into the uterus to establish a pregnancy could 
only be achieved through an increasingly intimate merging of technology and 
reproductive substance—to the extent that it is not clear which is the more 
successful coupling involved in ivF, that between the egg and sperm, or be-
tween artifice and biology. More to the point, it means that the only biology 
that can be fully characterized in the context of such modeling is that pro-
duced when reproductive substance can be brought into a successful work-
ing relationship with experimental techniques. That this forced, harnessed, or 
cultivated biology is at once more fully characterized and more surprising is 
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the result of the kind of biology it is—namely a biology that only works when 
it is coupled to the right tools.
In addition to the domestication of semistandardized (well- trained) ex-
perimental methods (for animal husbandry, surgical procedures, culture 
techniques, incubation temperatures, etc.) and agreed- upon criteria for pro-
cesses such as fertilization, another crucial feature of mammalian in vitro ex-
perimentation familiar from other histories of equipment is the effect of accu-
mulated scale. The greater project of characterizing how reproduction works 
needed to be undertaken on a vast comparative basis, achieved through the 
circulation of both model organisms and proven techniques through many 
hands and over many generations, in order to fine- tune the workings they 
could reveal, or produce, in the laboratories of highly trained experimental-
ists. Scale is of course particularly important to science in terms of evaluat-
ing and reproducing experimental results, and in the identification and elu-
cidation of missing factors—such as egg maturation or sperm capacitation. 
Gradually, over time, the differing reproductive cycles and mechanisms of 
various mammalian species have become part of a much larger archive of 
know- how that has in turn yielded new factors: how conception happened for 
hamsters, for example, could not be relied upon to establish its precise work-
ings in mice, never mind goats, deer, or dogs. It was only over time, and with 
the benefit of increasing cross- species (interspecific) comparison (scale) that 
the early events of mammalian development could be more reliably charac-
terized as a linear series of stages or steps—in order that they could be reli-
ably (technically) reproduced. In their own cyclical way, basic techniques and 
experiments—including both ivF and embryo transfer—are also scaled up, 
thus sedimenting into place a stable base of stem, or platform, technologies 
that is endlessly repeated. These lineages of technique were literally fused 
with the lineages of model organisms used in embryology (which often be-
came model organisms through the repeated application of particular tech-
niques) thus comprising the inherited technical physiology of developmen-
tal biology. It is in the merging of these various tools and models that a new 
ability to work biology becomes more practiced and reliable—even if it is not 
at all clear what this functionality reveals in the curiouser and curiouser world 
of early mammalian development.
Thus, for example, Pincus begins his book The Eggs of Mammals (dedi-
cated to Crozier) by typically comparing two very different model organisms 
through the same technology. “The fundamental control of the cleavage mi-
toses is alike in rabbit and sea urchin ova” (1936: 98), he notes. One lineage 
here is his direct academic descent from Loeb via Crozier, while another is 
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a technological inheritance—or kinship of technique—through the reprise 
of classical experiments, such as artificial parthenogenesis (à la Loeb) and 
embryo transfer (à la Heape). Despite the fact that Pincus’s book is largely 
descriptive and offers no obvious engineering solutions (and might even ap-
pear to be dedicated to the use of in vitro methods in order to return to an 
earlier era of classical or descriptive embryology characterized by “mere” ob-
servation37), his Loebism is apparent in his overriding emphasis throughout 
the 160- page monograph on the means of investigation. “The investigative 
aspects are what interest and intrigue me,” he writes (1936: vii). Here, then, 
as Hannah Landecker points out, the “cycle of artificial parthenogenesis” is 
proof of “a genealogy of plasticity [that] structures today’s experimental prob-
ing of the manifold potentiality of living matter and the practical experimen-
tal milieus in which cells are made to live” (2007: 8). However, we might add 
that this genealogy of plasticity is also one in which technology acts as a kind 
of shared substance of descent, remaking the science as scientists remake 
their work objects and technical objectives.38 This technical evolution, while 
linear, is thus also cyclical—endlessly recapitulating the alliance between the 
objects and methods that constitute its lineage—and recombinant, as it re-
circulates these elements, by passing them around, as it were, through a kind 
of experimental exogamy. The means of investigation—the constant remix-
ing of known model systems and model organisms with new animal species 
and genres of technique—are thus as much an object of study, and source of 
discovery, as the processes they are designed to investigate.39 This circulatory 
recycling of technique fused with substance is, indeed, how reproductive bi-
ology reproduces itself as a science. The importance of passaging and transfer 
partially explains why the biological phenomena this branch of science in-
vestigates—be they fertilization, cleavage, ovulation, or heredity—are never 
purely biological, or for that matter never fully “understood.” Indeed, as Pin-
cus says himself, his book about the eggs of mammals is as much about tech-
niques as ova. It is “an examination [of] the experimental investigations of the 
growth and development of the mammalian ovum during the various stages 
of its life history in the ovary and oviducts” (1936: 128, emphasis added) (fig-
ures 3.6 and 3.7).40
Landecker’s emphasis, like that of other historians of twentieth- century 
biology, on “those practices that exploit and explore the plasticity of living 
things” (2007: 8) is evident in Pincus’s use of ivF and artificial partheno-
genesis in combination with techniques of both explantation (tissue culture) 
and transplantation (embryo transfer) to explore oogenesis across a range 
of model organisms from different animal species subjected to repassaged 
FigurEs 3.6 and 3.7. 
Mammalian ova in culture 
documented by Gregory Pincus 
in one of the numerous tables of 
experimental data contained in 
his The Eggs of Mammals (New 
York: Macmillan, 1936).
Embryo pionEErs 141
and recycled species of technique. Pincus, like Robert Edwards, was strongly 
motivated by a conviction that inadequate attention had been paid to the 
living mammalian egg due to a technical deficit, or, as he put it, “because no 
technique was developed for preserving it intact in vitro” (1936: 2). Pincus was 
determined to remedy this technical deficit, and he provides an exhaustive re-
view of existing tools and technologies (including cinematography) alongside 
those he has invented himself (such as a new form of pipette for removing ova 
during lapararotomy; 66–67). The outcomes of hundreds of experiments are 
meticulously recorded through “standard motion picture cameras adapted 
for microphotography” (66) in Pincus’s Eggs of Mammals over the course of 
ten chapters containing twenty- six tables, thirty- three figures, and thirty- six 
original photographic plates that together document a technological history 
as well as a physiological one. Throughout his technologically adventurous re-
searches, Pincus was dedicated to an instrumental genealogy of technique: to 
“the experimental investigation of the growth and development of the mam-
malian ovum during the various stages of its life history” (1936: 128).41
On the one hand, this question for Pincus concerned “the problem of the 
origin of the definitive ova” (128, also referred to as the origin of the “so called 
‘primordial’ germ cells of the embryo,” 6), while on the other it was dedi-
cated to another kind of development entirely, namely of the technical means 
available to pursue these obscure origins, ranging from the use of ultravio-
let light and radiation (X- ray sterilization) to the injection of bespoke hor-
monal preparations. Both what Pincus classed as the “essentially descriptive” 
(1936: 5) observation of egg cell morphogenesis and the more explicitly inter-
ventionist “experimental investigation of the growth of egg cells” (6) achieved 
by “varying the conditions . . . and deducing from the derived data the nature 
of the factors concerned in the production of functional eggs” (6) relied on 
the constant development of new techniques, including those of visualiza-
tion and calculation, as well as surgery, tissue culture, and the ability to artifi-
cially simulate both chemical and physical events relevant to “the physiologi-
cal processes occurring in developing eggs” (53). As a record of what the effort 
to take living mammalian ova “in hand” involves, his portrait of an evolving 
technological milieu is as thorough as that provided by Marx of Adam Smith’s 
famous pin factory.
The experimental work for The Eggs of Mammals had taken place largely 
in the absence of any detailed understanding of the endocrinology of mam-
malian reproduction, but nonetheless made significant contributions to this 
field that would later be applied to the development of the first successful oral 
contraceptive pill—the achievement for which Pincus is historically most 
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well known. His own interests continued to focus on parthenogenesis, and 
it was his aim to produce live offspring from unfertilized eggs that had been 
artificially induced to begin development when he left Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, for a sabbatical in Cambridge, England, in 1937. He had noted in The 
Eggs of Mammals that although “we have seen that rabbit ova may be fertilized 
and cultured in vitro” it remained unclear “whether such ova may give rise to 
normal rabbits”—noting that on the basis of his published work with Enz-
mann (Pincus and Enzmann 1934) the “transplantation of such ova into the 
oviducts of pseudopregnant rabbit [reveals] that [only] ova fertilized in vitro 
and also normally fertilized ova kept in culture during the cleavage period ap-
parently resumed normal development after transplantation as evidenced by 
the production of normal young at term” (Pincus 1936: 96). Pincus had con-
cluded on the basis of this work that “it would seem then that parthenoge-
netic development may be induced in vivo” and that “presumably normal em-
bryos might develop if a diploid cleavage nucleus could be induced to form,” 
suggestively adding that he and Enzmann had “in fact, found indications that 
such a process may occur in activated rabbit eggs” (1936: 111).
These published observations were the source of significant media cover-
age, including a New York Times editorial that compared “Dr. Gregory Pincus 
of Harvard” to the character of Bokanovsky, the Director of Hatcheries and 
Conditioning, in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. In 1937 Pincus was the 
subject of a sensationalist article in Collier’s magazine unfavorably depicting 
him as a well- resourced, impatient young scientist with a name “borrowed 
from a detective novel,” with “slender, almost feminine hands” and the grand 
vision of fatherless offspring: “the mythical land of the Amazons would then 
come to life. A world where women would be self- sufficient; man’s value pre-
cisely zero,” the article concluded (cited in Speroff 2009: 88). This negative 
publicity, combined with the advent of the Second World War, the demise of 
Harvard’s Department of Physiology and the Bussey Institution, and “the fact 
that he was Jewish” (Speroff 2009: 89), led to the termination of Pincus’s em-
ployment at Harvard while he was in England.
During 1938–1941, while Pincus was involved in a lengthy relocation to 
what would eventually become the Worcester Foundation for Experimental 
Biology (where both the first successful mammalian ivF and the birth control 
pill would later be born), another émigré biologist, Min- Chueh Chang, was 
earning his PhD in John Hammond’s Animal Research Station at Cambridge. 
Unbeknownst to either of them, and never having met in Cambridge, Pincus 
and Chang would spend the rest of their working lives dedicated to a lengthy 
series of experiments on the endless frontier of reproductive science, much 
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of it applied to American medical and agricultural problems, just as FDR had 
imagined. Indeed, Chang was to arrive at the newly established independent 
biological research facility in central Massachusetts, an hour outside Boston, 
almost coincidentally with the publication of Vannevar Bush’s influential re-
port in March 1945. Together, Pincus and Chang would contribute to the curi-
ous evolution of ivF largely through their work on contraception—exactly 
the kind of applied project Roosevelt would have applauded, although with 
an outcome he is likely never to have imagined.
the Birth of iVF
As noted at the outset of this chapter, there are many reasons why the fron-
tier analogy might be considered particularly apt to describe the postwar de-
velopment of reproductive biology and its translational offspring in the form 
of human ivF, for it is possible to sketch the outlines of something very much 
like what FDR appears to have envisaged when we consider the postwar de-
velopment of reproductive biomedicine and bioscience. However, I have also 
suggested that the frontier idiom is in some ways more complicated than it 
seems—at times even paradoxically so. These complications, I suggest, may 
be apt, since they provide a useful interpretive perspective from which to 
examine some of the more paradoxical aspects of the development of ivF 
and experimental embryology, as well as biology and the life sciences more 
broadly. The mixed idioms of the frontier and pioneering may help us to ap-
preciate that being after ivF is not simply to be in a position to potentially 
benefit from a successful clinical application that was deliberately achieved 
at the end of a lengthy process of translational scientific advance. Instead, 
I have suggested, it may be helpful to distinguish between the frontier as it 
is encountered going forward and how it is reckoned in hindsight—in the 
same way we might somewhat skeptically view the technological progress 
narratives that are likely to appear more goal oriented from the point of look-
ing backward, or from the standpoint of a proven technological success story 
(the miracle baby). This distinction is similar to that separating the forward- 
looking anticipation of the frontier as a gigantic landscape of opportunity, and 
the experience of probing more experimentally with the tools at hand. The dif-
ference between these two perspectives allows us to approach the question of 
the technological frontier less in terms of a specific goal, or aim, and instead, 
as Gell suggests, through the magic of an imaginative reach, or play, that ex-
tends beyond the merely real in an approach to the edges of the known. The 
resulting, ambivalent and fortuitous, model of scientific development is more 
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consistent with the haphazard evolution of ivF than the this- discovery- led- 
to- that- landmark- result model of technological development—as if it were a 
chain reaction, or even inevitable.
The second reason I have employed the frontier idiom as hermeneu-
tic guide in this chapter is to exploit its traction as an analogy for conver-
sion, through which what is beyond the merely real can become the “regular 
real”—as have airplanes traveling over the North Pole, or babies conceived in 
a dish (to name but two examples). From this point of view we can appreciate 
the process by which technology domesticates its objects—by making them 
workable and tractable, as well as viable and populous, through the sedimen-
tation of relationships of technique that often have the reproduction of tech-
nology as their immediate goal. As is explored further in chapter 7, this trans-
fer, or conversion, of the unknown into the known is what the idiom of the 
frontier delivers, or performs, as a representational device, or metaphor, to 
naturalize new relationships—such as those between biology and technology 
as evolving ways of life. By invoking this representational work of conversion 
and retrospective sedimentation, I want to suggest that the paths established 
in and through technological inheritance—what we conventionally think of 
as the advance of technology—is, like the frontier, more complex and multi-
faceted than it may seem. In vitro fertilization is a good example of this kind 
of complex evolution, as is the history of embryology, because the conver-
sions and transmutations that occur in these realms (among others) not only 
stretch but frequently exceed the frames of the models, idioms, or metaphors 
used to represent them.
Like other technologies, ivF stretches and exceeds the frame of existing 
understandings—for example, by enabling an unusual transfer “into man” 
not only of a high- tech reproductive substance (an in vitro fertilized egg) but 
a living human tool. For in addition to being a biological relative, a much- 
desired would- be take- home baby, or a precious human embryo, the in vitro 
fertilized human egg cell is also a technology, in the most conventional sense 
of the term. But it is clearly also an unusual technology—a fusion of biology 
and engineering, a mechanization of substance that establishes a new biologi-
cal relation to and as technology—and one that arguably becomes curiouser 
and curiouser even as it is more fully characterized in a scientific sense. What 
are we to make of the miracle baby’s complex ancestry on the technological 
frontiers that made his or her existence biologically possible as the offspring 
of a vast, interspecific project of reworking reproductivity? What are the im-
plications for either biological or technological evolution of their union in the 
form of several million human offspring?
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Before moving any further with this question, the final section of this 
chapter briefly completes the tool history of the world’s most famous embryo 
transfer, conducted by Patrick Steptoe in his Oldham obstetrical ward, fol-
lowing the successful fertilization of Mrs. Brown’s egg in Robert Edwards’s lab 
next door. It is Chang, working in Pincus’s lab, who is now acknowledged to 
have achieved the first live births following ivF in mammals in 1959—an ac-
complishment that was itself the offspring of a long lineage of successful em-
bryo transfer experiments in the rabbit (1891), rat (1933), sheep (1934), goat 
(1934), mouse (1942), cow (1949), and pig (1951). It would be another two de-
cades before this technique was successfully translated into a clinical proce-
dure by Edwards and Steptoe following their recycling and recombination of 
several lineages of technique as well as their tenacious “forward march” into 
unknown territory. Like Pincus, Edwards was at least as interested in the de-
velopment of new techniques as what they would reveal about the underlying 
biological principles they were intended to explore, and like Chang he was 
particularly interested to exploit the possibilities of ivF and embryo transfer 
in mammals for a wide variety of research purposes. Indeed, like many of the 
embryo transfer pioneers who preceded him, including both Chang and Pin-
cus, Edwards was adept in exploiting the somewhat chaotic overlap between 
the actual and potential uses of embryo transfer for agricultural applications, 
as a research technique to address basic questions of mammalian reproduc-
tion and development, and as a potential clinical tool (the latter initially en-
visaged, as mentioned earlier, as a contraceptive device).
From inovulation to iVF
Following his initial training in agricultural science in Wales, Edwards moved 
to Conrad Waddington’s bustling interdisciplinary Institute of Animal Genet-
ics in Edinburgh as a doctoral student, where he was surrounded not only by 
high- quality experimental science but by the superb facilities provided by 
Waddington’s generous funding. Here he was inspired by a film produced 
by Alan Beatty titled Inovulation demonstrating a new method of cervical em-
bryo transfer in mice, resulting in the birth of viable offspring. Sitting at the 
back of the lecture theater, Edwards recalls, “I became more and more ex-
cited. . . . There and then I knew what I wanted to do as a PhD student and 
who I wanted to supervise me” (Edwards and Steptoe 1980: 20). Having com-
pleted his PhD research by inducing chromosomal changes in mouse em-
bryos, Edwards set off to California to embark on a new project in reproduc-
tive immunology, returning to a position at the National Institute for Medical 
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Research in Mill Hill, north London, in 1958. Here too his interests fluctu-
ated: “I flitted from laboratory to laboratory in the UK and the USA, changed 
scientific and medical partners in a way unmatched in any barn dance” (37). 
Still motivated by his early work stimulating mouse egg development using 
gonadotrophins, Edwards resumed his embryological work at Mill Hill, only 
to discover that the in vivo maturation of mouse eggs in culture solution had 
already been confirmed by Pincus at Cambridge a quarter of a century earlier. 
And not only in mice, as Pincus had also successfully cultured human eggs. 
Initially disappointed (“I sat in the Mill Hill Institute library momentarily de-
pressed; the novelty of my discovery had suddenly worn thin,” 40), Edwards 
soon reevaluated his discovery (or rediscovery) in more favorable terms. “As I 
drove home to Elstree I pondered, ‘Was it so sad?’ It was encouraging in prac-
tical terms. Human eggs, according to Pincus would ripen outside the body 
and become ready for fertilization” (40).
In order to explore these practical (now translational) frontiers, Edwards 
needed to make contact with clinicians. Extending the interdisciplinary barn 
dance about which he was already somewhat uncomfortable, Edwards was 
to find himself even more awkwardly situated in the surgeries he needed to 
visit to acquire human eggs for his research. Having gained the collabora-
tion of Molly Rose, the consultant surgeon who delivered his first daughter, 
Edwards became a regular visitor to the Edgware General Hospital in North 
London, where he attended operations self- consciously “clutching [his] glass 
sterile pot—the receptacle for the precious bit of superfluous ovarian tissue.” 
Here, he felt himself both a novice and out of place—on the very threshold 
of the path to unprecedented future human applications, and yet ambivalent 
regarding this proximity. “‘What am I doing?,’ I asked myself. ‘Do I really have 
a place in this theatre?’” (Edwards and Steptoe 1980: 42). Similarly, his new 
research on human eggs, begun with “high hopes,” soon “began to feel less 
certain.” None of the eggs provided to Edwards by Rose or other gynecologists 
showed any signs of ripening in culture. He decided Pincus had been wrong.
Pincus, whom I respected and whom I had met two or three times, 
was wrong [and] had been wrong before. His work on parthenogenesis 
during the 1930s, on the birth of fatherless rabbits, had failed to stand 
the test of time. All the same, I admired him enormously. Among the 
famous scientists whom I have met and come to know he still stands 
near the top. Pincus had helped to reshape modern life, especially for 
women, with his contraceptive pill. I thought then, as I think now, 
that he never received full recognition for his work. There are men— 
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pygmies compared with him—who have been awarded Nobel Prizes. 
Perhaps he was too controversial. . . . He was a fighter. He was gritty 
and outspoken. He would have made a fine Yorkshireman! (1980: 43)
Edwards was a Yorkshireman himself, and his admiring description of Pin-
cus draws attention to many of the traits they shared. Eventually Edwards 
would also be awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 2010 
for his work leading to the development of human ivF, which, like contra-
ception, has reshaped modern life, especially for women. Edwards’s work 
was controversial, and ivF would not have been successfully achieved in 
humans had he not been a gritty and outspoken fighter, who valued his role 
as a pioneer. Like Pincus, who in many ways set the prototype for his un-
conventional, technique- driven, iconoclastic, and unusually interdisciplinary 
career, Edwards was a “scientific entrepreneur,” in the way Adele Clarke (after 
Howard Becker 1963) has applied this term to the reproductive sciences, em-
phasizing the extreme heterogeneity of relationships between professional 
worlds that must be negotiated by key actors, who require a wide range of 
skills, as well as the will and energy to interconnect them, in order to succeed. 
Like Pincus’s, Edwards’s career was challenged by what Clarke describes as 
the “enduring illegitimacy, marginality and controversial status of the repro-
ductive sciences as a discipline” (1998: 18)—a situation Edwards met with a 
combination of verve, tenacity, and hard work that ultimately benefited from 
a generous dose of good luck.
As Martin Johnson (2011) has noted of the partnership that would develop 
between Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe, they were both outsiders to 
their professions and the establishment, known not only for their iconoclasm 
but for their ambition and talent. It can be added that theirs was in many re-
spects a marriage of technique, beginning with a telephone conversation in 
1967 about laparoscopy, and developing over the next two decades as a mod-
ern technological odyssey the adjective Promethean is not out of place de-
scribing. Along the road to successful human ivF in Oldham, Lancashire, in 
1978, not very far from either Birmingham or Manchester, or the mechani-
cal workshops of the Industrial Revolution, Edwards dug deep into the long 
legacy of technical innovation in experimental embryology described in this 
chapter, in order to rework human reproductivity to deliver a new mode of 
human procreation in which biology and technology were viably coupled. 
To this work Steptoe added the highly successful technique of laparoscopy 
(now the basis for keyhole surgery and many other clinical and experimen-
tal uses) while Edwards devised the means to fertilize human eggs in vitro. 
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While the obstacle of infertility confronted Steptoe in his practice as a gyne-
cologist, it is clear that the value of ivF went far beyond the ability to assist 
conception in Edwards’s far- reaching vision of ivF as a platform technology 
for everything from preimplantation genetic diagnosis to stem cell propaga-
tion and tissue engineering. The confirmation of the birth of viable human 
offspring from this pioneering technique both inaugurated and legitimated 
the progressive expansion of the reproductive frontier into future applica-
tions that have since made of ivF what Walter Heape, a century previously, 
had established through mammalian embryo transfer—namely a platform or 
stem technology with a life of its own.
Thus, while the legacy of Steptoe and Edwards as the medical- scientific 
partnership behind the first successful human ivF may remain umbilically 
linked to the image of the test- tube baby, and the birth of reproductive bio-
medicine, it could equally be claimed that it is the transfer of the ivF platform 
into human use tout court that has proven to be of an even greater significance 
we have only just begun to appreciate. The meaning of this legacy is the ori-
gin of Biological Relatives, in asking whether the logic of ivF extends beyond 
human procreation to other reproductive purposes. Even the somewhat sur-
prising scale of human ivF’s expansion worldwide over the past thirty- five 
years may pale in the wake of its future significance—which will not only 
be measured by ivF’s expansion into genetic disease prevention, human em-
bryonic stem cell research, and regenerative medicine, but must take into 
account a watershed point in the very meaning of the adjective “biological” 
as it becomes increasingly synonymous with technology. Reproductive tech-
nology is arguably a pivotal point of (con)fusion for the anxious contemporary 
question of what kind of kinship or relationality shared biological substance 
establishes, and what kind of mechanics reproductivity comprises, responds 
to, or delivers. These are not questions that can be answered in the lab unless 
it is the conflation of human experimentalism and human evolution that are 
considered to be the laboratory writ large in which the mechanisms of fron-
tier reproduction will continue to be characterized over time.
But this future might be better charted by careful study of the past than by 
more open- ended speculation, and it is thus the lived relationship to early ivF 
that is the focus of the following chapters. In order to understand the condi-
tion of being after ivF, or biologically relative, it is necessary to examine yet 
another dimension of this process, in order once again to view it from a differ-
ent angle. For if, as I have suggested, the kinships of technology that engender 
ivF must be understood as relational—uniting tools, objects, concepts, prac-
tices, and people—so too does their union reveal a new technology of kinship, 
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and a new biology. Indeed, this is the point of ivF—its goal is to produce new 
biological relations through technology, and thus a new future for reproduc-
tivity, as kinship both through and as technology. As we shall see, the bio-
logical relations established through new reproductive technologies depend 
on genealogies not only of scientific technique but of even older social tech-
nologies. In the next chapter, then, we turn to yet another stem or platform 
technology—the social and cultural organization of human reproduction as 
kinship that has an equally elaborate set of exact mechanisms, if a somewhat 
different set of tools. As we shall see, this apparatus also fuses the biological 
with the technical—and indeed has done so for much longer than ivF.
FouR Reproductive technologies
In the previous chapter, the workings necessary to take reproductive sub-
stance in hand in order to characterize and remake it were explored in the 
context of embryology. This chapter turns to the examination of gender and 
kinship as technologies not only in order to demonstrate how they are neces-
sary in order for ivF to work, or that they are also remade through ivF. By ex-
amining the exact mechanisms and elementary structures of ivF through the 
lens of kinship theory, this chapter suggests once again that this technique 
is not exactly what it seems in part because it changes what is being repro-
duced, by producing an imitation that is both similar to and different from the 
original forms on which it is based, modeled, or after. Like chapter 3, this one 
argues that ivF is not only biologically reproductive but technologically re-
productive as well, and thus constitutive of a distinctive form of regeneration 
in which these two processes are combined to make new people.
As Alfred Gell notes in his discussion of technology, it is not only “inade-
quately understood” as tool use, but must include within its definition the 
sum total of social relationships that make knowledge and technique possible, 
thus ultimately comprising all “the necessary conditions for cooperation be-
tween individuals in technical activity” (1988: 6). But what is technical ac-
tivity? Gell identifies a basic level of technical activity to provide food, shelter, 
clothing, manufacture, and tools. He includes language and communication 
in this category, which he classifies as “Technology of Production.” However, 
as he notes, human societies are particularly notable for their tendency to “go 
to extreme lengths to secure specific patterns of matings and births,” adding 
that infant socialization is conducted in “a technically elaborated way” and 
that human beings are “bred and reared under controlled conditions that are 
technically managed, so as to produce precisely those individuals for whom 
social provision has been made.” As a result, he emphasizes, “the reproduc-
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tion of society is the consequence of a vast amount of very skilled manipula-
tion” and this technical system “include[s] most of what conventional anthro-
pology designates by the word kinship,” a term he paraphrases as “Technology 
of Reproduction” (Gell 1988: 7).
As Gell states, “the whole domain of kinship has to be understood pri-
marily as a technology. . . . The patterns of social relationships we identify 
as ‘kinship systems’ are a set of technical strategies for managing our repro-
ductive destiny via an elaborate sequence of purposes” (1988: 7). This chap-
ter goes somewhat further to suggest that the understanding of kinship, as 
well as gender and sex, as technologies is not fully captured by the posit-
ing of a role for technology as managerial or strategic—although this pro-
vides a useful starting point. If, as we saw in chapter 3, technology is not only 
added to, or even grafted into, living substance, but becomes a new kind of 
living substance as a result, then technology is more than managerial. It is less 
additive. The work it does is more substantial, and its relations are less divis-
ible than even Gell’s encompassing definition suggests. Technology is more 
“world- building,” to use Haraway’s (1997) phrase. Arguably, this aspect of how 
technology works is particularly visible from the point of view of kinship, thus 
making it a useful perspective to graft onto those explored so far. Although 
the intersection between biology and technology in this chapter is rather dif-
ferent from that discussed in the context of embryology, it too works in ways 
that can be precisely charted, and the workings of kinship, as well as gender 
and sex, take on particularly interesting meanings in the context of ivF, where 
an unusually recursive form of technology transfer is ongoing—as we have 
already seen. An obvious question, albeit a challenging one, is to ask what re-
lation these different models of technology, and their precise workings, might 
bear to one another. In the continuing spirit of a thought experiment, this 
question motivates my turn in this chapter to a consideration of kinship as a 
technology from the point of view of being after ivF.
One of the great difficulties of appreciating the operation of kinship as a 
technology, in both anthropology and social life, has been the intransigent 
question of what kinship organizes—which is conventionally imagined as the 
natural flow of reproductive substance. There has always been a bit of magi-
cal thinking going on in this respect within kinship theory, where on the one 
hand kinship emerges through the imposition of social law, but on the other 
hand is determined by certain universal qualities of human physiology—and 
indeed by the natural flow of reproductive substance that must be managed. 
In the same way that technological evolution has often been assumed to be 
automatic (if not explicitly then by default) or based on self- evident needs, so 
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too has the evolution of kinship systems largely been explained as a process 
that is based on a preexisting natural mechanism with a biological purpose 
that requires no further explanation. The difficulties of moving beyond a natu-
ralized model of reproductive biology, and its accompanying presumption 
of automatically polarized sexual difference, are both well known and wide-
spread. The faulty logic here is the same we often encounter in explanations 
of technological development that simply assume it is inevitable.
What the looking glass of ivF helps to reveal is how technologies of kinship 
and gender, among others, activate reproductive substance, not the other way 
around. Indeed, ivF makes explicit how and why technologies of kinship not 
only organize reproduction but are reproductive substance—and thus how 
reproductivity is itself produced, worked up, or cultivated. This way of think-
ing is counterintuitive in part because natural agency is conventionally pre-
sumed to precede social, or technological, management—as if biological re-
production is a process that will occur regardless, or even by itself, as it were. 
However, this automatic reproductive model is exactly what the existence of 
ivF contradicts: if biological reproduction acted by and for itself, ivF would 
not be necessary. In vitro fertilization is intended to achieve reproduction in 
“a technically elaborated way,” as Gell put it, employing “a vast amount of very 
skilled manipulation” (1988: 7). As we saw in chapter 3, reproduction came 
to be understood experimentally through technologies designed not only to 
manage it, but to manipulate the reproductive process—and indeed to fun-
damentally reshape its actions by controlling and redirecting them. Signifi-
cantly, it is precisely this history of transforming biology into a technology 
that gives rise to clinical ivF—arguably experimental embryology’s most suc-
cessful translation. Because ivF is dedicated to the project of forcing repro-
duction, its genealogy lies in the acquisition of technological control. This is 
the point of view from which ivF engenders biological relativity—an iden-
tity between biology and technology that makes it impossible to determine 
where the one begins and the other ends—and as we shall see, this is also the 
perspective from which ivF can be seen to be modeling, and extending, how 
kinship functions as a technology not only of reproduction but of production 
as well.
The story that is retold in this chapter—whereby a presumed biological 
base to kinship, gender, reproduction, and sex came to be understood instead 
as a technology—foregrounds a parallel between the elementary structures 
of ivF and the experimental life of kinship, sex, and gender in culture, as it 
were. However, the effort is also to push the overall argument about ivF a bit 
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further—by asking once again what ivF models, and what it substantiates or 
reproduces as a way of life, a kind of life, or a way of living the remaking of 
life. How does ivF model the future of kinship as a technology (or the future 
of technology as kinship)? Arguably, what ivF reveals, both as a reproductive 
model and as a technological path, is the extent to which human reproductive 
substance has always been activated in more complex technical ways than 
may heretofore have been made so explicit. If this technicality is the condi-
tion for reproductivity, then technology is more than merely a means—it is 
shared reproductive substance.
One of the main reasons this question matters is because it allows us to see 
how much more than the prospect of miracle babies is reproduced through 
ivF, and the future of kinship it substantializes. As is argued in the next two 
chapters, and as has been discussed already in chapter 1, the rapid and exten-
sive expansion of ivF technology over the past three decades cannot simply 
be explained by either its success or its popularity—not least as these two 
criteria contradict each other. Either the use of ivF has expanded rapidly be-
cause it is popular in spite of having a less than 50 percent success rate, or its 
popularity and success rely on something other than its disappointing take- 
home- baby ratio. Put differently, the rapid and widespread expansion of ivF 
technology cannot be explained by its popularity as a reproductive technology 
unless it is successfully reproducing something other than offspring. In vitro 
fertilization may be popular, for example, because the pursuit of success is 
important regardless of the odds against it, or it may be that the pursuit of 
ivF offers something else, or because at least being seen to try to procreate 
is preferable to doing nothing. These possibilities lead to others. If biological 
reproduction (like kinship) is not simply driven by an automatic transgen-
erational flow of reproductive substance—if, as Gell claims, it must be orga-
nized and managed through complex technical strategies—then is there a 
degree to which it is the implementation of such strategies for their own sake 
that explains, in part, why ivF is so popular? While this might seem almost 
absurd from the point of view of the ostensible goal of ivF (to make babies), 
this chapter reviews the important reasons why the pursuit of biological off-
spring should not be presumed to be as obvious a goal as it might seem. We 
can also go further than this and ask whether the success of ivF is, at a very 
fundamental level, simply reproducing an active relationship to technology, 
full stop. Perhaps ivF is not only about managing or improving biological re-
production, but is itself a means of producing other things, other relation-
ships, other values, or other identities. Surprising though it may seem, for 
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example, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that what ivF organizes 
and enables are parenthood and kinship identities that can be achieved with-
out having babies.
As we shall see in this chapter, most theories of kinship have presumed 
it must be based on something else—it must come after nature, or as a re-
sult of biology, for example. Yet the alternative possibility that kinship could 
have been invented simply for itself is strongly implied in much of this same 
literature—particularly that of Lévi- Strauss, who, like Gell, strongly empha-
sizes free play and creativity and primarily describes kinship as a language. 
The most significant flaw in the arguments of Lévi- Strauss concerning the 
origins of kinship derive from the offensive and unnecessary argument that 
it is women’s natural reproductive capacity that gives rise to the exchange of 
women, and that it is competition over this good that necessitates the first 
social law of exogamy, inaugurating the transition from nature to culture. But 
these are also his most unconvincing claims, since why should a self- acting, 
but gendered and sexed, reproductivity lie at the base of human social life, 
initially manifest as the exchange of women, and what explains this premise? 
The origin of this self- acting model of fecundity as a gender- specific good, 
and the mute intransigence of this premise—not only in the work of Lévi- 
Strauss, but in much of social and political thought throughout the twentieth 
century—lies in the fact that, unlike kinship, sex and reproduction have been 
viewed as “merely biological.” Until recently, the exact mechanisms of sex and 
reproduction have simply not been theorized because they are presumed to 
be too obvious to require explanation.1 Thus they have been ignored. In vitro 
fertilization is interesting not only because of the degree to which it makes 
the activation of reproductive substance so vividly explicit, but because of the 
further questions this revelation foregrounds—or indeed forces into view. 
For example, to what extent is ivF a successful conjugal technology despite 
its failures as a reproductive one? Similarly, might it be a highly successful 
technology for the reproduction of gender identities and gender roles regard-
less of its reproductive outcome? Is it, as Gay Becker (2000) suggests, a tech-
nology that allows for the reproduction of a trying identity, a striving- after 
identity, or even a means of reproducing a class identity? These are important 
questions to ask because if it is the case that people feel they must undergo 
ivF in order to be seen to be trying everything, who is this trying for and what 
is it in aid of? If it is for the alleviation of personal distress in the face of a 
failed, or spoiled, identity, then is ivF a technology for identity repair? Is this 
what ivF technology is after in the sense of why it is pursued by so many—
who are perhaps not only seeking a technology of reproduction, but technolo-
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gies of gender and sex, or the arrangement of successful conjugality? Is ivF a 
technology not only for making babies but for making kinship, or repairing 
it, in the wake of a breach in the expected automatic flow of reproductive 
substance? Put most broadly, to what extent is ivF a technology for produc-
ing new types of identity and sociality not only in addition to, but sometimes 
instead of, making babies? If ivF substantializes a new ground state of repro-
ductivity, and if this is why it exists, does this form of reproduction come into 
being, like kinship or writing, simply for itself? If this appears too simplistic 
an explanation for the origins of ivF, it is worth recalling that the idea that 
kinship systems essentially reproduce themselves for themselves is taught to 
undergraduates as one of the elementary structures of both social emergence 
and social life.2
In sum, is ivF a technology that has never been reducible to the pursuit 
of successful reproduction in the strictly biological sense of the term?3 Yes, 
clearly, ivF is used to provide much- wanted children for couples whose infer-
tility prevented them from having biological offspring of their own—and this 
is clearly part of the reason it exists at all. And yet such a goal is more complex 
than it might appear, as well as being only part of the story. As with most goal- 
oriented applications, the objective is never entirely self- evident to begin with 
and is always supplemented by additional effects, even when it is achieved. 
This overdetermined quality of ivF technology has been the subject of con-
siderable attention from feminists, and rightly so as ivF is a technology with 
more complex and often paradoxical consequences than its apparently self- 
evident function suggests. In contrast to the idea that ivF is a simple, essen-
tially mimetic, technology directed at obvious ends, and that it is increasingly 
popular despite its shortcomings simply because these ends are so hugely 
desirable, exists the possibility that ivF is neither simple nor simply mimetic, 
and that neither what it is reproducing nor how it works are obvious at all.
experimental kinship
In one of the very first anthropological analyses of new reproductive tech-
nologies, published in the early 1990s, Marilyn Strathern described them as 
experiments and invited her readers to “ponder upon how to think about ex-
periments being conducted in a real system that is regarded as both a biologi-
cal and a social one” (1992b: 3). Such an intervention, she suggested, would 
be likely to have far- reaching effects, since “ideas about kinship offered a 
theory, if you like, about the relationship of society to the natural world”: 
“Having sex, transmitting genes, giving birth: these facts of life were once 
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taken as the basis for those relations between spouses, siblings, parents and 
children which were, in turn, taken as the basis of kin relations. Incorporated 
into such a reproductive model were suppositions about the connection be-
tween natural facts and social constructions” (Strathern 1992b: 5). Fittingly, 
Strathern’s favored adjective to describe the separate and distinct but over-
lapping logics of the hybrid reproductive model grounding English or Euro- 
American kinship thinking is “merographic”—a term she explains in relation 
to the embryological term “meroblast” (1992a: 204n).4 “Merographic connec-
tions,” as they are habitually used in the English- speaking world where ivF 
was invented, work to connect plurality and singularity at once—conserving 
the distinctiveness of the domains that are brought into conjunction, while 
emphasizing the plurality of connections that can be made in this way. Thus, 
for example, as Strathern explains: “Culture and nature may be connected 
together as domains that run in an analogous fashion insofar as each oper-
ates in a similar way according to laws of its own; at the same time, each 
is also connected to a whole range of other phenomena which differentiate 
them—the activities of human beings, for instance, by contrast to the physi-
cal properties of the universe” (1992a: 73). The English penchant for mero-
graphic thinking (“putting things into context”) can most simply be described 
as making “a connection from another angle” (1992a: 73), and this conceptual 
mechanism is especially useful for generating new perspectives as separate 
domains are exchanged, or transferred, thus changing the background against 
which parts can be characterized.
What Strathern wants her modern readers to note is how this mechanism 
introduces an inevitable plurality into the process of defining even those 
things that are imagined to stand for themselves—such as a biological fact. 
In vitro fertilization can be used as an example, since it can be thought of as 
part of either a biological or a technical process. In social practice, it is in-
deed a characteristic and even regular feature of the world of ivF that people 
constantly switch back and forth between these two points of view, or inhabit 
them simultaneously as convergent, if also distinct, perspectives. Moreover, it 
is precisely the experience of inhabiting multiple contradictory frames of ref-
erence at the same time that in part accounts for the distinctiveness of the ivF 
experience, and its inherent ambivalence. And this is also Strathern’s point 
about merographic thinking—the fact that different domains of knowledge 
can be exchanged draws attention to the instrumentalism by which contexts 
of interpretation are altered and recombined, so that, for example, ivF can be 
seen as just like biology, or as a form of technological control.
In vitro fertilized embryos fit easily within a merographic model of facts 
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that belong to multiple and transferable logics, or orders. More than just plu-
ral or hybrid, the research objects produced within contemporary scientific 
study in fields such as synthetic biology, regenerative medicine, and tissue 
engineering are classically merographic in the sense that the logics of their 
parts belong to several distinct but overlapping wholes. The logic of experi-
mental embryology precisely relies upon epistemological transfers of this 
kind, through which biological components come to be understood by mov-
ing them around, and by resituating the same phenomena within different 
technological or biological orders or wholes. That these transfers produce 
effects is the whole point of this kind of empirical science, which it substan-
tializes in the form of entities like Spemann’s push- me- pull- you salamander. 
Similarly, recombining these parts to make new wholes, such as artificial em-
bryos, cybrids, and cell lines, might be called a merographic technique that 
substantializes, or implements, a merographic conceptuality. Strathern’s de-
scription of English kinship in After Nature is remarkably accurate to describe 
the principles informing this style of investigation. “Each order that encom-
passes the parts may be thought of as a whole, as the individual parts may 
also be thought of as wholes. But parts in this view do not make wholes. . . . 
Thus the logic of the totality is not necessarily to be found in the logic of the 
parts, but in principles, forces, relations that exist beyond the parts” (Strathern 
1992a: 76, emphasis added). Indeed, it may be in the contemporary biosci-
ences where Strathern’s point that it is a habitual feature of the modern Eng-
lish mind- set to think merographically is uniquely applicable. She refers to it 
as “the English view that anything can be part of something else.” As she ex-
plains, the “very fact of trying to put something into context is a merographic 
move.” Not surprisingly, since it applies not only to English but to modern, 
post- Enlightenment thought, this principle describes experimental science, 
and in particular developmental biology, very accurately since it is all about 
recombining parts into new wholes. Hence the “whole” human genome can 
refer to a complete genetic sequence of a species, as in “the human genome,” 
the genetic constitution of an individual (Craig Venter’s genome), and a tech-
nological project (as in, “the human genome was sequenced in 2001”).
Descriptions of genetic function likewise refer to code, information, mes-
sages, transcription, copying, mutation, sequencing, writing, splicing, pro-
gramming, multiplication, language, libraries, architecture, grammar, beads 
on a string, spaghetti, and the alphabet. This is precisely the plurality mero-
graphic connections enable, through which metaphor and metonymy are 
conjoined. Similarly, the names that are given to the protein sequences that 
comprise genes, alleles, mutations, or markers belong to different conven-
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tions of scientific description according to how they are measured, marked, 
or mapped—and according to which techniques are used.5 The postgenomic 
sciences connect these distinct domains merographically because they rely 
on multilayered understandings, which simultaneously invoke plural and di-
vergent conventions of explanation, yet remain coherent because they are 
partial. Merographic thinking, then, is not only habitual but necessary to con-
temporary science, where it is important that a word like “gene” is neither too 
specific nor less real because such key concepts and analogies are only loosely 
attached to their objects. Like the biology the word “gene” is used to analyze, 
the term itself must retain a plasticity that allows it to be intercontextual.
The fact that merographic thinking is reproductive (in the sense of always 
generating new connections) takes on an additional dimension when it is 
employed in a reproductive context such as ivF. Here, and as we see further 
in chapter 5, merographic connections are used, in part, to instrumentalize 
reproductive substance—to equip it to function, or to put it in motion to re-
veal its mechanisms. Merographic thinking is not merely metaphorical. The 
substitution of an instrumental technology (ivF) for the process of biological 
reproduction (sex) in the name of producing future biological offspring (kin) 
is achieved through a translational merographic move, connecting what is 
imagined as substance (nature) to agency (culture). Merographic thinking, in 
other words, is part of the conceptual equipment necessary to make ivF both 
thinkable and doable, indeed to make it workable at all. This is one reason 
why new reproductive technologies such as ivF provide a context for espe-
cially thick descriptions of how reproduction is understood to work, or how it 
is imagined to be made to work, or put to work, by the technologies that make 
it workable.6 This is also how ivF becomes the stage on which reproductive 
aspirations become newly generative, prolix, and explicit through their new 
connections. Merographic thinking is part of what makes the ivF platform 
work so well—and thus how it becomes so successfully reproductive.
Of the many reasons it is useful to revisit the feminist critique of the anthro-
pological model of kinship as part nature, part culture, three are particularly 
relevant to this chapter and have determined its shape. Merographically, per-
haps, this chapter makes a connection from another angle to the same ques-
tions examined in the previous chapters concerning the intersection of a bio-
logical model of procreation with a technological model through which it is 
reengineered (ivF). To the extent that this intersection is the viable union, 
or coupling, ivF confirms and reproduces in the form of viable offspring, it is 
worth noting that ivF also, therefore, literalizes the merographic connection 
between biology and artifice as a kinship connection—that is, through ties 
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of substance achieved through cultured- up procreation. As Charis Thompson 
(2005) has shown, it is the way the biological relation that is the goal of ivF is 
taken apart and put back together in the process of producing it that can be 
traced so explicitly through this technology—a process she describes as “stra-
tegic naturalization.” In this sense, and just as Strathern originally observed 
in her analysis of kinship in the context of new reproductive technologies 
in the early 1990s, ivF and assisted reproductive technologies more broadly 
introduce a new dimension to kinship—by providing new biological relatives 
that simultaneously make explicit new definitions of them (social, scientific, 
legal, ethical, cultural) and new mechanisms (technological, artificial, man- 
made) through which they are made. This is how new categories of biological 
relatives have come into existence (“gestational mother,” “egg donor,” “ivF 
twin,” “saviour sibling,” etc.), but also how the very idea of a biological tie has 
been relativized—in both senses of the term. The results, argues Strathern, 
are not only “a new ambiguity about what should count as natural” and a new 
distinction “between social and biological parenthood” (1992b: 19); in addi-
tion, ivF reveals the mechanics of how reproduction is composed and orga-
nized in order to be activated, acted upon, or realized in the making of kin 
and kinship. The contingency of biological reproduction is exposed, Strath-
ern suggests, in the very process of forcing it to work. “The more facilitation 
is given to the biological reproduction of human persons, the harder it is to 
think of a domain of natural facts independent of social intervention” (1992b: 
30). Here, again, we see a demonstration of how the merographic mechanism 
of this reproductive model becomes more generative through its contingency 
(it produces more kinds of biological relatives).7 Indeed it is contingency that 
activates the merographic mechanism.
I return at the end of this chapter to the role of technology in Strathern’s 
merographic thought experiment. The reason such a question arises is itself 
doubly assisted by developments in feminist theories of gender and kinship 
during the 1980s, in ways that pose yet another technological trajectory to 
ponder upon. This chapter anticipates the next, where I argue that a review 
of the feminist analysis of women’s experience of reproductive technology 
raises the somewhat counterintuitive question of whether ivF is a technology 
of making sex that both underserves and exceeds the goal of making babies. 
In the discussion below, this question is “prequelled” by reviewing how gen-
der and kinship come to be theorized as technologies of sex within feminist 
anthropology, in contrast to the use of this term by Foucault. A possibility I 
explore, in part relying on Strathern’s earlier work in The Gender of the Gift 
(and leading up to her famous claim that Melanesian babies don’t come from 
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women), is that far from “taking away the very concept that made kinship 
itself a distinctive domain” (i.e., a priori natural facts), or making it “harder 
to think of a domain of natural facts independent of social intervention,” ivF 
and assisted reproductive technologies simply deliver merographic concep-
tuality in the form of new biological relations as technologies. I suggest that 
this may not be so much a departure from kinship thinking but, as Strathern 
argues, its original form.
The approach in this chapter draws primarily on feminist anthropological 
debates about kinship, gender, and reproduction, and, like the previous chap-
ter, redescribes a conceptual evolution indigenous to a specific field of inves-
tigation. The story told here is thus part of the history of science, narrated 
through the development of new techniques to explore the exact mechanisms 
of reproductivity. Like chapter 3, this one is also composed of a series of case 
studies, episodes, and snapshots. It begins by revisiting Gayle Rubin’s cru-
cial early theorization of the sex/gender system before moving on, in a more 
or less chronological fashion, to the feminist anthropological engagement 
with structuralism and the work of Lévi- Strauss. In the middle section I give 
careful consideration to the feminist anthropological critique of the nature- 
culture dichotomy, despite the already vast literature available on this debate, 
because I have a particular point in mind about its relation to the emergence 
of the gender- as- technology argument, most closely associated with the work 
of Judith Butler. The discussion here, although also covering much familiar 
ground, is aimed to elucidate the ways in which sex is mechanized, not only to 
produce a reciprocating set of linkages to chapter 3, and the rest of this book, 
but to explore further the meaning of biological relativity. This merographic 
use of the mechanical analogy is intended to emphasize points of overlap or 
connection between these arguments. It is the question of what these connec-
tions reveal, and how to reveal them, that determine the mosaic form of this 
book as a whole. If, then, the following discussion appears either to retrace 
familiar ground for some readers, or to introduce completely new terrain to 
others, that is in part because its aim is not traditionally synthetic but delib-
erately formal. My aim is to identify and connect the repeated elucidation of 
specific forms—namely the exact mechanisms by which sex is technologized 




In her landmark contribution to feminist anthropological theories of sexual 
inequality in the mid- 1970s, Gayle Rubin introduced the term “sex/gender 
system” as part of her call for a “political economy of sexual systems” to ex-
plain how “particular conventions of sexuality are produced and maintained” 
(1975: 165). “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex” 
draws inspiration from Marx and Engels both in its model of social repro-
duction and in its diagnostic method of reading Freud and Lévi- Strauss as 
feminism’s Ricardo and Smith, who “see neither the implications of what 
they are saying, nor the implicit critique which their work can generate when 
subjected to a feminist eye” (Rubin 1975: 159). Whereas Marx had a robust 
method of political critique but took no account of gender, sexuality, or sex 
(Rubin argues), Freud and Lévi- Strauss each outline a “systematic apparatus 
that takes up females as raw materials and fashions domesticated women as 
products” (1975: 158) but offer no critique of sexed subordination. “What we 
need is a political economy of sexual systems. We need to study each society 
to determine the exact mechanisms by which particular conventions of sexu-
ality are produced and maintained” (1975: 177), Rubin memorably concluded, 
in an essay that inverted much of the feminist legacy that inspired it by argu-
ing that gender and kinship are technologies for producing sexuality and sex, 
not simply organizing them.
Rubin defines the sex/gender system twice in her article. Initially she offers 
a “preliminary definition” of it as “the part of social life which is the locus 
of the oppression of women, of sexual minorities, and of certain aspects of 
human personality within individuals” (a definition that is explicitly meant 
to denote something like Marx’s underdeveloped concept of social reproduc-
tion, but note the early emphasis on individual sexual personality). “For lack 
of a more elegant term,” Rubin describes this social mechanism as the “sex/
gender system,” which she defines as “the set of arrangements by which a 
society transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity, and 
in which these transformed needs are satisfied” (1975: 159). Shortly after-
ward she offers a second definition: “Every society has a sex/gender system—
a set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of human sex and 
procreation is shaped by human intervention and satisfied in a conventional 
manner, no matter how bizarre some of the conventions might be” (1975: 
165). Both definitions begin with Marxist references—to products and raw 
materials respectively—and both emphasize that the “set of arrangements” 
is structural and systemic. The first definition ends with a quasi- functionalist 
reference to the satisfaction of certain basic needs, whereas the second defi-
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nition instead emphasizes conventions—one of the most frequently used 
terms throughout Rubin’s essay.8 “Biological sexuality” in the first definition 
becomes “the biological raw material of human sex and procreation” in the 
second. The mechanism in the first sentence—how society transforms bio-
logical sexuality into products—is altered in the second, which refers to the 
way human intervention shapes biological raw material.
These variations usefully illustrate both the enormity and the difficulty 
of the numerous interlinked tasks outlined and tackled in Rubin’s prescient 
and still influential essay, in which she attempted to “sketch some elements 
of . . . the genesis of sexual inequality” (1975: 158), but also, and perhaps 
more notably, forcibly challenged the ways in which this problem had come 
to be defined. The essay is thus dedicated, in proper Marxist fashion, both to 
the conceptualization of apparatus and to the apparatus of conceptuality. The 
difficulty of defining what “sex/gender system” refers to is one that Rubin is 
herself eloquent in diagnosing, both in the writings of the male theorists she 
rereads, and in feminist politics. Like Shulamith Firestone, she is concerned 
with the missing domain most often referred to as social reproduction: she 
wants to expand its scope and to characterize its products more completely 
in order both to encompass the production of sexual difference and to reverse 
the standard account of where sexual inequality comes from (e.g., a set of bio-
logical sex differences that are given in nature). Thus it is Engels from whom 
Rubin takes her main inspiration—arguing, exactly like her predecessor Fire-
stone (1972), that we need a new and more comprehensive version of Origins. 
However, it is precisely a model of the production of sex or gender difference 
that Engels lacked (as, for that matter, did Firestone), and thus it is the pro-
duction of sex and gender that Rubin seeks to explain—a task that leads her 
to the analysis of kinship.
Underlying Rubin’s effort to retheorize kinship as a mode of producing a 
sex/gender system, and the sex/gender system as a form of political economy, 
is her persistent frustration with the view that it is mere biology—or “ani-
mal biology” as she calls it at one point—that is the source of women’s sub-
ordination. This was, of course, a primary concern of feminist anthropology 
in the 1970s (as it has been throughout the history of feminist thought). The 
feminist effort to root out the persistent biologism within various anthropo-
logical accounts of social structure had, since the mid- 1970s, taken several 
tracks, but with varying degrees of success—often (paradoxically) reconfirm-
ing the intractability of animal biology rather than dislodging it. Hence, for 
example, in her landmark essay “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?” 
(first published in Feminist Studies in 1972 and later republished in the edited 
rEproductivE tEchnologiEs 163
anthology Woman, Culture and Society [Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974]) Sherry 
Ortner equated the denigration of women (“the universality of female sub-
ordination,” 69) not with “biological determinism” (which “almost anyone 
in anthropology” would agree had “failed as an explanation,” 71) but with 
“the framework of culturally defined value systems” (i.e., social conventions) 
within which the biological differences between women and men “take on a 
significance of superior/inferior” (71). In other words, woman is not closer to 
nature, but she is perceived to be through a cultural apparatus that produces 
this effect. She is not biologically inferior, but her association with biological 
reproduction excludes her from equal authorship of cultural, political, and 
social institutions. In other words, her inferiority is derived not from a bio-
logical function but from a grammatical one.
Ortner’s influential argument took advantage of the main attraction of 
structuralist anthropology identified by Rubin, namely that it “places the op-
pression of women within social structures, rather than in biology” (Rubin 
1975: 175). However, like many other feminist anthropologists in the 1970s, 
Ortner struggled to leave behind the generic and habitual biologism that lies 
at the foundation of the human sciences and remains broadly commonsensi-
cal today. Like Simone de Beauvoir, on whose work her analysis is closely 
based (and whose famous passage on male transcendence she quotes at 
length; 1974: 75), Ortner continually returns to the very “biological differ-
ences” between women and men her theory ostensibly set out to challenge. 
Here, in contrast to the plastic biology we encountered in chapter 3, is the 
rigid universal biology of so much social theory, always already imagined as 
preset to a binary sexual dimorphism that is determined by its reproductive 
function. It is this “physiological contrast between male and female” (Ortner 
1974: 75) defined by the reproductive function, or, as Ortner interprets it, 
“women’s greater bodily involvement with the natural functions surrounding 
reproduction” that cause her to be universally “seen as more a part of nature 
than man is” (76).
Within structuralism, as is discussed further below, this same model of 
reproductive biology similarly plays a dual role as both a sign and a condi-
tion. It is the difference between the two that provided the wiggle room for 
early (1970s) feminist critiques of biological determinism such as Ortner’s. 
What makes structuralism attractive to Ortner is the replacement of biologi-
cal facts by a social mechanism. In many ways, Ortner is reading Lévi- Strauss 
exactly as he intended to be read, as a theorist of the “exact mechanisms” 
out of which kinship originates. Where Rubin sees a biological trap, Ortner 
sees a handy device. Ortner cites the famous passage in the closing chapter 
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of The Elementary Structures of Kinship in which Lévi- Strauss explains why 
“the rule of exogamy” is “the only means . . . of avoiding indefinite fission and 
segmentation which the practice of consanguineous marriages would bring 
about” (Lévi- Strauss 1969: 479). Such fragmentation would, he claims, cre-
ate “so many closed systems or sealed monads which no pre- established har-
mony could prevent from coming into conflict” (479). Ortner cites this same 
passage still further, in which Lévi- Strauss makes the crucial claim that “the 
risk of seeing a biological family become established as a closed system is 
definitely eliminated [by the rule of exogamy]: the biological group can no 
longer stand apart, and the bond of alliance with another family ensures the 
dominance of the social over the biological, and of the cultural over the natu-
ral” (Lévi- Strauss 1969: 479, cited in Ortner 1974: 78). Adding that this is the 
same structural mechanism that accounts for women’s universal subordina-
tion, Ortner reaches her signature conclusion that “if the specifically biologi-
cal (reproductive) function of the family is stressed, as in Lévi- Strauss’s for-
mulation, then the family (and hence woman) is identified with nature pure 
and simple, as opposed to culture” (197: 79). It follows that “men are identi-
fied not only with culture, in the sense of all human creativity” but are seen 
as “the ‘natural’ proprietors of religion, ritual, politics, and other realms of 
cultural thought and action” (79). Crucially for Ortner, this is a mechanical 
(structural), not a biological, problem.
Having deciphered the workings of the machinery, Ortner logically pro-
poses how it might be reverse engineered. Thus she adds an important quali-
fication concerning the role of reproductive biology in relation to gender 
inequality. In contrast to the Lévi- Straussian diktat that their reproductive 
biology ensures that women “in general represent a certain category of signs” 
that are “destined to a certain kind of communication” which “like words, 
should be things that were exchanged” (Lévi- Strauss 1969: 496), Ortner ar-
gues women might as easily be valued as the source of culture for the same 
biological reasons.9 After all, it is women who socialize infants, guiding them 
from nature into culture in their role as nurturers (“it is she who transforms 
new born infants from mere organisms into cultured humans, teaching them 
manners and the proper ways to behave” [Ortner 1974: 79–80]).10 In the 
home, she is also “a powerful agent of the cultural process [by] constantly 
transforming raw natural resources into cultural products . . . which could 
easily place her [according to Lévi- Strauss] in the category of culture triumph-
ing over nature” (Ortner 1974: 80).
Again, it is the grammar, not the biology, that needs to be changed. The 
system can be rewired, hacked, reassembled. True enough that this counter-
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argument reinforces a biological model of sexual difference and does nothing 
to challenge the prominence of reproductive biology as a determinant (in-
deed, it is not intended to). But Ortner is hardly unaware of the shortcomings 
of Lévi- Strauss’s biologism (in sum, that exogamy is essential to human sur-
vival because it mandates the systematic exchange of women). Arguably, she 
very nearly implies that his biological models are redundant to his argument 
altogether. What she is pointing to is his compelling depiction of the elaborate 
technology of kinship through which the human is not only born but made (a 
depiction that has long been part of structuralism’s appeal to many, includ-
ing Rubin). Ortner rightly questions the presumption that simply because 
women are deemed the “valuables par excellence” (Lévi- Strauss 1969: 481) 
in this system that “the emergence of symbolic thought must have required 
that . . . women themselves are treated as signs, which are misused when not 
put to the use reserved for signs, which is to be communicated” (496).11 Thus, 
although Ortner has been criticized for claiming that “the secondary status of 
woman in society is one of the true universals, a pan- cultural fact” (1974: 67) 
and that “it is simply a fact that proportionately more of woman’s body space, 
for a greater percentage of her lifetime . . . is taken up with the natural pro-
cesses surrounding the reproduction of the species” (75), her argument none-
theless anticipates the later theorization of sex as technological.
Both Ortner’s original article (1972) and the volume in which it was re-
printed (Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974) remain paradigmatic set pieces for an 
important avenue of feminist anthropological models of gender subordina-
tion during the 1970s. Despite their own inscription at times within a bi-
ologized discourse of gender and sex (and often reproduction in particular), 
these approaches drew on the utility of structuralist approaches in order to 
challenge biological determinism by locating the source of gender asymmetry 
in the symbolic grammar, or cultural mechanics, of kinship systems, thus rela-
tivizing the cultural importance of biology—if not biology itself. The potential 
to denaturalize, to de- essentalize sex, sexuality, and reproduction is very close 
at hand in these arguments that approach the making of sex mechanically 
(or “technologically,” to use Gell’s term). Indeed, as Rubin emphasizes in her 
analysis of structuralism, it offers “an acute, but condensed, apprehension of 
certain aspects of the social relations of sex and gender” in which kinship is 
understood as a mode of production “in the most general sense of the term: a 
molding, a transformation of objects (in this case, people) to and by a subjec-
tive purpose [that] has its own relations of production, distribution, and ex-
change, which include certain ‘property’ forms in people” (Rubin 1975: 177). 
However, Rubin is both more cautious than Ortner in accepting Lévi- Strauss’s 
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methods and conclusions, and more focused on what his theory leaves out. 
She is most similar to her French colleague Monique Wittig in doubting the 
entire premise of The Elementary Structures of Kinship.12 Rubin diagnoses a dif-
ferent mechanical problem than Ortner: it is not that the tool has to be used 
differently; it has to be improved. Indeed, and as she is among the first to 
suggest, Levi- Strauss’s structuralist anthropology is most revealing of what it 
lacks, namely a more precise account of the exact mechanisms by which sex 
and gender are organized and produced:
If Lévi- Strauss is correct in seeing the exchange of women as a funda-
mental principle of kinship, the subordination of women can be seen 
as a product of the relationships by which sex and gender are orga-
nized and produced. . . . There is an “economics” of sex and gender, 
and what we need is a political economy of sexual systems. We need 
to study each society to determine the exact mechanisms by which par-
ticular conventions of sexuality are produced and maintained. The “ex-
change of women” is an initial step toward building an arsenal of con-
cepts with which sexual systems can be described. (Rubin 1975: 177, 
emphasis added)
Stark Categories
While she accurately perceived their potential utility as tools for analyzing 
sex and gender, Rubin also characterized structuralism and psychoanalysis 
as “the most sophisticated ideologies of sexism around” (1975: 200). Citing 
Derrida’s diagnosis of Lévi- Strauss’s ethnocentrism, she warned of the danger 
that “the sexism in the tradition of which they are a part tends to be dragged 
in with each borrowing” (1975: 200).13 Rubin’s critique of Lévi- Strauss and 
her concern about the pitfalls of his method (a problem indexed by Ortner’s 
algorithm) was echoed by the response within feminist anthropology to much 
of the structuralist project during the 1980s, which focused in particular on 
the unexamined link between binary sex categories and reproductive bi-
ology. In a direct response to Ortner’s arguments (as well as those of Edwin 
Ardener [1972] concerning “the problem of women” and Nicole- Claude Ma-
thieu’s [1973] “Homme- Culture et Femme- Nature”), Nature, Culture and 
Gender, edited by Carol MacCormack and Marilyn Strathern, was published 
in 1980, launching an important decade of feminist anthropological theory 
with a critique of these three terms. From page 1, the editors have Lévi- 
Strauss in their sights along with his system of “stark categories” standing in 
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“wooden opposition” as if confirming “an ultimate human code”—“a single 
basic structure of binary thinking underlying all human mental functioning 
and behaviour”—through which to “understand the whole of human be-
haviour despite its manifest diversity” (MacCormack 1980: 1–2).14 As Mac-
Cormack points out, this entire hypothesis pivots on an illusion. In place of 
argument stands the phantom of biological automatism. “One of the great 
difficulties with Lévi- Strauss’s structuralism,” she argues, “is the nature of the 
link between these unconscious functions of the brain and the ‘reality’ struc-
turalism is meant to explain,” especially since “Lévi- Strauss locates funda-
mental structure at the deep level of unconscious function, and gives it an 
ontological status, or existence, of its own” (3). In a potent opening chapter 
to the volume, she draws on the critiques of structuralism within anthro-
pology (e.g., Leach 1970) to argue Lévi- Strauss cannot logically have it both 
ways—he cannot say the human mind is neurologically hardwired to produce 
binary categories, and also argue it is this same “natural” mechanical capacity 
that drives the emergence of human beings out of a state of nature into the 
definitively artificial state of culture (MacCormack 1980: 4). Like the rest of 
culture, the grammar of these “stark categories” is made not born, she insists.
Thus MacCormack proposes a counterarchaeology of these stark cate-
gories within Anglo- European thought, arguing that they uncritically repro-
duce narrow cultural traditions and beliefs, such as “the faith of industrial 
society that that society is produced by enterprising activity” (1980: 6) and 
the belief in the moral necessity of progress.15 These received ideas, she con-
tinues, are the offspring of “a historically particular ideological polemic in 
eighteenth- century Europe” reinforced by “nineteenth century, evolutionary 
ideas [that] provided a ‘natural’ explanation of gender differences” (7). Mac-
Cormack reminds her readers that these same categories were closely asso-
ciated with the emergence of modern gender roles, and that as early as the 
mid- eighteenth century “a well established bio- medical tradition observed 
and defined humans, hardening the conceptual division between unique 
feminine and unique masculine attributes,” thus reinforcing “a biological de-
terminism [that] ‘explained’ women [while] men were more defined by their 
social acts, [which is] an attitude of enquiry which persists in some present- 
day literature on gender” (21). Only the persistent ethnocentrism of West-
ern anthropologists could explain the repeated use of such a highly specific 
metaphysics to explain the workings of other societies, whose own indigenous 
categories have nothing in common with the ruling epistemological ortho-
doxy of English abstract nouns, she concludes.
MacCormack’s critique of the narrow historical and philosophical pedi-
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gree of the reified concept nouns set out in the first three chapters of Na-
ture, Culture and Gender is succeeded by a series of regional case studies com-
bined with historical chapters, such as that by Ludmilla Jordanova exploring 
the rise of the medical professional in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. Reminding her readers of the importance to the nascent 
medical profession of securing control over women’s reproductive capacity, 
Jordanova emphasizes “the historical importance of science, medicine and 
technology” to the reification, or “hardening,” of gender stereotypes and “the 
promulgation of myths of femininity” often based on the “naturalness” of 
their childbearing function (1980: 64). In particular, she explores the histori-
cal processes through which pregnancy became the object of intense clinical 
surveillance and medical fascination in the eighteenth century, describing the 
emergence of a gendered epistemology of the body, as well as the sexualiza-
tion of scientific knowledge, through which the penetrating gaze of the male 
physician or anatomist is recapitulated as a form of male heroism and sexual 
conquest. Jordanova’s work, alongside that of other feminist historians in the 
1980s, began to revise the historical question of how gender has been shaped 
by modern science into one that asked precisely the reverse—that is, how 
modern science is gendered, or how it has been sexed. In this way, Jordanova 
is among the first to document “sexual vision”—the production of biological 
facts to order, as it were, not only confirming a naturalized gender binarism 
but exaggerating it and embedding it in a way of seeing that becomes an insti-
tutionalized conceptuality, or indeed convention.
Nature, Culture and Gender concludes with Marilyn Strathern’s chapter, 
“No Nature, No Culture: The Hagen Case,” focusing on gender categories in 
Melanesia. Here, the opening arguments of her coeditor, MacCormack, are 
ethnographically reprised to demonstrate the limitations of Western philo-
sophical models and concepts, by arguing that among the Hagen
there is no culture, in the sense of the cumulative works of man, and 
no nature to be tamed and made productive. And ideas such as these 
cannot be a referent of gender imagery. . . . These two domains are not 
brought into systematic relationship; the intervening metaphor of cul-
ture’s dominion over nature is not there. On the contrary, insofar as 
gender is used in a differentiating, dialectical manner, the distinction 
between male and female constantly creates the notion of humanity as 
a “background of common similarity” (Wagner 1975:118–19). Neither 
male nor female can possibly stand for “humanity” as against “nature” 
because the distinction between them is used to evaluate areas in which 
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human action is creative and individuating. . . . Representations of 
domination and influence between the sexes are precisely about ways 
of human interaction, and not also about humanity’s project in relation 
to a less than human world. (Strathern 1980: 219)
In this passage, Strathern not only argues that, as her title suggests, there 
is no meaningful referent for the signifiers “nature” or “culture.” While cri-
tiquing the basic premise of Lévi- Strauss’s argument (as well as Ortner’s, and 
much of social anthropology), she is nonetheless borrowing from the logic 
of structuralism more broadly—and of post- structuralism—in her empha-
sis on gender systems as mechanisms or devices for producing difference. 
This emphasis on culture as technology is what allows Strathern to begin 
to challenge not only the binary opposition of nature and culture but the 
static definition of these categories, as if they automatically partitioned social 
life into separate domains (an argument that was strongly affirmed by the 
structural- functionalism of Radcliffe- Brown). As Strathern points out, even 
within Western societies, “there is no such thing as nature or culture. Each 
is a highly relativized concept whose ultimate signification must be derived 
from its place within a specific metaphysics. No single meaning can in fact 
be given to nature or culture in western thought: there is no consistent di-
chotomy, only a matrix of contrasts” (1980: 177, emphasis added).
elementary Structures
The effort to extract the analysis of nature, culture, and gender from a static 
binary technics was accelerated by related shifts within 1980s anthropology 
at large, in particular the auto- critique of the discipline’s colonial heritage 
and the embrace of more literary or hermeneutical methods, often draw-
ing on post- structuralist insights (Clifford 1983; Fabian 1983; Spivak 1987). 
A new definition of structure as process, or even as event (as in ritual), and 
as partial (as in language) was taking hold and, within social anthropology, 
was giving rise to more diverse and explicitly contingent accounts of cultural 
forms (Clifford and Marcus 1986). Unlike a previous era in which the African-
ist paradigms of British structural functionalism favored attention to lineages, 
descent groups, and the politics of corporate property and rank, new influ-
ences, such as Melanesian ethnography, were more focused on exchange sys-
tems, as well as gender, sexuality, and personhood. Similarly, the shift away 
from descent theory and toward structuralist anthropology (alliance theory) 
favored the “linguistic turn” toward interpretive or symbolic anthropology, 
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championed by figures such as David Schneider, Clifford Geertz, James Boon, 
and Roy Wagner. Both Paul Rabinow and Marilyn Strathern were to become 
prominent figures in this tradition, also associated with what Donna Haraway 
describes, in her account of gender theory in this period, as “the disaggrega-
tion of metaphors of single systems in favor of complex open fields of criss- 
crossing plays of domination, privilege, and difference” (1991: 140).
At the same time they were critiquing them, however, feminist anthro-
pologists also continued throughout the 1980s to retool established anthro-
pological theories such as structuralism for the study of gender through a 
process of extended deduction. Thus, in the same way Rubin (1975: 179) fol-
lows Lévi- Strauss’s deductions “even further” than he himself does, in order to 
diagnose, for example, both the arbitrariness of his assignment of sex “value” 
and the need to account for institutionalized heterosexuality, so too does 
Sylvia Yanagisako read David Schneider’s (1984) influential critique of kin-
ship theory several steps beyond his original conclusions in order to draw fur-
ther feminist insights.16 Schneider, like many anthropologists, was critical of 
Lévi- Strauss’s biologism, although he also tracked this tendency across much 
anthropological theory, and especially the study of kinship. He claimed that 
anthropological theories of kinship in general relied on a base- superstructure 
model whereby social meaning was “added to . . . some real or putative set 
of biological, reproductive relationships” (Schneider 1984: 56). Schneider 
cited Lévi- Strauss as a paradigmatic case, pointing to his a priori reliance on 
the “limit of elementary structures which lies in the biological possibilities” 
(56, citing Lévi- Strauss 1969: xxiii) as an example of an underlying biological 
model of the real natural facts upon which all kinship is ultimately seen to 
be based: “always it is the genealogical grid, a construct modelled on the pre-
sumption of actual biological relations, that underlies the sociocultural product 
called kinship” (56, emphasis added). Schneider argues not only that this view 
of kinship is no more than a conventional scholarly doctrine, but that it is 
colonial, Eurocentric, out of date, unscientific, and illogical. He furthermore 
claims that while there is “virtual unanimity in defining kinship in terms of 
reproduction” (1984: 193), there is no attempt to justify why this is so, leading 
him to conclude that “kinship has been defined by European social scientists, 
and [therefore] European social scientists use their own folk culture as the 
source of many, if not all, of their ways of formulating and understanding the 
world about them” (193). The self- acting reproductive mechanism imagined 
as the base of “the sociocultural product called kinship,” he argued, indexed a 
modeling problem caused by groupthink.
In a Rubinesque extension of Schneider’s critique, Sylvia Yanagisako 
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pointed out that the claim that “the genealogical grid” is based on the bio-
logical facts of sexual reproduction indexes yet another important folk model, 
namely that of the sex- gender distinction: “Our model of the natural differ-
ence in the roles of men and women in sexual reproduction lies at the core 
of our studies of the cultural organization of gender, at the same time that it 
constitutes the core of the genealogical grid that has defined kinship for us” 
(1985: 1). In their subsequent volume proposing a unified analysis of gender 
and kinship, Yanagisako and Jane Collier provided a lengthy diagnosis of the 
role of conventional idioms of natural sex within the anthropological litera-
ture on kinship:
Gender assumptions pervade notions about the facts of sexual repro-
duction commonplace in the kinship literature. Much of what is writ-
ten about the atoms of kinship (Lévi- Strauss 1949), the axiom of pre-
scriptive altruism (Fortes 1958; Fortes 1969), the universality of the 
family (Fox 1967), and the centrality of the mother- child bond (Good-
enough 1970) is rooted in assumptions about the natural characteristics 
of women and men and their natural roles in sexual procreation. . . . 
Above all, we take for granted that they represent two naturally differ-
ent categories of people and that the natural difference between them 
is the basis of human reproduction and, therefore, kinship. (1987: 32)
Primary among these “natural characteristics of women and men” is the fact 
that women bear children, a fact that is “interpreted as creating a universal 
relation of human reproduction” (Yanagisako and Collier 1987: 33). Like Mac-
Cormack and Strathern (1980) before them, Yanagisako and Collier go on to 
claim that this “folk model of human reproduction” (35) is ubiquitous, and 
has even “become a convention in much of the feminist literature” (33). They 
point out that the sex- gender distinction “mirrors the attempt of the kinship 
theorists reviewed by Schneider to separate the study of kinship from the 
same biological facts” (33), and go on to suggest that moving beyond the folk 
model of reproduction would involve submitting “the ‘biological’ facts them-
selves” to investigation, insisting on a more precise account of the “patterns 
of action” evident in “social events and relationships” (42).
Curiously, however, Yanagisako and Collier do not cite Rubin’s (or Fire-
stone’s) interest in this question, nor do they pursue in any detail what a more 
rigorous questioning of “the ‘biological’ facts themselves” might involve. In-
stead, following Bourdieu, they advocate a form of analysis that has since 
come to be known as “practice theory,” based on a context- specific, dialectical 
model of how people are historically shaped by the meanings and structures 
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in which they are embedded, and how they experience, understand, and re-
shape these same social forces. At a remove from the vigorous feminist de-
bate concerning precisely “the natural characteristics of women and men and 
their natural roles in sexual procreation” occurring in other arenas of feminist 
scholarship during the 1980s, Collier and Yanagisako gesture toward, but do 
not substantially pursue, the investigation of what “questioning the ‘biologi-
cal’ facts themselves” might actually involve. In the early 1980s, this investi-
gation had only just begun to be undertaken (most notably by Haraway 1978a, 
1978b, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1985; and Keller 1982, 1983).17 Even at the heart of 
feminist anthropological efforts in the 1980s to theorize gender and kinship 
outside of “the ‘biological’ facts themselves,” the intransigent hold of an imag-
ined self- acting biological mechanism at the base of cultural technics was 
slow to give up its grip on the mental equipment of its interrogators.
Cross- Sex Persons
Strathern’s contribution to Gender and Kinship: Essays toward a Unified Analysis 
(Collier and Yanagisako 1987a) was, like its other chapters, initially written 
for the 1982 Bellagio conference on which the anthology is based. “Producing 
Difference: Two New Guinea Highlands Kinship Systems” picks up in some 
senses where she left off in 1980, by exploring gender and kinship not in terms 
of what they are but rather what they do, and in particular how they enable de-
tachment as well as connection (Strathern 1987: 272–273). This analysis pre-
sumes “a matrix of relationships to which people belong but from which they 
can also detach themselves”—an instrumental contrast that Strathern argues 
can be activated through concepts of gender, so that gender becomes “a ve-
hicle for conceptualizing differences in the qualities of kinship attachments” 
(1987: 274)—again a kind of social technics or cultural grammar, but this time 
theorized as agency. She thus claims not only that there is no single order-
ing of gender, and no underlying biology that defines it, but that instead gen-
der and kinship categories are productive instruments that are consciously 
manipulated by actors for a variety of specific instrumental purposes, and 
through a wide range of transactions—from gift exchange to ceremonial food 
production. Instead of women being exchanged like words, it is words that are 
exchanged to make gender in this account. Mobile gender categories, in other 
words, are vehicles, devices, or mechanisms put to work in the activation of 
other relationalities. As Strathern points out, the partibility of identity is an 
assumed feature even of the kinship systems described by structural func-
tionalists such as Radcliffe- Brown and Fortes, who emphasize that “different 
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components of the person’s makeup are visible in the different ties he or she 
has with others” (Strathern 1987: 275). She adds to this model, however, more 
substantial emphasis on individual agency by tracing the exchange relations 
that produce recombinant, transient, and multiple gender and kinship identi-
ties, and by demonstrating how the manipulation of “an assemblage of roles” 
(297) is the basis for producing new persons. In contrast to Western models of 
“the ‘person’ as an already existing natural entity” (297), Strathern focuses on 
the amount of explicit manipulation required to manufacture a specific iden-
tity or relationship—a process she describes as a technology of reproduction.
In a closely related argument developed in the same period (although pub-
lished earlier), Strathern applies these principles more explicitly to the Lévi- 
Straussian problem of marriage exchange, or what is also known as alliance 
theory. Published in 1984 in the Annual Review of Anthropology, Strathern’s 
analysis of marriage exchange in Melanesia was both a tribute to the increas-
ing importance of Melanesian ethnography and a contribution to feminist 
attempts to provide a unified account of kinship and gender. In her review, 
Strathern introduces a critique of the categories “woman” and “nature,” and 
the presumed significance of “the biological facts of human reproduction” 
that receives fuller treatment in The Gender of the Gift, published four years 
later. In her technically precise reworking of the perennial question of traf-
fic in women, in 1984, Strathern initially sets about analyzing the question of 
“what ‘exchanges’ involving and accompanying marriage are about” by using 
this question as a foil to the many unexamined Western presumptions it re-
veals (about subjects and objects, gifts and commodities, men and women, 
society and the individual, etc.).18 Emphasizing the enormous variety within 
Melanesian societies practicing marriage exchange, Strathern notes the per-
sistence of “an analytical problem,” namely that there is no stable comparative 
basis within these systems to determine what, exactly, is being exchanged, 
or by whom. The highly varied marriage transactions, she argues, defy even 
the complex typologies for which anthropological comparison is renowned. 
Among the Tor of lowland Irian Jaya who practice sister exchange, bilateral 
cross- cousin marriage (including first cousins) produces dual organizations, 
but without named groups such as moieties.19 There are no bride wealth ex-
changes, but flutes are exchanged among men to trace their connections 
to heirs and in- laws through matrilines. Among the Mae Enga of the New 
Guinea Highlands, affines are the major category of exchange partner among 
men who trace their connections patrilineally—wives being regarded as 
exogenous to the patrilineal clan body, but important to ceremonial exchange 
related to illness, death compensation, or marriage. Among the Kaulong of 
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New Britain, by contrast, exchange is based on bilateral affinal ties, while resi-
dence is organized by cognatic descent. Ceremonial exchange works in oppo-
sition to marriage, as it is linked to production, rather than reproduction. And 
so the list continues of organizational forms that put existing anthropological 
categories of marriage exchange through the proverbial Cuisinart.
As Strathern notes, such intense regional (and often proximate) variation 
belies conventional anthropological classification of societies based on types 
of marriage exchange, forms of kinship systems, or corresponding rules that 
govern exchange relations. Instead, she suggests, the analysis of marriage ex-
change requires a complex decoding of sex and gender differences as mecha-
nisms for producing substance: “Differences between the sexes generally pro-
vide a code for the conceptualization of difference as a ritual or political fact” 
(Strathern 1984: 50, emphasis added). In other words, “A number of societies 
discriminate social categories according to the rubric of internal sharing and 
external exchange, and the gender coding of mediating links invariably under-
writes the conceptual divide. These idioms feed into those of shared substance. 
They become an aspect of theories about conception and the constitution 
of persons and the extent to which persons may be seen as the product of 
differentiated others” (50, emphasis added, references removed). Strathern 
refers to this “differentiated bestowal of substance connections” as a means 
by which “categories of kin thus negotiate social identities through the ex-
changes they set in motion” (50–51, emphasis added). The way in which differ-
entiated substances are transacted and recombined enables connections to 
be made and identities established, as well as changed, and thus re- activated. 
The work of activating these substantial connections is evident, for example, 
in the making of same- sex, cross- sex, androgynous, and pansexual categories 
of persons, things, and actions as well as recombinant and pluralized means 
of reproduction. “We can argue that categories of persons ‘pass around’ sexual 
attributes among themselves,” Strathern suggests, through a traffic that is via 
gender rather than “in women” (52). This reproductive model not only sug-
gests a different kind of social machinery from that imagined by Lévi- Strauss, 
who takes biological sex and gender identity as givens that do not need to 
be explained, but proposes a different mechanism, namely of production or 
manufacture through recombination and transaction.
From the point of view of the identities and relationships that are defined 
by the frequent transformation of things into people, and people into things, 
as well as the transubstantiation of food, wealth, and bodily substances in the 
constitution—or achievement—of personhood, it is difficult to interpret the 
exchange of women in straightforward terms, since “woman” becomes a more 
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unstable and shifting signifier. It is not even the case that the very substance 
of gender has been mechanized, in this view (because gender has no sub-
stance in this model), but rather a mechanics that is substantialized as iden-
tity (which is the product). Here, gender has become a very different kind of 
structural mechanism—for which substance is never a primary or originary 
essence, but rather a product, or means. Identity is no longer unitary, in this 
view, but made up of adjustable components that can be reproduced anew. 
From this perspective it makes no sense to imagine woman as a singular, or 
global, identity—because gender only ever exists as an effect of composition. 
It is thus impossible even to conceive of the exchange of women, because it 
is the wrong way around: a woman can only be the outcome of exchange as 
composition. There is no prior, defining, essential substance on which the 
identity “woman” can simply be based. The idea that femaleness or sex are at 
some level merely biological is unthinkable.
This observation implicitly posits that marriage exchange is productive of 
the very conditions to which it is conventionally seen as a response, namely 
the biological facts of sex. As Strathern expresses this insight more pointedly: 
“If ‘women’ are not the only items which circulate in marriage exchanges, 
what then is being conveyed in those aspects of their person seen as ex-
changeable?” (1984: 65). The shift here is precisely away from the idea of the 
prior substantial person whose given attributes determine a fixed identity 
(e.g., male) and toward a model of the production of persons and identities 
through relational, transactional, and intentional labor. Only in a Western sys-
tem of thought in which biology is understood as an essential, a priori, onto-
logically and globally defining condition can women become a stable cate-
gory of goods substitutable for wealth, raw material, or precious and scarce 
resources, while also becoming a category from which no individual woman 
can ever escape. Such a premise, Strathern suggests, is unscientific—as logi-
cally unsound as the Victorian theories of the primitive horde from which 
this naturalized, quasi- evolutionary model of natural sex is derived. In sum, 
a wholesale rethink is required: “we cannot assume how women’s fertility 
will be valued [for the purposes of cross- cultural comparison] any more than 
we can assume that marriage arrangements concerning women are funda-
mental to processes of social regeneration” (1984: 65). Strathern concludes, 
“Frameworks for kinship analyses which turn on the allocation of women in 
marriage select a particular relation as critically regenerative. This selection 
hides the very difference between systems whose self- modelling sets up mar-
riage exchanges as symbolically regenerative and those which eclipse or sub-
sume marriage or deny it centrality in the reproduction of ‘society’” (66). Like 
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Rubin, Strathern argues that it is only the self- modeling premise that women 
have a value that stands for itself, and that this is why they are the transactees 
rather than the transactors in marriage exchanges, which allows marriage 
exchange to be understood as the exchange of women by men. As she dem-
onstrates, this is not an assumption that can be empirically verified through 
cross- cultural comparison. Instead, she shows that gender is the product of 
labor, of activating a cultural apparatus that involves working it, and thus 
comprises a form of productivity.
From Being to doing
These themes were significantly expanded in Strathern’s 1988 publication 
The Gender of the Gift, in which, as its title suggests, she presents both a new 
theory of gender and a new model of exchange. Throughout this paradigm- 
altering work, gender is variously depicted as a form of action, a product, a 
medium, a code, and an aesthetic—in sum, gender is theorized as an instru-
ment, mechanism, device, or means.
At the heart of this ambitious project were two core contributions. One, 
following Rubin’s invitation, was a much more precise theorization of the 
exact mechanisms connecting social reproduction, political economy, and the 
sex/gender system—albeit no longer cast in any of these terms. Her second 
major theme was how meaning systems could be analyzed differently within 
social theory, and she sought to demonstrate how conceptual categories ac-
tively constitute their objects, and thus perform a constitutive role as the ani-
mating mechanisms of social life. Whereas Strathern’s most prominent con-
temporaries, such as Schneider, had helped to bring about a shift away from 
structures of function toward structures of meaning, Strathern extended this 
further to encompass mechanisms of meaning—or indeed meaning as means. 
The work of Schneider, Geertz, and others had pushed anthropology toward 
the study of culture and thus symbolic systems, drawing inspiration from the 
work of both Talcott Parsons (who taught both Schneider and Geertz) and 
by extension Weber (rather than Durkheim, whose concept of organic soli-
darity strongly influenced functionalism). At the very outset of The Gender of 
the Gift, Strathern makes clear that her theory of gender is not an attempt to 
explain synchronic structures of social organization, but a means of introduc-
ing a new method to analyze symbols, concepts, principles, and knowledge 
categories as processual strategies or techniques. As we have already seen in 
her critique of the traffic in women model, a crucial distinction for Strathern 
is that “the basis for classification does not inhere in the objects themselves 
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but in how they are transacted and to what ends. The action is the gendered 
activity” (1988: xi, emphasis added). This move from substance to technique 
marked a decisive shift away from an analytical model based on how social 
groups functionally cohere in order to produce a whole (social organization) 
toward a model of the production of difference. Strathern’s model eschewed 
the analogy of either organism or system, and instead drew attention to the 
disparate connections out of which relationships are composed, animated, 
and manipulated and through which persons are made, activated, or worked 
into being.
Although throughout her synthetic and comparative account of Melane-
sian models of conception and procreation Strathern makes clear that there 
are enormous variations in the means by which bodies are gendered, includ-
ing cross- and transgendering, and that ideas of innate shared substance, 
a naturalized or quasi- biological model of impregnation, or individualized 
notions of possessing a self are more often than not unhelpful projections 
based on Western models of reproduction, it is not until the close of the book 
that she introduces a section titled “Mothers Who Do Not Make Babies” 
(1988: 311). Since her book is in many ways a response to Rubin, and thus 
both to Lévi- Strauss and to feminism, her alternative account of reproduc-
tion can also be read as a critique of both structuralist anthropology and much 
feminist  theory:
In my description of the gift economies of Melanesia I have, of course, 
found it useful to refer to “the person” as an objectification (“personifi-
cation”) of relationships. In so far as people turn one set of relationships 
into another, they act (as individual subjects) to turn themselves into 
persons (objects) in the regard of others. They objectify themselves, one 
might say. . . . Melanesian women cannot be analyzed as commodities 
in men’s exchanges for the obvious reason that these societies do not 
constitute commodity economies. The negative can take an alternative 
form: Melanesian women do not make babies. (Strathern 1988: 314)
In contrast to the Western tendency to presume that motherhood is self- 
evidently a natural fact, “relations do not have such an automatic existence” in 
Melanesian society, claims Strathern. It is relations that are reproductive, she 
emphasizes, not simply biology: “children are the outcome of the interactions 
of multiple others” (1988: 316). Biological capacity is not absent from this 
model, but it must be coupled with specific mechanisms for producing and 
arranging persons in order to “make babies.” Making babies, to paraphrase 
Charis Thompson (2005), requires not only “making parents,” but much else 
178 chaptEr Four
besides. Biological reproduction in this view is the outcome of a multiplex 
composition: it does not happen “by itself.” Despite himself, Lévi- Strauss im-
plied much the same thing: the making of viable parenthood is the prerequi-
site for the making of viable offspring. Similarly, his work can be interpreted 
to be claiming that it is the making of social cohesion that is the prerequisite 
for both making parents and making babies—just as it is the prerequisite for 
making language, making art, or making an axe. It falls to Strathern only to 
point out, then, that birth is the moment at which the multiple prior acts con-
stituting the child are made known and revealed: the simple fact that women 
can be seen to give birth is only revealing of the penultimate act in a chain 
of events that can no more be described as primarily biological than as pri-
marily temporal, primarily spatial, or primarily human (Strathern 1988: 316–
317). Contrary to de Beauvoir, the assumption that femaleness always stands 
in immanent relation to the already- produced nature of society can be re-
versed: “Melanesian social creativity is not predicated on a hierarchical view 
of a world of objects created by natural processes upon which social relation-
ships are built. Social relations are imagined as a precondition for action, not 
simply a result of it” (321).
The argument that women do not produce babies is not a refutation of a 
biological component of reproduction, but it offers a significant reconfigu-
ration of how biological reproduction works. From this perspective, for ex-
ample, it is evident that reproductive substance is not automatically repro-
ductive. The various components involved in the generation or reproduction 
of persons must be made, secured, composed, and activated in order to make 
babies. As ivF similarly, and tellingly, demonstrates with equal clarity, eggs 
and sperm can only become reproductive within a specific composition and 
under carefully managed conditions—indeed, only after other preconditions 
are met in an ordered sequence, and only by these means, which are them-
selves not always sufficient. In the same way that the reproduction of persons 
can never be merely biological, mere biology can be induced to become repro-
ductive only via other means. It is these means that produce the conditions of 
reproductivity: indeed they are reproductivity itself.
technologies of gender
The shift away from the taken- for- grantedness of the relationship between 
sex, gender, reproduction, and kinship toward a fuller account of the “exact 
mechanisms by which particular conventions of sexuality are produced and 
maintained” (Rubin 1975: 177) was not only facilitated by feminist anthro-
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pology. This was the same period that revealed what Evelyn Fox Keller has 
described as a “double shift in perception” characterizing feminist accounts 
of sex and gender: “First, from sex to gender, and second, from the force of 
gender in shaping the development of men and women to its force in delin-
eating the cultural maps of the social and natural worlds these adults inhabit” 
(1992: 17). This double shift is also evident in the work of numerous feminist 
biologists in the 1980s including Ruth Hubbard (1990), Lynda Birke (1986), 
and Anne Fausto- Sterling (1985)—who recast the question of the biology 
of gender into one that addresses the gender of biology. Their critiques of 
the category “female” were aided by the challenge to the category “woman” 
that gained momentum during the 1980s from a wide range of sources, most 
notably black and postcolonial feminist theorists and feminists of color such 
as Alice Walker (1983), Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa (1981), Hazel 
Carby (1987), Hortense Spillers (1987), Gayatri Spivak (1985), and Audre 
Lorde (1984). Feminist post- structuralist accounts of gender from feminist 
literary studies and feminist film theory inspired a new, explicit attention to 
gender as a technology, most elaborately in the work of Teresa de Lauretis 
(1984, 1987). Early versions of what has become queer theory appeared also at 
this time, including Rubin’s (1992) later essay “Thinking Sex,” and in the work 
of Eve Sedgwick (1990), among others. These efforts to significantly retheo-
rize gender received powerful synthetic expression in Judith Butler’s (1990) 
Gender Trouble, which took direct inspiration from feminist anthropology to 
recast the relation of sex to gender, or biology to identity, in what remains 
one of the most influential accounts of the production of sex to emerge from 
within twentieth- century feminist theory. Disputing the seemingly common-
sense view that “being female constitute[s] a ‘natural fact’” and arguing in-
stead that such “foundational categories of identity . . . can be shown as pro-
ductions that create the effect of the natural, the original and the inevitable” 
(Butler 1990: x), Butler proposed a model that, like Strathern’s, radically re-
positioned “the biological facts of sexual reproduction” as an effect of gen-
der categories, rather than the reverse. For Butler, sex categories (male and 
female) comprise “a discursive formation that acts as a naturalized founda-
tion” (1990: 37), and she describes Gender Trouble as a project designed to ex-
pose the circularity of “that felicitous self- naturalization” (33). Like Strathern, 
Butler defines gender as the product of deliberate artifice: “the repeated styli-
zation of the body . . . within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal[s] 
over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being” 
(33). Gender thus becomes the substantialization of technique.
Butler, like Strathern and Ortner, is also concerned with the mechaniza-
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tion of sex. From the point of view of the production of new persons, both 
gender identity and its organization into sexual activity are logical precondi-
tions for biological substance to be put to work reproductively. In this model, 
biology is not sexual by itself, just as biological substance is not reproductive 
on its own. Butler thus follows a path similar to that set out by Yanagisako 
and Collier in their assertion that “the next phase in the feminist reanaly-
sis of gender and kinship should be to question the assumption that ‘male’ 
and ‘female’ are two natural categories of human beings whose relations are 
everywhere structured by their biological difference” (1987: 7). Arguing for 
an approach that locates the production of difference within a broader social 
context, Yanagisako and Collier suggest that “instead of asking how the cate-
gories of ‘male’ and ‘female’ are endowed with culturally specific characters, 
thus taking the difference between them for granted, we need to ask how par-
ticular societies define difference” (35).
Butler’s contention, though pointing in a different direction toward con-
temporary identity politics, likewise interrogates the presumption that “there 
is a natural or biological female who is subsequently transformed into a so-
cially subordinate ‘woman,’ with the consequence that ‘sex’ is to nature or ‘the 
raw’ as gender is to culture or ‘the cooked’” (1990: 37). In a direct reprise of 
MacCormack and Strathern’s (1980) arguments in Nature, Culture and Gen-
der, Butler claims that “the analysis that assumes nature to be singular and 
prediscursive cannot ask, what qualifies as ‘nature’ within a given cultural 
context, and for what purposes?” (1990: 37). In addition, Butler presses for-
ward Yanagisako and Collier’s prediction that “having recognized our model 
of biological difference as a particular cultural model of thinking about rela-
tions between people, we should be able to question the ‘biological facts’ of 
sex themselves” (1987: 42).
Using embryological mechanisms as her example, Butler turned to repro-
ductive substance to illustrate her point in Gender Trouble. In a section exam-
ining scientific accounts of the “master switch” of sex determination, Butler 
traces the production of binary sex in cases of ambiguous persons, whose 
chromosomal and morphological sex diverge. Asking why a binary order must 
be imposed on these “incoherent” sexes, even when they clearly demonstrate 
its nonbinary existence in nature, Butler concludes that “cultural assump-
tions regarding the relative status of men and women and the binary relation 
of gender itself frame and focus the research into sex determination” (1990: 
109). In other words, it is the presumption of gender difference that pro-
duces the mandate for the discovery of binary biological sex, not the reverse. 
In a critique of this circularity that parallels that from within feminist an-
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thropology, Butler concludes: “The task of distinguishing sex from gender 
becomes all the more difficult once we understand that gendered meanings 
frame the hypothesis and the reasoning of those biomedical inquiries that 
seek to establish ‘sex’ for us as prior to the cultural meanings that it acquires” 
(1990: 109). Here, then, is another example of how sex is made, as well as a 
case of how gender is a technology of revealing, or of bringing forth. The work 
involved in reimposing sex binarism upon nondimorphic biological sex con-
firms the determinism of the former in lieu of the latter—making of sexuality 
what Butler, following Foucault, refers to as an “ambivalent product” (1990: 
134). Indeed, this demonstration exactly reveals the mechanisms through 
which technologies of gender are used to make sex. Thus, echoing Yanagisako 
and Collier’s (1987: 32) complaint that “the standard units of our genealo-
gies, after all, are circles and triangles about which we assume a number of 
things,” Butler maintains that it is “only from a self- consciously denaturalized 
position [that] we can see how the appearance of naturalness is itself consti-
tuted” (1990: 110).20
The significance of Strathern’s work on new reproductive technologies dis-
cussed at the outset of this chapter, published shortly after Gender Trouble, 
takes on an important additional dimension in relation to the emergence of 
a more explicit theorization of gender as a technology in the work of Butler 
(1990), de Lauretis (1987), and also Haraway (1991). A crucially important 
feature of Butler’s argument, like Haraway’s, is its turn toward bioscience and 
its lack of concern with biological determinism. It is at the juncture of these 
crucial feminist debates in the 1980s, where the effort to undo gender meets 
the project to debiologize reproduction, that a new feminist engagement with 
technology gains momentum. Coincidentally, this new technological turn, 
epitomized by Haraway’s cyborg politics, takes place at exactly the same time 
that ivF is finally successful in humans. It is thus not surprising that the femi-
nist debates rehearsed in this chapter are accompanied by an equally large 
literature on new reproductive technologies, to which I turn in chapter 5.
Conclusion
As noted at the outset of this chapter, neither the origins of technology nor 
its progress over time can be equated in any simple way with the use of tools, 
or for that matter the development of tools to meet needs, but must instead 
be viewed, as both Marx and Gell argue, from the perspective of the social 
relationships that make knowledge and technique possible to begin with. As 
we have seen, this is also the argument of Lévi- Strauss in his theorization of 
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kinship as a technology—an elementary structure that not only organizes but 
produces and activates reproductivity in a particular form, or forms. From 
this point of view, the traditional distinction invoked by Gell between “Tech-
nology of Production” and “Technology of Reproduction” overlooks the im-
portant point that reproduction, like gender and kinship, must also be pro-
duced: it is not simply there to be presumed as a self- acting force. Similarly, 
although one of the reasons Marxist theory neglects the mode of reproduc-
tion—the means by which the laborer reproduces himself or herself—is that 
reproduction is assumed to flow automatically, as it were, we can see from the 
point of view of gender and kinship theory that a prior mode of production 
is required to activate reproductivity, or to put it to work. As we shall see in 
chapters 5 and 6, this process is neatly repeated, and modeled, by ivF—for 
which biology is not a necessary prerequisite on its own but must be con-
joined with technology. Indeed, as a looking glass, this is exactly what ivF 
reveals.
However, before moving forward, it is useful to pause briefly to look back, 
and to ask, for example, how these arguments about gender and kinship as 
technologies might be used to understand the history of embryology differ-
ently. One very striking feature of the concept of automatic reproduction 
so prevalent within social theory, where it is seen to function naturally as 
a global biological phenomenon underpinning social life (and prior to it), is 
how differently reproduction is theorized from the point of view of embryol-
ogy. Somewhat ironically, it is from the standpoint of being closest to biologi-
cal reproduction that ideas of the natural are most irrelevant. There is noth-
ing merely biological about biology in a stem cell lab: stem cells, like in vitro 
embryos, are artifactual. Indeed, from the point of view of experimental em-
bryology, the entire point of analyzing reproductive substance is to explore 
its mechanisms by coupling it to technology—by making technology work to 
reveal these mechanics.
But arguably the history of embryology demonstrates something else as 
well, which is that in activating reproductive substance technologically—in 
order to study or analyze its characteristics—the definition of technology also 
changes, for as we have seen in chapter 3, the substance itself becomes a tool. 
Returning to Strathern’s definition of merographic thinking, we can see that 
this relay between substances and tools is somewhat curiously reproduced 
as a naturalized form of conceptuality. And as Strathern emphasizes repeat-
edly, what is familiar about merographic thinking is its connections to kin-
ship. Hence, what Engels described as the frontier between the organic and 
the inorganic in the context of the hand and tool is also a line that is con-
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stantly crossed and recrossed in the context of what Strathern calls kinship 
thinking—a context she argues is both preeminently hybrid and distinctively 
postindustrial. “It has become routinely thinkable in the post- industrialism 
of the late- twentieth century . . . to make play with juxtaposing images of 
the organic and inorganic. . . . The one does not imitate the other so much 
as seemingly deploy or use its principles or parts. . . . The parallel lies in kin-
ship thinking. Kinship systems and family structures are imagined as social 
arrangements not just imitating but based on and deploying processes of biologi-
cal reproduction” (Strathern 1992b: 3, emphasis added). This point, about how 
kinship thinking itself routinely relies on a traffic, or play, between substance 
and tool, points to a very different sense in which ivF functions as a kin-
ship technology: it is not only a technology that is used to produce kinship 
(biological relations) but a technique that substantializes the merographic 
mechanics of how kinship is routinely thought (its conceptual technology). 
Among the many things ivF can be seen to model, then, is the naturalness 
of the relationship between substance and tool, after which logic it is fash-
ioned, and thus reproduces.21 Tellingly, Strathern, like Butler, argues that the 
deployment of imitation is the mechanism by which substance and tool are 
linked and routinely recombined as parts and wholes. This too is a process ivF 
models neatly, while also curiously undoing the very logic on which it is based 
(i.e., to repair the nature it imitates).
We can go further with these questions (weaving our needles in and out, 
backward and forward through the liana to hold all the straws together), by 
pointing out how closely ivF resembles the arguments put forward by Butler 
concerning technologies of gender. Indeed, ivF stages or performs exactly 
the same process Butler describes through which substance is stylized to pro-
duce the appearance of “a natural sort of being” (1990: 109), thus also sub-
stantializing a naturalized origin that then appears as if it were prior to the 
cultural expectations it confirms. Moreover, as we shall see in more depth in 
the following chapters, this stylization applies to the making of parenthood 
identities (and those of gender, kinship, and sex) in the context of ivF, as well 
as to the making of babies. If, as this book argues, we will better understand 
ivF if we presume it is not merely a single- purpose, obvious clinical proce-
dure servicing a self- evident goal or need, but instead a more complex un-
folding technology that serves a more diverse set of purposes, then its exact 
mechanisms need to be more fully characterized, just as those of gender and 
kinship have been.
However, before returning to the question of the extent to which ivF is 
not only modeled after nature but indeed after received models of gender 
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and kinship, there is another question that will detain us in chapter 5, which 
is that of what happens to women or gender after ivF. In turning to the ques-
tion of how ivF is lived as a way of life, I begin in chapter 5 by reviewing the 
extensive feminist debate concerning the social implications of ivF and other 
new reproductive technologies that took place in the immediate wake of the 
birth of Louise Brown. I then turn to the feminist focus on ivF as a source of 
a defining ambivalence concerning both reproductive technology and repro-
ductive politics—a focus that anticipates much of the contemporary concern 
about the frontier of new biology more widely. As we shall see, ivF serves in 
these debates once again as an instructive demonstration, or model, of a wider 
process—in this case of the political response to technologies that challenge 
the very naturalisms they are seen to serve. Here once again the biological 
relativities that follow in the wake of ivF’s success are very evident and thus, 
with the added advantage of hindsight, provide us with another context in 
which to explore what kinds of futures for gender, kinship, and technology 
are implied by ivF’s recent present.
FiVe living iVF
So far in this book we have considered the general questions raised by ivF in 
a pair of broadly reflective overview chapters (1 and 2) and have followed the 
exact mechanisms of technologies for making sex in two subsequent chapters 
on experimental embryology and kinship theory (3 and 4). This chapter ex-
tends this sequence of frames by turning to a rereading of the feminist debate 
over reproductive technologies in the 1980s and the initial empirical studies 
of “living ivF,” which are explored from three distinct points of view. The first 
encounter is between ivF and feminism, the second between ivF and women, 
and the third between ivF and gender. These encounters move us into the 
realm of the social life of ivF and allow us to analyze ivF not only as a tech-
nology of living substance, but a technology that is lived as the remaking of 
life.1 They also allow us to consider the question concerning technology in re-
lation to the politics of reproduction and gender, or sexual politics. Needless 
to say, this is such a vast and complicated encounter it is surprising that it is 
ever viewed as a specific one—that is, as one that largely or even exclusively 
concerns women, women’s rights, or women’s reproductive rights.2
Like chapter 4, this chapter also revisits the feminist literature of the 1980s, 
during the period in which ivF began to become much more widespread. My 
aim is not only to suggest how we might engage with these debates differ-
ently with the benefit of hindsight, from the vantage point of being five mil-
lion miracle babies later and in the midst of the “biotech century.” Following 
on from the discussion of technologies of substance in chapter 3, and tech-
nologies of gender, kinship, and sex in chapter 4, this chapter foregrounds the 
question of technological ambivalence in the context of living ivF. Undoubt-
edly one of the major themes of the feminist debate over ivF, technological 
ambivalence has a parallel meaning in the context of feminism, where both 
ivF and gender (and sex and kinship) are analyzed as technologies that split 
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both subjects and political movements. This splitting, however, is not the rou-
tine hybrid or plural conceptuality described by Strathern in chapter 4, nor is 
it the “ambivalence of modernity” described by Zygmunt Bauman or Ulrich 
Beck. It describes instead the tension graphically illustrated in the large cor-
pus of work on women’s reproductive agency, identity, and choice, especially 
in relation to various technologies, from abortion and contraception to pre-
natal screening, in which increased choice becomes a very double- edged bar-
gain (Petchesky 1984). Finally, this chapter seeks to show how ambivalence 
characterizes the feminist debate in another, not unrelated, recursion of con-
tent and form: while often represented as polarized (which in many respects 
it was), the feminist debate over new reproductive technologies (nrts) is, 
from another angle, better described as consistently equivocal across the so- 
called radical- feminist versus socialist feminist divide. Importantly, more-
over, the most significant shared ground within an otherwise divided debate 
was its pivotal focus on women’s experience of ivF.
All of these aspects of ivF make it an “ambivalent topic” for feminism, and 
this chapter explores this ambivalence politically as well as somewhat auto-
biographically. As Haraway (1991) notes, ambivalence is itself a double- edged 
sword. While ambivalence is associated with discomfort, powerlessness, in-
decision, and uncertainty, Haraway also points out the political danger of 
assuming that “clear- sighted critique grounding a solid political episte-
mology” is the only alternative to “manipulated false consciousness.” Indeed, 
she claims, “ambivalence toward the disrupted unities mediated by high- tech 
culture” may be an important space in which to discover “new kinds of unity” 
(1991: 30). Holding on to ambivalence may be an important means, she ar-
gues, to acknowledge that “what people are experiencing is not transparently 
clear” (31) and that developing understandings even of our own personal ex-
perience requires both evolving frames of reference and collective space in 
which to reflect. The ambivalent and contradictory feelings engendered by 
many new technologies, even in their most apparently dehumanizing mo-
ments, she argues, can also be resources for new forms of political organiza-
tion and social change. Citing the irony of her own historical background, “a 
PhD in Biology for an Irish Catholic girl . . . made possible by Sputnik’s im-
pact on US national science- education policy,” Haraway argues that “there are 
more grounds for hope by focussing on the contradictory effects of politics . . . 
than by focussing on present defeats.” She continues:
The permanent partiality of feminist points of view has consequences 
for our expectations of forms of political organization and participa-
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tion. We do not need a totality in order to work well. The feminist dream 
of a common language, like all dreams for a perfectly true language, of 
perfectly faithful naming of experience, is a totalizing and imperialist 
one. In that sense, dialectics too is a dream language, longing to resolve 
contradiction. Perhaps, ironically, we can learn from our fusions with 
animals and machines how not to be Man, the embodiment of West-
ern logos. From the point of view of pleasure in these potent and taboo 
fusions, made inevitable by the social relations of science and tech-
nology, there might indeed be a feminist science. (31)
Building on Haraway’s insights, this chapter makes two main arguments 
about the tensions within feminism concerning reproductive technologies in 
general, and ivF in particular, as well as the ambivalence of the ivF experi-
ence identified within repeated feminist studies of how women experience 
this technology. The first builds on Charis Thompson’s (2005: 56) observa-
tion that the reason why nrts have provided “the perfect text” for feminist 
theory is because of the extent to which they condense so many of the social, 
economic, and political stratifications that affect women’s lives and selves, 
while also foregrounding the tension between accommodation to the status 
quo and resistance. Like Thompson, I also suggest that ivF models technolo-
gies of gender, kinship, and sex and that it has become a defining concern 
of contemporary feminist theory because of this isomorphism. This implies, 
however, that the feminist analysis of ivF is potentially applicable to tech-
nology more broadly—and this is the second argument this chapter explores 
in more depth. Both of these perspectives are intended to emphasize what the 
feminist analysis of ivF has revealed about the process of navigating complex 
technological change—particularly when the technology is biological. This, 
of course, is a much more prominent question today than it was when many 
of the first feminist accounts of ivF and nrts were written in the 1980s. The 
main purpose of this chapter, then, is to illustrate how this body of feminist 
work has gained increasing relevance as some of its implications have become 
more pointed in relation to present- day concerns about biology as technology. 
In contrast to the conclusion drawn by some that the 1980s feminist debates 
about ivF and nrts were overly pessimistic, too descriptive, politically failed, 
divisive, ineffective, or problematically dependent on the category “woman,” I 
suggest instead that they generated a number of useful insights into the con-
dition of being after ivF that continue to be relevant to the “tool future” of 
biology more generally. In particular, as I hope to show, these debates gen-
erated models of technology as identity and documented the profoundly am-
188 chaptEr FivE
bivalent relationships with, to, and through technology that have increasingly 
widespread relevance to understanding how the remaking of life is lived in 
the age of biological control.
a Formative debate
Even measured against the extraordinary output of feminist scholars dur-
ing the 1980s, across virtually every academic discipline, the feminist debate 
over new reproductive technologies stands out as one of the most prolific to 
emerge during this formative period of contemporary feminist thought. Like 
the debate over pornography, to which it is often compared, it was frequently 
acrimonious and often caught between a politics of accommodation to exist-
ing (unequal, sexist, male- dominated) power structures and the attempt to 
change them. Likewise, the feminist debates on nrts in the 1980s vacillated 
between prioritizing a distinctively sexual or gender politics and developing 
more complex, situation- specific, intersectional political strategies. In part, 
the debate over nrts was about feminism itself. But at the same time, these 
debates also charted very new ground and grappled with many issues we are 
facing today decades before they came to more widespread prominence (egg 
donation being but one example). As this chapter suggests, the feminist analy-
sis of ivF was also the first to examine not only how biology becomes a tech-
nology, or an identity, but how the transfer of new reproductive and genetic 
technologies into the human (“into man”) could be studied, how the implica-
tions of this transfer could be analyzed, and how its politics could be charac-
terized while nrts became much more widespread. The feminist emphasis 
on personal experience—on “the personal as political”—was central to its 
critical stance toward nrts and ivF—and its careful attention to the affec-
tive politics of the ambivalent engagement with technology. Consequently, 
these debates offer central insights that are, if anything, even more relevant 
thirty years later to the broad and pressing questions posed by contemporary 
bioscience and biomedicine. I suggest in this chapter that these insights take 
on particular significance in the wake of the five millionth miracle baby be-
cause the feminist debate over nrts was primarily concerned with ivF—now 
a technology that has an applied human history of nearly half a century, and 
yet still a technology that is poorly understood and undertheorized for exactly 
the reasons Raymond Williams (1990) diagnoses for technology in general, 
namely that it may seem as though we already know what its effects have 
been. As feminists were among the first to demonstrate, the logics of ivF are 
not as obvious as they may seem.
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It is no exaggeration to say that thousands of books and articles have been 
written by feminists on reproductive technologies—old and new—mostly 
from the 1980s onward, and including the first empirical studies of the ex-
perience of ivF.3 Artificial insemination, surrogacy, surgery, and hormonal 
enhancement of fertility, as well as contraception and abortion, can all be 
counted as forms of technological assistance to reproduction, or what are 
known as reproductive technologies. But it is the rapid expansion of ivF, and 
its evolution as a technological platform for genetic as well as reproductive 
intervention, that gave rise to increasing concern about nrts from the 1980s 
onward. Building on the legacy of the women’s health movement, and a bur-
geoning interest in what has come to be known as science studies, feminist 
scholars were among the first to begin to seriously engage with the implica-
tions of bioscience and the new genetics through the lens of reproductive 
biomedicine. Whereas the concerns of bioethics originated in a wide range 
of practices, from organ donation and euthanasia to informed consent and 
genetic screening, feminists were particularly concerned from the outset 
with the encounter between nrts and women’s bodies—a tellingly domi-
nant  concern in feminist debates over ivF. Similarly, whereas it was the ad-
vent of the new genetics that dominated much social science research on the 
rise of the biosciences in the 1990s, the earlier period of feminist research 
with which this chapter is concerned prioritized reproductive biomedicine 
and nrts.
Like most feminist debates, the expansive debate over nrts has been the 
subject of conflicting interpretations reflecting the ambivalence that is as en-
demic to feminist politics as it is to the experience of being female. In addi-
tion to being a divisive topic, producing what Margarete Sandelowski (1990) 
memorably termed “fault lines in the sisterhood,” the feminist debate over 
nrts is also often characterized as neglected. Writing in one of the most influ-
ential discussions of the ethics of ivF in 1995, the British theologian Anthony 
Dyson remarks that it is nothing less than “astonishing that most of the con-
temporary literature on ivF virtually or wholly ignores the feminist argu-
ments” (1995: 6). He goes on to note that this neglect is particularly lamen-
table given the quality and depth of this body of scholarship: “In contrast to 
the highly individualistic arguments employed in much of the literature on 
the nrts, the feminist writers have developed a significant body of social 
ethics instead—a social ethics which must also be reckoned as political to 
its very core” (6). Dyson devotes an entire chapter of his book to the femi-
nist critique of nrts and ivF in order to give them “pride of place” in con-
trast to their conspicuous absence elsewhere: “Surprisingly, very few of the 
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books and articles about ivF make any reference at all to the feminist chal-
lenge,” he notes, adding, “As far as my reading goes, feminists are correct in 
observing that none of the male- centred criticisms of the nrts, be they con-
servative or radical, has opposed the technologies because of what they do to 
women” (43).
Inadequately recognized for their scholarly contributions at the time of 
their original publication, and mainly remembered for their bitter disagree-
ments afterward (if they are referred to at all), the feminist literature on nrts 
recapitulates the difficulties faced by feminist theory and women’s studies in 
general as marginalized research areas. The theme of the divisiveness of femi-
nist debates on this topic is ubiquitous, even within much of the retrospective 
feminist literature, although it is worth pausing to ask why this is the case and 
how the term is being used.4 The common, and pejorative, use of this term 
refers to the creation, sometimes deliberate, of unwanted or unhelpful divi-
sions, as in causing disagreement or sowing discord. But it is hardly surprising 
that feminist critiques of nrts would be the cause of disagreement. A more 
productive way to interpret the deeply felt divisions within feminist debate is 
as a measure of serious and committed critical thought, generating the diver-
sity of perspectives that is not only intrinsic to either intellectual or political 
struggle, but often considered to be indicative of their quality.5 To the extent 
the feminist debate over nrts opened an important space in which to mobi-
lize a less normative set of responses to ivF than those that have emerged, for 
example, from bioethics (e.g., “reproductive autonomy”; Robertson 1994), it 
has not so much been a matter of speaking truth to power as of “speaking am-
bivalence to progress.”6
I was actively involved in the early feminist intellectual and political mobi-
lization in response to nrts, and this experience partly shaped my scholarly 
interest in ivF and my PhD research on this topic between 1986 and 1989—
so this chapter also has an autobiographical element. Since I experienced at 
close hand the conflicts within feminism concerning nrts, in my twenties 
during the 1980s, I remain reluctant to dismiss their unsettling emotional 
consequences as either missing the point or as a regrettable side effect of po-
litical struggle. Such conflicts, I learned, are the political point: they taught 
me that the effort to remain ethically and politically responsive to the pressing 
questions posed by nrts is bound to be a demanding, and sometimes pain-
ful, process. We should expect to feel uncomfortable about the issues raised 
by ivF and nrts, as well as biomedicine and biotechnology more widely, as 
discomfort is one of the surest signs that an important ethical and political 
problem is nearby. Confusion and conflict are not diminishing forces: they are 
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indices of engagement, and crucial sources of political insight and creativity, 
as well as thought and speech and writing. In the same way that it is short-
sighted to read the feminist debate over nrts merely as inconclusive or un-
resolved, so too is it misguided to expect to resolve the question of biology as 
technology, or questions concerning the future of nrts, genetic engineering, 
cloning, or stem cell research. One of the reasons for writing this book is my 
concern that the very process of having become more comfortable with ivF 
and its related technologies suggests the need to rethink their histories more 
carefully and more radically. As many ethnographic and medical studies are 
now asking, it may also be necessary to question whether ivF actually even is 
as comfortable as it seems. But I return to these questions later. For the time 
being, the question this chapter explores is what can be learned from the his-
tory of feminist debates over nrts in the 1980s, particularly concerning ivF, 
and specifically from the divisions this topic generated. As I hope to demon-
strate, these perspectives constitute a neglected resource that richly rewards 
revisiting, and should become more incorporated in contemporary teaching 
as well as dialogue about the future of biological control.
early Feminist Primers
Two anthologies published in the early 1980s, Birth Control and Controlling 
Birth (Holmes et al. 1980) and The Custom- Made Child? (Holmes et al. 1981) 
were the first feminist volumes to focus attention specifically on reproductive 
technology following the birth of Louise Brown in 1978.7 But it was not until 
the mid- 1980s that this literature began rapidly to expand. 1984 saw the publi-
cation of Test- Tube Women: What Future for Motherhood?, a feminist anthology 
aimed at a popular audience edited by three feminist scientists (Rita Arditti, 
Renate Duelli Klein, and Shelley Minden) and containing thirty- three short 
contributions from a range of feminist perspectives. In 1985, Boston- based 
feminist journalist Gena Corea published The Mother Machine: From Artificial 
Insemination to Artificial Wombs, the first major feminist monograph address-
ing nrts, also aimed at a popular audience, and in which nrts are denounced 
as tools of patriarchal oppression. In 1986, the first academic book by a femi-
nist social scientist, The Tentative Pregnancy: Prenatal Diagnosis and the Future 
of Motherhood, was published by New York sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman, 
presenting the results of her major study of amniocentesis, and promoting 
the effort to provide a more supportive environment for women using this 
technology. In these groundbreaking feminist books the major themes that 
have come to dominate feminist debate over nrts more or less ever since 
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are already evident. A brief look at these influential volumes is thus a useful 
place to begin.
Test- Tube Women, perhaps the best- known feminist text on the subject of 
nrts, illustrated in its very composition the tensions between feminists that 
would define the fault lines of this field. The anthology opens with a forceful 
editorial introduction in which “the real message for women” (Arditti et al. 
1984: 5, original emphasis) of reproductive technology is voiced as a call to re-
sistance (“we are all at risk of becoming Test- Tube Women,” 6, original empha-
sis). However, the various chapters contained in its 482 pages are significantly 
less unified in their assessments—offering a wide and diverse spectrum of 
feminist perspectives on everything from lesbian motherhood to cloning. In 
contrast to the unequivocal editorial insistence on the urgency of opposing 
new forms of biological subordination through male- controlled reproductive 
technology, Test- Tube Women’s contributors offer a disparate array of personal, 
political, and theoretical responses to the question of “whether we as femi-
nists should endorse [nrts] or [whether they are] just one more way to keep 
women subordinated to male control” (1). In spite of all the reasons to be 
cautious about nrts expressed by the various chapter authors, there is little 
by way of consensus about what to do about them, other than to network, 
share information, monitor developments, and remain skeptical. Moreover, 
the strategies on offer appear contradictory—ranging from the argument that 
“new reproductive technologies may be the key to more functional ways of 
raising children” (Breeze 1984: 397) to the claim that nrts exemplify the 
reification of manmade femininity (Raymond 1984: 433). The anthology is 
thus a primer in more than one sense: it contains not only the early seeds 
of feminist analysis of nrts, but expresses in its very structure, in the con-
trast between the certainty of the editorial call to arms and the far less uni-
fied responses from its assembled foot soldiers, the profound ambivalence 
that would continue to characterize feminist debate and activism in this area.
The contrast between Corea’s (1985) and Rothman’s (1986) now- classic 
studies of nrts is equally revealing of the scope of feminist division on this 
subject (as is the contrast between Rothman’s early and later writings). In her 
contribution to Test- Tube Women, Rothman emphasizes the paradox of nrts 
in terms of how they complicate the meaning of choice—a theme that has 
come to define almost all of the most important work by feminist social scien-
tists on reproductive technology since. On the one hand, she argues, nrts 
such as prenatal screening undoubtedly enable more, and in some instances 
much better, reproductive choices for women. They could in this sense genu-
inely be described as assisting women technologically. However, nrts also 
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transform the experience of both reproduction and reproductive choice for 
women, and in many ways diminish it, thus potentially leaving women worse 
off than they would have been without such choices, or assistance, to begin 
with.8 Rothman thus argues for a continuing emphasis on the need for in-
formation and choice, while at the same time maintaining a critical politi-
cal stance toward the contexts of such choices—much as her influential col-
league Rosalind Petchesky (1984) advocated in the context of abortion, which 
she described, paraphrasing Marx, as a choice women must fight to protect, 
even if it is not one that is made on their own terms.
It is, of course, also paradoxical if women come to feel pressured by femi-
nism into choosing not to choose, by avoiding the technology altogether. As 
Rothman concludes her chapter in Test- Tube Women: “We must not get caught 
into discussions of which reproductive technologies are ‘politically correct,’ 
which empower and which enslave women. They all empower and they all 
enslave, they can be used for or against us” (Rothman 1984: 32–33).
These claims are further elaborated in Rothman’s meticulous, original, and 
still highly relevant study of women’s experience of amniocentesis (The Tenta-
tive Pregnancy, 1986, originally titled The Products of Conception, 1985). Using 
interview data from consultations with 120 women, half of whom underwent 
amniocentesis and half of whom refused the procedure, Rothman provides a 
detailed account of the ways in which prenatal screening and diagnosis dra-
matically (and often traumatically) transform the experience of pregnancy. 
Her title refers to one of her major empirical findings, namely that a ma-
jority of the women in her study who underwent amniocentesis embodied 
their emotional and technological ambivalence by suppressing the physical 
sensation of the first palpable fetal movements (quickening) until after the 
test results had been revealed (often well into the fifth month of pregnancy). 
Striking as such empirical findings are in themselves, what makes them par-
ticularly compelling in Rothman’s text is her sensitive and restrained han-
dling of the often hesitant voices of the women whose articulate accounts of 
embodying ambivalent progress form her book’s essential core.
A very different approach to the question of nrts is provided by Gena 
Corea (1985), a highly accomplished investigative journalist, whose account 
of nrts in The Mother Machine is dominated by the theme of male techno-
logical control over women’s bodies. Here, it is the producers rather than the 
consumers of nrts whose candor reveals a disturbing portrait of what Corea 
describes as the sinister background to the emergence of the reproductive ser-
vice industry. In her often surreal and disturbing interviews with men whose 
names are as seemingly Dickensian as their motives (e.g., Dr. John Seed), 
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Corea is keenly sensitive to language—quoting at length the “technodoc’s” 
descriptions of “bombing” ovaries with fertility drugs to produce “ovulation to 
order” (1985: 109); “recruiting,” “harvesting,” and “capturing” as many ova as 
possible from their women patients; sending embryos into outer space (116); 
and enabling “the biological manufacture of human beings to desired specifi-
cations” (133) to create a super- race (314). In tone, as well as content, Corea 
(whose chapter “Egg Snatchers” is placed back- to- back with Rothman’s in the 
opening section of Test- Tube Women; Corea 1984) could not be more explicit 
in her warning that nrts should be opposed root and branch, and have noth-
ing to offer women. Whereas for Rothman reproductive technology is essen-
tially neutral and can have some benefits for women, depending on how it is 
used, Corea draws on the work of Canadian sociologist Mary O’Brien (1981) to 
argue that these technologies are inherently patriarchal, manifesting a primi-
tive male drive to control women’s reproductive capacity. According to Corea, 
who also draws on Margaret Mead, Adrienne Rich, and Susan Griffin, repro-
ductive technologies are, like gynecology and obstetrics, not only products of 
a patriarchal society but the materialization of patriarchal male desires. They 
are thus, inherently and irredeemably, tools of patriarchal oppression that 
turn women into raw material and reproduction into a market. In Corea’s 
account, patriarchal technology is endowed with purpose, direction, motiva-
tion, and goals. Her analysis emphasizes the seamless coherence of patriarchy 
in the form of its technologies, which substantialize the aim of patriarchal 
control by extending its reach. In vitro fertilization is part of a historical pro-
cess that culminates in the establishment of “The Reproductive Brothel,” “The 
Capture of Maternity,” and “The Defeat of the Womb,” which are the titles of 
chapters 14, 15, and 16 of The Mother Machine.
Rothman argues precisely the opposite. In her account, reproductive tech-
nology is not inherently patriarchal—indeed it is not inherently anything; it 
is merely an avenue of possibility, creating new opportunities including the 
possibility of progressive social change. She writes, “I am not claiming that 
the technology is itself harmful. I think that the new technology of repro-
duction offers us an opportunity to work on our definition of parenthood, of 
motherhood, fatherhood and childhood, to rethink and improve our relations 
with each other in families. Freed from some of the biological constraints, we 
could evolve better, more egalitarian ways of relating to ourselves and each 
other in reproduction. The technology is a promise, beckoning us with new 
possibilities . . . giving us new control” (Rothman 1986: 3). These contrast-
ing accounts of nrts thus not only offer opposite solutions, but present radi-
cally different versions of “the question concerning technology.” Rothman 
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and Corea not only advocate opposing tactics, but rely on divergent models 
of the relationship between biology and technology. Whereas for Corea nrts 
embody and manifest a biological male drive to control women, thus com-
prising in themselves the very substance of patriarchal succession, as well as 
its means of reproduction, Rothman suggests that technology offers a path 
to overcome “biological constraints” and to change patriarchal definitions 
of kinship and family. In one vision is a technology at one with its patrilin-
eage—indeed a technology that intensifies male control of the very substance 
of patrilineage by gaining a firmer hold on biological reproduction (Corea’s 
chapter on cloning is subtitled “The Patriarchal Urge to Self- Generate”). In 
the other is a view of the potential of technology to create alternative kinship 
structures and new definitions of family—a plastic technology that offers a 
path to greater flexibility and freedom by releasing the “constraints” imposed 
by biology. In one version, then, technology extends a biological (male) drive 
to perpetuate a patriarchal lineage through reproductive control. In the other, 
technology potentially gives control back to women themselves.
This, of course, is a familiar political dilemma—in terms of not only 
women’s subordination (can the master’s tools dismantle the master’s 
house?) but technology (does mechanization improve the lives of workers 
even though it can oppress them?). Referring back to Rothman’s earlier warn-
ing against polarizing the debate (“We must not get caught into discussions 
of which reproductive technologies are ‘politically correct,’ which empower 
and which enslave women. They all empower and they all enslave, they 
can be used for or against us”), it is also clear that these positions can be read 
as either oppositional or complementary—or even as dialectically related. 
The one can be seen as the more cautionary version of the other, or they can 
be seen as irreconcilably polarized positions—Rothman being pro- nrt and 
colluding in their routinization, whereas Corea outlines a more oppositional 
anti- nrt strategy that risks the dangers of becoming caught in a judgmen-
tal stance that defines other women’s choices as complicit with patriarchal 
control. A key element of this contrast, as mentioned above, are the models 
of technology and biology being employed by each author—including the re-
lationship between these two terms.
the expansion of debate
If Rothman’s and Corea’s positions in the mid- 1980s provide a clear illustra-
tion of opposing feminist analyses of nrts, in the two most influential early 
monographs on this topic, the opposite can be claimed of the two most widely 
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cited feminist publications that quickly succeeded them. Two feminist an-
thologies that were seen by many to solidify the distinction between radical 
and socialist feminist responses to nrts were published in 1987. However, 
neither volume quite fit these categorizations, and upon closer inspection it is 
clear they have far more in common, particularly on the question of women’s 
agency to resist male dominance, but also, somewhat more surprisingly, on 
the issue of women’s experience of ivF as a form of “ambivalent progress.” 
Made to Order: The Myth of Reproductive and Genetic Progress, edited by Patri-
cia Spallone and Deborah Lynn Steinberg (1987) is, like Test- Tube Women, 
an anthology introduced by a powerful editorial stance that does not exactly 
match its contents. Similarly, Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood 
and Medicine, edited by Michelle Stanworth, although offered as an alterna-
tive to “the view that reproductive technologies represent a vehicle for men 
to wrest control of reproduction from women” (1987: 4) by providing a “fresh 
appraisal of reproductive technologies,” fails to deliver such a coherent set of 
contents. Indeed, despite claiming that “the authors in this volume firmly re-
ject . . . the particular feminist reading which sees in these technologies an 
unmitigated attack on women” (1987: 3), Stanworth’s anthology contains nu-
merous statements that explicitly support and even strengthen the interpre-
tation of nrts as an attack on women.
Thus, in the very first chapter, for example, the influential feminist soci-
ologist and reproductive activist Ann Oakley, while critical of the “reproduc-
tive brothel” model that is central to Corea’s work, nonetheless foregrounds 
the persistent exploitation of women within male- dominated medicine, and 
especially gynecology and obstetrics, for the past two centuries. Indeed, as 
Oakley makes clear in her chapter titled “From Walking Wombs to Test- Tube 
Babies,” her main argument is not intended to oppose the feminist claim 
that women are treated as “biological systems manipulable in the interests 
of patriarchy,” claiming instead, “Just as sex can become a commodity when 
men and women exploit the idea that women are sexual objects for men, so 
reproduction becomes a commodity when women become reproductive ob-
jects” (Oakley 1987: 51). Far from opposing “the particular feminist reading 
which sees in these technologies an unmitigated attack on women,” Oakley 
argues, just like Corea, that although doctors are not necessarily consciously 
or deliberately motivated to “control the lives of women” through reproduc-
tive technology, there is nonetheless “quite a lot of evidence that [this is] the 
effect” (1987: 50) of their introduction into clinical practice. Indeed, despite 
Stanworth’s claim to the contrary, Oakley argues that Corea’s “reproductive 
brothel” accusation (drawn from the work of Andrea Dworkin)9 accurately 
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characterizes the rise of nrts as both a market and an industry based on in-
creasing male control of women’s reproductive capacity. Contrary to her edi-
tor’s stated intentions for the volume, and even her own account of her posi-
tion at the outset of her chapter, Oakley endorses Dworkin’s model of nrts 
as a “total mode of control,” which, she argues, “illustrate[s] the contrast be-
tween reproduction before the use of modern medical technological manage-
ment and [the situation] after this system was established [by demonstrating 
that] centralized control by a powerful medical elite claiming expert techni-
cal knowledge is a more effective and total mode of control than a decentralized 
non- professional non- technological mode” (1987: 51, emphasis added). The 
problem with arguments such as Corea’s and Dworkin’s about patriarchy and 
male control of reproduction is thus not that they are too radical, according 
to Oakley. She precisely does not reject, as her editor Stanworth (1987: 4) 
would have it, “the view that reproductive technologies represent a vehicle 
for men to wrest control of reproduction from women.” Indeed, Oakley inter-
prets the introduction of nrts as achieving precisely this end, arguing that 
they intensify the objectification of women as “walking wombs” and “mind-
less mothers” (points she highlights in the title of her chapter). As we shall 
see, Oakley’s concerns, along with those of many of her cocontributors, have 
even more than this in common with the feminist camp to which they are 
allegedly opposed.
Rosalind Petchesky, another contributor to the Stanworth volume, is simi-
larly unwilling to entirely reject the patriarchal paradigm, also despite her 
own claims to the contrary, beginning her famous essay “Foetal Images: The 
Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of Reproduction” with a quotation from 
Hélène Cixous describing the exclusion of maternity from the patriarchal un-
conscious: “[Ultimately] the world of ‘being’ can function to the exclusion of 
the mother. No need for mother—provided that there is something of the 
maternal: and it is the father then who acts as—is—the mother. Either the 
woman is passive; or she doesn’t exist. What is left is unthinkable, unthought 
of. She does not enter into the oppositions, she is not coupled with the father 
(who is coupled with the son)” (Cixous, quoted in Petchesky 1987: 57). This is 
also the article (first published in Feminist Studies the previous year) in which 
Petchesky memorably develops the astute political observation that “the cur-
rent leadership of the anti- abortion movement has made a conscious strategic 
shift from religious discourses and authorities to medico- technical ones, in its 
efforts to win over the courts, the legislatures and popular ‘hearts and minds.’ 
But the vehicle for this shift is not organized medicine directly but mass cul-
ture and its diffusion into reproductive technology through the video display 
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terminal” (1987: 58). Describing the increasingly sophisticated use by the 
U.S. right- to- life movement of visual images of the unborn fetus to mobilize 
antiabortion sentiment, Petchesky argues these campaigners were “enlisting 
medical imagery in the service of mythic patriarchal messages” by produc-
ing a “baby man” who is also a spaceman- astronaut—“an autonomous, atom-
ized mini- space hero” (64). These representations—in effect the outcome of 
a coupling together of ultrasound and fetal imaging (nrts) with television, 
film, and other media—have become increasingly influential in the effort to 
separate fetal and maternal bodies, she suggests. “As a result, the pregnant 
woman is increasingly put in the position of adversary to her own pregnancy/
foetus” (65). These patterns, Petchesky argues, in turn “direct the practical 
applications of new reproductive technologies more towards enlarging clini-
cians’ control over reproductive processes than towards improving health 
(women’s or infants’). Despite their benefits for individual women, amnio-
centesis, in vitro fertilization, electronic foetal monitoring, routine caesarean 
deliveries, ultrasound and a range of heroic ‘foetal therapies’ (both in utero 
and ex utero) also have the effect of carving out more space/time for obstetri-
cal ‘management’ of pregnancy” (64). Thus, while Petchesky criticizes “femi-
nist cultural theorists in France, Britain and the United States” who have ar-
gued that “visualization and objectification . . . are specifically masculine” for 
relying on forms of “essentialism,” she nonetheless concedes that the “preva-
lence of the gaze” is indeed a reflection of “the deep gender bias of science 
(including medicine) [and] of its very ways of seeing” (68). Similarly, while 
she is critical of the feminist arguments of Nancy Hartsock, Mary O’Brien, 
E. Ann Kaplan, and others who “link patriarchal control over reproduction to 
the masculine quest for immortality” (71), she somewhat confusingly places a 
quotation by one of the leading feminist cultural theorists in France (Cixous) 
as the headnote to her chapter (see above). She is explicitly critical of the 
“reductionism” of “war against the womb” feminists, singling out her cocon-
tributor Ann Oakley’s work, and citing Oakley’s reference to “specific forms 
of the ancient masculine impulse ‘to confine and limit and curb the creativity 
and potentially polluting power of female procreation’ (Oakley, 1976, p. 57: 
cf. Corea, 1985a p. 303 and chapter 16; Rich, 1976, chapter 6; Ehrenreich and 
English, 1978; and Oakley, 1980)” (Petchesky 1987: 71). But if the lengthy list 
of citations provided by Petchesky to support this critique of Oakley’s reduc-
tionism were not enough evidence of the complexity of feminist positions on 
nrts, and the difficulty of assigning pro- and anti- nrt sides, Petchesky’s sub-
sequent criticisms of The Mother Machine raise still further questions about 
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the extent to which the feminist debate over nrts was itself marked from the 
outset by the same ambivalence it often described.
It would, of course, be a mistake to place too much importance on the all- 
too- common practice of lumping various feminist arguments together into 
typologies and caricaturing their contents under somewhat hackneyed labels, 
for this is in general how many political and intellectual positions are fought. 
Too much academic literalism is undoubtedly out of place in interpreting Pet-
chesky’s accusation that “works such as Gena Corea’s The Mother Machine and 
most articles in the anthology Test- Tube Women, portray women as perennial 
victims of an omnivorous male plot to take over their reproductive capacities. 
The specific forms taken by male strategies of reproductive control, while 
admittedly varying across times and cultures, are reduced to a pervasive, 
transhistorical ‘need.’ Meanwhile, women’s own resistance to this control, 
often successful, as well as their complicity in it, are ignored; women, in this 
view, have no role as agents of their reproductive destinies” (1987: 72). While 
recognizing the primary point Petchesky is making here about the limits of 
essentialist arguments, it is worth following her claim a bit further to see 
what this reveals about the fault lines described by Sandelowski (1990). Pet-
chesky’s main complaint in this passage is a familiar one—that the overvalua-
tion of male power leads to the undervaluation of female resistance. How-
ever, neither The Mother Machine nor Test- Tube Women are particularly good 
examples to illustrate this problem, since they are both products of feminist 
activism, and are thus examples of feminist resistance. Neither The Mother 
Machine nor Test- Tube Women ignores women’s resistance to patriarchal con-
trol—they are precisely dedicated to furthering it and constitute acts of re-
sistance in themselves. To understand Petchesky’s complaint, and indeed to 
comprehend the ricochet of cross- shots aimed at various forms of determin-
ism, reductionism, and essentialism in these debates more widely, it is neces-
sary to engage the deeply ambivalent relationship to nrts somewhat further.
FinRRage
Like the Stanworth anthology, Patricia Spallone and Deborah Steinburg’s 
1987 anthology, Made to Order: The Myth of Reproductive and Genetic Progress, 
contains a wide mix of feminist responses to nrts in which both their dan-
gers and potential benefits are explored. The association of Made to Order with 
radical feminism, and Reproductive Technologies with socialist feminism, while 
convenient and conventional, is nonetheless difficult to defend on the basis of 
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analyzing the actual contents of these two anthologies in more detail—which 
quickly reveals that their contributors, like those in Test- Tube Women, are dis-
tinctly ambivalent. Contrary to its association with an essentialized version of 
radical feminism, Made to Order contains more “traditional” socialist perspec-
tives, such as Farida Akhter’s chapter describing the coercive use of wheat 
relief in Bangladesh to attain sterilization targets and Maria Mies’s critique 
of corporate capitalism in her chapter “Why Do We Need All This?” Above 
all, what stands out from this anthology is that, like Test- Tube Women, its idio-
syncrasy and wide inclusiveness reflect its close proximity to feminist politi-
cal activism. Unlike most Anglo- American feminist publications from this 
period, Made to Order is broadly international, containing contributions from 
feminists in India, Bangladesh, Brazil, Germany, Australia, France, and Brit-
ain as well as the United States. Clearly a publication produced by feminist 
activists, and deliberately written in accessible language, it contains, among 
other things, summaries of the development of new reproductive technolo-
gies globally in a series of twenty- one country reports compiled by the editors 
on the basis of their correspondence with the international network of local 
feminist activists involved in FinrragE.10 A number of traditional empirical 
approaches to the study of the cultural implications of new reproductive tech-
nologies were also introduced for the first time in this volume, including com-
parative analysis of media coverage and public debate of nrts, and of national 
and international regulatory strategies. Along with Patricia Spallone’s (1989) 
insightful feminist analysis of genetic engineering, Made to Order is one of the 
first feminist anthologies to link the gender politics of ivF and other nrts 
to those of bioscience, agribusiness, and biotechnology. Pleasingly, the an-
thology contains several authentic feminist manifestos, all of which disagree 
with one another. In sum, unlike the more conventionally Anglo- centric an-
thology edited by Stanworth, Made to Order offers an unusually international 
set of feminist political interventions that convincingly represent the diverse 
and impassioned nature of global feminist collective actions in response to 
the development of nrts in the 1980s.
Above all, what distinguishes Made to Order is its indebtedness to new 
forms of “glocal” feminist political activism directed at the rise of new re-
productive and genetic technologies. As its editors note, “this may be the era 
of biotechnology, but it is also the age of international feminism” (Spallone 
and Steinburg 1987: 16). The influence of un Decade for Women activism is 
clearly evident in the form of the international feminist political networks 
mobilized to respond to the challenges posed by nrts, including FinrragE, 
as well as networks of women health activists with links to the environmen-
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tal movements, the antinuclear movement, and the effort to oppose coer-
cive family planning measures in the Third World. Because of the vehement 
anti- nrt stance taken by some of its more prominent members, including 
Gena Corea, the “FinrragE position” came to be somewhat reductively as-
sociated with the “nrts = patriarchy” stance.11 What my own experience in 
FinrragE confirmed, however, was that, like the actual contents of Made to 
Order, this was an international network of much greater political diversity 
than any simple characterization of a single position on nrts could encom-
pass (the claims of some of its most prominent members to the contrary not-
withstanding).
I began attending FinrragE meetings in 1986, shortly after it was formed, 
as part of its British contingent, comprised (like the rest of the network) of a 
loose network of feminists with a variety of backgrounds and interests united 
by a shared concern about nrts. If the FinrragE position was associated 
with a single unified stance outside the network, its actual workings as ex-
perienced by those within it revealed a much more encompassing definition 
of collective action that was largely manifest as information sharing, inno-
vative research projects, workshop and conference organization, (very long) 
meetings, campaigning, writing and publishing, and generally encouraging 
feminist debate of precisely the kind represented in Made to Order. Serviced 
by a rotating International Coordinating Group that was based in Britain 
from 1987 to 1989, and functioning with pre- Internet technology (depen-
dent on Xerox and snail mail), the work of hundreds of FinrragE members 
worldwide largely consisted of packaging and circulating hand- photocopied 
“international packets” of media clippings and policy documents, monitor-
ing developments internationally, organizing conferences, exchanging cor-
respondence, and developing feminist analyses of reproductive and genetic 
technologies that emphasized the interconnections between bioscience and 
biomedicine as they affected women’s rights and women’s health, as well as 
the environment, the economy, and ethical debate.
Shared by the most prominent members of FinrragE, including Gena 
Corea, Renate Klein, Jalna Hanmer, and Maria Mies, was a well- defined posi-
tion of opposition to all forms of new reproductive and genetic technology. 
This position was repeatedly spelled out in a number of documents, from the 
founding manifesto of FinrragE to various publications and conference pro-
ceedings (many of which can be accessed on the FinrragE website, www 
.finrrage.org). This position emphasized the male medical takeover of repro-
duction, the deceptive marketing of ivF and other nrts, the experimental na-
ture of many nrt treatments, the exclusion of women and women’s interests 
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from almost all forms of public debate about nrts, and the need for women 
to become more critical of techniques such as ivF that were often depicted in 
heroic and celebratory terms. The accompanying FinrragE line was simple: 
nrts should be banned.
This line, however, was unevenly shared throughout the FinrragE net-
work as a whole, as is evident in many of the publications associated with 
FinrragE, such as Made to Order, which, like Test- Tube Women, begins with 
a forceful editorial introduction by Gena Corea, Jalna Hanmer, Renate Klein, 
Robyn Rowland, and Janice Raymond calling for a rejection of nrts: “By re-
jecting these technologies we take a woman- centred stance. . . . We should 
not forget that . . . the ‘technodocs’ need our bodies. . . . If we deny them our 
bodies and speak out angrily against them in public, then perhaps they will 
be forced to stop” (Corea et al. 1987: 11). Following this introductory chapter, 
however, is a much more mixed series of feminist responses to a wide range of 
technologies, in which some authors openly reject the FinrragE line. Green 
activist Linda Bullard, for example, states that she has “no quarrel with the 
Age of Biology” (Bullard 1987: 117) while policy specialist Patricia Hynes out-
lines a regulatory model for new reproductive technologies based on the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency that would allow “women [to represent] 
themselves on policy boards and regulatory committees as the subjects of 
these risky technologies” (Hynes 1987: 198). Like the chapter structures of 
both Test- Tube Women and Made to Order, the FinrragE network conjoined a 
small group of prominent feminists who were strongly in agreement with one 
another to a much larger and more amorphous group of network members 
who held a more diverse range of views. In addition to disagreeing about the 
political challenges posed by nrts, the bulk of the FinrragE membership 
also had different views about the need for a single, unified political position 
in response to them. For the feminists most committed to the FinrragE 
position of complete opposition to nrts, such as the authors of the edito-
rial introduction to Made to Order, a line was a line—not a bunch of lines. 
This group operated much like a radical cell, often portraying their work as 
part of a war against patriarchy. The rest of the network operated more like a 
post–un Decade women’s collective action, in which a very high tolerance of 
diversity was both a valued and an expected component of feminist politics.
The regular meetings of British FinrragE members I attended as a gradu-
ate student in London, Bradford, York, Birmingham, and Leeds were highly 
informative and full of debate. They were also fun. The opportunity to meet 
other feminists involved in writing, thinking, and reading about nrts gen-
erated enormous energy and excitement. The meetings always involved the 
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opportunity to learn about feminist activism in other parts of the world, and 
this internationalism was reflected in FinrragE conferences, which brought 
together feminist activists from dozens of countries. The model of local activ-
ism linked to a global political agenda was thus very fully realized within 
FinrragE, at a time when feminism was rapidly becoming a more diverse 
and well- organized global political movement. Fueled by the torrent of femi-
nist publications concerning reproductive technology, including Haraway’s 
(1985) “Manifesto for Cyborgs” and Emily Martin’s (1987) The Woman in the 
Body, to name but two of the instant feminist classics from this period, the 
FinrragE network was in many respects one of the most successful and 
productive global feminist organizations to emerge during the 1980s. Like 
many such movements, FinrragE members struggled to articulate a single 
political line. As a result, there were, in effect, two FinrragEs—one that un-
equivocally advocated complete opposition to all forms of nrt, and another, 
larger, constituency that had a broadly skeptical caution toward the rapid 
routinization of procedures such as ivF, but which stopped short of insisting 
that no women should use them under any conditions. One of the main differ-
ences between these two different constituencies—the copresence of which 
was obvious to any participant in FinrragE activities—was the invisibility 
to outsiders of the diversity of FinrragE activism, masked as this was by the 
FinrragE position or line.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the political structure of FinrragE as it evolved from 
1985 to 1989 from an insider’s point of view. As I have attempted to illustrate 
in this diagram, a division of both perception and politics separated a rela-
tively small group of comparatively prominent FinrragE activists associated 
with the network’s strong anti- nrt stance from the bulk of its membership, 
who held more disparate views, and this division predictably led to conflict. 
For example, while there was strong sympathy for the FinrragE position of 
complete opposition to all forms of new reproductive and genetic technolo-
gies, many activists in the network interpreted this position as strategic, or 
even as symbolic, rather than as strictly literal. After all, abortion and contra-
ception are reproductive technologies, and no one was calling for a ban on 
their use. Even some members who agreed with the line doubted its like-
lihood of success, and others expressed concern that such a rigid political 
position significantly weakened the ability of FinrragE participants to gain 
a foothold in public debate. For many, the difference between their personal 
version of resistance and those that were officially spelled out in the many 
FinrragE manifestos was irrelevant to most of what went on in FinrragE. 
Like most political groups, the reality of participating in FinrragE meant 
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working in small groups on specific tasks that did not require a precise defi-
nition of the network’s exact aims. So while it would be inaccurate to suggest 
that most FinrragE members did not share an explicitly feminist concern 
with the effects of nrts on women, and the near- complete exclusion of these 
concerns from public debate, it was equally true that not everyone agreed 
about what was to be done.
Conflicts over tactics predictably ranged from mild to severe. Some mem-
bers, for example, felt it was wrong to respond to public enquiries such as that 
of the British government in the wake of the Warnock Report, arguing that 
feminist responses would only legitimize a state effort to pass laws allowing 
for more use of nrts and the growth of a fertility market. Others felt a lack of 
response would defeat the whole purpose of FinrragE, which was intended 
to publicize a feminist critical perspective on nrts and to expose their dele-
terious effects on women. More severe conflict surrounded the often- heard 
criticisms that FinrragE neglected the difficulties of infertile women, cast 
ivF users as collaborators with patriarchy, and naively appealed to the state 
for protection (in the form of calling for a complete ban on the use of nrts). 
In a 1985 issue of the British feminist journal Trouble and Strife, infertility 
awareness activist Naomi Pfeffer criticized the work of FinrragE, claiming, 
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FigurE 5.1. This insider’s view of FinrragE illustrates the difference between how 
the network was perceived externally and how it appeared from within, particularly 
in relation to the FinrragE line of strict opposition to new reproductive and genetic 
technologies. Author’s diagram.
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“The one voice that is never heard is that of the most directly implicated: the 
voice of infertile women. Because of their absence, this debate appears, from 
the perspective of an infertile woman, to be curiously ill- informed in terms 
of what it is like to be infertile, socially, medically, and emotionally” (Pfeffer 
1985: 46). Shortly afterward, and in the same journal, Marge Berer, represent-
ing the Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights, accused FinrragE 
of “imperialist dogma” that was “void of evidence” and displayed political in-
experience. “To kid oneself that the state is more benevolent than science to 
women is politically naïve and dangerous” (Berer 1985: 33).
Tensions concerning these questions were also present within FinrragE 
and centered on various specific issues. The suggestion that FinrragE 
should take a more sympathetic stance toward women ivF users was one such 
issue, and the question of whether assisted conception technology could be 
made more “woman friendly” was another. The problem posed by the stance 
of complete opposition was an almost constant source of debate that some-
times led to visceral disagreements. A case in point was the decision by the 
Bombay- based FinrragE affiliate the Forum against Oppression of Women, 
who successfully campaigned for a law banning the use of amniocentesis for 
sex selection in the state of Maharashta, to support a strictly limited use of 
this technology to scan for fetal abnormality (largely in support of the repro-
ductive crisis being experienced by women in the wake of the Bhopal disas-
ter). For many FinrragE participants this decision was both laudable and 
obvious, while for others, including many of FinrragE’s leading activists, it 
explicitly departed from the network’s stated aims and official position by fail-
ing to enforce a complete ban on this technology.
These and other debates within the network reached a boiling point at the 
March 1989 FinrragE conference in Bangladesh, coorganized by FinrragE 
and a local alternative development agency, ubinig.12 Although a productive 
conference in many respects, and highly successful as an international femi-
nist forum, the event was marred by a series of conflicts that led to increasing 
fragmentation of the network in its wake. In the autumn of 1989 the Interna-
tional Coordinating Group of FinrragE disbanded, while numerous other 
organizations, including the Forum against Oppression of Women, left the 
network. A book contract with Zed Press for the conference proceedings was 
canceled, and the network effectively split into those who remained part of 
a smaller and more politically cohesive core of radical activists (led by a new 
international coordinating group in Germany), and those who left FinrragE. 
Along with many other FinrragE participants, I left the network in the wake 
of the Dhaka conference, although I have kept in close touch with many of 
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its present and former members, both in the United Kingdom and in many 
other countries.
Contested Conceptions
It is in many ways predictable, given my experience of the conflicts in 
FinrragE over the question of women’s experiences of ivF, that I am in-
clined toward a different interpretation of the feminist divisions in this era 
than those which emphasize either radical versus socialist feminist divisions, 
or pro- versus anti- stances toward nrts. My experiences led me to perceive 
such interpretations as too neatly polarized. Given my own interests and 
background, it is also not surprising that my attention was drawn to the issue 
that arguably unites Made to Order and Reproductive Technologies (as it united 
most of FinrragE with its opponents), namely that of the ambivalence of 
women’s reproductive agency in general and of the ivF journey in particular. 
The promotion of women’s reproductive empowerment and agency was not 
only a shared priority across disparate walks of feminist political opinion, and 
diverse contexts of feminist political activism worldwide during the 1980s, 
but also an issue that became particularly difficult, uncomfortable, and divi-
sive precisely at the point that nrts became involved. And no reproductive 
technology epitomized this difficulty more than ivF. As a result, not only 
in Western countries, but in India, Brazil, the Philippines, and the Middle 
East, the question of women’s relationship to ivF became one of the most in-
tensely fraught political questions for feminists both within and outside of 
FinrragE.
Thus, despite their other differences, and in spite of being presented as op-
posing feminist positions, both of the anthologies discussed above addressed 
the issue of ivF in strikingly similar ways. Alongside articles that were highly 
critical of nrts in Made to Order and Reproductive Technologies were chapters 
addressing women’s experiences of infertility and ivF, as well as the impor-
tance of protecting women’s access to artificial insemination and other repro-
ductive technologies that were seen to offer paths forward out of rigid nor-
mative conventions of kinship and family formation, as well as the distress 
of infertility. Contrary to its close association with the FinrragE line, Made 
to Order contains one of the first feminist analyses of women’s experience of 
ivF by Australian FinrragE member Christine Crowe. As the editors note 
in introducing Crowe’s chapter: “In the debates on the new reproductive and 
genetic technologies, little attention has been paid to women’s experiences of 
infertility and motherhood. . . . Often our efforts to defend women’s right to 
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self- determination and reproductive choice have left out infertile women. . . . 
The availability of ivF puts our politics into a new context” (Spallone and 
Steinberg 1987: 15). Similarly, although none of the chapters in Stanworth’s 
anthology directly address women’s experience of ivF, Reproductive Technolo-
gies includes a chapter from Naomi Pfeffer, the coauthor with Anne Woollett 
of the first feminist guide to infertility, The Experience of Infertility, published 
by the feminist press Virago in London in 1983. Stanworth’s introduction to 
Pfeffer’s chapter closely parallels Spallone and Steinberg’s introduction of 
Crowe’s research, emphasizing (albeit in a somewhat more critical tone) “the 
refusal by both supporters and opponents of reproductive technologies to ac-
knowledge the heterogeneity of infertility [which] has had the effect of fur-
ther stigmatising infertile women and men” (Stanworth 1987: 6). The impor-
tance placed on a sympathetic feminist approach to women’s experience of 
infertility and ivF in both of these opposed feminist accounts not only consti-
tutes an important point of overlap but anticipates one of the most substan-
tial legacies of these debates in the form of the analysis of how reproductive 
technologies are understood and experienced by those for whom they be-
come a way of life.
infertility and iVF
During the 1980s, the theme of women’s experience of infertility grew sig-
nificantly in importance and, once again, three of the key volumes from this 
era usefully recapitulate some of the main fault lines to emerge in feminist 
debate. Pfeffer and Woollett’s 1983 guidebook was based on the authors’ own 
experience of infertility and infertility treatment, as well as interviews with 
other women who shared this experience. Designed as a feminist handbook 
for coming to terms with infertility, it was written to provide information 
and advice, and to break the silence surrounding infertility. Drawing on the 
work of Adrienne Rich, the authors argue that both sexuality and reproduc-
tion must be reclaimed from male- dominated frameworks and values: “We 
believe, like Adrienne Rich, that in the realm of sexuality and reproduction, ‘it 
is crucial that women take seriously the enterprise of finding out what we do 
feel instead of accepting what we have been told we must feel’” (Pfeffer and 
Woollett 1983: 1). In their guidebook Pfeffer and Woollett interspersed de-
tailed medical information and practical advice with chapters describing the 
emotional and psychological toll of coping with infertility—very much in the 
tradition of earlier women’s health guidebooks such as Our Bodies, Ourselves. 
Pfeffer and Woollett are not uncritical of nrts or ivF, both of which, they 
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argue, raise questions about the social conditioning leading women to feel 
childbearing is an essential part of their identity. They express concern about 
the extent to which ivF has been developed within a male- dominated medi-
cal profession that defines women’s reproductive capacity as something to be 
managed and as an intrinsically flawed system (thus leading to the overattri-
bution of infertility to the female partner, for example). They do not, however, 
claim that ivF is synonymous with patriarchal control, and instead are above 
all concerned to enable women to make their own reproductive choices, even 
if these may involve submitting to costly, painful, and most likely unsuccess-
ful attempts at ivF.
Written before nrts began to be the subject of more vociferous feminist 
debate, The Experience of Infertility successfully built on the self- help model of 
women’s empowerment established through the women’s health and repro-
ductive rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s. That such an approach had 
become significantly more problematic for feminists by the mid- 1980s may be 
one reason why no successor project to this volume was ever published. The 
closest candidates for such a companion volume are both, indeed, quite dif-
ferent from it. Tomorrow’s Child: Reproductive Technologies in the 1990s (Birke 
et al. 1990), produced, like Test- Tube Women, by three feminist scientists, was 
also a Virago feminist health handbook published in London in 1990.13 Like 
its predecessor, it provided up- to- date practical information about infertility, 
its diagnosis, and its potential alleviation through ivF and other procedures. 
Unlike the earlier volume, however, Tomorrow’s Child is concerned less with 
women’s experience of infertility or childlessness than the feminist debate 
about them, arguing, like Rothman (1986), against a wholesale rejection of 
these technologies and instead for greater accountability for their marketing 
and use, as well as better information for women who are considering these 
options. In the concluding chapters the authors call for an improved debate 
over the role of science and technology in society, increased control over re-
productive technology by women, and more support of the use of such tech-
nology to challenge existing social arrangements of family, child care, and 
kinship, rather than reinforcing the status quo. In addition to being a guide-
book, Tomorrow’s Child drew on Shulamith Firestone’s vision of the need for 
science, technology, and society to change in unison in order for reproduc-
tion to be redefined in ways that truly liberate women.
A different set of emphases and arguments distinguished The Experience 
of Infertility from Renate Klein’s 1989 anthology, also published as a feminist 
handbook of sorts by Pandora, titled Infertility: Women Speak Out about Their 
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Experiences of Reproductive Medicine. This volume is much more similar to 
The Experience of Infertility than is Tomorrow’s Child in its foregrounding of 
women’s personal experience and testimony as a basis for feminist politics, 
feminist analysis of reproductive health, and the feminist critique of nrts. 
However, Infertility is intended to be a condemnation of ivF and nrts, most 
closely resembling the account offered by Gena Corea (with whom Klein co-
authored Man Made Women in 1985). As in Test- Tube Women, of which Klein 
was a coeditor, an emphatic editorial introduction affirms that “the mes-
sage is clear. . . . ivF is a failed technology” (Klein 1989: 1, original empha-
sis), leaving no room for equivocation. These technologies not only expose 
women to “dangerous health hazards” and require that women be used as 
“living test sites for drugs and new techniques” (1989: 2), but “often severely 
violate a woman’s sense of dignity” (4) by invoking a “brutal ideology which 
sees women as mere breeders who need to be controlled” (6). In sum, and as 
the cover of Klein’s anthology affirms: “Reproductive technology fails women: 
it’s a con.” Correspondingly, the aim of Klein’s book was twofold. On the one 
hand she was seeking to expose the hidden truth of ivF and the reality behind 
the image of benevolent medicine and happy media stories (much as Corea 
had attempted to expose the hidden background of the science and market-
ing behind ivF). On the other hand, Klein sought to empower her readers “to 
have a real choice to say ‘No’ to conventional fertility treatments as well as 
ivF” (1989: 7, original emphasis).
Like Pfeffer and Woollett, Klein included in her handbook chapters cover-
ing a wide range of experiences of infertility and childlessness, as well as forms 
of its diagnosis and treatment. This inclusive spirit does not extend to Klein’s 
final assessment of nrts, however. Her book closes with a forty- five- page de-
nouncement of nrts that calls for immediate global legislation to ban their 
use, and a worldwide feminist movement of resistance to oppose their future 
development. It is in this context that Klein pointedly describes FinrragE 
as a network that is not so much concerned with, but opposed to, nrts. In a 
passage reminiscent of more recent critics of biomedicine and biotechnology, 
such as Bill McKibben (2004), Klein infuses her conclusion with a passionate 
injunction to act before time runs out: “There is still time to stop the techno-
patriarchal clock that races towards a future of people ‘made to order’—an 
un- humanness of an unprecedented degree. It is not too late. Immature eggs 
cannot yet be matured. . . . The artificial womb is not yet perfected. Living 
women still play the most important role in the technological set- up. May 
the voices of the women in this book increase a movement with a strong bias 
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in international feminist solidarity that resists the technologies and says no 
with passion” (1989: 289). Though largely critical of nrts, however, few of 
the contributors to Klein’s anthology are as certain as Klein herself about the 
viability of alternatives to high- tech medical options such as ivF, or the pos-
sibility of large numbers of women resisting them. To the contrary, many of 
the contributors suggest that despite having considerable reservations about 
these techniques, they remain sympathetic to women who choose them for a 
variety of reasons. Even some of the women most critical of nrts on the basis 
of their own experience reject the blanket opposition Klein advocates. As one 
woman described her experience in a chapter authored by German feminist 
health activist Ute Winkler, for example: “I could not say to a woman that she 
should not try it. I can understand why she would want to go for it. So I would 
say to her: ‘OK, it will be nasty and you will suffer.’ But I would not say that 
she should not be allowed to try” (Winkler 1989: 100).
The dilemma described by “Inge M.,” whereby she says for herself that 
she would never go through ivF again, indeed that she “would not like to be 
part of their machinery ever again” (Winkler 1989: 100), yet that she could 
not say to another woman that she should not try it, exposes the ambiva-
lence of choices and choosing familiar to many areas of feminist politics. In-
deed it is a statement that precisely recapitulates the feminist ambivalence 
toward ivF that has since come to dominate the debate over nrts in general. 
Even while denouncing “their machinery” for herself, “Inge M.” is reluctant 
to dictate other women’s choices. For Klein, this presents a double dilemma 
since it represents not only a failure of feminist resistance but the tragedy of 
women’s voluntary compliance with patriarchal science, thus providing the 
“technodocs” with “experimental test- sites” (Klein 1989: 230): “The tragedy 
lies in women’s cooperation with the experimenters” (246), Klein laments, 
adding that “women taking part in ivF do not realize that, unwittingly, they 
contribute to this sick scenario of interfering with human reproduction” 
(279). According to this view, women who participate in ivF are not only vic-
tims but colluders (246). Yet although Klein argues that “there are no better 
spokeswomen against these technologies than women who have actually 
gone through the procedures, and survived” (286), such women themselves, 
as is made evident by their own published testimony in Klein’s book, do not 
always endorse their editor’s imperative “to be firm and advise women not to 
use these technologies” (287).
The model used by Klein is in fact less that of either the women’s health 
handbook or the self- help guide than a publication in the tradition of “speak-
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ing out” against war crimes, as in the feminist tribunals of crimes against 
women organized around sexual violence (Bunch 1982; Russell and Van de 
Ven 1976). Klein is not an infertile woman herself seeking to break the silence 
in order to raise consciousness in a manner that will assist women to find 
their own path. Contrary to her avowed reliance on women’s own personal 
testimony, which, although critical, is distinctly equivocal, Klein attempts to 
reframe her spokeswomen’s voices as evidence of the imperative to “stop this 
crazy technology by saying no” (1989: 279, original emphasis).
Inevitably, accusations from feminists such as Klein, who describes 
women who undergo ivF as “addicts” who “willingly become research ma-
terial” (1989: 249), were the source of concern to feminists researching the di-
lemma of infertility more sympathetically, such as U.S. nurse and anthropolo-
gist Margarete Sandelowski, whose interviews with infertile women patients 
during the 1980s led her to offer a very different interpretation of their testi-
mony. Writing in 1990, Sandelowski warned of “fault lines” in an “imperilled 
sisterhood” and, specifically that “many feminist critiques of reproductive 
technology perpetuate and intensify the tensions that already exist between 
fertile and infertile women and reinforce, rather than counter, patriarchal 
ideas about and divisions among women” (1990: 34). She adds, “Current femi-
nist discourse has largely focussed on the consequences of using technolo-
gies developed to remedy infertility rather than on the infertility experience 
itself” and that as a result “infertile women find themselves confronted with 
a group of feminists who suspect their motivations to procreate as strongly 
as they suspect the medical community’s desires to create babies by artificial 
means” (39). To the extent that such feminist arguments interpret women’s 
motivations to pursue ivF as “a sign of the perversity of women’s socializa-
tion” (41), argues Sandelowski, echoing Rothman (1984), they are unhelpfully 
“pitting one group of women against another” (42–43).
Somewhat contrary to the network’s anti- nrt reputation, the beginnings 
of a more comprehensive feminist account of the encounter between women 
and nrts was initiated largely by members of FinrragE during the 1980s. 
Alison Solomon, for example, a FinrragE member and feminist health activ-
ist from Israel, was among the first to emphasize the importance of separating 
an analysis of the often traumatic experience of infertility treatment from the 
experience of infertility itself—a distinction, she suggested, that many femi-
nist critics of nrts had failed to make (Solomon 1989). Somewhat ironically, 
given its editorial stance, Renate Klein’s Infertility also contains a chapter from 
the Danish feminist historian and social theorist Lene Koch, a member of 
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FinrragE who did not share Klein’s view that the only possible response to 
women who chose to undergo ivF was to reeducate them. Instead, like San-
delowski, Koch sought to reeducate herself by seeking out women who had 
undergone ivF in order to learn from their experience. As she explains in 
her chapter in Klein’s anthology, her research in Denmark with women who 
spoke to her about their experience of ivF forced her to reconsider the nature 
of the dilemma the technology poses, in part because of her increasing sen-
sitivity to the reasons women are so determined to undertake it, and to suc-
ceed despite the odds.
This dilemma—which is in many ways that of “Inge M.”—was taken up by 
an increasing number of FinrragE members in the 1980s, following the lead 
of Christine Crowe, the first feminist researcher to conduct a detailed empiri-
cal study of women’s experience of ivF, which she published in 1985.14 Titled 
“Women Want It” (and reprinted in Made to Order), Crowe’s article, based on 
interviews with women undergoing ivF in one of Sydney’s first major assisted 
conception clinics, explored women’s reasons for desiring ivF treatment and, 
like Rothman’s study of amniocentesis, chronicled how their understandings 
of such a choice could change over the course of treatment, frequently result-
ing in outcomes they had not anticipated. Like many feminist researchers on 
ivF since, Crowe provided compelling data on the extent to which ivF was 
as much a technology of gender, kinship, and conjugality as of reproduction. 
A dominant theme in Crowe’s study is the role of social pressures to attempt 
ivF in order to complete a family and to confirm a gender identity, as well as 
to affirm or repair conjugality through biological reproduction—or at least to 
be seen as trying to establish a pregnancy.15 As Crowe noted, “Most women 
expressed the feelings of being excluded from the social nexus of mothers 
and couples with children, not only in terms of neighbours, but with long- 
established friends. Parenthood was perceived to be the common experience 
around which friendships were maintained” (Crowe 1987: 89). Notably, Crowe 
also emphasized the difficulties described by her respondents of not being 
seen to try hard enough if they considered dropping out of ivF programs:
Many women stated that being on an ivF program forced them to centre 
their lives even more explicitly around reproduction. They recognized the 
inability to attempt to accept their infertility and to come to some re-
solve about life plans. . . . Once a woman has decided to undergo an ivF 
procedure, participation in the program seems to have a life of its own. 
For various reasons women found it very difficult to “give up” the pro-
gram. Those who had initially set a time limit to how long they would 
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participate, or how many attempts they would have, found it very diffi-
cult to adhere to their initial resolve. (1987: 91, emphasis added)
Such findings were important to the feminist debate about nrts for several 
reasons, not least the extent to which they revealed, even in these very first 
studies, that the pursuit of ivF was not exclusively driven by the desire to 
have children. As Crowe demonstrated, a fuller understanding of women’s 
motivations to pursue ivF revealed that being seen to try to become pregnant 
through ivF could in some ways perform a role similar to actually having chil-
dren—at least for a time.16 Pursuing ivF, for example, could ameliorate the 
social pressures to participate in the common experience of parenthood by 
allowing women to center their lives around reproduction even if they failed 
to produce offspring. In this way, ivF could be seen to enable the performance 
of gender that Judith Butler would shortly be naming as a compulsory feature 
of identity, and that feminist kinship theorists were already describing as the 
product of exogamy—rather than its source.
Whereas earlier feminist accounts of the experience of ivF had docu-
mented women’s sense of being trapped in an endless series of failed ivF 
cycles, Crowe was able to offer an explanation of why this was so. Hence, for 
example, Gena Corea had clearly researched women’s experiences of ivF as 
part of her investigation of reproductive biomedicine for The Mother Machine. 
Her examples, like Crowe’s, accurately and poignantly depicted what is par-
ticularly painful about the ivF encounter:
Nancy was one of the “lucky” women who had a successful embryo 
transfer after her first laparoscopy in an Australian program. She was 
pregnant. Part of her cheered, while another part cautioned that the 
chances of success were small. “It was this incredible turmoil that I 
was in,” she explained. After about a month, she lost the pregnancy. 
“I wasn’t really surprised when I lost it. Some other people who I’ve 
talked to in the program feel devastated. I didn’t. I just felt real sad. I 
felt grief- ridden for a while, but I didn’t think about giving up.” After her 
second laparoscopy, while she, still sore, was recovering from surgery, 
the doctor told her the eggs they had just harvested had been abnormal. 
“When I went in [that] second time and my egg didn’t even fertilize, 
that was harder than the first time because I thought, “Well, I’ve lost a 
pregnancy, but next time they’re going to get it.” There were six more 
“next times”—seven operations in all—and they still had not “gotten 
it” by the time Nancy was interviewed in 1981. (Corea 1985: 180–181)
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Both the tone and the context of Corea’s depiction of the experience of under-
going ivF reflect a single interpretation of this encounter, namely that it con-
firms a pattern of exploitation. “Of the thousands of women hoping to get a 
baby through the 200- odd ivF programs across the globe, the vast majority 
have been disappointed. The cycle of hopes raised (she’s accepted in the pro-
gram) and dashed (the doctor could not get an egg), raised (got an egg) and 
dashed (the egg was abnormal), raised (got a normal egg) and dashed (em-
bryo did not implant), raised (embryo implanted) and dashed (miscarried) 
harms women in ways pharmacrats have not acknowledged” (Corea 1985: 
180). For Corea, there is no possibility of interpreting this scenario other than 
in terms of the harm done by patriarchal culture and its message to women 
about their place. “The message comes down with the force of centuries- long 
repetition. The patriarchy gives us the message through games, stories, toys. 
Our mothers whisper it to us. Our protests preach it. Our doctors give us 
treatments if our ovaries or our wombs fail us. It is our cell- deep knowledge: 
We are here to bear the children of men. If we cannot do it, we are not real 
women. There is no reason for us to exist” (1985: 170).
Crowe’s examples, by contrast, are more equivocally interpreted in order 
to reveal a more complicated struggle against these same norms of femininity. 
Her examples are differently inflected to allow room for resistance and to 
allow a more nuanced understanding of how and why people adapt them-
selves to circumstances beyond their control. Crowe not only illustrates but 
helps to explain the exact mechanisms by which people adapt themselves to 
choices that are not being made on terms they have chosen:
ivF may be seen by many women with fertility problems as the last in 
a long line of medical procedures. . . . Some women feel they “owe it to 
themselves” to attempt this last possible avenue before making further 
long term decisions about their life. Once undergoing an ivF procedure 
many women find it difficult to discontinue. One woman described ivF 
as a “whirlpool” where hope is offered “just around the corner.” The 
fact that ivF is possible, and its persistent lure of “next time,” makes it 
even harder for a woman to consider life without a child born of her-
self. (1988: 58)
By this means, Crowe can illustrate not only why women undergo ivF, but 
how they attempt to protect themselves in the process. As one patient she 
interviewed explained: “I know it’s not going to work again, but we’ll try any-
way. You try to protect yourself. That self- protection is very strong. . . . All 
you’re trying to do is to cushion that emotional blow at the end” (Crowe 1988: 
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60). Crowe’s findings further confirmed that ivF patients are hardly unaware 
of the fact that they are undertaking ivF in a highly unequal situation, in 
which medical experts are in charge, while patients are both subordinate and 
dependent upon their doctors for the help they are seeking. As another inter-
viewee explained: “When we first went to see the doctor [at the ivF clinic] I 
was saying to my husband: ‘Now, whatever you do, keep your mouth shut and 
be good, because this is the last chance we get’” (1988: 60).
Documenting the phenomenon later characterized by Charis Thomp-
son (2005) as “ontological choreography,” Crowe revealed that the women 
patients she interviewed expected to be objectified and thought their doc-
tors were likely to be incapable of treating them other than as “uteruses and 
tubes”: “They’re technical, they’re success oriented, they want to get preg-
nancies—that’s their job . . . to do ivF and to put embryos back, and to keep 
doing it day after day after day, with lots of women coming through on a con-
veyor belt. I don’t see how they can avoid just seeing women as objects be-
cause after all that’s what they are to them . . . just uteruses and tubes. Also, 
they have no training in the psychological or emotional aspects. They’d be 
terrified to get into that!” (Crowe 1988: 62–63). Crowe’s findings anticipate 
the description offered by Lauren Berlant of “cruel optimism,” defined as “a 
relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility” (2006: 21). 
In the same way, Berlant draws our attention to “the labor of reproducing life 
in the contemporary world [that is] also the activity of being worn out by it” 
(2006: 23), so too does Crowe provide an account of an attachment to chasing 
an impossible baby, noting of the patients in her study that “those who had set 
a time limit to how long they would participate in the program found it ex-
tremely difficult to adhere to their initial resolve; none kept to their original 
limit.” As another patient she interviewed explained:
I’ve been chasing a baby ever since I was 22. You’ve got to draw the line 
somewhere. Thirty- five was going to be “it” . . . but I still feel that physi-
cally and mentally I could still have a child. For the last twelve months 
I’ve been trying to kid myself into saying that I don’t care if I quit any-
how. I’d like to be in a position so that I feel freer and not subject to any 
manipulation, and it’s not so important to me . . . but really, for all that 
twelve months it’s been a struggle inside myself, and I’ve never really 
reached the stage where I could say I could quit. (Crowe 1988: 64–65)
In addition to illuminating the precise mechanisms by which ivF becomes a 
way of life, Crowe identifies not only a feminine, and feminist, dilemma, but 
a technological one. There are several important paths that follow from her 
216 chaptEr FivE
investigations, including the question of what happens when technologies 
of gender and technologies of reproduction intersect. Or, to put it the other 
way around, are there circumstances in which the engagement with a tech-
nological quest or pilgrimage becomes a distinctly feminizing experience, for 
example in the psychoanalytic sense of how femininity is positively defined 
by subordination and lack? Is a certain kind of familiar heroism attached to 
the pursuit of impossible goals? Sara Ahmed makes an important point about 
the “relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility” (Ber-
lant 2006: 21) in her account of “the promise of happiness” and what happi-
ness comes “after”:
If we think of instrumental goods as objects of happiness, important 
consequences follow. Things become good, or acquire their value as 
goods, insofar as they point toward happiness. Objects become “happi-
ness means.” Or we could say they become happiness pointers, as if to 
follow their point would be to find happiness. If objects provide a means 
of making us happy, then in directing ourselves toward this or that ob-
ject we are aiming somewhere else: toward a happiness that is pre-
sumed to follow. The temporality of this following does matter. Happi-
ness is what would come after. Given this, happiness is directed toward 
certain objects, which point toward that which is not yet present. When 
we follow things, we aim for happiness, as if happiness is what you get 
if you reach certain points. (Ahmed 2010: 26)
As Ahmed notes, “we might assume that the relationship between an object 
and feeling involves causality: as if the object causes the feeling,” when in fact 
the attribution of happiness to causality is often retrospective. Thus “the ob-
ject of feeling lags behind the feeling” (Ahmed 2010: 27).
Berlant’s attention to the inherent ambivalence of attachments to “compro-
mised conditions of possibility” and Ahmed’s account of “happiness means” 
are highly pertinent to the problem posed by ivF, which cannot simply be ex-
plained in terms of women being given the wrong messages or false hopes. 
The question of women’s relationship to the promise of happiness ivF offers 
is both more complex and in many ways less specific to women than such an 
explanation suggests. To paraphrase Ahmed, if ivF offers a promise of hap-
piness, then to follow the path of ivF is precisely to move toward that which 
is not yet present, and thus to associate oneself with the happiness that is 
presumed to follow, even if the object of feeling never materializes. This is 
why ivF can offer a fulfilling orientation, whether or not it delivers a “take- 
home baby.”
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A question we can now ask as a result of the long tradition of feminist 
studies of women’s experience of ivF that began with Crowe’s work—and 
indeed that some concerned ivF practitioners have increasingly asked them-
selves as ivF has become so much more widespread—is whether ivF is so 
popular in part because of its elusive and demanding requirements. Like a 
modern technological pilgrimage, ivF can be understood as a path that ac-
quires moral and affective significance through the very nature of the jour-
ney as much as, if not even more than, through the fact of arrival. This is an 
important reason the path to ivF may be so difficult to leave despite serial 
failure, since ironically the endurance of so much deprivation only confirms 
more emphatically a dedication to the journey’s objectives.
The question of ivF’s complex appeal was also the subject of Canadian 
FinrragE member Linda Williams’s (1988) PhD in Toronto in the mid- 1980s. 
Exploring women’s motivations for undergoing ivF, and titled “It’s Going to 
Work for Me,” Williams’s research focused on why women continue to repeat 
ivF after failing, as most do, on their first complete cycle. Although it is in 
some ways a seemingly obvious question, Williams, a feminist sociologist like 
Crowe, provided the much- needed empirical data to account for what she 
described as “parenthood motivation”—an argument further developed in 
both Charis Thompson’s (2005) monograph Making Parents and Gay Becker’s 
(2000) study of ivF as a form of consumer culture in the United States. In 
Denmark, Lene Koch extended her study of women’s experience of ivF to 
make another important early finding that has been repeated many times 
since, namely the counterintuitive way in which women’s desire to pursue ivF 
treatment appears to increase in roughly the same proportion as their knowl-
edge of why it is most likely to fail. “Somehow,” Koch observes, “information 
did not matter” (1990: 225, original emphasis).
In her 1990 article titled “ivF—an Irrational Choice?” Koch explores the 
reasons for this apparent discrepancy (later a central theme in studies of new 
genetic choices; e.g., Rapp 1999). She makes sense of this dilemma, as her 
title indicates, by arguing that the reasons women want to undertake ivF, or 
want to continue to undertake additional cycles despite repeated failures, are 
not irrational but are reinforced through the unexpected physical and emo-
tional intensity of ivF, which engenders a rationality that is specific to the 
rigors of undergoing the highly stage- dependent ivF protocol, as well as the 
need to protect oneself against its high failure rates. Like many later research-
ers who have investigated women’s experience of ivF, Koch demonstrates 
the ways in which technological promise, reproductive labor, gendered iden-
tity, and individual agency interlock in the pursuit of ivF to produce a situ-
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ated rationality characterized by a distinctive temporality, instrumentality, 
affective orientation, and self- protective mechanisms. She argues that appre-
ciating the specificity of the “different rationality” experienced by women 
undergoing ivF is essential both to understanding why women want it and to 
building a dialogue about their decisions that is based on respect for their ex-
perience—to which they alone have access. To understand and respect such 
experiences, Koch emphasizes, is not necessarily to agree with the choices 
that led to them. However, she points out, a starting point of respect and 
understanding is a far more politically viable standpoint from which to openly 
disagree with such decisions than opposing them as either irrational or politi-
cally incorrect—never mind as culpable, illogical, or threatening to the future 
welfare of women as a group. In the context of feminist debate over ivF, Koch 
argues, “the belief that some views are ‘right’ and others are ‘wrong’ will not 
bring us closer to a better world for women” (1990: 231). Nor, she implied, 
would it lead to a greater understanding of the logic of ivF.
I began my own research on women’s experience of ivF in the mid- 1980s 
for both political and intellectual reasons, including concerns I shared with 
several other FinrragE members working on this theme. Like them, I be-
came educated in the learning curve of the ivF experience through the gen-
erosity of women who were willing to share with me their experiences of 
this technique, revealing its many paradoxical and unexpected features. I 
learned, for example, that it was indeed possible to become a little bit preg-
nant while undergoing ivF, and that, just as Rothman (1986) had shown, such 
experiences changed women’s relationships to their prior understandings of 
choices they had made before they began the arduous process of embodying 
their consequences. Hence, I discovered, the choice to undertake ivF may 
be made on the basis of a kind of guarantee that at least if you fail, you will 
have the compensatory satisfaction of having tried everything, meaning you 
will at least not be worse off even if you do not succeed in bringing home the 
much- desired take- home baby, since you will have more, not less, than what 
you started with (having neither a baby nor the emotional closure of having 
left no stone unturned). What this equation leaves out, I learned, is the ex-
tent to which ivF changes the terms of this guarantee over time. By enabling 
a woman to begin to experience pregnancy, for example by seeing her own 
eggs, seeing them fertilized with her partner’s sperm, and then having poten-
tially viable embryos transferred back into her womb, ivF ironically intensi-
fies the very deficit it is intended to mitigate. Often, once this proximity to 
pregnancy is physically and emotionally experienced, the more offered by 
simply knowing you have tried everything is no longer enough. Thus ivF may 
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have taken away something you did not even realize you could lose, which is 
even the prospect of a closure to the pain of infertility—producing an oppo-
site outcome to the more imagined at the outset, and one for which it is im-
possible to be prepared.
Conclusion
Becoming a little bit pregnant is but one of many distinctive features of what 
I described in my 1997 book Embodied Progress as “ivF as a way of life,” and 
many such insights continue to be gleaned by researchers from interviews 
with women and couples undergoing this procedure. Similar accounts of how 
reproductive technology alters the terrain of reproductive choice have been 
derived from what is now a significant number of sociological studies that 
broadly follow in Rothman’s footsteps by chronicling not only the situated 
rationalities but the embodied logics of experiencing reproductive technolo-
gies such as amniocentesis, ivF, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, ultra-
sound, surrogacy, artificial insemination, or egg donation. Indeed, many of 
the phenomena Paul Rabinow described as “biosociality” in the early 1990s—
to denote the technological remaking of biological ties, and the denatural-
ization of human biology as it came to be reengineered technologically—
were first documented in the context of the new reproductive, not genetic, 
technologies. In vitro fertilization involves exactly what Rabinow described 
as the matrix of biosociality, “nature . . . known and remade through tech-
nique [until it] finally become[s] artificial, just as culture becomes natural” 
(1992: 241–242). “Biosociality,” he predicted, would become “a circulation 
network of identity terms and restriction loci, around and through which a 
truly new type of autoproduction will emerge” (241–242). But although he 
very accurately predicted these transformations in the context of the new ge-
netics, they had already been described and documented within the feminist 
literature on nrts, which precisely chronicles the emergence of new types 
of identity, new relationalities, and new types of “autoproduction” (as well as 
family production, kinship production, and identity production) in the con-
text of nrts.
What Rabinow’s account of biosociality leaves out is the complex texture 
of living an ambivalent relationship to technologies of remaking life. In con-
trast, this ambivalence is precisely what is so vividly foregrounded in feminist 
accounts of ivF. Whereas biosociality emphasizes new forms of social affilia-
tion, and the emergence of new communities bound by a shared stake in bio-
logical redesign, the encounter with compromised possibilities that is so de-
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termining of the relationship to both infertility and its treatment is the focus 
of the feminist work on ivF, which reveals the isolation and exclusion that 
create the feeling of “having to try.” In the context of ivF described by many 
feminist researchers, the emphasis on gendered identities adds an important 
dimension to understanding biosociality, as the pursuit of nrts involves the 
remaking of identities, relationships, social groupings, and kinship ties. It is 
in this context, for example, that we can see more clearly how the familiar 
identity technologies of kinship and gender are not only the precursors, but 
also the products, of the pursuit of technologies such as ivF.
Six iVF live
In vitro fertilization, it turns out, is a reproductive technology in more than 
one sense. While enabling biological reproduction, it also offers a context for 
the reproduction of gender norms, family values, and kinship structures. At 
the same time, and in the same way that it is both just like and not like unas-
sisted reproduction, ivF provides a context in which established norms are 
changed. The ambivalence of the ivF encounter, at one level symptomatic of 
its high propensity for failure, is also, in more positive terms, a space of pos-
sibility: despite its shortcomings it may also offer a welcome source of hope, a 
pathway forward, a stone to turn. Embarking on an ivF quest may function as 
a mechanism to adapt to social conventions despite its all too common failure 
as a method of procreation and its relatively high risk of worsening the very 
problem it is intended to solve. And it is also popular because of the means 
it offers to defy convention, by enabling entirely new forms of reproduction 
to be pursued, such as egg donation, postmenopausal pregnancy, preimplan-
tation genetic diagnosis, and gestational surrogacy. In sum, ivF, for all its 
newly regular status, remains a reproductive frontier. Not only a technology 
of reproduction, ivF is a technology of identity and subjectification. To better 
understand the complex appeal of ivF that began to be charted in the mid- 
1980s by feminist researchers, it is useful to review the data now available on 
how ivF both reproduces and also challenges the norms it is ostensibly align-
ing with, or toward. This chapter thus picks up more or less where chapter 5 
left off, by developing a more detailed analysis of the feminist literature on 
the experience of living ivF—a literature that has continued to reveal how 
the embrace of ivF paradoxically becomes curiouser and curiouser during the 
same period it has become more regular.
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iVF: a new model of Sex?
In her meticulous and comprehensive 1993 study, Margarete Sandelow-
ski provided the first major sociological account of the experience of infer-
tility, infertility treatment, and adoption, outlining many of the patterns and 
themes that would come to define later studies in this field. With Child in 
Mind: Studies of the Personal Encounter with Infertility was the first monograph 
to chronicle many of the patterns that have since been repeatedly reported 
in subsequent social studies of assisted reproductive technology (art), in-
cluding my own, which was conducted in a different country and in a later 
period but nonetheless reconfirmed many of Sandelowski’s original findings. 
The disruption posed by infertility to the lives of individuals and couples, the 
stalled life course, the pressure from family and peer groups, the experience 
of failed or inadequate identities, the difficult choices and decisions that must 
be navigated with few landmarks, and the obstacle- course nature of the ivF 
quest, with its underlying teleology of hope, have all emerged as remarkably 
consistent themes across a widely disparate set of regional studies that now 
span the globe.
As noted in the introductory chapters, an important question to consider 
in the wake of the surprisingly rapid expansion of ivF worldwide since 1978 
is how to reconcile its apparently boundless appeal with both the consider-
able demands (physically, emotionally, financially) on those who undertake it 
against its equally well- known high failure rate (still well above 50 percent). 
These demands have been chronicled in a series of major academic studies 
from the mid- 1980s onward that, perhaps inevitably, foreground the ques-
tions of how and why people choose and navigate ivF and other arts.1 One 
approach to this question returns us to the role of ivF as a model, and to the 
ivF pioneer as a role model, for a new form of achieved parenthood that in-
creased in prominence and public visibility toward the close of the twentieth 
century, and has thus come to play an increasingly large role in the parent-
hood narratives of the twenty- first.2 It is with this increasingly normalized 
status of ivF in mind that many researchers have turned to the question of 
what this technique and its ilk are reproducing other than, or in addition 
to, children (especially given that take- home babies are more the exception 
than the rule). To the extent ivF is modeling a new role for technology in the 
context of assisting human reproduction (“giving nature a helping hand”), so 
too has sexual reproduction become increasingly interrelated with another 
form of coupling—that of biology and technology. Indeed, the burgeoning 
ivF industry appears increasingly symbiotically linked to a sense of crisis sur-
rounding fertility and the necessity—or even duty—not to take biological 
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reproduction for granted, or to ensure that it is (like other bodily capacities) 
prosthetically enhanced. This important context of the relativization of the 
biological has arguably been more fully mapped empirically in the context of 
ivF than any other.
The shift in cultural attitudes toward biological reproduction occurring 
from the 1980s onward is particularly striking in contrast to the taken- for- 
granted status of reproduction within much of social theory during this same 
period, where precisely the same process that is “taken in hand” through tech-
niques such as ivF remains passively imagined as the self- acting mechanism 
at the root of social organization. From the point of view of ivF, the “universal 
relation of human reproduction” described by Collier and Yanagisako (1987a: 
33), and the “natural characteristics of women and men and their natural 
roles in sexual procreation” (32) do not add up to the same “folk model of 
human reproduction” (35) upon which so much social theory in the past has 
been based. Instead, from the point of view of ivF the allegedly obvious natu-
ral value of women’s reproductive capacity disappears. In stark contrast to its 
imagined obviousness as a motor of social evolution, ivF reveals a context in 
which the engine of reproduction is stalled. Indeed, in the context of ivF the 
driving force, the natural genealogical flow, and thus the assumed telos of bio-
logical reproduction are reversed: rather than being a physiological basis for 
social evolution, the automatic mechanisms of biological reproduction are in 
need of being kick started—or simply replaced—by technology.
After ivF, this shift in the significance of biological reproduction—its 
altered causality—is equally evident in popular culture, where the drama of 
failed reproduction is coupled to both the promise of technology and the fear 
of infertility—as well as to new technological horizons, such as cloning and 
designer babies. For the post- ivF generation of young women born in the 
1980s, and now entering their thirties, both art and fertility anxiety are now 
facts of life—as familiar as YouTube or Facebook. It is as if their biological 
clock is not so much ticking toward offspring as toward a newly routinized 
technological encounter. As journalist Gemma Soames wrote in the London 
Sunday Times in February 2009, ivF has become “as much a part of female 
dialogue as waxing and highlights”:
We are part of a generation raised on ivF stories—a generation more 
acutely aware of and educated about dodgy ovaries, potential fibroids 
and infertility scares than our mothers and elder sisters ever were. . . . 
ivF is now as much a part of female dialogue as waxing and highlights. 
Through magazines, celebrities, soap plot lines and mates around the 
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corner, we have all lived vicariously through story after tear- jerking 
story of failed pregnancy attempts. We all watched Charlotte from Sex 
and the City fail to conceive for three whole seasons. Girls as young as 
18 have responded to ivF features printed in this magazine. (Soames 
2009)
To the extent that feminine identity is typically characterized by its prox-
imity to failure (a view that is strongly reinforced by the media), it could even 
be argued there is a close fit between the anticipation of failed reproductivity 
and the formation of normal femininity. It would follow, as Soames suggests, 
that the mere presence of so much fertility technology itself encourages a 
sense of potential deficit—a process made explicit through fertility fairs, ad-
vertising campaigns, and social media, while also being dramatized in popu-
lar films and tv shows. In the literature on ivF this phenomenon (we might 
call it the “because it’s there” phenomenon) is well documented. In my own 
study, conducted in the United Kingdom during a period of rapid expansion of 
ivF in the late 1980s, one patient described the U- turn she experienced when 
an ivF clinic opened nearby as immediate, despite having already reconciled 
herself to childlessness: “Mind you, we’d forgotten, we’d said alright. . . . We’d 
accepted [our infertility] pretty well until the clinic opened and then you go, 
ah! I’ve got another chance. I mean you’ve got to take it really, you’ve got to 
have a go” (Franklin 1997: 172).
The mutually reinforcing relationship between the rapidly expanding con-
sumer base for art and its increasing availability as a global health service 
industry is substantially aided by the vagueness of the fear of infertility, a 
famously difficult condition to define. Fertility has always been biologically 
relative: it is unusual in that it is a condition that can be either individual or 
shared (ultimately, fertility can be achieved only by two people), and it is a 
highly dependent condition (on age, diet, health, and thus income, class, and 
race). The clinical rule of thumb is that a third of infertility is male, a third is 
female, and a third is combined. It is typical for infertility to remain undiag-
nosed (unexplained infertility) or to be only partially diagnosed—and there is 
often more than one source of potential difficulty. Since it does not typically 
present as an independent condition, the most common way to define infer-
tility is retrospectively—as the persistence of an unexplained and unwanted 
nonevent in the wake of having tried to achieve conception for a specified 
period of time (often a year or two). It is thus perfectly possible to be infertile 
without ever knowing it, either as an individual or a couple, since it comes 
into being largely through failure, that is, through something that does not 
ivF livE 225
happen—or indeed something that does not happen over a prolonged period 
of time.
However, these are not the only reasons infertility is hard to define pre-
cisely. Many of the findings from sociological and anthropological studies of 
ivF suggest that it is the frequent underdefinition of infertility that has, some-
what paradoxically, led to an expansion of its diagnostic, or peridiagnostic, 
remit as an umbrella category. Thus, for example, the diagnosis of infertility 
is increasingly linked to genetic diagnoses, and thus also to the prevention 
of genetic disease (e.g., in the case of cystic fibrosis). Infertility can comprise 
everything from repeated miscarriages (which may also have a genetic cause 
in the form of a chromosomal translocation) to lifestyle factors (couples that 
commute or live apart) or incompatibility of the male and female gametes. A 
common cause of temporary infertility is home redecoration. On the face of 
it, such a wide range of factors make infertility a complex condition to diag-
nose, and this complexity is exacerbated by the growing awareness of infer-
tility as a potential problem for both couples and individuals—a possibility 
that art services have made more visible as they have become more promi-
nent. Hence, for example, during my fieldwork in several art clinics over 
many years I have frequently had conversations with very experienced clini-
cians who suspect that some of the prospective clients who visit their fertility 
clinics are looking for something other than a baby. The impression described 
by one ivF service coordinator I spoke to, based on the differences between 
her initial interviews with couples, and the fairly large proportion of those 
who did not keep their second appointment (approximately 50 percent), was 
that some people visit a fertility center “almost as a rite of passage,” or as if 
from a vague sense that fertility enhancement was now somehow necessary 
to successful conception.
The possibility that ivF might be offering various forms of what this clini-
cian dubbed “fertility reassurance” remained vague for her as well as for 
others I have spoken to who share the widespread suspicion among ivF per-
sonnel that they are not always dealing with individuals or couples who are 
worried they are technically infertile, but who are instead confused about the 
new role of technology in the business of making babies. Do they want advice 
about sex? Are they worried they do not know how to make a baby? Do they 
think technology is now necessary to have high- quality offspring?3
In one of the few discussions of the question of why people want to have 
their own or biological children, Karin Lesnik- Oberstein asks: “Even if the 
[new reproductive] technologies may be examined in terms of how people 
use and experience them, the outcome of the process seems to be seen as self- 
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evident and obvious, beyond question: children are children” (2008: xiii). The 
obviousness of the desire to have children leads to the view, Lesnik- Oberstein 
suggests, that the choice to use reproductive technology “is merely a practical 
one,” adding, “Any questioning of these assumptions has certainly not affected 
the continued expansion and use of reproductive technologies. And yet these 
assumptions provide the single underpinning motivation and justification for 
these activities” (xii).
As Lesnik- Oberstein also notes, there is a significant amount of evidence 
from the empirical literature on new reproductive technologies that assisted 
conception technologies, and the culture of which they are a part, are repro-
ducing much more than children per se. After all, part of the answer to the 
question of why people want children, whether or not they are their own bio-
logical children, is what having children represents in society. It is not neces-
sary to be an involuntarily childless person to recognize that having children 
is a highly normalized, naturalized, and valorized activity in society, closely 
correlated with the successful achievement of adult gender identities and the 
fulfillment of kinship obligations, particularly in relation to marriage. Given 
more careful consideration, it is all but self- evident that the culture of art is 
rapidly proliferating not only in the face of, but by means of, a host of inter-
linked insecurities concerning not only fertility in its narrowest sense of the 
biological ability to procreate, but other anxieties related to social expecta-
tions and social roles. This, in turn, suggests that ivF is not a response to 
failed reproduction per se but to the social expectations that are linked to 
successful procreation. Arguably it is also these expectations the existence of 
ivF makes more visible.
These expectations return us to Gayle Rubin’s question of how “the exact 
mechanisms by which particular conventions of sexuality are produced and 
maintained” (1975: 177). In the context of ivF the production of these con-
ventions is now contextualized by, or indeed fused with, another set of regu-
latory norms, more akin to those examined by Marx in his discussion of the 
introduction of a model of progress and improvement into the history of tech-
nology. As Marx notes, the desire to significantly change, or improve, manu-
facturing methods did not characterize, for example, much of the history of 
milling machines, which remained the same for centuries before the advent 
of the Industrial Revolution. The expectation that science and technology 
should be the source of continual improvements to the quality of life, which 
is one of the definitive expectations of the modern era, began to be applied 
to biology initially through agriculture and selective breeding, and later, as I 
observed in chapter 3, through the promise of engineering life. In vitro fertil-
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ization is the offspring of the coupling of these two genres of expectation: that 
particular conventions of sexuality are produced and maintained (Rubin), and 
that technology can aid in this process (Marx). The Loebian ideal of mecha-
nizing life is what enables these two trajectories to become one—that is, for 
the maintenance of sexual (reproductive, conjugal) convention to be assisted 
technologically.
Curiously, however, this marriage of technological progress with sexual 
convention in the context of the modern fertility market explicitly reverses 
the relationship between biological reproduction and social aspiration pre-
sumed in the traditional models provided by either social theory or evolution-
ary biology: after ivF it is no longer the case that social aspiration (initially in 
the form, according to Lévi- Strauss et al., of the aspiration to become social 
at all) follows from either the self- acting force of procreation or the desire to 
organize its flow in the wake of its natural occurrence (as a feature of what 
Rubin calls “animal biology”). In the context of ivF, it is social aspirations that 
activate reproductive substance, by mechanizing it, in order to make it work. 
Indeed, the agency here is doubly reversed: social aspirations become the 
antecedent of biological function, and biological function becomes a techno-
logical expectation, or even convention. At the very point, then, that the em-
bryologist composes by hand the arrangement of reproductive substance in 
glass intended to achieve ivF is the moment when technologies of making sex 
are doubled: here, sex is remade, twice. Sex becomes a technological conven-
tion, and conventional technologies are used to make sex. Like exogamy, ivF 
proceeds via the conventional organization of both parties and parts guided 
by established principles of composition: these are its exact mechanisms.
This process is what Strathern described when she noted that it has be-
come “routinely thinkable in the post- industrialism of the late- twentieth cen-
tury . . . to make play with juxtaposing images of the organic and inorganic.” 
This merographic mechanism is enabling, she claims, “because the one does 
not imitate the other so much as seemingly deploy or use its principles or 
parts”—it is the recombination, or mix, that is generative (facilitating in the 
case of ivF the remaking of sex). But the doubling of this function in the con-
text of reproductive technology also visibly exceeds its immediate pragmatics 
insofar as “kinship systems and family structures are imagined as social ar-
rangements not just imitating but based on and deploying processes of biological 
reproduction” (Strathern 1992b: 3, emphasis added). Thus, she argues, a new 
reproductive model is produced in the context of new reproductive technolo-
gies: “Perhaps a new ground for individual action will be this very capacity to 
combine desire with the appropriate enabling technology. If this is a change, 
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then the change has occurred as result of people becoming self- conscious 
about values already held. When the traditional yearning for parenthood can 
be satisfied by ‘artificial’ arrangements, it is the yearning that seems natu-
ral” (1992a: 177). This new reproductive model is what is substantialized as 
ivF—indeed, is its origin. However, as Strathern notes, and this chapter also 
argues, ivF exceeds and transforms this model—in Strathern’s terms it does 
not reproduce it exactly. The very reversal the model confirms, in which it is 
social aspiration and convention that activate and mechanize reproductive 
substance, enabling it to be taken in hand, remade as technique, and recon-
figured, defines the condition of being after ivF, and thus of becoming bio-
logically relative (or being before as well as after nature). The question of 
what it means “not only to imitate but to deploy” the processes of biological 
reproduction comes explicitly into view as a set of future possibilities via the 
success of ivF “in man” in the 1970s, and later as a market in fertility ser-
vices. The future of kinship suggested by such possibilities is one of artificial 
arrangements that, partly as a result of ivF, have become not only routinely 
thinkable but routinely reengineerable too. What is naturalized in this new 
reproductive model is precisely the reverse of that which structures the his-
tory of social theory, for it is now convention that naturalizes reproduction, 
not the other way around.
Thus, as ivF has become a better- established and widely available con-
sumer option, and itself a more normalized and naturalized activity, the 
questions of what people want from it, and what they are doing with it, have 
become more prominent concerns in research on ivF as well. This chapter ex-
plores the two halves of the new reproductive model introduced by ivF in two 
parts. In the first part, the literature on ivF is reviewed with an emphasis on 
how it both reveals and can be seen to alter “the exact mechanisms by which 
particular conventions of sexuality are produced and maintained” (Rubin 
1975: 177). By exploring all of the reasons people pursue ivF in addition to 
wanting to have children, I ask whether its increasingly widespread use can 
be explained not only as a response to social expectations and conventions, 
but as a means of naturalizing and normalizing new means of responding to 
these conventions—thus paradoxically instituting a new norm of reproduc-
tion that does not necessarily involve having children. The point of this ap-
proach is not to diminish the importance of having children to people under-
going ivF, nor in particular to dismiss the profound distress ivF can produce 
when it fails. The point is rather to explore the exact mechanisms linking 
convention, technology, and biology in the context of ivF because these arti-
ficial arrangements are increasingly how the future of kinship will be shaped 
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through identities and agencies similar to those produced in the context of 
ivF. Ultimately, in other words, the aim is to explore what it means for kinship 
to be imagined in and through technology as a context of natural achievement 
or the achievement of biological relations. Conversely, what does it mean for 
technological relations to be imagined biologically as kinship—for example, 
in order to form a kinship identity through a technological quest?
This is of course a very open- ended question, and in the second part of this 
chapter it is explored somewhat differently, through the medium of visual 
imagery—a perspective that is capacitated by the actual apparatus of ivF as a 
window onto the precise mechanisms of fertilization. If one of the questions 
ivF poses is how traditionally biological identities are reimagined and remade 
technologically—and in particular what are the exact mechanisms through 
which this occurs—it is helpful to explore the prominent ways in which this 
process is facilitated by that other crucial reproductive technology—the 
media. Thus, in the second part, I once again attempt to fuse the exact mecha-
nisms of embryology with their translation into other conventions, or genres, 
or substances, of making sex—in this case high- profile visual images of ma-
nipulated embryos, such as those that have become routinely viewable on the 
evening news, in the cinema, and in advertising. The aim here is, again, lim-
ited and specific, not least as the study of the visual culture of biomedicine is 
an enormous field in its own right. Specifically, then, I offer a reading of ivF 
imagery, or public spectacle, that is intended to contribute to the effort to 
characterize the artificial arrangements out of which I suggest the future of 
kinship is already being imagined. If ivF is a lens, what can we see through it? 
And how can this perspective help us understand how the logic of ivF is lived?
what is iVF after?
Strathern’s prediction that after the fact of artificial reproduction it will be 
the yearning for parenthood that is naturalized in lieu of a biological base to 
reproduction is both confirmed and complicated by the now extensive litera-
ture on how and why ivF is chosen by its users. Indeed, what is seen as either 
natural or biological in the context of ivF appear to be among the most flex-
ible components in a procedure than can otherwise often feel relentlessly 
regimented to its users. In the context of ivF it is the fixity and limits of tech-
nology, rather than biology, to which identities, hopes, aspirations, and de-
sires must be accommodated, since they, unlike the strict clinical protocols of 
ivF, can bend. Thus, to the extent that ivF consumers are seeking to realize a 
traditional (or nontraditional) dream of parenthood, it is the dream and not 
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the means that must be tweaked when things do not turn out as planned. It is 
for this reason that the context of ivF can be characterized very generally as 
one of highly flexible conventions coupled to a newly adjustable biology. In-
deed, even the most traditional conventions and idioms, such as biological re-
latedness, heterosexuality, the unity of the conjugal and procreative function, 
or the dictates of conservative religion, can be creatively warped and woofed 
to make a baby, or the attempt to have one via ivF, fit in. The achievement of 
viable offspring via ivF appears to be an event capable of aligning even the 
most unconventional of situations into happy conformity with the overarch-
ing social norm of celebrating the birth of a much- wanted child.4
Somewhat more surprising is the finding that the alignment with conven-
tion ivF enables its users to achieve through their technological pursuit of 
parenthood not only can be realized without having children, but can even 
succeed in lieu of having them. While it might seem obvious that what people 
want from ivF is a take- home baby, an increasing amount of data on ivF sug-
gest that this motivation is not always so straightforward. For example, in her 
PhD dissertation on ivF in Mexico, Sandra Gonzalez- Santos (2010) relates a 
revealing anecdote about disclosing her own voluntary childlessness during 
the course of her research in several different Mexican art clinics between 
2006 and 2008. Worried it might be alienating to some of the women ivF 
patients she was interviewing that she herself did not share their desire for 
children, Gonzalez was both surprised and relieved to discover that a signifi-
cant number of her informants not only lauded her choice to remain childless 
but envied it, claiming they wished it was an acceptable option not to have 
children themselves. They were having ivF, they explained, because it was 
ultimately easier to succumb to the constant pressure from in- laws than to 
resist: if they could not have children they at least needed to be seen as try-
ing to by aligning themselves with the child- oriented trajectory of ivF. These 
responses thus provide a counterintuitive (or not) example of women in ivF 
programs for whom “being seen to try” to procreate could provide an alibi for 
not doing so: being seen to be trying to have a baby could, to a degree, substi-
tute for having one, at least temporarily—and possibly permanently. In vitro 
fertilization could even be a way not to have children (since it would prob-
ably fail), while at the same time avoiding at least some of the stigma normally 
attaching to such an outcome (by being seen to have tried everything), and 
nonetheless acquiring an achieved parenthood identity along the way.
The question of how identities are being produced and managed, or 
crafted, at various stages of ivF is not new, but one that has been repeatedly 
characterized and in some cases prioritized by researchers such as Sande-
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lowski and Gonzalez, among others. This is the main theme, for example, 
of much of Charis Thompson’s work, for which she has developed the term 
“ontological choreography” in part to describe the constantly recombinant 
process of identity transitioning over the course of art treatment. This find-
ing corresponds with another of the most strikingly consistent themes across 
the now rather large literature on women’s and couples’ experiences of infer-
tility treatment, which is the staggering amount of labor involved in this form 
of activity. This aspect of the experience of unwanted childlessness featured 
prominently, for example, in Margarete Sandelowski’s aforementioned study 
of 123 women and couples trying “to achieve a pregnancy”:
The amount of effort expended in negotiating the maze and in man-
aging its dead ends . . . was staggering. The women and couples had 
been trying for an average of five years to achieve a pregnancy prior to 
their participation in these studies. Of the forty- eight infertile women 
interviewed in the first study, eleven women had been trying for five to 
ten years, one woman thirteen years, and one woman seventeen years; 
sixteen of them had suffered one or more pregnancy losses or infant 
deaths prior to entering the study. Of seventy- five infertile couples 
interviewed in the second study, twenty- eight couples had been trying 
over a five to ten year period to achieve pregnancies and two couples 
over an eleven to twelve year period; seventeen couples had suffered 
one or more pregnancy losses or infant deaths prior to entering the 
study and eight couples had suffered one or more adoption failures. 
(1993: 92)
Conducted in the mid- 1980s, Sandelowski’s research was the first to 
identify and characterize a pattern that has since come to appear noticeably 
dominant in the ivF literature ever since—be it drawn from interviews with 
women or couples in North, Central, or Latin America, Europe, the Middle 
East, India, China, Southeast Asia, Scandinavia, the former Soviet Union, 
Australia, or Africa. This is the pattern of determined, middle- class couples 
who desire services to provide them with children, and whose expenditure 
of effort, cash, and determination plays a key role in the identity formation 
process specific to the context of choosing arts. This trend toward increased 
investment of both time and money in technological assistance as part of the 
parenthood quest is increasingly accompanied by the expanded use of ivF 
to prevent genetic disease (via both preimplantation genetic diagnosis and 
savior siblings), fertility tourism, and increasing lower- middle or working- 
class consumption of fertility services, using limited disposable income, as 
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is seen in parts of China. New dimensions of the ivF quest continue to be 
revealed, as in Marcia Inhorn’s (2011) overview of diasporic Middle Eastern 
communities seeking to return to have ivF at home in a complex pattern of 
reproductive repatriation. Together, these and related phenomena constitute 
a new biosocial public sphere—a domain of activity characterized by the pro-
liferation of services aimed at assisting couples to achieve parenthood, and 
the consumption of these services not only in pursuit of healthy biological 
offspring, but the new parenthood identities this sector also offers, which are 
sought as one of several means of being seen to meet social expectations de-
fining successful family formation. Unpacking the motivation to pursue ivF, 
in other words, reveals the desire for both more than a baby, and in some 
cases less.
It is, for all of these reasons, important to ask a variant of David Schneider’s 
question about kinship, namely, what is art all about? Even if we take for 
granted that much of the pursuit of art is merely practical, it is clear the 
quest involved in procedures such as ivF is often precisely that—a heroic 
struggle in pursuit of elusive goals. According to the American Heritage Dictio-
nary’s definition of “quest,” it is “the act or an instance of seeking or pursuing 
something; a search” or “an expedition undertaken in medieval romance by a 
knight in order to perform a prescribed feat.” That ivF is deliberately chosen 
is undoubtedly an important feature distinguishing its clientele, while at the 
same time the complex motivations engendering this choice, or path forward, 
have been one of the most carefully analyzed and exhaustively documented 
topics within the art literature. That romance features in the quest narra-
tive is hardly irrelevant, since art is often pursued with the explicit aim of 
achieving marital fulfillment or conjugal completion. Often for religious as 
well as personal and social reasons, couples without children may be seen as 
conjugally failed or even illegitimate. In Israel, as Susan Kahn (2000) demon-
strates, an insufficient effort to have children may be seen as a dereliction of 
national historic duty, whereas in neighboring Lebanon, as Morgan Clarke ob-
serves, it may be seen as the occasion for a familial crisis of faith (as one of his 
informants notes of a childless couple, reprising a now- familiar injunction, 
“they should at least try ivF”; 2009: 159). To the extent that ivF is a search, 
the question must be posed of what it is a search for, which, the literature 
would seem increasingly to suggest, is rarely, if ever, just a baby.
It is in the answers to the question of what art is all about that we may 
also be better able to begin to explain not only the enormous popularity of ivF, 
and its rapid expansion, but the staggering amount of work involved in pur-
suing resolutions to infertility. The amount of work is staggering not simply 
ivF livE 233
because the ivF procedure is demanding and difficult. The more complex ex-
planation, suggested even in the very earliest studies of women’s encounter 
with infertility and ivF explored in chapter 5, is that the amount of work is 
so staggering because ivF is a resolution of much more than infertility itself. 
Moreover, and as we have already seen, it is precisely the staggering amount 
of labor that can itself provide a defense against a failed or spoiled gender 
identity, because in trying so hard is found a means to achieve the very thing 
that is sought (in other words, the quest for parenthood becomes a substitute 
for it).5 If ivF were as easy as “passing him on the stairs” it could not serve 
this function. The sense of having to try has many sources, and one of them 
may well be the need, or desire, to be seen to be trying. The word “quest” that 
is so widespread in the ivF literature also has many sources, one of which is 
that the experience of undergoing ivF is never entirely private. In vitro fertil-
ization requires a constant public performance, whether its aim is to protect 
one’s privacy or to achieve the reverse—to make a clear show of willingness 
to undergo anything in pursuit of a child of one’s own, the eventual fulfillment 
of a childless marriage, the provision of much- wanted grandchildren for rela-
tives, a greater sense of belonging to friendship networks, or simply devotion 
to a partner or spouse. Sociologically known as “face work,” this performative 
dimension of ivF is increasingly visible as one of its most substantial compo-
nents, and constitutes an important part of its public face as well in the now- 
common representations of it in popular media.
These themes are clearly brought out in Charis Thompson’s insightful 
study of reproductive technologies published in 2005, a quarter of a century 
after the first feminist analyses of new reproductive technologies began to 
be published. Highly attentive to the question of identity formation in the 
context of ivF, and closely following Judith Butler’s (1990) account of gen-
der identity as a performance, Thompson notes how much of her fieldwork 
and interview data from ivF confirms a pattern of exaggerated gender and 
kinship roles stereotypically emulating those of “the ideal nuclear family” 
(2005: 141). This is hardly surprising, she suggests, given that one of the main 
ways ivF has been normalized is through its naturalization, thus challenging 
the “monstrous” stigma once more firmly attached to this form of building a 
family by “domesticating” arts. “A significant way to normalize the newness 
of the techniques [of art] and the kinship relations and social interactions 
they represent is to naturalize them as much as possible. . . . Naturalization 
normalizes and domesticates procedures making them seem like appropri-
ate ways of building a family rather than monstrous innovations” (141). Both 
male and female gender identities, Thompson argues, become “fundamental 
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principle[s] of categorization” in the context of ivF treatment because these 
threatened identities are precisely what need to be reinforced in the face 
of infertility or unwanted childlessness, while also being the core categories 
around and through which treatment is organized. “Gender, both biologically 
and socially understood and enacted, is a fundamental principle of categori-
zation in arts. Furthermore, the deficit and stigma of infertility are often ex-
perienced substantially as gender deficits and gender stigma” (119).
What is also noticeable about the temporal sequence Thompson describes, 
whereby exaggerated familial and gender- based stereotypes are enacted dur-
ing the process of ivF, is the sense of a compensatory substitution provided by 
ivF itself—not only in terms of what the procedure might eventually provide, 
in the form of viable offspring, but through the gender- appropriate enactment 
of each individual stage of the ivF procedure in pursuit of such an outcome. 
After all, ivF is designed to precisely replicate each of the steps in the jour-
ney to parenthood, by restaging them as an extracorporeal simulacrum of 
the real thing ivF is imitating.6 As Thompson observed in her fieldwork, the 
effort to perform gender and kinship identities more strongly as part of the 
pursuit of successful ivF thus constitutes part of the labor and effort involved 
in following this arduous quest—which is aimed potentially at having a baby, 
but in the meantime is also about producing appropriately gendered parent-
ing behavior along the way. Indeed, this behavior is deliberately exaggerated 
in an effort to help the process to work. Tellingly, Thompson uses the adjec-
tive “hyperconventional” to describe the gender roles she observed for both 
women and men during her fieldwork in ivF clinics—a process for which she 
also uses the military analogy of “retrenchment.” “As I explored gender in in-
fertility clinics, I found that supposedly natural gender dimorphism is often 
invoked most strongly at those times when the natural is unstable or poorly 
integrated into patients’ lives. Patients and practitioners retrench into hyper-
conventional understandings of some of these sorting binaries to stabilise and 
domesticate others and remove stigma” (2005: 142).
It is hardly surprising that couples seeking ivF treatment either con-
sciously or unconsciously produce “highly scripted roles and stereotypes” of 
kinship, family, and gender identities in the carefully monitored, arduously 
clinical, and heteronormative context of ivF, where patients are highly con-
scious of their dependence on the medical staff assisting them in their pursuit 
of an elusive goal.7 Indeed, argues Thompson, these “parodic performances 
of hypergender- appropriate behaviour are also sometimes used to script 
and navigate treatment itself” (2005: 119). At the very least, “patients going 
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through treatment need to pass, socially and biologically, as the gender to 
which they have already been assigned” thus offsetting “the possibility of fail-
ure to perform hegemonic gender by those who precisely in this site must try 
harder than ever to perform and norm gender” (118, emphasis added).8 Thomp-
son further describes these efforts to mobilize identity technologies as if to 
instrumentalize, or produce, the biological process they seek to achieve, as 
means of domesticating the unruly and unfamiliar process they are involved 
in. Here too we see the direct parallel discussed in chapter 5 of inhabiting 
identity categories and navigating the technology of ivF.
Strathern’s point that in lieu of a naturalized biological conformity to con-
ventional expectations it is the yearning for these conventions that is natu-
ralized instead becomes more pointed in this context. For it is not only the 
yearning for conformity with the demands of peer pressure, or the expecta-
tions of in- laws, that is at stake. There is also a yearning for gender confor-
mity, and for alignment with the institutional norms of both heterosexuality 
and marriage. In fact, so much yearning is occurring in the context of ivF that 
we might rephrase Gayle Rubin’s question to ask, what are the exact mecha-
nisms by which the yearning for particular conventions of sexuality is pro-
duced and maintained? Part of the recursive answer to this question is that 
the widespread availability of ivF is now contributing to the reproduction, 
and indeed intensification, of the very desires it is intended to satisfy, thus 
reinforcing a paradoxical pattern that is by no means limited to this particu-
lar technology. The fact that ivF is more likely than not to fail in its primary 
function of making babies is part of what renders it particularly complicated, 
but hardly unique.
Significantly, however, and undoubtedly adding to the staggering amount 
of work involved in trying to make ivF work, is the fact that in addition to 
being the site of an understandable effort to naturalize and normalize infer-
tility treatment, and to use it as a context for the production of conventional 
parenthood identities (with or without babies), the art clinic is also home 
to many new and very unconventional versions of the biological facts under-
stood to be grounding these same gender and kinship roles in nature. Women 
undergoing ivF, for example, need to be treated in such a manner that their 
hormonal systems are aligned with an egg maturation protocol that will maxi-
mize their chances of conceiving by overproducing ova. Somewhat paradoxi-
cally, this requires the induction of artificial menopause by downregulating a 
woman’s normal cycle of menstruation (in effect, it is switched off). As one 
U.K. clinic explains this procedure in their online introduction to ivF:
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Your pituitary gland needs to be “switched off” before you can receive 
drugs to stimulate egg production. These drugs stimulate the produc-
tion of a “follicle.” A follicle is an immature egg, surrounded by a bubble 
of fluid, in the ovary. These immature eggs need to grow and develop 
inside their bubbles of fluid before they can be collected.
If the pituitary gland is not “switched off” it may release a hormone 
that causes the bubbles (follicles) to burst (doctors call this “sponta-
neous ovulation”). . . . Turning off your reproductive hormone cycle in 
this way allows the doctors to have better control over the actions of 
your ovaries. . . .
Having your reproductive cycle turned off tricks your body into 
thinking it is going through the menopause. Because of this, you may 
experience symptoms similar to those of the menopause, such as hot 
flushes, headaches, mood swings, dizziness, lack of concentration, dry 
mouth and vaginal soreness. Don’t worry—this artificial menopause is 
only temporary and will stop once you stop taking the drugs. (Hull Fer-
tility Services, http://www.hullivf.org.uk/treatment/ivf/step1.html, ac-
cessed April 11, 2013)
After the old cycle is switched off, a new cycle—one that allows more biologi-
cal control to maximize both the number of eggs that are surgically removed 
and their quality—is then induced, again using a bespoke pharmaceutical 
protocol to imitate a natural cycle, albeit not the patient’s own natural cycle, 
but a standardized one:
You will receive drugs to encourage follicle production after your own 
reproductive hormone cycle has been switched off (or “downregu-
lated”). You will need to carry on taking your downregulation drugs at 
the same time as you take your follicle stimulating drugs. . . .
Remember, your drug regime will be pErsonalisEd to you. It 
is vitally important that you take these drugs correctly every day, so 
please, please, ask if there is anything that you are not sure about. (Hull 
Fertility Services http://www.hullivf.org.uk/treatment/ivf/step1.html, 
accessed April 11, 2013)
The challenges of performing hyperfemininity while undergoing artificial 
menopause notwithstanding, these treatment protocols indicate the extent 
to which normal understandings of female biology are reconfigured in the 
context of ivF—so that, for example, menopause becomes a route to fer-
tility, and thus an enabling not an opposing phenomenon in the pursuit of a 
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successful pregnancy.9 Thus, however personalized it may be, and however 
normalized it may have become, it is simultaneously the case that ivF signifi-
cantly disrupts conventional understandings of biology, thus departing from 
a patient’s prior experience of her own normal biological physicality, or natu-
ral cycles, by introducing a whole new fertility ontology to be choreographed. 
The double- identity demands of ivF can thus be described as exaggerating 
a conventional gender identity while inhabiting an unconventional biology. 
Importantly, this effort is accompanied (and explained) by the new repro-
ductive model provided by art, in which conception is highly technologi-
cally mediated, so that some of the key biological facts are no longer under-
stood or narrated in terms of imitating natural biology at all, but in terms of 
its opposite—artificial biology, a kind of parallel fertility universe. This new 
biology—the supplementary, additional, additive biology of standardized bio-
logical control—is what must be renaturalized by women ivF patients (i.e., 
made to be as similar to “the real thing” as possible so ivF will work) through 
gender norms at the very same time it denaturalizes their own reproductive 
biology as they have normally experienced it in the past.10 Here, again, the de-
naturalizing effects of technology replacing biology, or taking it in hand, can 
be met with a reverse, compensatory naturalization of reproductive desire 
and hope. No wonder gender norms are strengthened in the face of this con-
fusing experience, since they are one of the only variables that remain some-
what within patients’ own control.
Precisely, then, because ivF both is and is not just like what it is imitating, 
it requires both a normalized and naturalized compliance with conventional 
gender roles, and an adaptation to unconventional biology in order to achieve 
this end. For both women and men on ivF programs, such an ambivalent 
situation thus requires the kind of “double consciousness” described by femi-
nist phenomenologists Sandra Bartky (1993) and Iris Marion Young (1990), or 
by Emily Martin (1987) in her account of the medicalization of the reproduc-
tive body.11 To the extent, then, that ivF is, in Annemarie Mol’s (2002) terms, 
a “multiple” that is reproducing more than babies, this mode of inhabiting a 
technological imitation of life is one of the technologies of self it also gener-
ates. It is the complex ways in which these new tactical subjectivities are em-
bedded, or grounded, in what are often highly naturalized versions of social 
convention (e.g., gender) that also perform an instructive imitation—by re-
capitulating the reproductive model they have displaced, namely the social 
construction of natural facts. Here, however, and at the same time, the con-
dition of being biologically relative is also manifest as the natural construc-
tion of social facts: social convention is naturalized as the before, to which 
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the biological functions ivF performs come after. These, then, are the (some-
what confusing) exact mechanisms of how technologies of gender and sex 
are interwoven with reproductive substance in the quest to make babies. No 
wonder it is tiring.
Identity is not the only personal attribute to become the subject of in-
creased tactical and adaptive labor in the context of ivF and achieved repro-
duction. The artificial metabolism this procedure requires is often described 
by women undergoing ivF as a time of suspension of their normal physicality, 
punctuated by unfamiliar emotional, psychological, and emotional sensations 
and an altered sense of self, or personality. Similar disjunctures between com-
peting versions of the same physical events are particularly well illustrated by 
the way experiences of the moment of conception can be transformed by ivF, 
as well as the new possibility ivF introduces of becoming “a little bit preg-
nant.” Margarete Sandelowski was the first of many commentators on ivF to 
notice and record the significance of what she calls “ambiguous conception” 
in accounts of the new biological facts introduced by ivF. Whereas, she ex-
plains, under normal (unassisted) circumstances naturally fertile couples do 
not experience conception as a discrete event, or moment, in the process of 
producing a pregnancy, the ivF process breaks conception down into distinct 
stages that are each part of a carefully managed, highly monitored, and thus 
largely observable sequence. This also means that patients are very conscious 
of which stage they are in, and precisely which step of each stage they have 
reached, the vacillating temporality of which (fast then slow then intermi-
nable, only to speed up again and slow down at the very end) is in part what 
gives ivF such a quest- like character for those undergoing it. This unfamiliar 
temporal sequence is also what allows for the novel sensation of being nearly, 
or partially, pregnant. As Sandelowski explains, “Infertile couples were more 
likely to think of themselves as in one or another phase of getting pregnant. 
They were, therefore, in a position to challenge the adequacy of a commonly 
accepted biocultural dichotomy—the either- or- ness of pregnancy—accord-
ing to which a woman could either be pregnant or not pregnant, but could 
not be a little bit pregnant” (1993: 122).
As Sandelowski notes, the experience of conception as a lengthy, drawn- 
out process of stages enables a range of different definitions of pregnancy to 
be, in effect, individually adjusted, or personalized, by women undergoing 
this procedure—some of whom may experience themselves as being impreg-
nated through the process of embryo transfer, but others of whom may (in a 
manner akin to the tentative pregnancies identified by Rothman [1986]) more 
cautiously define the start of their pregnancies in terms of successful implan-
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tation. A feature, then, of the biotechnical model of reproduction offered by 
ivF is that it can be described as both debiologizing and rebiologizing, offer-
ing a version of biology that is bespoke, artificial, controllable, personalized, 
and redesignable, while also providing essentially the “same” route to con-
ception, pregnancy, and parenthood as that naturally experienced by fertile 
couples.12 This is also why, although it is conventionally defined as an imita-
tion of existing biological processes, ivF allows for these same physiologi-
cal events to be experienced in ways that enable new biological facts to be 
born—such as the condition of being partially pregnant.13
As noted earlier, these and many similar observations throughout the femi-
nist and social scientific literature on ivF since the mid- 1980s have confirmed 
the extent to which ivF has become a fluid technological way of life that is 
at once highly strategic and completely out of control. In vitro fertilization is 
now a curiously familiar procedure through which a highly visible and explicit 
process of reshuffling the facts of life is assisted by a strategic parallel organi-
zation of natural and artificial biologies. Part of the labor involved in ivF is the 
dual requirement to work within both naturalized and artificial, normal and 
abnormal, and familiar and novel biologies simultaneously: compliance with 
ivF requires constant adjustment to its norms, and thus ivF itself operates as 
a powerful norming technology. Yet, however practiced the modern ivF con-
sumer might be in this topsy- turvy world of artificial biology, it is hard work 
to make sense of its workings.
These observations in turn lead us back to the questions with which this 
chapter started—What is ivF reproducing? What kind of technology is it? 
What do people want from it? What does living ivF reveal about other tech-
nologically inflected identities—or indeed the analysis of identity as a tech-
nology? On the basis of the above discussion it appears that one of the reasons 
ivF becomes curiouser and curiouser, especially to those who inhabit this 
technology as a way of life most intensively, is because it both conventional-
izes an unconventional biology and because it norms a familiar technologi-
cal ambivalence. Inhabiting this world seems to require a constant workload 
of innovation, adaptation, and adjustment in order to reestablish conven-
tional norms in what are often odd or strange circumstances (e.g., becoming 
menopausal to become fertile or becoming partially pregnant). An overriding 
norm for this context is thus simply labor itself—laboring through ivF to do 
one’s best to make it work. Yet it is clearly a labor- intensive context in which 
much more than babies are being made. The quasi- mythic connotations of 
the quest for ivF, so ubiquitously commented upon in the literature, while no 
doubt an accurate and important dimension of the ivF experience, also point 
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toward some of the functions ivF fulfills as a heroic task—namely to per-
form that familiar oxymoron of ordinary heroism.14 As on a frontier, it is the 
overcoming of substantial obstacles that is at stake in this process of domes-
ticating unfamiliar territory. These paradoxical, counterintuitive dimensions 
of ivF have been noted by many observers, beginning with Sandelowski’s ac-
count twenty years ago (in which she also tellingly describes how difficult it 
may be for some couples to eventually “make the conversion” to pregnancy—
i.e., to finish their quest [1993: 91–120]) and greatly furthered by Thompson 
([2005] who, as her title suggests, describes how ivF makes parents as well 
as children). Similarly, Judith Lorber (1989) describes ivF as a conjugal ad-
justment technology that enables women to acquire more control and re-
sources in marriage (a process she calls “patriarchal bargaining”), while Gay 
Becker (2000) has documented the embeddedness of the quest for ivF in the 
consumer world of the late twentieth- century ethos of the American Dream 
(much as I also showed the case for consuming ivF in the “enterprise culture” 
of Thatcherism in the U.K. during the 1980s [Franklin 1997]).15
A number of more recent studies have also shown why ivF is not so para-
doxical from the point of view of gender as a technology. In her highly per-
ceptive study of “making modern mothers” in urban Greece, for example, 
anthropologist Heather Paxson explains how ivF norms gender expectations 
in much the same way gender conventions norm ivF. As she notes, “When 
gender is a matter of personal responsibility, when mothering ‘completes’ a 
woman’s nature . . . women have a moral obligation to aspire to motherhood. 
In this way women are shown to be good at being women, and good Greek citi-
zens” (2004: 211). In Paxson’s account, this work of being good at gender and 
complete as a person is explicitly theorized as technological: she describes 
urban Greek motherhood as a techni, from the Greek word technologhia, sig-
nifying the arts, mastery of technique, and craft. As Paxson emphasizes, techni 
is not imagined as separate from nature, or fisi, as in the Anglophone tradi-
tion. Rather, claims Paxson, “Athenian women today approach motherhood 
as something to be worked at, achieved, and continuously demonstrated” 
(214).16 She argues that in Greece, naturalizing is not the opposite of social-
izing but rather its synonym in the sense of crafting—“when customary be-
havior is naturalized in Greece, there is always room for strategic maneuver-
ing. . . . Naturalization in Greece does something other than suggest fixity, 
inevitability, or a sense that there is nothing humans can do about the mat-
ter” (214).
Consequently, ivF is imagined as the fulfillment of a social duty to make 
nature that, in the Greek context, adds heroism because, as one of Paxson’s 
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informants describes it, “there’s some procedure” (2004: 223), meaning work 
to be done. “They think I’m a heroine,” this informant continues. “You have to 
want it a lot . . . to enter into a procedure and have a baby like that” (223). In 
the same way that ivF reveals an added dimension to maternity— maternity 
by special service, we might call it—Paxson argues it similarly adds to the 
pressure to become maternal. “The introduction of ivF,” she claims,
Helps constitute a parallel shift in how women’s proper relationship 
to teknopiia [the art of maternity] is assessed: the having of children is 
no longer a taken- for- granted aspect of marriage that “just happens,” 
but has become an achievement based on techniques of motherhood 
that are both newly proliferating and increasingly scrutinized. A notion 
of achieved motherhood is further constituted by a capitalist market 
economy (of which medical technology is a part) and the increasingly 
diversified participation of women in this economy as workers and con-
sumers. . . . The substance of the nature that women must control in 
order to demonstrate gender proficiency is also transforming: women’s 
need to control their sexuality is giving way to a need to control, even 
rationalize, a biological capacity to bring forth babies. (2004: 240)
As Paxson observes, the extension of the maternal arts to include ivF also 
changes the terms of gender proficiency. There is now not only more women 
can do to become gender proficient; there is an added level of service that can 
make maternity even more of an achievement than it was previously. Under 
such conditions, to say no to ivF is not only to decline the opportunity to be-
come gender compliant but the opportunity to become gender heroic.
To the extent that ivF is not only a reproductive technology in the sense 
of producing offspring, but in the sense of being a technology of gender, or a 
maternal art, we can better understand its corresponding aspirational ideals 
and imaginaries. These may in part account for the appeal of what this tech-
nology reproduces somewhat independently not only of its actual outcome, 
but even of its stated or intended outcome. Were we to understand the diffi-
culty of ivF to constitute part of its appeal, the question of what it is all about 
becomes one that is better understood through the lens of multiple, adjust-
able rationalities—which is, in fact, exactly what ivF has been documented 
to require of its users, consumers, and clients in the numerous accounts now 
available of how this technology is lived. While not in any way wanting to sug-
gest that large numbers of people who undergo ivF do not really want chil-
dren, or that it functions as much as a substitute for parenthood as a potential 
route to it, that it is a strategic alibi for women who do not actually want to 
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become mothers, or that it is attractive because of its alluring mythic conno-
tations—or even simply because it is there—I suggest that one way to read 
the considerable body of empirical evidence documenting the experience of 
undergoing ivF and arts is simply that their appeal is more complex and 
paradoxical than it might at first appear.
Drawing on the various threads woven together so far, I want to consider 
further the shift ivF makes most vividly explicit, which I suggest is the cou-
pling not of egg and sperm, but of biology and artifice in the service of a new 
kinship norm. This new norm, as we have seen, affirms a code for conduct 
that is no longer naturally based on shared reproductive substance, but in-
stead on new formations of technological agency that are before as well as 
after nature. An important point here is that it is within this formulation that 
the operation of kinship as a technology is again made doubly explicit. In vitro 
fertilization is at once a technology reproducing social forms and norms, and 
a scientific technique that replicates the imagined origin of these forms and 
norms, but which also re- creates this original template through the direct 
manipulation, or crafting, of shared reproductive substance. One of the most 
important points noted about this duplicity of ivF as a technology is its many 
similarities to technologies of gender, which share this same duplicitous pat-
tern. Indeed, as we can see also from Thompson’s (2005) work, ivF is literally 
a kind of procreative drag in its quasi- parodic in vitro imitation of “the facts 
of life.” As noted in chapter 5, Judith Butler was among the first to ask of sex 
whether it is “as culturally constructed as gender” or indeed whether it is, in 
this sense, just like gender in that sex too is “tenuously constituted in time 
. . . through a stylized repetition of acts” that can only be interpreted through 
the lens of the very gender differences that the biological sexes are imagined 
to “ground” in natural fact (1990: 179). In this chapter so far, we have looked 
at how ivF establishes a code for conduct that is modeled on a technological 
protocol that is itself modeled on a naturalized expectation for biological re-
production, that in turn imitates the facts of life as they are imagined to exist 
naturally as a sui generis biological base.17 We have also examined how the 
empirical analysis of ivF as a lived technology of life can be used to reveal 
the labor involved in the complex ontological choreography this technique 
requires. In this way, ivF has been used as a lens to investigate the patterns 
involved in living a biological life that is remade by technique—a complex 
pattern of subjectification that is arguably indigenous to ivF as a way of life 
but by no means necessarily limited to this specific technique. I turn now to 
the related question of how this process has been not only lived but witnessed 
as a live spectacle on- screen.
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iVF live
This section, which could also be titled “Virtual ivF,” offers another close 
reading of ivF as a model of a model of a model to examine a different form 
of its serial recursivity—from technics into technics, culture into culture, 
and art into art. As it happens, we can do this instructively and quite liter-
ally using the widely circulated imagery of the manipulation of human re-
productive cells provided by ivF, in the appropriately doubled form of digi-
tal mirroring. Here we return to the question of the hand and tool raised 
earlier, but also to the role of another form of culture media, namely the cir-
culation of ivF imagery in popular culture through which this technique be-
comes increasingly legible as itself a convention, or even genre, of remaking 
life. Thus, ivF reveals its made- not- born pedigree as ontological choreogra-
phy through a series of now- familiar media images that provide access to 
the scene of being before nature—in the sense of facing it, or of being on a 
frontier, dedicated to assisting the flow of life through new forms of techno-
logical husbandry. In addition to being a technology of living substance and 
a way of life, ivF has been implanted into popular consciousness over the 
past three decades as a set of images and narratives depicting live embryo-
logical procedures such as fertilization, microinjection, and nuclear transfer. 
Part of the way ivF has become more comfortable and familiar is through a 
kind of mass public education in reproductive biology so that the human ga-
mete in a petri dish now recognizably codes for a celebrated arena of tech-
nological innovation and capacity. Indeed, these increasingly familiar visual 
images have arguably become the dominant visual signifier of the expansion 
of the ivF platform over the past half century, if not for the age of biology in 
general. Like ultrasound imagery, with its ability to convey the live action of 
pregnancy as a screen image, ivF offers privileged visual access to the previ-
ously unseen events of early human life—and indeed is popularly associated 
with precisely this capacity. Thus, the following section turns to a different 
perspective on what ivF is all about in relation to its staging and performance 
of a new reproductive model by exploring, in visual terms, its circulation as a 
highly public spectacle of the remaking of sex. In order to be taken in hand, 
the ivF embryo, as we saw in chapter 3, must first be made available to the 
eye, and this process means it can be reproduced as imagery, broadcast, or 
downloaded from the Internet at will. Unlike in the nineteenth or early twen-
tieth centuries, the technological means of broadcasting such images enables 
them to proliferate within the media- saturated technological culture of the 
twenty- first century. In this section, then, I revisit the question of the labor 
involved in ivF from a position more akin to that of Marx and Engels, as they 
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observed, often in minute detail, the evolution of machines in front of them, 
and in particular the interposition of tool and hand that so distinctly marked 
the onset of the Industrial Revolution. However, I also turn to the interface 
between ivF technology and its worldwide audience, who are increasingly 
literate in its language of visual form, to explore how live ivF circulates as a 
different kind of shared technological substance, and virtual life, as an iconic 
spectacle of making sex.
In vitro fertilization is, of course (and among other things), a very famous 
technology—perhaps even a technology that to a certain extent epitomizes 
what a technology is imagined to be and to do, and thus also a sign of the 
technological (especially where it meets the biological). The difference be-
tween conception via ivF and unassisted, natural, or spontaneous conception 
is precisely what is celebrated by the adjectives “precious” or “miracle” com-
monly used to mark ivF babies as special. As Stewart Brand observes, what is 
also iconic about ivF babies is that despite their artificial or test- tube origins, 
the viable offspring of ivF are indistinguishable from regular children. This is 
another of the unifications ivF can be seen to perform, by linking the normal 
and the technological biologically. In the remainder of this chapter, I turn to 
the public face of ivF as a set of visual images to explore the question of how 
ivF has itself become conventional—a new norm of making sex that is based 
on a new set of exact mechanisms. The turn here, to ivF as a technology of 
representation, adds another crucial layer to the question of what it is doing 
and why people seek it out. We turn, in other words, to the way in which ivF 
can be interpreted as a technology of refiguration as well as reproduction 
through its interface with the mainstream media.
thE baby in thE bottlE
As Susan Squier (1994) points out in her analysis of the twentieth- century 
history of the image of the baby in the bottle, ivF technology has a powerful 
visual and literary genealogy that can be read, among other things, as a series 
of reflections on the reproductive politics of gender and sex filtered through 
the lens of artificial conception. Looking back to the nineteenth century, 
Squier points, for example, to feminist readings of Mary Shelley’s Franken-
stein and her critique of “the new male birth of fraternal contractual democ-
racy” with its “male monopoly on political creation” as well as her “power-
ful critique of the newly revised institution of mothering.” Together these 
themes have been argued to converge in Shelley’s creation of “a nightmare 
image of scientific procreation that anticipates ivF” (Squier 1994: 14). In the 
early twentieth century, she argues, these themes continued to proliferate in 
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a host of tales, fables, novels, and children’s stories featuring technologies of 
embryology and reproduction, and the moral, scientific, and political ques-
tions they raised. From Charles Kingsley Amis’s The Water Babies to Julian 
Huxley’s “Tissue Culture Kings,” J. D. S. Haldane’s essay “Daedalus, or Sci-
ence and the Future,” the prolific writings of his sister Naomi Mitchison, and 
their close friends and colleagues the Huxleys, Vera Brittain, J. D. Bernal, and 
H. G. Wells, in whose writings the figures of ectogenesis, cloning, and artifi-
cial reproduction conspicuously serve as the lens through which definitions 
of the future, and future technologies, are both imaged and imagined. As 
Squier notes, these stories produced by a highly scientifically literate group 
of friends and kin (many of whom were closely biologically related as well as 
related through the study of biology) typically wove together elements from 
the history of embryology with science fiction, even sometimes very accu-
rately predicting the future, as in Haldane’s account of the young Cambridge 
undergraduate who successfully developed ivF (1924). As Squier notes, “Hal-
dane’s story of the development of in vitro gestation parallels the actual story 
of the development of in vitro fertilization, as told in Dr Robert Edwards’s 
autobiographical account. Both narratives move from successful animal em-
bryology to advances in human embryology” (1994: 71). And yet, as she points 
out, Haldane’s story—first delivered as a lecture in Cambridge to the Here-
tics Society—is also couched in the language of myth, narrating the victory of 
Daedalus over Prometheus as confirmation that biology has become the “piv-
otal” science for the twentieth century (72). Thus, “Daedalus looks cheerfully 
ahead to a future in which the invention of ectogenesis enables the control of 
human reproduction, the improvement of the human species, and finally the 
emancipation of mankind” (73).
In the same way that Squier argues the complex interwoven plots of Hal-
dane’s vision of ectogenesis united British biofuturists, humanists, and social-
ists with their detractors throughout the 1920s and 1930s in a debate over re-
productive technology, so too can this period be understood in Foucauldian 
terms as an extension of the “entry of the phenomena peculiar to the life of 
the human species into the order of knowledge and power [and] the sphere of 
political techniques” (Foucault 1990: 141–142). Except that, to be precise, it 
is not merely sex, or even sexuality, in these debates that serves as the “pivot 
of the two axes along which developed the entire political technology of life” 
(145), as Foucault suggests, but a more literal technologization of reproduc-
tion in the form of taking it in hand. It is artificial reproduction and ectogene-
sis that are pivotal in this debate about the future of the human—just as they 
have continued to be since.
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Squier’s account can help us to move more explicitly into the realm of 
ivF as a contemporary, twenty- first- century representational field, or what 
I describe as the visual logic of ivF, and in particular its role as a source of 
symbolic imagery coupling biology and artifice. What is notable in Squier’s 
account is the sheer amount of imaginative reconstruction of sex, gender, 
kinship, and reproduction that was occurring through the lens of the baby in 
the bottle in this period, but also how much these debates explicitly addressed 
what were later described as the technologies of sex, gender, and kinship de-
scribed by theorists such as Foucault, de Lauretis, Haraway, Strathern, and 
Butler. The conventions of sexual difference, sexual reproduction, and sexual 
identity, as well as sex roles and sexual practices, were all being debated dur-
ing this period through the defamiliarizing lens of experimental embryology 
and its unusual tool kit. New possibilities of regeneration as well as recom-
bination, in the form of chimeras, hybrids, and mosaics, as well as cloning, 
transhumanism, and ectogenesis, were in free play amid the questioning of 
traditional gender and kinship (and economic) orders in the mid- twentieth 
century. As in the context of ivF, cloning, and transgenesis today, these tech-
nologies are imagined at once as repair mechanisms, or enhancement de-
vices, and as radical rewrites of the biological rule book—transgressive by 
their very nature, and thus both paralleling and enabling the social transfor-
mations to which they are linked. As Squier herself suggests, the history of 
the baby in the bottle supplies a prehistory for ivF in which this technique 
plays a far more radical role than its use as a “renormalizing” technology in 
the present might suggest. However, as she also points out, this history fur-
ther suggests that a technological imitation, substitute, or even aid is by its 
very nature a supplement, a prosthetic, and thus a superordinating logic that, 
as Derrida famously claims, is never neutral.
scrEEning ivF
As argued in chapter 3, it is crucial to the history of ivF that it provided a tech-
nological platform through which reproductive substance could be both seen 
and handled. It is equally crucial for ivF as a representational technology that 
it has, in this sense, a natural visual interface with the mainstream media—
among other things, it is a screen- based technology. As we have seen with the 
dramatic success of the iPhone, the introduction of the handheld screen was 
in itself an iconic moment for the history of human technologies, enhancing 
the hand- tool relation by intensifying its depth as well as scale. In vitro fertil-
ization too is a powerful handheld screen window onto early life that achieves 
a similar, if less portable, marriage between visualization and manipulation—
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and one that is greatly amplified by the capacities of micromanipulation har-
nessed to digital reproduction (figure 6.1).
Crucial to the visual logic of ivF on- screen is the fact that what we are 
looking at when we observe a fertilized egg, or embryo, in a petri dish—or 
the manipulation of an egg or embryo in one of these handy chambers—is no 
ordinary sight. For many people, scientists, clinicians, and patients alike, wit-
nessing a live human embryo is special. Images of early human life—be they 
of gametes, embryos, or fetuses—are distinctively mediagenic in that they 
merge highly specialized scientific imaging apparatus with intimate human 
biological substance. Crucially, what is also witnessed in such a spectacle is 
the fact that this substance, such as a fertilized egg, has been rendered newly 
manipulable, or ready to be, as Landecker (2007) puts it, “taken in hand.” This 
makes of such images an especially suggestive primal scene of the new repro-
ductive mechanics brought about by assisted conception, and it is not surpris-
ing much has been written about embryos as visual objects (Franklin 1999). 
As many artists as well as news editors and lobbyists have recognized, con-
temporary embryological imagery is a potent contact zone uniting scientific 
research, high- tech laboratory apparatus, biological substance, and powerful 
visualizing techniques with the promissory future of the age of biology. These 
images at once sign the beginnings of human life, to suggest both common 
human origins and shared human futures, while also depicting a shared tech-
nological, and uniquely human, technological legacy through the very fact 
of their existence in vitro (thus a second sign of beingness as human techno-
logical agency). The images thus themselves model a fusion of accumulated 
scientific knowledge, human reproductive substance, and technological arti-
FigurE 6.1. In vitro 
fertilization offers a 
screen window onto 
handheld life that 
is, in the age of the 
Internet, virtually 
downloadable, 
contributing to the 
mass circulation of 
ivF imagery, or what 
we might refer to 
as iVF. Photo by the 
author.
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fice, multiply overdetermining the viewer position of witnessing ourselves, 
our technology, our future, and our obligations to one another. In this sense, 
and as the artist Suzanne Anker has poignantly suggested, the in vitro lens is 
also a mirror (Anker and Franklin 2010).
Importantly, and unlike other reproductive screening technologies, such 
as ultrasound, ivF imagery involves a form of witnessing that requires a 
viewer position that is after the fact of direct manipulation of what is shown. 
In the very fact of these images’ existence is the structuring presence of the 
technologies that make them possible, the hands that hold these tools, the 
screens that display these scenes, and the logics that make such interventions 
both possible and desirable. The sense of being hands- on is irrevocably part of 
what these images display from a spectator position that reproduces the point 
of view of the manipulator. Thus the viewer who participates in witnessing 
these scenes is visually implicated in the substantive and conceptual connec-
tions they establish.18 Hence, in addition to the practical or scientific ques-
tions posed by these primal scenes (how does life begin, what are its mecha-
nisms, how do they work), and their special content (early human life, shared 
origins, potential offspring, cures for disease, etc.), there is an inevitable form 
of complicity in what Evelyn Keller (1996a) describes as “the biological gaze,” 
because the very ability to witness these objects references a past intervention 
that has allowed us in as viewers, looking, as we inevitably must, through the 
keyhole science has provided for us to observe a formerly hidden domain. It 
is impossible, in other words, to view an image of an in vitro embryo without 
inhabiting the position of its handler.
The popular version of the reproductive gaze inaugurated by the fetal pho-
tography of Lennart Nilsson in the 1960s, and now manifest as the contempo-
rary imagery of ivF, stem cells, and cloning, is derivative of ivF’s history as a 
research tool, both in its logic and in its logistics. The taking in hand of repro-
ductive substance made possible by and for the technologization of sex is now 
both familiar and quotidian in the form of still photography or clinical appa-
ratus such as the ultrasound monitor, and also publicly broadcast live images, 
such as those often shown depicting micromanipulation techniques. The now 
increasingly common flat- screen image of micromanipulation that punctu-
ates news items on cloning, for example, routinely displays a cell secured in 
place by a holding pipette on one side being penetrated by a microinjection 
needle, a biopsy pipette, or some other microtool on the other. This image 
has consequently become a powerful visual shorthand for the union of tech-
nology and biology in the name of remaking life. This familiar screen scene 
typically appears as a horizon, the pipette- cell- pipette fusion bisecting the 
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frame in an assemblage that now codes for biotechnological investigation writ 
large. It is this explicit image of cellular manipulation, greatly enlarged and 
often shown in live motion, that has inaugurated the mass witnessing of new 
flows of reproductive and genetic substance in a spectacle of reengineering at 
the ground zero of built biology. Already iconic, micromanipulation imagery 
is used in advertising, in corporate logos, and on fashionable club wear and cd 
covers, as well as being featured on the evening news, in mainstream films, 
and in documentary accounts of new reproductive technologies such as clon-
ing (figure 6.2).
The image of micromanipulation shares a visual kinship with earlier iconic 
images uniting the logics of life and technology with the question of human 
obligations to the future, most notably the much- celebrated late twentieth- 
century images of the fetus and the blue planet (Franklin et al. 2000). Like the 
fetus and the blue planet images, the cell at the center of the micromanipula-
tion image glows with a radiant light—often blue or amber—combining the 
ethereal beauty of life itself with the power of the bioscientific gaze. Unlike 
such earlier images, however, the distinctly planetary cell becomes a window 
onto the ability to reengineer biological interiority. With its faintly visible 
cumulus, or corona, the cell appears to emit vitality, or energy, as a kind of 
bioluminescence, but it is not floating in space. The cell is at once bounded 
and permeable, captive and already joined with the tools that hold it in place. 
Translucent, it is also somewhat opaque, with an obscure and grainy interior, 
FigurE 6.2. The icsi 
procedure is now 
commonly viewed 





documentaries, as a 
live- action sequence 
that explicitly displays 
the taking of life in 
hand. Reproduced 
courtesy of the Guy’s 
stem cell team.
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lacking depth of field while at the same time the tools convey a sense of reach 
beyond the visible frame, or edge, of the image. Structuring the image is the 
shallow plane of focus, which, like the holding pipette, positions the cell se-
curely in a flat visual field. Like a living petri dish, the micromanipulation 
setup handily presents a visually engaging biopic of tools that are the source 
of new life and poised to grasp, probe, and penetrate the cell’s interior. In par-
ticular, the image of microinjection, in which a needle is shown penetrating 
an egg cell, recapitulates the familiar moment of conception, restaging the 
conventional denouement of the sexual union of egg and sperm, and thus 
life’s beginnings (Martin 1991). Instead of the agency of fertilization being 
carried by the substance itself, however, micromanipulation images depict 
the helping hands of science as the active agents, which assume the activity 
formerly understood to be merely biological, self- acting, or naturally auto-
matic. Here, then, are the new mechanics of making sex—replacing and ex-
tending biological action in the form of handheld tools.
In contrast to the still portraits of the fetus or the blue planet, the scene 
of microinjection is cinematic, and the movement of the micromanipulation 
tools is the main story these images convey and emphasize.19 Notably, these 
are more evidently working screen scenes than the earlier images of inner 
and outer space, often linked in newsreel footage with accompanying shots 
of white- coated scientists at work in their labs.20 The cell in these images 
is tightly coupled to its tools, engaged in a process of itself being retooled, 
whereby its internal mechanics will be recomposed, reprogrammed, and re-
made. This is the bespoke wet life of the biotechnology lab in the making—no 
longer the pristine, untouched, natural life of the planet or the fetus, part of 
whose grandeur lay in the autonomy of their inherent and ultimately mysteri-
ous life- giving properties, which exceed and predate even our most powerful 
means of technological creation.
The new animated digital embryological imagery also differs from earlier 
photographic reproductive portraiture in not being self- contained: this 
imagery does not remain within the frame. Whereas Nilsson’s fetal portraits 
remain within the margins of the photograph, as set pieces that speak for 
themselves partly through the independence of the fetal body, the scene of 
micromanipulation always extends off- screen, breaking through the frame of 
the image along the trajectory of the handles of the microtools. These tools, 
and the camera, thus become the connecting substances linking the cell to 
the larger apparatus of the micromanipulation station and the guiding hands 
and eyes of its live operator. The manipulation tools are scaled precisely to cel-
lular dimensions to create a workable fit between the microscopic object and 
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the prosthetic hands of the operator who will delicately reconstruct it, and so 
they are also magnified, creating the shallow depth of field, the flat light, the 
blurred background, and the slow, jerky, groping movements depicted in the 
now- familiar genre of animated films that unite two lives through tools. These 
effects of scale, dimension, perspective, framing, and context reproduce the 
scientific gaze, its instruments, and its object—as well as its labor—exactly.
The biological relativity introduced through these images is particularly 
pronounced in the blurring of the tool and object they so vividly reveal. In the 
magnified image of micromanipulation, the aqueous environment of the cell 
is evident in the viscosity of its contents, and can be seen as well in the flows 
of substances within the hollow glass tools themselves. Like the cell, the in-
struments are transparent, enabling us to both see and see through this multi-
layered scene of fertile coupling. In a kind of respiratory movement, the injec-
tion needle appears to inhale cellular contents for removal, and to exhale new 
material into the cell’s interior. In this sense, micromanipulation imagery me-
chanically imitates a metabolic symbiosis of parts. And indeed this is precisely 
what is occurring. Micromanipulation takes place on cells that are typically 
submerged in clear sterile oil, using tiny glass tools as thin as strands of hair. 
The microtools are secured with small clamps that attach them to hydrauli-
cally driven joysticks that allow the manipulator to conduct various proce-
dures, using touch as much as sight to guide his or her movements. The eye-
pieces are connected to a video lead that allows the manipulator to view the 
bed of the machine on a monitor, and to record, transmit, or display these 
processes on- screen. To view the contents of a cell takes a practiced eye, as 
there is little contrast, for example, between tiny semitransparent organelles, 
such as the multiple pronuclei, and the rest of the cell contents, consisting 
largely of cytoplasm (Franklin 2003b). It is for this reason that a color filter is 
often used, to aid the manipulator in identifying the various parts of the cell 
by increasing resolution or contrast.
For both clinical and scientific procedures, there are five basic microtools 
that are used exclusively for manipulating eggs, embryos, and sperm:
1 Holding pipette to fix and position the oocyte or embryo during  
a procedure
2 Microneedle to create an opening in the zona pellucida or  
shell of the egg
3 Blunt biopsy micropipette 15–16 μm in diameter for polar  
body removal
4 Blunt micropipette 25–30 μm in diameter for blastomere biopsy
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5 Finely pulled micropipette of 7–8 μm inner diameter beveled to a 
thirty- degree angle with the tip pulled to form an intracytoplasmic 
sperm injection (icsi) needle
As we have seen earlier in the clean room, additional varieties of micropipette 
for human embryonic cell line procedures are commonly forged by hand by 
softening a glass capillary tube over a burner and pulling it to form the de-
sired width and tip. Mechanical pipette pullers can also be used, and com-
mercially prepared micropipettes are increasingly available. Two additional 
instruments, a microforge and a beveler, are used to fashion specialized fea-
tures of these glass tools. In addition to controlling for the diameter of the 
end of the micropipette, and sharpening, beveling, or flame polishing of the 
tip, microtools are bent to an angle commensurate with the bed of the micro-
manipulator, so that they can be positioned parallel with each other and with 
the machine. As well as precision and pre- preparation, sterility is essential 
to the success of micromanipulation techniques such as microinjection or 
embryo biopsy. For example, newly made tools may be exposed to ultraviolet 
radiation before use for up to twenty minutes to sterilize them, and cells are 
immersed in sterile equilibrated mineral oil during manipulation procedures 
to keep them clean. Purity has become more important to assisted concep-
tion technology as the effort to alleviate infertility has increasingly involved 
various kinds of genetic testing, screening, and diagnosis, and also, as we have 
seen, to the derivation of human embryonic stem cell (Esc) lines. The pres-
ence of male gametes adhering around the cumulus cells of the ova is poten-
tially the cause of misdiagnosis when an embryo needs to be screened for mo-
lecular abnormalities, or contamination of a cell line.21
The most common micromanipulation procedure in the context of con-
temporary reproductive biomedicine is icsi, now used both to enhance 
the purity of ivF embryos (by eliminating excess, potentially contaminat-
ing sperm) and to increase the fertilization rate of the limited egg supply by 
ensuring that the sperm penetrates the thick outer coat of the egg. Scenes 
of icsi dominate the micromanipulation imagery made available to a wider 
audience, both because they are readily available, and perhaps because they 
replay the iconic moment of conception, involving penetration of the egg 
with the sperm- containing injection needle. This refiguration of the process 
of fertilization, however, is, like ivF in general, both like and unlike its unas-
sisted counterpart. As the following technical instructions for icsi empha-
size, the roles of the egg and sperm are significantly altered in this version of 
the drama of life’s beginnings:
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Under control of the stereomicroscope the washed sperm are added 
to the drop containing 10% pvp [polyvinylpyrrolidone], to slow down 
sperm movement, facilitating selection of morphologically normal 
sperm for injection. This also minimizes sperm adherence to the glass 
surface once it is inside the micropipette. . . . A sperm is immobilised 
by gently rubbing its tail on the bottom of the dish and aspirated into 
the pipette, tail first. . . . Once the oocyte is brought into focus, the 
icsi micropipette containing the immobilized sperm is lowered and 
brought into focus; once again, the fluid control and sperm movement 
within the pipette are assessed. Should the sperm become stuck in the 
pipette, it is expelled and another sperm is retrieved, or if necessary the 
microtool is changed.
The holding pipette is lowered and the oocyte is rotated so that a slit 
opening in the zona pellucida is at the 3 o’clock position. The outer edge 
of the oocyte is brought into focus and the sperm is brought to the tip of 
the micropipette. The micropipette is guided through the slit opening 
in the zona pellucida into the center of the oocyte, and a small amount 
of ooplasm is aspirated into the micropipette to ensure breakage of the 
membrane by slow turning of the micrometer of the microinjector. 
Once the membrane has been broken, the contents of the micropipette, 
i.e. ooplasm and the immobilised sperm, are expelled slowly into the 
oocyte and the micropipette is slowly withdrawn. Complete control 
over aspiration and expulsion are needed to diminish the amount of 
medium deposited along with the sperm. (Verlinsky et al. 2000: 22)
As is evident from this technical description of icsi, fertilization in the con-
text of assisted conception is not narrated as a journey, an adventure romance, 
or an epic quest, but as a difficult feat of manual control. Thus, although the 
image is legible as an analogy to normal fertilization, the procedure is clearly 
quite different in terms of both form and content. Indeed, other than the 
fact that a sperm ends up inside an egg, almost nothing about the means of 
achieving this legendary union is analogous to the conventional narrative of 
the exact mechanisms uniting egg and sperm. Indeed, as in the case of ivF, for 
which artificial menopause is a counterintuitive precursor, icsi is in many re-
spects the opposite of its unassisted corollary. Far from being an all but auto-
matic natural process ensuring the flow of reproductive substance across the 
generations, these images depict a skilled manual feat of precision microengi-
neering. Deliberately prevented from being either self- acting or automatic, 
the union of the gametes emerges instead from the delicate labor of manual 
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assemblage. Formerly imagined as unstoppable, the sperm cell is firmly taken 
in hand by the micromanipulator: first it is immobilized, then immersed in 
ooplasm, and expelled into the egg—its tail having been cut off to make it 
more easily manageable and cleaner. No longer a heroic gamete- Olympian, 
the sperm must be brought under “complete control.”
What is just like normal conception in the context of icsi remains its pur-
pose, namely the unification of egg and sperm—thus activating the process of 
fertilization leading to potential biological offspring. From the point of view of 
the continuity of biological relations between parents and offspring, the logic 
of icsi is identical to that of unassisted conception. Consequently, according 
to the familiar kinship pattern of bilateral descent, through which the off-
spring inherits an equal amount of shared substance from both parents, icsi 
is isomorphic with the standard model of unassisted conception. However, 
it is arguably a different union than that of egg and sperm which defines the 
visual and technical logics of these images, namely the merging or fusion of 
substance and tool, and tool and hand. The icsi coupling, then, comprises 
several interrelated pairs: egg and sperm, camera and screen, tool and hand, 
viewer and manipulator, and substance and tool. The reproduction of this 
screen scene via the mainstream media adds yet another level to the logic of 
these images too, as it is the images themselves that now provide a shared 
cultural frame of reference for witnessing the remaking of sex—or even a 
shared culture medium for understanding them. This layering of techno-
logics—whereby icsi might be viewed on television, for example—in turn 
introduces a new convention of witnessing the exact mechanisms of repro-
duction live on- screen, so that one technology of reproduction (tv, iPhone, 
Internet, etc.) encompasses another (icsi).
What is on display in such a spectacle is thus not only the logic of ivF, but 
the biological relativity implicit in making biological relatives. The relativity 
of the biological to the technical could hardly be made more explicitly visual 
than in the scene of microinjection, in which substance and tool engage in 
the complex intercourse of merging with a purpose. Beyond the frame, be-
yond the invisible hands, beyond the camera and its monitor, beyond the lab 
are all of the other surrounding elements of this composition through which 
it makes sense to even a casual viewer. But like ivF, the sense it makes may 
be superficially obvious in ways that obscure what is implicitly contradic-
tory and even queer about such images. For in addition to everything legible 
and ordinary about their logics of biology, kinship, reproduction, technology, 
progress, and hope (among others) are the counterlogics such a scene has the 
potential to suggest or imply.
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Conclusion
It is in the convergence between the prevailing logics and conventions of bio-
logical kinship and those introduced by new reproductive technologies that 
ivF, icsi, and their ilk open up the space of biological relativity that remains 
to be charted as the age of biology unfolds. There is no reason not to assume 
that the remaking of nature as technique will remain largely compatible with 
the logics of unassisted nature, or natural procreation, or of the automatic 
flow of genealogy—nature has long been cultured, after all, and as we have 
seen even maternity is an art. Nature and biology are highly plastic categories, 
and kinship has long been the idiom to describe how they are worked, cul-
tured up, and mediated. As we have also seen, the logic by which biological 
kinship is understood to create a natural tie, or a biological relation, is highly 
dependent on specific forms of labor, including the crafting of substantial 
connections. In Charis Thompson’s term, natural facts are used strategically. 
Thus, we do not need to imagine that either the ambivalent aspects of living 
ivF or its paradoxical logics necessarily displace earlier models of biologi-
cal reproduction or biological kinship. They are ambivalent precisely because 
they include these logics as well as others. However, we can observe all the 
same that the new context of biological relativity that is introduced by con-
ception after ivF adds new dimensions to conventional understandings of re-
production and biology—reproducing these conventions, to use Strathern’s 
term, inexactly. This new doubled or contingent biology has become one of 
the iconic spectacles of the twenty- first century, while at the same time, like 
television and airplanes before it, a regular fact of life.
The way in which these new dimensions of reproductive experience 
stretch the frame of existing conventions is both paralleled and demonstrated 
in the imagery that has accompanied the rise of ivF over the past thirty years, 
and specifically the rise of micromanipulation imagery, in its very explicit 
staging of the mechanization of reproductive substance. If micromanipula-
tion has become an increasingly recognizable visual shorthand for the fusion 
of tool and substance, and if icsi introduces a new figuration of conception 
that is more strongly defined in visual terms than in narrative ones, what are 
the consequences of these shifts for understandings of the facts of life? Or 
what we might call iVF? How do these new images interact with older, more 
established representations of reproductive substance, such as the traditional 
egg and sperm narrative? How do they display, or model, the work of making 
ivF work? If micromanipulation is a source of new, mainstream, public, and 
popular images of the workings of sex, by working it up, as it were, what is 
the iconography to which they belong? In sum, how do these new images re-
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signify reproductive substance, and what is the visual grammar they bring 
into being?
For example, one of the most important grammatical or indexical changes 
these images both suggest and confirm is the introduction of a new gene-
alogical model, in which it is not only reproductive substance, but its direc-
tionality, orientation, or flow that is redesigned. In the familiar tree models 
of natural history, so favored by Darwin and still a basic tool of genetics today, 
reproductive flow is always one way. It is also always brachiating and bilateral, 
but contained, and limited, in its irrevocable path. This arboreal pattern of 
biological flow is superseded in micromanipulation images both by new con-
duits for the transmission of substance in the form of tools, and the possibility 
of open- ended dissemination. These hollow glass straws are the new conduits 
of micromanipulated life. Extending beyond the frame, the microtools point 
not only to the newly manipulable cellular interior that is their object, but to 
the termination of the conventional genealogical model (so familiar to kin-
ship studies) that was their predecessor. The rotation of life’s regenerative axis 
to a horizontal position correspondingly reorients the genealogy of flat- screen 
life, detaching this scene from its former genealogical trunk, and leaving it lit-
erally open ended. The new stem of life in the flat- screen world of cultivated 
human cells is the deconstructed inner cell mass—the source of totipotent 
cells that can be endlessly amplified and redirected into bespoke regenerative 
lines. In the context of flat- screen life, genealogy is an open door.
The visual grammar that holds the micromanipulation image in place, 
then, is not derived from the logic of sex or genealogy belonging to natu-
ral history, but rather to modern scientific technique. It might be difficult to 
find a more explicit visual representation of Rabinow’s (1992) claim that life 
“will become technique” in a manner that reverses the order of Darwinian 
evolutionary time and telos, by making culture the origin of biology. The fact 
that the cells on the bed of the micromanipulator are submerged in culture 
medium reminds us of the etymological roots of the term “culture” in culti-
vation, that is, in the art of technique. What micromanipulation imagery pro-
vides is the kind of horizon- altering perspectival shift described by Barbara 
Duden (1993) in relation to fetal photography—offering an instrumental 
reframing of reproduction as technology. This is how micromanipulation 
imagery has become, in Duden’s words, “part of the mental universe of our 
time” (1993: 1) in its depiction of the production of new life in ways that are 
detached from the orders and logics of living things that have structured far 
more than biological categories in the past.
It is the relativity of these former biological categories that ivF arguably 
ivF livE 257
makes more visible—both in its use as a clinical procedure, and as a research 
tool in science. To describe ivF as a technological platform has a literal mean-
ing in relation to micromanipulation imagery that is both technically and 
metaphorically apt (as is the common description of the micromanipulation 
table as its bed). The mental universe in which both ivF and flat- screen life 
are legible—their grammar—is increasingly widely shared, and help to con-
textualize the question of why ivF is so popular in spite of all its difficulty, 
and why it is so curious despite having become more regular and normal. The 
same logic that makes ivF useful for clinical purposes—as a tool to aid in the 
overcoming of the obstacle of infertility—applies to the remaking of biology 
as technology more generally, and thus also to the newly conventional visual 
logic of micromanipulation, with its vivid depiction of taking human repro-
ductive cells in hand. To the extent this logic also grounds a new understand-
ing of technology as biology, through the recomposition of reproductive sub-
stance, so too has it already reshaped the future of how kinship can be both 
imagined and made.
SeVen Frontier Culture
As the introduction to this book outlined, ivF can be understood both as a 
technologization of substance and as a substantialization of technology, and 
thus as a lens that allows us to reconsider the meanings of both technology 
and biology. By tracing this argument through a series of frames, and draw-
ing on a range of theorists to examine ivF as a stem technology, I have asked 
how we might understand the retooling of reproductive substance and its in-
stitutionalization as both new kinds of making life and new ways of living the 
remaking of life. As chapters 5 and 6 have suggested, there are many ways to 
investigate the condition of being after ivF, including the perspective offered 
by experiencing it directly as a patient or provider, and the more distant, but 
increasingly explicit, encounter with it in mainstream popular media as a 
representation, and now generic imagery, of embryo retooling as an open 
door. In both of these cases, which I suggest have important structural par-
allels despite their differences, the retooling of reproductive substance ap-
pears, among other things, to exceed the frames of existing understandings 
of sex, biology, kinship, technology, and even life itself. At the same time, 
I have also argued that the logics of ivF both belong to and extend famil-
iar ideas and conventions associated with reproduction, science, and tech-
nology, as well as parenthood, the family, and kinship. In my previous work 
(Franklin 1997) I have used the idiom of hope to describe this convergence 
between the known and the unfamiliar, suggesting, as many others have also 
done, that the discourses of both hope and progress act as powerful forces 
extending reproductive technology, and the biosciences more generally, con-
tinually into unknown territory—or out of the frame. As noted in chapter 3, 
this is why both reproduction and technology are often envisaged, celebrated, 
and defended as frontiers, and why those who inhabit this territory, be they 
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clinicians, scientists, or patients, are similarly described, and may experience 
themselves, as pioneers.
However, it is worth returning to the concept of the frontier once again, 
and for the same reasons it was discussed earlier in this book—namely, its 
analytic value in staging and refiguring from another angle the question con-
cerning technology for which it is often an analogy. As noted in chapter 3, 
the frontier is a familiar but strange concept—at once describing a border 
between states and open- ended, unknown terrain. It at once provides an idi-
omatic figuration of opportunity and reward, and, in the discourse of the New 
World frontier at least, recalls a place of reversion, lawlessness, mutability, 
and conflict. Contradictory as well is the dual association of frontier life with 
movement and settlement, catastrophe and rebirth, wilderness and domesti-
cation. It is both an idealized concept and a temporary place or setting. Both 
practically and ideologically, the frontier signifies exploration, and thus tran-
sition, as well as conversion. The forward, or facing, orientation of the ex-
ploratory frontier idiom has its temporal equivalent in futurity: it is encoun-
tered by going forward.1 But by definition the frontier is eventually left behind 
in both time and space.
What is left behind in the advance of the frontier line, or the edge of the 
frontier, is a zone of hybridity, in which settlement and domestication are en-
tangled with the unknown or wild elements—a mix of agencies, entities, and 
forces. The labor of the frontier is one of ordering and imposing control, often 
imagined as seeding the growth of civilization through technologies of culti-
vation, epitomized by agriculture, which pave the way for a more elaborate so-
cial infrastructure. In this chapter, I begin by returning to the concept of the 
frontier in order to revisit the question of how this idiom models, or mirrors, 
technological evolution or progress. Drawing on recent anthropological and 
archaeological theory, I borrow from models of agriculture and domestication 
as frontier zones to suggest yet another perspective on the endless frontier of 
technology. In turn, this brings us back to the question of technology as evo-
lution or natural history—for in all of these contexts (and perhaps especially 
that of domestication) explanatory models have shifted toward more hybrid, 
contingent, nonlinear accounts of interaction (Haraway 2008). Such a shift, 
I suggest, is consistent with what we might expect from the frontier idiom—
with all of its magical conversion abilities—and also, if perhaps less obviously, 
of science, and in particular embryology.
As well as being important to what is changing within the biology lab, 
where the role of tools increasingly troubles the frontier between the organic 
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and the inorganic, the analogy to frontier culture remains a useful trope for 
considering what is going on outside the lab as well, in the border zones of 
waiting rooms and clinics. The second part of this chapter thus returns to the 
in- between of the ivF–stem cell interface. Crossing over to the ivF side of the 
hole in the wall connecting the stem cell lab and the assisted conception unit 
(acu), I follow the development of a permanent art installation inside the 
clinic produced by photographer in residence Gina Glover. This major instal-
lation of artwork, The Art of A.R.T., represents the ivF encounter from both 
patients’ and clinicians’ points of view. Something of an ethnographer herself, 
Glover in her installation offers a visual logic of ivF that is an alternative to 
that described in chapter 6, as yet another window on the topsy- turvy world 
of ivF. One way to interpret her installation, I suggest, is as frontier bioart.
It is here, in an encounter with an artist’s depiction of the future of kinship 
that is also the rendering of an encounter with the reproductive frontier, that 
I want to sketch some of the ways we might imagine a sociology of technology 
that is more robustly sociological—that is, which offers us a more fully socio-
logical model of technology and technological change. As we have seen, the 
hole in the wall of the lab is itself a frontier line of sorts, not only demarcating 
a space of pioneering science, but dividing the space of frontiering between 
those who inhabit one kind of work space in the acu, and another where re-
productivity itself is being explored and domesticated. Always a problematic 
idiom, and not necessarily one whose mock heroism we want to reclaim, the 
frontier concept is nonetheless useful, I suggest, as itself a kind of artifice—
a representational apparatus that performs a distinctive kind of work convert-
ing meanings. In other words, the idiom of the frontier is itself a conceptual 
tool. In this chapter I suggest that it can be used to investigate what is going 
back and forth through the hole in the wall, and indeed why the hole is there 
at all.
Frontiers of knowledge
On the cover of the 1925 American Library Association pamphlet Frontiers of 
Knowledge is reproduced an engraving of a man reading a book at a desk under 
a starry sky.2 Looming above him is the headless, winged statue of Nike, the 
Olympian goddess of victory, the remains of which were found in Greece in 
the late nineteenth century, and are now prominently displayed at the Louvre 
in Paris (figure 7.1).
This American frontier image combines classical antiquity and European 
culture, set against the backdrop of the universe, with the figure of a reader, 
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or thinker, in the foreground. Written by Jesse Lee Bennett, a journalist and 
popular writer, Frontiers of Knowledge is aimed at a general audience and in-
tended to explain the origins and functions of knowledge and to make it more 
available to all. A practical guide, and part of a series titled Reading with a 
Purpose, it is dedicated to “those who, wishing to educate themselves over a 
lifetime, desire a broad perspective of the whole field of knowledge” (Bennett 
1925: 5). In his brief didactic treatise, Bennett uses the idiom of the frontier 
both as an analogy to knowledge, and as a synecdoche for American pragma-
tism and self- improvement. He writes, “There are now only a few unexplored 
parts of the earth on which we live. But there are such great unexplored por-
tions of the universe that the little world of knowledge we now possess must 
rather be thought of as a clearing in a wilderness with frontiers steadily ad-
vancing into the mystery of what mankind does not yet know than as a com-
plete thing like our planet” (1925: 17). At once a concrete geographical com-
parison intended to convey the difference between an expanding clearing in 
FigurE 7.1. The cover 
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the wilderness—of unknown proportions—and the finite, known, and com-
plete size of planet earth, Bennett’s analogy is also more abstract, and magi-
cal, in its invocation of the “mystery” into which frontiers advance, against the 
realm of “what mankind does not yet know.” In this description, the conven-
tional movement of the frontier (steadily advancing) appears as a self- acting 
force of expansion, set against a void (the universe), while simultaneously 
the frontier is also depicted in terms of actual historical events, manual labor 
(clearing), and human progress. Developing the frontier analogy in a more 
explicitly American vein, Bennett continues: “Today the frontiers of knowl-
edge appear very, very far removed from the simple questions which origi-
nally sent intelligence ranging far afield seeking answers, just as the coast 
of America seemed very remote from the little villages where the sailors of 
Columbus grew up and from which they set out to see what lay beyond the 
western horizon” (31).
This analogy, between frontiers of the mind and exploration “beyond the 
western horizon” recalls the blurred line between what Gell (1988: 8) called 
the “merely real” and the imaginative reach of exploration, while seamlessly 
also inserting Old World civilization into the New World trajectory made 
famous in Frederick Jackson Turner’s depiction of westward expansion on 
the American frontier as manifest destiny—the same idiom later invoked by 
Roosevelt, and now ubiquitous in science policy in Europe and many other 
parts of the world. Like Roosevelt and his advisors, whose inspiration may 
well have come from writers such as Bennett, Frontiers of Knowledge proposes 
an inexorable advance of civilization in the wake of such heroic American pio-
neers as Daniel Boone. “Only a few people were out on the frontiers of civili-
zation with Daniel Boone; only a few people were near Peary at the North 
Pole or with any explorer or adventurer in wild, remote places. But today great 
cities exist in the place which was a frontier in the time of Daniel Boone. Soon 
airships will be going regularly across the North Pole” (Bennett 1925: 31).3 At 
work in this generic description of manifest destiny and the inevitable march 
of progress are the familiar coordinates of time and space associated with 
the frontier—its forward expansion in the past transforming over time into a 
settled place in the here and now of the contemporary, epitomized by the rise 
of cities out of what were once “wild, remote places.” Prominent in this pas-
sage, however, is also an account of modern technology—analogized to the 
progress of “great cities” by reference to what has become taken for granted, 
or regular—in much the same way Stewart Brand refers to ivF babies having 
become more regular over time. Thus the analogy of the frontier that was ini-
tially a depiction of space becomes one of time—“the place which was a fron-
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tier” having vanished, its very existence having been eclipsed by the transfor-
mation its advance has brought about.
The logic of these analogies may be so familiar as to appear in need of no 
further comment, so established is the frontier narrative still in the account 
of the growth of human civilization, technological advance, and scientific 
progress. However, it is precisely the magical logic of the frontier that in-
vites further scrutiny because of its deeply paradoxical composition—a mix of 
historical fact, nationalist fiction, mythic allegory, and colonial propaganda.4 
The problem here is similar to that often described for the evolution of tech-
nology—that of mistaking the consequences for the cause, as if airplanes 
evolved by themselves. This is the intransigent problem Habermas describes 
as the “thesis of the autonomous character of technical development” and 
dismisses as “prescientific” (2010: 174). Also known as technological deter-
minism, the attribution of an autonomous character to technical advances is 
further denigrated by Habermas as a ruse: “in the end,” he asserts, such an 
attribution ultimately “serves to conceal preexisting, unreflected social inter-
ests.” After all, as he notes, “the pace and direction of technical development 
today depend to a great extent on public investments: in the United States 
the defence and space administration are the largest sources of resource con-
tracts” (174).
The extensive debate over the extent to which Marx attributed too much 
neutrality to technology and not enough politics to the evolution of technics 
(other than the interests of the ruling classes and the needs of capital) has 
long remained unresolved in part as a result of this either- or approach to the 
question of technological autonomy.5 What the idiom of the frontier and the 
“self- propelling” model of technology have in common, in other words, is 
the neglect of their specific mechanics—or as it may turn out, their organics. 
As Raymond Williams (1990) also points out, it is as if the only critical ques-
tion to be asked of either of these idioms, or of the manifest destiny ethos that 
suffuses both of them, is whether they are, as Habermas puts it, “a mere ex-
tension of natural history” (2010: 87).6
Indeed, both Marx and Engels did conceive of technology as an exten-
sion of natural history—so much so that Bernard Stiegler (1998: 2) suggests 
Engels’s account of the coevolution of tool and hand “troubles the frontier be-
tween the organic and the inorganic” to such an extent that it all but consti-
tutes a new theory of life itself.7 Such a view invokes yet another model of the 
frontier, as well as of natural history, which is in Stiegler’s account reimagined 
as a genealogy of technics. Whereas for Habermas mere natural history im-
plies a lack of explanation, or even a convenient deceit, another approach can 
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be arrived at by assuming that natural history itself is undertheorized. Thus, 
as noted earlier, when Marx cites Darwin’s model of the evolution of organs 
in order to explore the increasing differentiation of tools and technique, he 
need not be read as either naturalizing or neutralizing technology, but instead 
as proposing a more complex mechanism for technological development, as 
well as for human evolution—indeed that these are at one level isomorphic.
It is no surprise that the models of both the frontier and technology (as 
well as evolution) most similar to those of Marx and Engels have long been 
found in both archaeology and anthropology—where for over half a century 
the human- tool relation has been theorized, to repeat Engels’s language, as 
a frontier.8 The frontier model of the archaeologist of early agriculture today, 
for example, is likely to be more similar to contemporary nonlinear, symbi-
otic accounts of evolution, domestication, or speciation than earlier, quasi- 
Darwinian narratives of human emergence driven by steady cultural or tech-
nological advance, such as those of Lewis Henry Morgan (1877), Leslie White 
(1959), or Lewis Binford (1965).9 Paralleling developments in science and 
technology studies more widely, the analysis of human technological develop-
ment advocated by anthropologists such as Pierre Lemonnier favors not only 
the view that “techniques are first and foremost social productions” (1993: 2) 
but that “the logic and coherence of . . . technological knowledge . . . are not 
related solely to the physical phenomena that are set in motion by a particu-
lar technique. Social representations of technology are also a mixture of ideas 
concerning realms other than matter or energy” (3, emphasis added). Thus, 
for example, in his account of early agriculture (neolithicization), the archae-
ologist Marek Zvelebil argues against any simple equation of technological 
development with cultural or economic change. Summarizing the view that 
has increasingly come to dominate the effort to model both local and general 
patterns of agricultural experimentation in the evolution of settlement cul-
ture, Zvelebil emphasizes the importance of complex interactions rather than 
functional causality:
Ostensibly, the transition to farming is an economic process involving a 
shift from dependence on biologically wild to biologically domesticated 
resources. However, the process cannot be separated from the cultural, 
social and historical contexts in which it occurred. The change in econ-
omy may be a cause of, or perhaps a consequence of, changes in ideol-
ogy, material culture or the social organization of participant groups, 
changes often referred to as neolithicization. It is not clear whether 
these changes were broadly simultaneous or whether, in Europe, the 
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shift from dependence on undomesticated local resources to agro- 
pastoral farming can be regarded as a signature for the sociocultural 
developments of the Neolithic [more generally]. (1994: 323)
To analyze in more regional specificity a process of transition (e.g., to agro-
pastoralism) that is less likely to have involved singular stages or direct causes 
than a series of overlapping, repeated, and nonlinear events, Zvelebil em-
ploys the concept of an agricultural frontier zone to describe a context of 
exchange, of to- ing and fro- ing, including the cross- transfer of genes as well 
as of languages, material culture, and other resources. An advantage of such 
models, according to the author, is not only a “finer resolution” but a larger 
scale: “The agricultural frontier is more than a boundary. It is a far- reaching 
phenomenon, covering a wide geographical space, within which contacts be-
tween foragers and farmers occur, and which is occupied by communities 
in different stages of the transition” (Zvelebil 1994: 328). This archaeologi-
cal model of the frontier as a contact zone, allowing for a much wider range 
of types of interactions, exchanges, and transfers, as well as a larger pool 
of active variables shaping technological change, typifies the shift within ar-
chaeology and anthropology generally toward a more mixed picture of the 
emergence of both agriculture and domestication.10 In contrast to the pro-
gressive linear models of influential twentieth- century archaeologists, such 
as V. Gordon Childe (1952), who painted a picture of early farmers similar to 
that of Jesse Lee Bennett—pursuing avenues of progress out of their wilder-
ness clearings toward a more civilized society—more recent theories have, 
for example, concluded that mobile subsistence farming may well have been 
compatible with livestock domestication, and that one need not have pre-
ceded the other. Indeed, it now appears increasingly likely that a wide range 
of strategies were employed simultaneously even within specific regions—as 
the very term “agropastoral farming” suggests.11
These shifts have been strongly reinforced by work in social and cultural 
studies of science, where, as the work of Haraway (2008), among others, 
clearly demonstrates, the idea, for example, of nature as a mixed, hybrid 
zone of contiguous agencies is, if anything, now the dominant approach in 
social theory. The identification of what the anthropologist Rebecca Cassidy 
describes as “porous, culturally- variable distinctions between wild and do-
mesticated” (2007: 3) that have increasingly dominated the retheorization 
of agriculture and human evolution have important implications for under-
standing the history of technology as well. The fact that Darwin based much 
of his research into the concept of natural selection on domesticated ani-
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mals, as well as artificially housed or contained animal specimens, becomes 
increasingly significant in the context of the resurgent epigenetic paradigm 
within developmental biology, suggesting, among other things, that, as Dar-
win speculated himself in his much- discredited thesis of pangenesis, the flow 
of inherited substance is neither strictly one- way nor entirely independent of 
environmental influences. (Indeed it was precisely this theory Walter Heape 
was testing in his original embryo transfer experiments of the late nineteenth 
century, prefiguring the increased significance reproductive biology has ac-
quired in the context of remodeling developmental genetics.) In retrospect, 
what is so suggestive within Darwin’s discredited model of pangenesis is the 
possibility that artificial and natural selection interact. To the extent that it 
foregrounds how organisms interact in the context of a technological culture, 
the petri- dish model of tooled life appears less and less specifically modern, 
and indeed more like a neolithic frontier.
Contemporary theories of biological development have been radically 
altered by the possibilities that learned behavior may become heritable, and 
that terminal differentiation can be reversed (and that human embryonic 
stem cells are themselves “an epigenetic adaptation to the ex vivo environ-
ment” [Smith 2008]). In turn, new possibilities are opened up for redesigning 
whole organisms and their parts—including both the generation of new cellu-
lar applications and the production of new cellular tools to enhance not only 
genetic but epigenetic control (Smith 2008: 453). That genes are no longer 
“one- way” but can be “told what to do” is reinforced by the unorthodox dis-
covery that a relatively small number of genes can reset a cell’s developmen-
tal clock, rendering it newly embryonic, by inducing pluripotency. Thus the 
importance, noted earlier, of the induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cell (named 
for the iPhone), which can now be used in many experiments that previously 
required difficult- to- source human embryos. The Loebian concept behind the 
iPS cell is that fundamental biological processes can be retooled to access a 
different part of their structural memory. This technology has precisely the 
magical reach we would expect from a frontier science that is developing new 
horizon applications.
This magical reach also appeals well beyond science. New concepts such 
as epigenetic reprogramming, induced pluripotency, and gene transfer have 
begun to travel more widely, and have been adopted as learning aids by lead-
ing biofuturists such as Stewart Brand, who urges (much as Firestone once 
did) that evolution must be “taken in hand” in the name of a survivable human 
future. The turn to in vitro models in Brand’s influential publication Whole 
Earth Discipline thus extends his analogy to ivF discussed earlier, by annexing 
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it to the language of molecular and synthetic biology: “Thanks to horizontal 
gene transfer, microbes have developed astounding skills. Tiny as they are, 
microbes can learn. . . . Microbes do complex quorum sensing, both within 
species and between species. . . . They make rain on purpose” (2010: 175). The 
new reeducability and skill of the complex microbe described in this passage 
exemplifies how such models themselves have become, like ivF, more regu-
lar. The astounding powers of these complex microbes and their potential to 
cross species borders appear to offer a new theory of biopower, according to 
which biological substances can become versatile and powerful tools in the 
effort to reverse engineer evolutionary change. Now that we know how adapt-
able genes are in taking, as well as giving, instructions, they can be retrained 
to make smarter tools. This is the same “biology is technology” model dis-
cussed in chapter 1, and it is the promise of this same logic that leads Brand 
to cite ivF as the big example of why we need to learn to live by remaking 
life, by tooling up biology, as it were. Alongside the work of leading synthetic 
biologists such as Craig Venter, Drew Endy, and George Church, Brand cites 
the Princeton physicist Freeman Dyson’s claim “that the domestication of bio-
technology will dominate our lives during the next fifty years at least as much 
as the domestication of computers has dominated our lives during the previ-
ous fifty years” (Dyson quoted in Brand 2010: 179). In vitro fertilization is the 
regularizing analogy by which these possibilities are tamed through the now 
familiar facts of technologically assisted parenthood.
As noted in chapter 3, Hannah Landecker (2007) has insightfully docu-
mented how “biotechnology changes what it is to be biological” in the context 
of cells that become “living tools.” As that chapter argued, it is now increas-
ingly evident that the working up of biology through techniques such as ivF is 
also changing what it means to be technological. In the increasingly quotidian 
crossover between the languages of natural history, evolution, and biology 
with those of technology, redesign, and engineering emerge exactly the same 
porous distinctions described by Cassidy in the context of the relationship be-
tween domestication and agriculture (distinctions that were already porous, 
as we have seen, in the writings of Marx and Engels, as well as Darwin). Now 
that biotechnology itself is being described as the object of domestication, it 
is worth returning to the question of what evolution and natural history refer 
to, exactly—for example, from the point of view of ivF.
Through the lens of the frontier idiom, we might describe the relationship 
between biology and engineering in the early twenty- first century as a clas-
sic example of a hybrid contact zone, primarily characterized by exchange, 
mixtures, and trading. Like the frontiers of old, the contemporary biofrontier 
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is a zone of exploration, of domestication, and of prospecting for new sub-
stances—now also including living tools. As in the case of the British parlia-
mentary defense, twice in the last twenty years, of the nation’s right to new 
human embryo tools to improve the health of the population, the prospect 
of “walking hopefully into the foothills of a gigantic mountain range” is in-
creasingly seen to be of significant economic and political importance—and 
not only in the United Kingdom. Few national governments appear to be in 
any doubt today concerning the substantial economic importance of the bio-
frontier—and the imperative to accelerate the domestication of new species 
of biotools and bioproducts for the benefit of the biopolity. The age of biology, 
as The Economist magazine has dubbed it, is today substantially manifest as 
the effort to domesticate biological substance by making it more technologi-
cal, while at the same time this merographic analogy returns to redefine tech-
nology as more biological. To describe biology as a frontier today essentially 
means describing it as a tool future. This view of the technological vitality 
of biological innovation in turn suggests a different model of kinship as it 
becomes substantialized not only through biological relations but through 
their identity with technology. If it is the case that modern human reproduc-
tive substance has never been strictly biological—in the sense of being inde-
pendently biological, naturally biological, or biologically automatic—since 
it is organized through a selective reproductive apparatus, then this biology 
must “always already” have incorporated the technicity of its environment 
(which not only humans have introduced) since—well, more or less since 
it started. Such a hypothesis—of a physical chemistry between the organic 
and inorganic that is exaggerated by in vitro life—would offer yet another 
looking- glass perspective out of the world of ivF, and onto its future.12
Cabin Fever
Given these complex imbrications linking biology and technology with the 
prospect of reengineering human futures, it is fortuitously apt that it is the 
sculpture of the Winged Victory of Samothrace that appears on the cover 
of Frontiers of Knowledge, looming behind our lone frontier everyman at his 
desk—as she too has a special relationship to the future of technology, as well 
as its perils. This sculpture from approximately 200 bc depicting the goddess 
Nike is thought to have been commissioned to commemorate a naval battle, 
and to have been installed on the island of Samothrace in Greece in such a 
manner as to suggest she was standing on the prow of a ship. She leans for-
ward, and her missing right arm was once cupped to her missing mouth in a 
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cry of victory, inspiring her crew to triumph over adversity. Much admired, 
she is considered to be one of the masterpieces of Hellenic art and one of the 
Louvre’s greatest treasures in part because of the powerful sense of move-
ment she conveys—not only in her posture, but in the finely wrought ruffling 
of her gown, as if facing into a gale. The sense of her movement into open- 
ended space is furthered by this active stance—her wings fully outstretched, 
as if addressing fate itself.
In addition to physical momentum, she thus evokes a sense of spirited 
engagement (indeed perhaps with the spirits themselves). In the imagined 
space ahead of her lie the obstacles to be overcome, and in her eagerness to 
confront them she both embodies and inspires progress. She thus evokes in 
her entire (sculptural) figure the magical reaching out of the frontier, the 
child as airplane, and the future of airships regularly traversing the North 
Pole. Thus her incorporation into the Rolls- Royce “flying lady,” the figurine 
also known as the Spirit of Ecstasy introduced at the Paris motor show in 1904 
and still a feature on the hood of these iconic cars. As if embodying, then, the 
transfer of the frontier analogy not only to knowledge, but to technological 
advance, as well as the military origins of this idiom, we see in this statue’s 
role as the mascot to elite machines both the sense of hopeful inspiration and 
the recurring themes of conflict and of confrontation that have defined the 
modern technological age.
As Ulrich Beck (1992) has argued, the equation of technological innova-
tion with progress characteristic of the postwar period, during which the 
frontier idiom guided the establishment of large- scale publicly funded institu-
tions such as the National Science Foundation, became increasingly strained 
toward the end of the twentieth century, burdened by what Beck describes 
as “an anarchy of side effects” (1992: 214), and characterized by increasing 
political conflict.13 Far from enjoying automatic public consensus, faith in 
progress becomes, in his view, something that must be enforced, thus in-
augurating a countermodernity equivalent to a secular religion over which 
battles are increasingly fought. Unguided by democratic deliberation, and yet 
enforced as a government economic priority, the automatic policy of pur-
suing scientific and technological progress creates “a blank page as a politi-
cal program, to which wholesale agreement is demanded as if it were the 
earthly road to heaven” (214). Unequivocal on this point, Beck identifies late 
twentieth- century faith in progress as an inversion of the very modernity it 
created. Indeed, he writes, progress “can be understood as legitimate social 
change without democratic political legitimation. Faith in progress replaces 
voting. . . . The fundamental demands of democracy have been turned on 
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their heads by the model of progress. . . . Progress is the inversion of rational 
action. . . . It is the continuous changing of society into the unknown with-
out a program or a vote” (214). In addition to the more well- known cases of 
nuclear power and genetic engineering, Beck describes the introduction of 
ivF and embryo transfer as an example of the “free pass” (207) handed over 
to science in the name of progress, resulting in what he describes as “an ava-
lanche of problems” (206). In addition to the question of whether ivF will 
lead to “completely new types of social relationships, whose consequences 
cannot be predicted,” he notes that “deep- frozen embryos could be stored and 
sold,” thus “provid[ing] science with long hoped- for ‘experimental objects’ 
. . . for embryological and pharmacological research [as well as] genetic diag-
nosis and therapy on embryos, with all of the associated fundamental ques-
tions [including] what constitutes a socially and ethically ‘desirable,’ ‘used’ 
or ‘healthy’ genetic substance? Who will perform this ‘quality control of em-
bryos’ . . . and by what right and with what standards? What will happen to 
the ‘low quality embryos’ which do not satisfy the requirements of this pre-
natal ‘entrance examination for the world’?” (206, citations removed). Like 
both Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas, Beck interprets the birth of ivF as 
a “secret farewell to an epoch in human history” that has transpired without 
public, political, or parliamentary consent. “How is it possible,” he asks, “that 
all this can happen and that only subsequently the questions regarding the 
consequences, goals and dangers of this noiseless social and cultural revolu-
tion must be pursued by a critical public against the professional optimism of 
the small clique of human genetic specialists, without real influence of their 
own and fixated on scientific conjecturing?” (206–207, emphasis removed).
Published in Germany in 1986, and widely hailed for its introduction of 
the concepts of the risk society and reflexive modernization, Beck’s analysis 
in some ways closely resembles those of (the somewhat less widely admired) 
feminists concerned with reproductive technology in the mid- 1980s dis-
cussed in chapter 5, who similarly emphasized the lack of sufficient public de-
bate of the introduction of ivF, and who interpreted this lack of deliberation 
as a measure of the counterdemocratic hegemony of the medical profession, 
as well as the emergence of conflict in the wake of a more reflexive techno-
logical ambivalence. Beck’s claim that ivF conveniently establishes a reliable 
source of human research embryos has also long been a feminist concern, as 
described, for example, by Gena Corea in her 1985 critique of reproductive 
technologies as “the application of animal husbandry to human beings” by an 
elite “power structure” lacking any “conscious policy”:
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Th[e] language of therapy used in describing ivF obscures the fact that 
medicine is not just a healing art but is also an institution of social 
control. ivF gives the power structure potent tools for such control. It 
makes a certain scenario possible: the application of animal husbandry 
to human beings in processes that will reduce women to breeders and 
offer a centralized group of white men control over who is born into 
the world. This would not necessarily be a conspiracy or even a con-
scious policy. The efforts of diverse men to create technologies that will 
increase male control over women and reproduction may be unformal-
ized and intuitive, but nonetheless effective. (1985: 123–124)
Here, then, in reverse composition, is the relation of domestication to tech-
nology described earlier, once again on the reproductive frontier, but much 
less optimistically so. Where both Beck and Corea point to the dehumaniz-
ing, antidemocratic, and subjugating legacies of the potent tools made avail-
able via human ivF, others, such as Brand, now argue the human condition 
has not been so different from animal husbandry all along, and that more ad-
vanced human husbandry is no longer an optional extra, but must instead be 
intensified.
And yet! (as Heidegger would say) whether or not its introduction was 
democratic or consensual, or its risks were sufficiently debated in advance, 
ivF has become, since the 1980s when its introduction might still have ap-
peared to affect only a tiny minority of citizens, a vast and well- established 
global industry—indeed one that is not only as regular as air travel over the 
North Pole, but increasingly reliant on the airline industry to connect con-
sumers with the reproductive products they require. The project of taking 
biology in hand is now more than ever one that is consciously, politically, 
publicly, and consensually annexed to an expanding biomedical, biopoliti-
cal, and bioeconomic future of cultured biology. To argue that ivF should 
not exist may be credible for the same reasons organ transplantation is still 
objected to by some. Or Facebook. But the time has passed for such objec-
tions to have any likelihood of abolishing this technology. Ethical and political 
concerns are not gone, but they have migrated, have been sidelined, or, as in 
the case of Cardinal Keith O’Brien’s objections to embryo research described 
earlier, have become the object of ridicule. Direct opposition to either ivF 
or embryo research is now confined to a small minority in global terms. And 
although calls such as Beck’s for a more meaningful public engagement with 
scientific innovation continue to emphasize the importance of moving it fur-
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ther upstream (a goal that to a degree is manifest in the context of new ini-
tiatives such as synthetic biology), the logic of ivF, as discussed in chapter 1 
of this book, is now both publicly celebrated and irrevocable. Dissenting con-
cern has moved elsewhere—for example, to humanizing animals, nanotech-
nology, and the regulation of trade in human tissues, cells, and organs. Far 
from being banned, or even curtailed (or, for that matter, even meaningfully 
monitored in most parts of the world), ivF, as Brand notes, has become taken 
for granted. The “avalanche of problems” anticipated by Beck may indeed 
be manifest as an ongoing debate over stem cells, embryo research, cloning, 
and designer babies. But these concerns do not appear to have substantially 
undermined either continuing public support of research to develop new bio-
logical tools such as iPS cells, nor to have diminished popular or philanthropic 
endorsement of such endeavors. Indeed, as chapter 5 has shown, ivF has be-
come not only normal but normative.
In retrospect, the case of ivF suggests that insofar as people are voting with 
their feet by queuing up for an ever- widening range of almost entirely priva-
tized reproductive services, this technology is supported by a widespread, di-
verse—and increasingly global—public consensus. Whether or not ivF was 
foisted upon an initially naive and unconsenting public, as Beck alleges, and 
regardless of whether it increases male control of reproduction, as Corea pre-
dicted, the progress of ivF since the mid- 1980s (as a science, an industry, and 
a market) can hardly be described as either slow or hesitant. It is no longer 
even significantly controversial. Five million miracle babies later, ivF looks 
like other frontiers that are already behind us.
But as chapter 6 has also shown, the rise of ivF has not been unaccompa-
nied by the ambivalence Beck described and the expansion of technological 
control of reproduction Corea more unambivalently predicted would be sub-
ordinating. What the case of ivF thus also foregrounds is the need for more 
complex models of technological change, and a wider conversation to address 
the sociological character of these changes. This is one reason I have argued 
that the feminist debates over reproductive technologies in the 1980s, and in 
particular the effort to integrate the understanding of ivF technology with 
the analysis of technologies of gender and kinship, offers a perspective that 
is of increasing value to understand the evolution of the biosciences more 
broadly. The fact, for example, that engagement with both the promise and 
the practice of ivF turns out to be much more complicated than it might ini-
tially appear yields a powerful insight not only into the question concerning 
technology more generally, but the ongoing difficulty of how to analyze the 
current question concerning biology that this book attempts to explore.
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Arguably, what the feminist analysis of ivF reveals with especially signifi-
cant implications for the future of the biosciences is the absence of adequate 
attention to reproduction not only in the analysis of technology, but in the 
effort to theorize social and political structures in general. The difference 
between Beck’s account of new reproductive technologies and those of femi-
nists in the same period lies mainly in the feminist emphasis on the extent to 
which reproduction was not included within the public political process to 
begin with. Moreover, what feminist analyses have demonstrated is that if the 
explicit technologization of reproduction has made this absence in social and 
political theory more visible, it has not made it more legible or tractable. Had 
Foucault observed the emergence of a complex worldwide debate over the re-
lationship between ivF and regenerative medicine, or had he followed the de-
bate over designer babies in Le Monde, he might have been inspired to revisit 
the “strangely muddled zone” of reproductive technology and its significance 
to biopolitics. No doubt Marx would have been a profuse commentator on the 
rise of biocapital in the context of stem cells and regenerative medicine. And 
even Lévi- Strauss must have been tempted at times to consider the complex 
exchange of gametes that is now a routine procedure in the heart of Paris as a 
new mythic paradigm, or even grammar.
What the absence of such contributions reveals in retrospect is precisely 
what the feminist analysis of reproductive technology has shown all along, 
namely that the scope and depth of biopolitics has only just begun to be re-
vealed or charted, but also that from the point of view of gender politics this is 
hardly novel. In the same way the meaning of “biopower,” as Foucault rightly 
argued, has been hampered by too narrow a definition of politics, so too was 
his expansion of the term “technology” to encompass the discursive process 
of subject formation a feminist theory manqué (pace Rubin 1975: 185). Miss-
ing from its remit was not only an adequate account of gender but, more sur-
prisingly, of sex, and in particular of the heteronormative apparatus through 
which sexual reproduction is both organized and channeled. Much as the 
introduction of ivF may have been imagined as a means of facilitating norma-
tive heterosexual, conjugal, and familial ties—and much as it may have been 
seen as analogous to biological reproduction in vivo—it has turned out, as 
Strathern predicted, not quite to reproduce these preconditions exactly. In-
stead, this technology occupies a parallel universe that now supplements an 
imagined original to which it is never entirely resolved.
That this process of supplementation has itself been replicated in the new 
traffic connecting biology and technology more widely—in which one is at 
once synonymous with but exceeds the other, just as the tools of the micro-
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manipulator exceed the frame of cellular reconstruction—only reveals more 
clearly why ivF was never a simple case of giving nature a helping hand to 
begin with. Repositioning this technique within the longer history of retool-
ing reproductive substance, and especially the effort to include within this 
history the recognition that conventional gender and kinship structures are 
as much part of this retooling as hand- beveled pipettes, opens a new window 
onto the question of what “biotechnology” actually means.
It turns out to be in the dehyphenated space of this now familiar neologism 
that biotechnology, like biopolitics, or for that matter biology, still has much 
to reveal. So far, what the lens of ivF reveals is both that we already have a 
more contingent understanding of biology, and a more biological model of 
technology. So much has already been argued throughout this book, and ac-
counts for its title. In turning, then, in the second part of this chapter to a 
more concrete engagement with the new reproductive frontier opened up by 
ivF, and to the ongoing effort to domesticate biology as a technology, as well 
as the new kinship and gender norms this technology relies upon for its own 
reproduction, it is once again the view up close to the encounter with ivF as 
both a technology and a way of life that is explored. The aim of this section, 
which returns to the question of the frontier, is mainly to view this problem 
from another angle—again from another technology, namely photography. 
Shifting, then, as in the last chapter, into a different kind of culture medium, 
we turn to the British artist photographer Gina Glover and The Art of A.R.T.
In the following tour of an art installation in an art clinic, we encounter 
the reproductive frontier as a highly political space, but one that, for all of the 
reasons discussed in the first section of this chapter, as yet lacks a very precise 
political, sociological, or philosophical analysis. In the newly normative space 
of an ivF waiting room, we also reencounter the ongoing ambivalence toward 
technological possibility so consistently described in the feminist literature 
on ivF. Indeed a “strangely muddled zone,” to reinvoke Foucault’s description 
somewhat differently, the space of reproductive pioneering is both anxiously 
and intimately ambivalent—while remaining ripe with possibility and exert-
ing a curious allure. Here, in closest contact with the process of retooling re-
productive substance, is also a space of careful thought and extended imagi-
native reach conjoined with a queer sort of human husbandry. It is to the 
lessons we can learn from this space of biological relativity, as depicted by an 
artist in residence, that we now turn to reconsider the open- ended questions 
of how the futures of new tools and new kinships are conceived by those who 
are living with them closest to hand.
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art in the age of Reproductive technology
Having worked with the Guy’s and St. Thomas’s acu since the late 1990s, I was 
already familiar with the award- winning installation the British artist Gina 
Glover had completed in the Guy’s Hospital Genetics Clinic in 2002–2003 
before I learned that she had been commissioned to create a second exhibit 
in the new ivF–stem cell facility, The Art of A.R.T., completed in 2008. From 
my previous ethnography on preimplantation genetic diagnosis, which was 
partly based in the Guy’s Genetics Clinic (Franklin and Roberts 2006), I was 
familiar with Gina’s most famous hospital installation piece— Chromosome 
Socks (figure 7.2). When I arranged to interview Gina about her new installa-
tion, in the autumn of 2009, we thus agreed to meet in the Guy’s clinic foyer 
where her previous work remains a favorite talking point.
As Gina explained to me while standing beside her signature photo light 
box, Chromosome Socks emerged from a year- long residency in the Guy’s cytol-
ogy lab and came to be the centerpiece for the installation not only because it 
worked visually, but because it was the process of making this piece that en-
abled Gina to clarify her artistic method: “I mean how it originated was that 
what I observed when I was working in cytology, where they were looking at 
chromosomes, was their sensibility to have stripy scarves, stripy socks, stripy 
this, stripy that. Everywhere I looked there was all this stripiness. People [had 
them] had on their notice boards, the men were wearing stripy ties. . . . It 
was extraordinary, the stripiness of everything.” This stripiness—the sarto-




permission of the 
artist, Gina Glover.
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stock in trade—was both visually and symbolically suggestive. It was also an 
idiom that was ready to hand both in the lab and at home—indeed it estab-
lished a connection between these two different parts of the cytologists’ lives. 
In the same way that the cytologists’ socks traveled with them from home to 
work, so too were socks a naturally striped pair of familiar objects used in the 
translation of genetic diagnosis to patients. For her artwork, Gina sought to 
exploit these connections by asking the geneticists to donate their socks for 
her project. “And then I would talk to people and they would talk about socks 
in a washing machine, or spaghetti, and things like that, and so the idea of 
socks was originally formulated from remarks they made. And so I collected, 
and they gave me, [their socks]. This is a geneticist’s child’s sock [pointing 
to the smallest pair of socks]. And so all the socks were donated to me, but 
I didn’t have quite enough so I bought a few more at Brixton market, just to 
top it up a bit.”
Knitting together, as it were, the public and the private lives of the ge-
neticists, their own biological relations, as well as the domestic and commer-
cial economies, the socks proved to be an ideal artistic medium. To enhance 
their “socks appeal,” Gina photographed the socks against a bright white 
background, later Photoshopped to form a halo around each pair. She then 
mounted the glowing socks on a pearly gray backlit grid, each pair itemized 
with bright orange numbers to create an oversized glowing montage mimick-
ing, but mutating, the screens used for diagnosing chromosomal disorders. 
The use of bright color animated the pairs, while the halos enlivened them 
with light. The effect is not unlike a sock party piece—perhaps a disco. “I 
kind of wanted them to look a bit psychedelic. I think chromosomes should 
dance,” Gina explained.
This was not the first incarnation of the socks piece, however. For her first 
shoot Gina had photographed the socks in a domestic garden, in what she de-
scribes as a more “documentary” style—a style, as it turned out, the cytolo-
gists found hard to follow (figure 7.3). Pinning the socks to a laundry line, 
Gina had originally imagined the elementary units of cytology crossed with 
the familial associations of a garden, a home, and housework. This pastoral, 
Edenic, yet domestic and ordinary location, however, proved too generic an 
image. The addition of a dog running under the hanging socks only made it 
more closely resemble a bucolic ad for laundry detergent. “Originally I didn’t 
understand about a karyotype. So I put the socks on a washing line. Which I 
was very proud of, and it had taken me a whole day to arrange them, and to 
get a dog to go through, and get the garden looking okay, and to be the right 
kind of garden to put them in, and of course came back and was told very, very 
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firmly that that didn’t work, and that wasn’t right, and it was totally meaning-
less.” In retrospect, Gina agreed the garden setting wasn’t quite right: “What 
didn’t work with the washing line was that it was in a back garden. It almost 
needed to be a washing line in Venice.” The socks needed to be somehow out 
of place to show up: the image needed to be incongruous, but with a point to 
the mismatch between object and place. The bright socks needed to be back-
grounded, she felt, against something more rectilinear, more contrasting, and 
less like where socks might be found ordinarily. But most importantly, she 
realized, she had not paid adequate attention to the work of the cytologists: 
the image did not connect with them in part because it was too removed, too 
superficial, too untranslatable. Estranged from their donated socks by Gina’s 
initial stab at re- presenting them artistically, the cytologists failed to compre-
hend her image. There was not enough affinity to pull them in.
What Gina next created drew less on the pastoral image of the domestic 
garden than on a different home ground for the cytologists: the primal scene 
of medical genetic screening—their own professional domestic window—
the light box. By cutting, pasting, and rearranging the vividly banded pairs 
of stripy socks into a kind of table (just as a cytologist would), and mounting 
them in illuminated gridlike squares, Gina reproduced one of the defining 
FigurE 7.3. Gina Glover’s initial attempt to depict the work of cytology attempted 
(unsuccessfully) to deploy a more pastoral setting. Reproduced with permission of the 
artist, Gina Glover.
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visual technologies of cytology, the karyotype, which is used to match pairs 
of chromosomes and thus to detect genetic abnormality. As in a scientific 
karyotype, her image is both standardized and individual. Each pair of socks 
repeats the general pattern, but not consistently, as each chromosome, and 
pair, is unique. There is variation in the color and shape of each sock, and each 
pair is shot against a slightly different background—resulting in a series of 
portraits that make up a population, defined by their similarity, but also by 
their serial uniqueness.
In both its mode of production and its final form, then, the resulting image 
is itself an imitation that is defined by both its similarity and uniqueness. It 
is at once a faithful depiction of a karyotype and a clever masquerade, a pas-
tiche, and a torque of a familiar technics: Chromosome Socks is an imitation of 
a karyotype that is more dramatically dressed up, and in fact not a karyotype 
at all, but a comment on one. Clearly, it is an artist’s representation of a karyo-
type. It relies on the visual pun of socks that look like chromosomes arranged 
into a karyotype- like grid, but one that has been enhanced even beyond 
Kodachrome brightness, as if it is a karyotype on steroids—enlarged, vivid, 
and theatrical. A translation of technique that doubles back on its makers in 
the labor of its making, its remade- ness becomes akin to homegrown meth-
ods, while introducing a new way of seeing them. At the same time that the 
image relies upon conventional and familiar mechanisms of scientific dis-
play, it re- presents them by putting a mundane domestic object center stage, 
the humble sock. One need not know that most of these socks were donated 
by people working in the clinic to recognize that they are ordinary domestic 
objects that would have belonged to someone. It does not matter whether or 
not they have been worn, or by whom, for these socks to epitomize everyone’s 
everyday ordinary, as well as the personal and the individual, and the quirky.
Similarly, although they are systematically arranged and displayed in 
numbered rows, from largest to smallest (as would be a proper karyotype), 
the overall image is noticeably asymmetrical. Only one row of socks is com-
plete—the rest have gaps. In between the dancing pairs of psychedelic socks 
are blank empty squares—at once relieving the eye from too much vivid, in- 
your- face stripy sockiness, but also subtly suggesting the unseen, the unsee-
able, and the unknown—the incomplete. The way of seeing this piece of art-
work thus establishes fuses the professional bioscientific gaze with the daily 
familiar of the domestic routine: it offers us a picture of clinical genetics as 
nonthreatening, familiar, and somewhat comical. Adult and child socks share 
a kinship of technology—literally banded together as a stripy group of indi-
viduals and pairs united under the glare of exactly the surveillance Foucault 
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described as a new, disciplining norm of genealogy as technics. Knowingly 
ironic, and an obvious caricature, the witty image nonetheless retains a mildly 
pedagogical flavor, recapitulating the ubiquity of domestic analogies used in 
the context of genetic counseling, where dna is commonly analogized to such 
familiar images as beads on a string, an alphabet, a book, or a recipe, and the 
mixing together of genes is compared to spaghetti, or socks in the washing 
machine.
In her discussion of “the biological gaze,” such as that practiced by clinical 
geneticists in the lab, Evelyn Fox Keller (1996a) emphasizes its interdepen-
dence with touch, as well as its ethos of action, through which sight is allied 
to the handling of objects to investigate the causes of things. This feature of 
the biological gaze can also be understood diagnostically, for example, in the 
use of tracers to identify genes for specific diseases, in order to prevent the 
establishment of a pregnancy using an affected embryo. Indeed, the agency 
of the biological gaze—its attachment to the identification of causes through 
intervention, in order to achieve greater control over outcomes—is arguably 
the whole point of clinical genetic applications such as preimplantation ge-
netic diagnosis. As in Gell’s account of technological reaching, Keller notes 
that “the history of the biological gaze . . . has become increasingly and seem-
ingly inevitably enmeshed in actual touching, in taking the object in hand, in 
trespassing on and transforming the very thing we look at” (1996a: 108). The 
probing, imaginative eye, she argues, requires the probing hand to enquire 
more fully into the mechanisms that make things work:
The fact is that scientists have found a way to walk up to the object and 
touch it; no longer do they peer through the microscope with their 
hands behind their backs. This in fact was the great contribution the 
rise of an experimental ethos brought to nineteenth century biology: 
the desire—and increasingly the skill—to reach in and touch the object 
under the microscope, and thereby “to make it real.” In other words, 
once the microscope was joined with the manual manipulations of ex-
perimental biology—marking, cutting and dissecting under the scope 
. . . the microscope became a reliable tool for veridical knowledge. By 
the close of the nineteenth century, hand and eye had begun to con-
verge. (1996a: 112)
It was in experimental embryology, argues Keller, that the union of “repre-
senting and intervening,” as Ian Hacking describes it (1983: 189–190), be-
came most prominent. Citing the classical experiments performed by Spe-
mann that are discussed in chapter 3, Keller notes:
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At first with relatively crude instruments—perhaps a glass rod drawn 
very finely, or a hair from a baby’s head—and later, in the twentieth 
century, with carefully machined microtomes and micromanipula-
tors—researchers could not only represent but actually intervene in 
the choreography of the minute primal stages of life. They could isolate 
the fertilized egg, watch it divide, gently mark one of the cells with a 
dab of dye and follow it as it continued to divide . . . or they could care-
fully separate the cells . . . to see if the two halves of the young embryo 
could independently form whole bodies. (1996a: 112)
It is by these means, she argues, that the biological gaze evolved from a prac-
tice not unlike astronomy into a hands- on science seeking to identify the 
causes of development (or, in Spemann’s case, the source of organization) by 
separating out and testing the very smallest units of life—that is, by manipu-
lating them. In this way, the gaze became a probe searching for the fulcrums 
of action, and aiming to identify the fundamental units that would, in turn, 
offer greater biological control. Linked to this change in the gaze was thus 
also a shift in what was being looked for—no longer mere classification, as 
Foucault described it, but instead, as Keller notes, “the means to alter—to in-
duce a change in—the course of natural phenomena” (1996a: 115). It was by 
this means, she claims, that scientists such as H. J. Muller, the classical geneti-
cist trained in T. H. Morgan’s lab in New York, were led to envisage a future 
in which control of genetic mutation would “place the process of evolution in 
our hands” (Muller cited in Keller 1996a: 116).
As Gina Glover’s image demonstrates, by imitating with her artist’s hand 
and eye precisely the touching and probing that motivate the scientists’ way 
of seeing, the biological gaze conveys more than just looking—it is also about 
touching, selecting, manipulating, and recomposing its objects. A highly 
skilled practice, acquired only through prolonged training, it is not surpris-
ing that the biological gaze, and its contiguous logics of clinical surveillance 
and therapeutic intervention, as well as of biological causality, are not always 
legible or obvious to the nonspecialist eye—for example, to patients in the 
Guy’s Genetics Clinic, to whom the glaringly visible signs of a positive or 
negative diagnosis that are like billboards to the cytologist or clinician may 
be literally invisible. This same process of translation is the object of Glover’s 
work, only altered by introducing yet another way of seeing, in the form of the 
artist’s handiwork, which retouches the karyoscape, rerendering it through 
the ordinary idiom of stripy socks. Differently trained, and differently fo-
cused, the eye of the photographer- artist is skilled in the process not only of 
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seeing, but of seeing how things are seen, and of revealing new ways of seeing 
both at once—the sight itself, and how it is composed. Like the experimen-
tal embryologist, or cytogeneticist, the photographer is also an adept practi-
tioner of the arts of seeing, as well as the use of technology to probe and ma-
nipulate the object under observation or to frame and reframe events (now 
especially possible in the highly manipulable digital media). For an artist such 
as Glover, whose work involves both photography and the manipulation of 
photographic images, often by manually cutting and pasting them into larger 
compositions (such as Chromosome Socks), the language of cytogenetics is, in 
a sense, already second nature.
The biological gaze that Glover imitates—namely that of the cytogeneti-
cist—is thus powerfully reinhabited by the artist, who has opened this gaze 
up to the viewer, in part by reconstituting it as identical in form, and labor, but 
not in content. As a result, the image offers a way of literally seeing through 
science, and yet also beyond it, as Chromosome Socks is not so much a scien-
tific image as an image of science. Glover’s art is thus doubly translational: 
it both complements and decenters the highly technical scientific work of 
karyotyping by producing an image that resembles genetic counselors’ analo-
gies, while inverting their epistemological gravity. At the same time, by sup-
plementing the biological gaze, which is itself a supplement to its objects, 
Glover introduces once again the relativity that now accompanies spectator-
ship of the biological—be it as a patient, a clinician, or as a viewer of the eve-
ning news, where digitally recorded clips of micromanipulation accompany 
descriptions of stem cells, cloning, and regenerative medicine.
The ArT of A.r.T.
Following its award- winning success in the Genetics Clinic, the method 
Glover devised for Chromosome Socks was translated into a different context 
in order to complete the project in the new acu at Guy’s, opened in the spring 
of 2009 by Robert Edwards. Overseas at the time, I was unable to attend the 
opening, and did not view the finished installation until the following au-
tumn. Visiting it for the first time, I immediately recognized some of Glover’s 
familiar themes as soon as I got out of the elevator on the eleventh floor on 
my first visit to the new lab. Under the title The Art of A.R.T., just opposite the 
elevator doors was a series of digital images of embryos arranged in a tradi-
tional developmental sequence, only now enhanced: Glover had in- filled the 
cells of a developing blastocyst with pink cherry blossom, using Photoshop.
When I interviewed Glover she explained that the photographs of a blos-
som had been taken near her London home, and had become a central theme 
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in the installation as a whole, elsewhere reshaped as giant floating chromo-
somes, and recurring as a motif across several of the collage images. As well 
as symbolizing springtime and renewal, the pink blossom set against the blue 
background was suggestive of the conventional color coding of sex. Signifi-
cantly, the pink cherry tree blossom also transformed the signature blue of 
micromanipulation imagery into open sky, while also thus inverting the view-
ers’ gaze upward: whereas an embryo observed through the lens of the micro-
manipulator is below the viewer, who is looking down, Glover’s embryo blos-
soms appeared to be floating in the sky above, their faint white aureoles like 
the wispy edges of clouds.
A similarly celestial theme is evident in Very Small and Far Away (figure 7.4), 
also in the central elevator waiting area opposite the clinic’s main entrance, 
where the title of this permanent installation The Art of A.R.T. is prominently dis-
played in large letters, announcing to the viewer that this exhibit is fully part of 
how this clinic understands its work. This giant galactic Photoshopped collage 
of cellular and celestial orbs drawn from inner and outer space is backgrounded, 
like Bennett’s frontier thinker, against a starry night sky. While referencing the 
ancient tradition of comparing embryology to star gazing (Gilbert 1994), these 
astronomical images also index the artist’s playful interpretation of scientific 
FigurE 7.4. Very Small and Far Away. Reproduced with permission of the artist,  
Gina Glover.
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imagery—repeating a signature theme in Glover’s work as a whole. Comment-
ing on the overlapping languages of astronomy and embryology—such as the 
birth and death of stars, and the aureoles and coronas of cells—Glover noted 
the striking visual similarities between the orbs of inner and outer space, while 
also revealing, as she put it, the varied ways of being round: “They are all round 
but they are different kinds of round.” It had been important to enhance these 
effects of similarity and difference, she explained, not only by making the tiny 
cells bigger, and the giant stars smaller, but by making the entire image very 
large—upwardly imitating, again, the sky itself—as a galaxy. “I have this on a 
postcard at home,” she said. “It just doesn’t work when it is that small.”
Just inside the clinic, in a place of suitable prominence, stands the com-
panion piece closest to Chromosome Socks in the Art of A.R.T. installation, in 
this case featuring enlarged, Photoshopped ties to represent the diagnosis of 
sperm morphology (figure 7.5). Once again the ties have been donated and 
subsequently posed (tied), then shot, cut, reshaped, composed, and further 
manipulated using Photoshop. Like the socks, the ties are displayed to re-
semble biological entities as they would be viewed scientifically in the context 
of clinical analysis. Again, the ties are vibrant and colorful, seeming to squirm 
against their clinically white graph- paper background. Like Chromosome Socks 
the image is both comical and instructive, scientific and domestic—an imi-
tation of diagnosis and a re- creation of diagnosis as art. Once again, too, in 
the cutting and pasting of the photographs to create a disciplined montage of 
selected elements, Gina’s labor as an artist reproduces that of the scientists 
whose work she is depicting.
Directly opposite the ties is Eggs Donation (figure 7.6)—a neat, orderly dis-
play of eggs donated by female members of the clinical staff, who are named 
and commemorated in the tiny museum- like labels underneath each indi-
vidual specimen. The eggs vary slightly in size but greatly in appearance 
FigurE 7.5. Sperm Morphology. Reproduced with permission of the artist, Gina Glover.
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and the wide range of materials out of which they have been fashioned—
some painted, some made of stone, some that are real (birds’) eggs, that are 
now (Photoshopped) egg specimens on display. At once depicting order and 
variety, the eggs contrast with the sperm ties opposite in being set against a 
stately black background, much as they might be in a museum display. Thus, 
again, while a quasi- scientific idiom is being imitated, it is also being reinhab-
ited by donated personal objects.
A slightly different take on eggs animates Ex Ovo Omnia (figure 7.7)—a 
collection of more than one hundred hens’ eggs dressed in colorful knitted 
cozies. In contrast to the formal curatorial, faintly Victorian, table of donated 
eggs, this egg population appears ready to go: they are out of the box and on 
the move. The sense of animation is enhanced by the cartoonish assemblage 
of characters depicted in a palette reminiscent of children’s toys or tv pro-
grams. These eggs are interactive and sociable, some appearing to converse 
in pairs, share a hat, or glance at one another. They are variously positioned 
standing, sitting, and lying down—together conveying a sense of a commu-
nity. By their very nature they could be described as culinary, domestic, and 
companionable. They are also cute and their tone is far from clinical, or even 
FigurE 7.6. Eggs Donation. Reproduced with permission of the artist, Gina Glover.
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serious. At the same time, the reference to the cozies having been bought on 
the Internet, and the presence of price tags, carries a less comical implication 
of a market in eggs—the eggs themselves also commodities purchased by the 
artist, no doubt in a supermarket. Similarly, one might wonder whether some 
of the eggs lying down are dead, or duds—perhaps hard- boiled, past their 
shelf life, or struck down by salmonella.
In describing both of these pieces, Glover comments on her growing obses-
sion with eggs during her residency (figure 7.8). “It is the same thing that hap-
pens when you go through ivF treatment,” she said. “You become obsessed 
with eggs. It got so that I was seeing eggs everywhere.” We spent a long time 
in front of a collage titled Seeing Eggs Everywhere, made up of several hun-
dred round objects resembling egg cells collected throughout Glover’s vari-
ous travels. For Glover this piece explicitly engages with her sense of enter-
ing into a kind of parallel universe to that of the ivF patients and the staff of 
the clinic in their obsession with eggs (which in humans are, like embryos, 
round). Echoing her galaxy of orbs is this busy “obsessive” concentration of 
“shots that have come from everywhere,” including a shopping trip with her 
daughter, also an artist, who lives in New York. “It is as much about what is 
going on here [she points to her head] as the process [of ivF] I’m describing.”
Embryos as windows
Gina Glover is not the first artist to investigate ivF as a way of seeing, nor 
is she the first to envision the embryo as window on new life. These themes 
have been taken up by other artists, many of whom are included in Suzanne 
FigurE 7.7. Ex Ovo Omnia. Reproduced with permission of the artist, Gina Glover.
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Anker and Dorothy Nelkin’s (2004) The Molecular Gaze, including Anker 
herself. Among the best- known prior art in this field was produced by the 
British conceptual artist Helen Chadwick during the 1990s—coincidentally 
in the lab of one of the embryologists who now works at Guy’s, Virginia Bolton 
(Franklin 1999).
Like Glover, Chadwick immersed herself in the technique of ivF, and be-
came fascinated by the culture of embryo culture. She too used photography 
as a medium and repeated the seeing- and- touching work of the embryolo-
gists’ biological gaze to prepare her images, responding with her artists’ hands 
and eyes to the powerful visual aesthetics of embryology and its still- artisanal 
sense of craft. For her series Stilled Lives in 1995, Chadwick created large Plexi-
glas sculptures of jewelry—a ring, a brooch, a necklace—in which she em-
bedded photographic images of eggs and embryos derived from her work in 
the lab. Her hands- on training with embryologists had taught Chadwick how 
to grade embryos for clinical use, much as a jeweler would assess a precious 
gem. In her artwork, Chadwick built on these associations—not only in terms 
of the precious value of embryos, but in terms of the delicate manual skills 
needed to handle and manipulate them (Warner 1996). Chadwick, whose art 
frequently concerned her own body, became fascinated, for example, by the 
way lab technicians would use suction pipettes— incorporating their breath 
FigurE 7.8. Gina Glover explains The Art of A.R.T. Photo by author, reproduced with 
permission of the artist, Gina Glover.
FrontiEr culturE 287
into the process of creating new life. Similarly, she was captured by the drama 
of life’s delicacy in the petri dish, where some eggs developed beautifully, 
but others, inexplicably, failed to thrive. Much of Chadwick’s embryo art was 
focused on the proximity between life and death in the context of ivF, and 
how this tension was repeated in her own art through photography. Her title 
Stilled Lives captures this ambivalence, since the photograph at once entombs 
its dead image in emulsion and animates it as a photographic image simulat-
ing real life.14
Like Glover, Chadwick was struck by the power of the embryological gaze 
to redefine the world around her. Perhaps affected by the same “eggs are 
everywhere” obsession described by Glover, Chadwick frequently depicted 
embryos in the company of seeds, flowers, eyes, hair loops, and air bubbles, 
suggesting a shared kinship of form, as well as natural history. This kinship 
of form is extended in Chadwick’s work, like Glover’s, to stars and the galaxy, 
as in Chadwick’s piece Nebula. But whereas Chadwick’s experience of ivF 
was based largely in the lab, Glover’s artwork combines the experiences of 
patients, scientists, and clinicians—attempting to give voice to the world of 
ivF they together inhabit—in part through transformative ways of seeing that 
become a shared language in pursuit of a shared goal. Repeatedly she depicts 
both the strangeness and the ordinariness of the world of ivF in her photo-
graphic compositions, which attempt to translate these experiences into a 
visual vocabulary. Thus, for example, in Yes!—Glover’s calendric imitation of 
counting the days of an ivF cycle—she uses rows of pregnancy test wands to 
translate the experience of waiting for results during the process of ivF into a 
stylized, repetitive sentence of images ending in victory (figure 7.9). At times 
she employs the actual voices of both clinicians and patients, collected dur-
ing her residency, by superimposing their words over composite images she 
has made to express them visually. Hence in Nigella she has incorporated ex-
tracts from transcripts from her local interlocutors, much as an ethnographer 
might (figure 7.10).
This sense of the social fabric of relationality contextualizing everything 
about the often fraught and inevitably highly charged emotional experience 
of undergoing ivF is not easily captured visually, and this may be one reason 
Glover uses the medium of fabrics extensively throughout her work. These 
fabrics include not only socks and ties, or cozies, but quilts and also Suffolk 
Puffs, a distinctive fabric construction created by gathering cloth into stylized 
bunches, shaped like buds, and used in quilting, upholstery, and home deco-
rating. The incorporation of this traditional domestic craft into Glover’s art-
work draws associations not only with homemaking, but with female labor, 
FigurE 7.9.  
Yes! Reproduced with 





of the artist, Gina 
Glover.
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expertise, and manual skill—the domestic arts. Glover’s photomontage of a 
quilt made of Suffolk Puffs in petri dishes captures the social role of fabric in 
her wider aesthetic vocabulary, suggesting the extent to which people’s entire 
lives are, in a sense, stuffed into a tiny glass world as they make their passage 
through the ordeal that is ivF (figure 7.11). At the same time, the clustering 
of so many tiny worlds together as a patchwork quilt evokes the sense of soli-
darity often forged among couples undergoing ivF, and conveys the collective 
effort involved in such a project, including the professional ivF team mov-
ing things forward. Indeed from this point of view, the quilted quality of so 
many of Glover’s Photoshopped compositions might also be seen to define her 
role as a residential, translational, frontier artist—knitting together the fabric 
of the ivF world into photomontages that are at once beautiful patchworks, 
finely crafted objects, composites of a myriad domestic bits and pieces, and 
necessary means of keeping out the cold.
thE rEproductivE FrontiEr
The art of quilting, one of the traditional feminine domestic crafts celebrated 
by Judy Chicago in her landmark installation piece The Dinner Party, is sug-
gestive not only of feminized labor, or art, but also the frontier. In its asso-
ciations with the economical reuse of leftover fabric, the practicality born of 
necessity, the provision of much- needed protection against the elements, and 
FigurE 7.11.  
Suffolk Puffs. 
Reproduced with 
permission of the 
artist, Gina Glover.
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the crucial importance of neighborly assistance (the quilting bee being the 
feminine equivalent of barn raising), the quilt continues to evoke a frontier 
heritage. In addition to the sexual division of reproductive labor referenced 
throughout Glover’s Art of A.R.T. is thus a longer inheritance of the gendered 
norms of both domestic labor and technology, evident, for example, in the 
use of Suffolk Puffs. In turn, these legacies evoke the familiar interiority of 
domestic worlds, be they the delicate china collections of middle- class Victo-
rian dining rooms, or the busy kitchens of suburban housewives in present- 
day London.
Writing of the American frontier, the literary theorist Annette Kolodny 
(1975, 1984) describes a gendered space, in which cultivation acquires contra-
dictory meanings of both harmony and destruction. On the one hand a space 
of promise, hope, and future fulfillment, the expanding westward frontier 
also left in its wake a trail of environmental pillage that early commentators 
such as the naturalist and explorer James Audubon described as an abuse 
of the land. Guiding the westward expansion, Kolodny argues, were famil-
iar gendered archetypes of reproduction, sexuality, and marriage, ultimately 
manifest as a defining ambivalence toward “the lay of the land.”15 Citing Fred-
erick Jackson Turner’s famous 1893 frontier hypothesis, she notes that he 
“made explicit what had always been the experiential truth of the American 
continent: the West was a woman, and to it belonged the hope of rebirth and 
regeneration” (Kolodny 1975: 137). “European men, institutions and ideas,” 
wrote Turner,
were lodged in the American wilderness, and this great American West 
took them to her bosom, taught them a new way of looking upon the 
destiny of the common man, trained them in adaptation to the condi-
tions of the New World, to the creation of new institutions to meet new 
needs; and ever as society on her eastern border grew to resemble the 
Old World in its social forms and its industry, as it began to lose faith in 
the ideal of democracy, she opened new provinces, and dowered new 
democracies in her most distant domains with her material treasures. 
(Turner cited in Kolodny 1975: 137)
Such a vividly gendered description, argues Kolodny, cannot be dismissed as 
merely metaphoric in its language, for the gendered polarities evident in this 
passage are too ubiquitous to ignore, and too structurally prominent in fron-
tier life to overlook, complex and contradictory though they may be. These 
gendered images she suggests, are crucial to understanding the postfrontier 
colonial ethos Turner described as the founding basis of the American char-
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acter and nation—an ethos that has now been transferred, with equally com-
plex implications, into the pursuit of scientific and technological frontiers, 
such as reproductive biomedicine:
Colonization brought with it an inevitable paradox: the success of 
settlement depended on the ability to master the land, transforming 
the virgin territories into something else—a farm, a village, a road, a 
canal, a railway, a mine, a factory, a city, and finally, an urban nation. 
As a result, those who initially responded to the promise inherent in 
a feminine landscape were now faced with the consequences of that 
response: either they recoiled in horror from the meaning of their ma-
nipulation of a naturally generous world . . . or they continue[d] pursu-
ing the fantasy in daily life. (1975: 7, references removed)
In labeling this phenomenon the “uniquely American pastoral impulse” 
(1975: 8), and claiming that it is a defining legacy of ambivalence formed in 
the context of frontier experience and mythology, Kolodny’s analysis raises 
important questions about the transfer of the American frontier analogy into 
science.16 Indeed, nothing about her attention to the formative roles of gender 
polarity, the sexual division of labor, the imagery of rebirth, or the idiom of 
conjugality in the making of the American frontier ethos would be unfamiliar 
to feminist theorists of science more generally, including Evelyn Fox Keller, 
who points out in her analysis of gender and science:
Of course, not all scientists have embraced the conception of science as 
one of “putting nature on the rack and torturing the answers out of her.” 
Nor have all men embraced a conception of masculinity that demands 
cool detachment and domination. Nor even have all scientists been 
men. But most have. And however variable the attitudes of individual 
male scientists toward science and toward masculinity, the metaphor 
of a marriage between mind and nature necessarily does not look the 
same to them as it does to women. . . . In a science constructed around 
the naming of an object (nature) as female and the parallel naming of 
a subject (mind) as male, any scientist who happens to be a woman is 
confronted with an a priori contradiction in terms. (1996b: 174)
The implications of both Kolodny’s and Keller’s arguments in the context of 
a new scientific frontier that is premised upon ever greater control of the 
female reproductive system are precisely those mapped out so powerfully in 
the feminist literature on new reproductive technologies discussed in chap-
ter 5. And it is no wonder that these implications have been the subject of 
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strongly worded and often passionate feminist writing, as well as ongoing 
feminist debate. If, as also noted earlier, the dominant turn in this literature 
has been away from a more archetypal or categorical analysis of patriarchy 
versus women’s bodies and instead toward the contradictory, ambivalent, 
equivocal, and often unresolved worlds of the people who inhabit this new 
frontier zone, with all its porosity and indeterminacy, the question of how 
technologies of gender both make and are remade upon the reproductive 
frontier remains a necessarily prominent one. Arguably, in fact, it is what the 
lens of gender or sex as technologies reveals about the development of ivF 
that we have yet fully either to perceive or articulate.17
In her description of her monumental feminist artwork, The Dinner Party, 
celebrating the regendering of artistic creativity, Judy Chicago (1996) de-
scribes not only her attempt to recover lost and undervalued feminine art 
forms, such as embroidery and ceramics, but also her effort to reclaim public 
space for these woman- identified, and often privatized, artisanal arts. Across 
her immense triangular (vaginal) table, Chicago deploys various media to 
produce a celebration of female artistic achievement, using the thirty- nine 
place settings commemorating goddesses and important historic women to 
showcase forgotten and marginalized feminine domestic arts, such as china 
painting, lace making, and needlework. Her “organic iconography” of plates 
derives from her own personal struggle to express herself as a female artist 
(memorably recorded in her autobiography, Through the Flower, 1977), and is 
intended to inspire women to create images of themselves “as subjects rather 
than as objects” (1996: 5). Decrying the “absence of public monuments,” the 
“absence of political leaders,” and the “absence in our museum of images” 
(1996: 5), Chicago sought to reclaim public space for female self- expression 
as well as to inspire women to produce more assertive imagery of themselves.
A significant part of the development of The Dinner Party project from its 
inception was an emphasis on teamwork. Initially with a few friends and sup-
porters, and later with large teams of up to thirty people, Chicago attempted 
to integrate a sense of group process into the finished work by encouraging 
dialogue about the piece as it developed. At evening potluck dinners every 
Thursday, discussions were held to address both technical problems and the 
broad philosophical and political issues raised by the piece. These conversa-
tions, which punctuated the process of completing The Dinner Party project, 
are described by Chicago (1996: 8) as “sometimes confrontational” and “often 
emotionally draining,” but above all as crucial to the work, and to the ability 
to integrate dialogue and process into the finished piece.
Indeed, The Dinner Party project has continued to generate debate—it re-
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mains a talking point; it continues to stimulate conversation; and it continues 
to inspire criticism as well as praise. Like the contemporaneous feminist de-
bates about reproductive technologies, it continues to evoke a sense of col-
lectivity, as well as division. In its material form the project remains didacti-
cally curatorial—reminding viewers of the narrow definition of high art and 
who has been excluded from this tradition. Overall it succeeds in its original 
aims—of publicly exhibiting the world of female art, of putting women’s ex-
perience on display, and thus creating an artistic soil out of which other simi-
lar projects can grow in the future.
Sitting in the waiting room of the Guy’s acu, surrounded by Gina Glover’s 
artwork, it is clear she has accomplished a similar task. By reflecting the ex-
periences of ivF patients back to them through her Art of A.R.T., she too has 
used artistic form to stimulate dialogue and to uncover the emotional reali-
ties of assisted reproduction. By visualizing women’s (and men’s) experience 
of ivF, and hanging it on the wall, she has transformed the often uncomfort-
ably public experience of this technique into a new form of kinship. By incor-
porating her own autobiography as a woman, a mother, an artist, a traveler, a 
tourist, a photographer, a shopper, a collector, and a Londoner into her work, 
she has infused her images with the ordinary business of living a life—thus 
integrating herself into the sociality she is depicting as an invitation for others 
to do the same. As I have often observed myself while visiting the clinic, the 
images become interactive windows for the assembled members of the wait-
ing room—not all of them patients, some being children or relatives of indi-
viduals or couples having treatment. Similarly, the staff members in the clinic 
and the lab take considerable pride in the presence of Gina’s work, which they 
describe as both an inclusive aesthetic and a constructive visual presence that 
assists them in the work they do.
The atmosphere of the clinic is noticeably different because of the pres-
ence of the installation as a whole, fused as it is with the clinic’s architecture, 
thus signifying not only an interest in patients’ lives, emotions, and labor, 
but the desire to recognize and include these nonclinical aspects of patients’ 
lives in the daily working life of the clinic. The prominence of artwork in the 
elevator exit area, before visitors have even entered the clinic, sends a power-
ful message about what kind of clinic it sees itself to be: it is not a clinic that 
shies away from the struggles that living ivF involves, the questions it poses, 
the hurdles it presents, or the doubts it may raise. It is a clinic that hangs on 
its walls questions that do not have easy answers.
This is another reason why The Art of A.R.T. is a distinctive window onto 
the culture of embryo culture and the world of ivF. The work of bioartists 
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such as Helen Chadwick and Gina Glover, along with many others, such as 
Suzanne Anker, enable us not only to contemplate, but to reinhabit the bio-
logical, molecular, and embryological ways of seeing that define the remaking 
of human reproductivity in the context of contemporary bioscience. They 
effect an artistic translation of translational sciences such as ivF and stem cell 
research, providing the basis for reflection, conversation, and dialogue. On 
display in the Guy’s acu is an installation that highlights the constitutive am-
bivalence of ivF—its “curiouser and curiouser” character posed as a series of 
re- presentations of its artifice, and as a series of questions about living the re-
making of life. Skillful bioartists are making these questions, reflections, and 
ambivalences more prominently visible as works of art, and thus as windows 
onto the question concerning technology as this question becomes ever more 
intimately biological. By exploring not only the biological gaze of the scien-
tist but the biographical ways of seeing of those who live in closest proximity 
to biotechniques, artists such as Gina Glover have imaginatively transformed 
the scientific lens into a window through which to observe and contemplate 
the looking- glass world of ivF. From this vantage point, it becomes possible to 
reconsider what kind of frontier territory is being inhabited, or domesticated, 
in the context of new reproductive technologies on both sides of the hole in 
the wall, or open door, connecting them.
Although her work does not explicitly concern human embryonic stem cell 
derivation, Glover’s art is nonetheless helpful as a means of exploring the ivF–
stem cell interface, as throughout her installation are reminders of the work 
that is involved in handling life as well as the emotional and physical demands 
of treatment. Inside the lab, biologists are making human cellular models in 
order to see into the workings of human biology: these new human tools, in-
cluding ivF itself, comprise a way of seeing that is based on replicating the 
object being investigated—imitating it with a purpose, we might say. This is, 
at the most obvious level, the whole point, for example, of a dish model of dis-
ease: it has advantages over animal models not only because it is human, and 
accessible, but because experimentally it can be manipulated and observed 
more directly—it is “the best tool you can get.” This way of seeing through 
the synthetic and the bespoke is how ivF was first developed—as a handmade 
model of human conception in glass.
Outside the lab are the ivF patients who are engaging with the retooling of 
reproductive substance in the most intimate and personal way—by attempt-
ing to achieve a successful pregnancy. And yet, like the experimentalism of 
science, this attempt to move forward often fails, and even when it succeeds 
may lead in unexpected directions. At once guided by the biological gaze, 
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this way of seeing is also blind in many of the most important respects. What 
it can see is dependent on what becomes its background, but even the very 
best visual tools of science are often deceptive in what they show—as both 
patients and clinicians are well aware. And there is of course a whole world 
that is never the object of the scientific gaze to begin with. Following the path 
of scientific progress requires becoming literate in these gaps and ambiva-
lences, as well as learning how to read a karyotype.
As Anker and Nelkin (2004) note in their important analysis of bioart, 
artists have to a certain extent turned the logic of the instrumental biologi-
cal gaze on its head—or inside out. The handmade synthetics that artists see 
through are their own creations and are dedicated to human artifice in, of, 
and for itself—often using their own bodies, biologies, and autobiographies 
as resources for what Beatriz da Costa and Kavita Philip (2008) describe as 
“tactical biopolitics.” As Anker and Nelkin point out, the tools, materials, and 
techniques used by scientists and bioartists increasingly overlap—indeed 
they are frequently identical.18 But as Anker and Nelkin also note, “ultimately 
the images generated by scientists and those provided by artists are based 
on quite different epistemologies. . . . They represent quite distinct ways of 
knowing the world” (2004: 189).
For anthropologists of science too, this conceptual difference holds an im-
portant methodological lesson, particularly perhaps for ethnography, which 
also relies on imitation as a learning tool, and writing as a technology, or art, 
of creative revealing. As it turns out, the anthropology of the life sciences is 
also a lens for seeing the remaking of biological life, using well- worn tech-
niques for depicting social relationships—such as collecting observations and 
writing about them. Similarly, in Gina Glover’s artwork is evident the impor-
tance not only of new biological tools, but of living with them—ambivalently, 
emotionally, and physiologically. Her artwork demonstrates how these bio-
logical and biographical relations to technology are knitted together on the 
frontier of reproductive pioneering—a frontier defined by the coupling of 
substance and tool. As well as revealing the art of art, Gina Glover’s artwork 
depicts a new frontier of biological relativity in which the social, the biologi-
cal, and the technical are lived ambivalently together.
In this way, Glover’s artistic insights are similar to those produced by 
Rayna Rapp (1999) in her ethnographic description of the moral pioneering 
engaged in by women in the context of new reproductive technologies. As 
Rapp notes, the advent of new reproductive technology also creates “moral 
pioneers” situated on “a research frontier,” where women being offered diffi-
cult and unprecedented decisions and choices are also “making concrete and 
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embodied decisions about the standard for entry into the human community” 
(1999: 3). Contesting the privatization and invisibility of this context of moral 
pioneering, she argues, “A classic feminist analysis might begin by noting that 
women have long been relegated to the sociocultural domain of the family, 
intimacy and the private; thus important cultural and political tensions con-
cerning the limits of individualism, privacy and bodily integrity have been 
played out by our potentially reproductive bodies. . . . Multiple iterations of 
our sex/gender system index our medico- legal system. . . . Women are thus 
culturally positioned to think about their reproductive capacities, desires, and 
decisions as a private dimension of public life” (306). Rapp, like Strathern, 
describes the emergence of new reproductive technologies such as amnio-
centesis as “an impromptu and large- scale social experiment” (309), adding 
that the work of moral pioneering is one of reshaping “a more social terrain” 
in which these technologies can be more consciously and ethically inhabited. 
The exclusion of reproduction from the public sphere, and its relegation to 
the privatized and feminized world of personal reproductive decision making, 
deprive the larger society of a crucial resource, she argues.
Arguably this privatization of reproduction, reproductive ethics, and re-
productive politics is one of the conditions that is changing after ivF. One of 
the consequences of the rapid expansion of ivF over the past thirty years, and 
its expansion into stem cell research, in labs such as the one at Guy’s, has been 
to make more publicly visible the political importance of a highly feminized 
and privatized reproductive frontier. Indeed, Rapp’s use of the terms “pio-
neering” and “frontier” encourage such a change, invoking as they do idioms 
more traditionally associated, as Kolodny argues, with a masculine realm of 
exploration and discovery. Somewhat unexpectedly, perhaps, the hole in the 
wall puncturing the border between ivF and stem cell research is thus also 
a window connecting one definition of the political in the past with another 
that is already taking shape in the present—under a very different defini-
tion of biopolitics that has more in common with reproductive politics. In 
the same way we may be cautious about adopting the idiom of the frontier 
at all, given its militaristic and colonial origins, so too we would rightly be 
wary of overestimating the influence of the way of seeing introduced by the 
newly porous and hybrid relationship between bioscience and reproductive 
biomedicine. To pursue this effort further, it will be necessary to understand 
and depict with greater clarity the extent to which experimental science is 
never separate from the experiment of being social at all.
eight after iVF
The future of kinship that is explored in this book through the lens of ivF in-
evitably raises the question of how kinship has been thought in the past—
especially since the kinship concept is itself a tool, in both quotidian and aca-
demic life. The history of kinship theory is itself relational in the sense that 
kinship models are proposed and reproposed analytically and comparatively 
over time (Carsten 2004; Strathern 2005), and so too is it an evolving tech-
nology. While I have been writing this book, for example, I have been teach-
ing kinship theory to students by examining how the very earliest debates 
about marriage, family, parenthood, and kinship out of which anthropology 
and sociology emerged in the late nineteenth century are related to current 
public consultation exercises occurring in the midst of the vast dissemination 
of shared reproductive substance in the present. Such debates not only be-
long to academic dialogue, they are active in social life—arguably in no small 
part due to the rise of new reproductive technologies over the past thirty 
years (Franklin and McKinnon 2001). Hence, while writing this conclusion 
I also prepared a short presentation for the Nuffield Council of Bioethics in 
London to assist them in their inquiry concerning mitochondrial donation—a 
new species of technological transfer of reproductive substance engendering 
debate about children with three genetic parents. Such an inquiry is a typi-
cally recursive exercise—a reiteration of kinship substance as sign, to model 
a problem, in this case addressing an ethical question about a code of con-
duct. Pronuclear and maternal spindle transfer techniques (pnt and mst), 
the council explains on the background information sheet prepared for their 
inquiry, raise new ethical questions, which they phrase in terms of kin ties, 
such as, “What might the use of these techniques signify for the relation-
ships of the resulting child to the three adults with whom it shares a genetic 
condition?” How, the members of the council’s working group would like to 
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know from expert witnesses from the social sciences, social psychology, and 
other disciplines, “might mitochondrial dna be associated with a person’s 
identity?” The scope of such kinship dilemmas is not narrowing as repro-
ductive and genetic biomedical interventions become more precise: to the 
contrary (and handily for anthropology teaching), the kinship dilemmas en-
gendered by these applications have now become analogies for one another 
in the increasingly complex field of technologically assisted reproductive pos-
sibilities. Hence, the council asks, “could the relationships . . . between the 
mitochondrial donor and a person born with their donated mitochondria be 
seen as similar to those involved in: a) organ or tissue transplantation? b) ga-
mete donation? c) donation of other bodily material?” Or, the members of 
the working group would like to know, “should [they] be seen as unique?” 
(Nuffield 2012).
Politically, it is now the established norm in the United Kingdom, where 
many innovative biomedical technologies affecting reproduction in both 
humans and nonhumans have been developed and introduced, for the im-
plementation of translational science to be accompanied by a formal pro-
cess of public consultation and dialogue. Often these translational biomedi-
cal efforts originate in formal and semiformal consultation and dialogue 
between patient groups and clinicians, leading to the involvement of scien-
tists and clinicians to see if new solutions can be found, as is the case with 
pnt and mst, which are intended to alleviate the burden of severe inherited 
mitochondrial (genetic) disease. Without overstating the role of dialogue (or 
rehearsing its shortcomings), it is not inaccurate to point out that modern 
health measures responding to rare, often obscure, genetic diseases typically 
include a dialogic component at both ends of, and often throughout, the pro-
cess of their development. This component is indeed perceived as critical to 
translational success. Ensuring that a consultation process, or talk, is built 
into a proposed application is now considered to be a crucial component in 
the introduction of new technologies (Burchell et al. 2009; Davies 2008).
If, in other words, the proposed clinical introduction of mitochondrial 
transfer rehearses a familiar process of seeking public consent to rewrite 
heredity in the name of improved human health, so too we might suggest 
that both this technical process of genetic reinscription and the larger hy-
brid genre of biomedical translation to which it belongs, are multiply au-
thored, combining not only numerous voices, or forms of dialogue, but dif-
ferent kinds of technological comparison. As the Nuffield Council notes, the 
situation of a child being born who has genetic relationships to three people 
is in some ways novel: “the genetic link between a mitochondrial donor and 
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the individual created using this donation has a relatively ambiguous social 
framework by which to contextualise it” (Nuffield 2012: 2). At the same time, 
they add, such possibilities already have analogies in the form of other kin-
dred procedures: “The possible ambiguity in the perception of the social re-
lationship between the resulting child and the donating woman that would 
be brought about after the use of maternal spindle and pronuclear transfer is 
also seen in the range of language used to describe the parentage of people 
born after the use of these procedures” (2).
As well as belonging to an increasingly familiar genre of technologically 
assisted biology, the novel transfer of reproductive substance in the context 
of pnt and mst thus already inherits “the range of language used to describe 
the parentage of people born after the use of these procedures.” In addition, 
the council notes, “there is an online market for information about mitochon-
drial heritage [although] not a great deal is known about perceptions of any 
social meaning within this genetic relationship” (Nuffield 2012: 2). As they 
have already suggested, analogies can be drawn to other forms of tissue and 
cell donation, as well as assisted conception technologies such as ivF. And 
these analogies are part of the translational process by which reproductive 
substance has become more publicly acknowledged through media such as 
the Internet.
Here, as in the history of kinship theory, a relation is established between 
past and future models of parenthood in the formation of the body politic. 
The Nuffield consultation replicates this process of serial modeling by intro-
ducing a range of comparative contexts and examples in its call for dialogue 
about the future of kinship. The future of new kinship technologies is thus 
contextualized through comparisons to those forms of biomedical assistance 
that already have human histories, such as ivF. We might call this process 
“conditional comparison” in the way the histories of recent technological 
innovations condition the prospect of their expansion in the future. And this 
is a conventional form of consultation, characterized by the weighing up of 
unknown and ambivalent future technological possibilities against what can 
be known from the past: many, if not most, public dialogues about the future 
of technology now take this form.
The following account of conditional comparison illustrates more pre-
cisely how this process functions, and also why it is important to understand-
ing the relation of being after that is so significant to the history of technology, 
and to being after ivF. Using a much older example, from one of Plato’s dia-
logues about technology, it is possible to see how dialogue functions as a kind 
of contact zone in which it is not only interaction with technology that is at 
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stake, but the question of being after, in several senses of this term—after in 
time, after as in pursuit, after as descent or succession, and after as style. As 
Haraway notes, these are the many forms of being after that are united in the 
contact zone: “Contact zones are where the action is, and interactions change 
interactions that follow. Probabilities alter; topologies morph; development is 
canalized by the fruits of reciprocal induction. Contact zones change the sub-
ject—all of the subjects—in surprising ways” (2008: 451). As the following 
example suggests, the contact zone is thus itself a reproductive frontier—a 
space of ambivalent possibility that is shaped, often unpredictably, by mul-
tiple interactions. At stake on the frontier is precisely what will come after, 
and how this can be controlled (or not). And at stake in the question con-
cerning technology is precisely the same set of contingencies. At stake in the 
future of reproductive technology is therefore not only the question of what 
kind of kinship will come after mst, but who will be part of the interaction, 
or dialogue, that shapes and guides this process.
The fear of technological futures that the following example illustrates is 
thus one to which, as we shall see, the politics of reproduction is both central 
and primary. For it is the anxiety engendered by the specter of technology 
racing ahead and spiraling out of control that haunts the threshold of new 
techniques such as ivF with the “monstrous” possibility of a degenerative 
“after.” The ambivalence that attaches to reproductive technologies such as 
ivF has many dimensions, but the question of which “after” will ensue from 
the next technological step forward is one of the most familiar of its forms. 
It is the fear of degeneration in the wake of technological change, set against 
the more confident expectation of an improved, more fruitful, future, that 
has long characterized technological ambivalence. But equally evident, and 
somewhat more curious, is the strikingly repetitive and overdetermined form 
of the question concerning technology as one in which it is the future of kin-
ship—and the question of what kind of kinship it will be—that is seen to be 
at stake, even in some of the very oldest dialogues about changing technologi-
cal inheritance.
hothouse
In the Platonic dialogue titled Phaedrus, after the young literary impressario 
whose peripatetic conversation with Socrates is its subject, the technology 
at issue is the written word. In the closing section of the dialogue, Socrates 
reflects on the relation of writing to speech, denigrating writing as a degen-
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erate copy of living words. Using the analogy of horticulture, he contrasts 
the forced hothouse growing of plants for a party with their “sensible” agri-
cultural production in order to castigate written speeches, and the damage 
they do to men who mistake the mere possession of information conveyed 
through “alien marks” for the active, vital integrity of spoken rhetoric (Plato 
2005: 62–64). The proper pursuit of truth through speaking, argues Socrates, 
produces wisdom as knowledge of its absence. Writing, by contrast, produces 
absence of memory in place of truth. “Socrates: So tell me this: the sensible 
farmer who had some seeds he cared about and wanted to bear fruit—would 
he sow them in some Garden of Adonis [forced pots] and delight in watching 
the garden become beautiful in eight days . . . for the sake of amusement on 
a feast day [or] would he make use of the science of farming and sow them 
in appropriate soil, being content if they reached maturity in eight months?” 
(2005: 64). Only “the man who thinks he has left behind a science in writing” 
and is thus “full of simplicity,” Socrates advises his young companion, would 
confuse “written words” with “the man who knows the subjects to which the 
written things relate” and can speak of them unassisted by technical devices 
(63). So too does Socrates warn that writing is but “black water sown through 
a pen” producing sterile “words that are incapable of speaking in their own 
support, and incapable of adequately teaching what is true.” The “garden of 
letters” is not only “without fruit” but is a sterile caricature of speech. It is 
incapable of generating “a seed from which others grow in other soils” or of 
“rendering the seed forever immortal,” and thus lacks the virtue of “making 
the one who has it as happy as a man can be” (65).
Writing, Socrates continues, is but a “phantom” with the “strange feature . . . 
like painting” of standing “as if alive” and yet remaining mute, defenseless, and 
passive. It lacks a proper origin to give it any character of its own because it is a 
mere copy. Letters, he claims, give but “the appearance of wisdom”:
The offspring of painting stand there as if alive, but if you ask them 
something, they preserve a quite solemn silence. Similarly with writ-
ten words: you might think that they spoke as if they had some thought 
in their heads, but if you ever ask them about any of the things they 
say out of a desire to learn, they point to just one thing, the same each 
time. And when once it is written, every composition trundles about 
everywhere in the same way, in the presence both of those who know 
about the subject and those who have nothing at all to do with it, and it 
does not know how to address those it should address, and not those it 
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should not. When it is ill treated and unjustly abused, it always needs 
its father to help it; for it is incapable of either defending or helping 
itself. (Plato 2005: 63)
Suffused with the language of reproduction and fertility, as well as generation 
and paternity, these passages from Plato’s dialogue depict technology in one 
of its formative dehumanizing moments in the history of philosophy—one 
that equates written words with deceit, illegitimacy, and death. A temptation, 
or even magical elixir, the artifice of written inscription is equated with a loss 
of humanity, a loss of truth, and a loss of self. This emphasis on loss and de-
generation is the same theme that later animates the work of both Husserl and 
Heidegger in their discussions of technology, and motivates Derrida’s lifelong 
effort to reclaim a place for the “garden of letters” in the horticultural aspira-
tions of the “sensible farmer.” The “crisis of the European sciences” depicted 
by Husserl as one of “mathematization” finds its echo in the fear of loss that 
Habermas (2010), arguing in this same tradition, later denigrates as techno-
logical automatism.
But what is of particular note in this passage from one of the foundational 
inherited texts of classical philosophy concerning the degenerative effects of 
technological reproduction is the dense intertwining of the issue of techno-
logical futurity with the reproduction of parenthood and the conventional 
structures of kinship. The relation of being after is entirely at stake in this 
dialogue, in which the misapplication of technology is equated not only to a 
loss of humanity but to a warping of kinship relations. Being after writing, in 
the sense of modeling oneself upon its artifice, is compared to being an ab-
ject orphan unrelated by kinship: “it does not know how to address those it 
should address, and not those it should not.” The relation of “after” suggested 
by Plato’s comparison of writing to misspent horticulture, to barrenness, and 
to wilful ignorance is one that equates technological reproduction not only 
with diminished individual capacity and exclusion from kinship, but terminal 
failure of the elementary reproductivity kinship organizes.
Plato’s depiction of the dehumanizing effects of being after a technology 
that caricatures an original is a powerful strand in the history of philosophy, 
and one that is centrally animated by the specter of degeneration. Hannah 
Arendt similarly described the “banality” of “artificial life” and the “forget-
ting” of “normal expression in speech and thought” that accompany “new 
scientific and technical knowledge” in the opening pages of The Human Con-
dition, published in 1958, in response to the development and use of atomic 
weapons. A German Jewish refugee, she was understandably cautious about 
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the seemingly inverse relationship of “the modern scientific worldview” and 
“science’s great triumphs” to the role of “thinking and speaking”—especially 
since, she warned, “speech is what makes man a political being” (Arendt 
1958: 3). Technology is what makes us human, she admitted, but we should 
never let even the greatest glories of human artifice to allow us to forget that 
“life itself is outside this artificial world” (2). Like Socrates (Plato), she uses 
a form of potted life to illustrate her point—the test- tube baby. “The human 
artifice of the world separates human existence from all mere animal environ-
ment, but life itself is outside this artificial world, and through life man re-
mains related to all other living organisms. For some time now, a great many 
scientific endeavours have been directed toward making life also ‘artificial,’ 
[such as those] manifest in the attempt to create life in the test- tube” (2).
Such ambitious artifice, Arendt warns, presumes for future man “an ex-
change” of the “free gift” of human life “for something he has made himself” 
(1958: 2–3)—in sum, for an artificial human condition, and thus for a relation 
of being after that is defined by loss. Such an exchange, she cautions, would 
create a potentially “final” forgetting that “would be as though our brain . . . 
were unable to follow what we do, so that from now on we would indeed 
need artificial machines to do our thinking and speaking.” The conditions that 
define human existence after the test- tube baby would no longer be those of 
the earth, birth, nature, or “life itself” but instead a “desire to escape” that 
would require a “turning- away” from these elementary human conditions, by 
a “cutting of the last tie” to them in a “fateful repudiation” (2). “If it should 
turn out to be true that knowledge (in the modern sense of know- how) and 
thought have parted company for good, then we would indeed become the 
helpless slaves, not so much of our machines as of our know- how, thoughtless 
creatures at the mercy of every gadget which is technically possible, no mat-
ter how murderous it is” (3). But how is it that knowledge and know- how part 
company for good through artifice? Is this “cutting of the last tie” between 
technology and thought equivalent to the Platonic denunciation of writing as 
a diminution of humanity?
Only a year after publication of The Human Condition, in 1959, Jacques 
Derrida gave his first lecture on the work of Husserl, “‘Genesis and Struc-
ture’ and Phenomenology”—in which he publicly launched his critique of 
the philosophical tradition of logos, or logocentrism, as the basis of transcen-
dental humanism precisely by offering an alternative account of kinship and 
technology. Turning to the anthropological materialism of both Marx and 
the French paleontologist André Leroi- Gourhan, Derrida introduced an ac-
count of techne as the invention of the human—the ground on which human 
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thought invents itself—only ever in an artificial world, and indeed only ever 
as the artifice that is “man.” Following Leroi- Gourhan, who argues that the 
human body—its upright skeletal posture, the molding of the human hand, 
the flattening of the human face—coevolves with the apparatus humans in-
vent, from flints and pots to language and signs, Derrida (1974) reads the his-
tory of “originary technics” as one of regeneration.
Like Marx, many of Derrida’s analogies for technology are biological. Thus 
he understands writing as a living system comparable to an organism, with a 
kinship to other technologies, for which one of his many analogies is grafting. 
In order even to begin to read a written text, one must become enjoined with 
its physiology, he claims, just as the text itself is the live offspring of previous 
couplings. In his critique of Plato’s Phaedrus, aptly titled Dissemination, Der-
rida’s (1981) vocabulary borrows and mutates Plato’s terminology to reconsti-
tute technics as both growth and life. From the outset Derrida describes writ-
ing as a “tissue,” morphing Plato’s depiction of logos as a zoon, “an animal that 
is born, grows, belongs to the phusis” (Derrida 1981: 79). Through this meta-
phor, Derrida grafts his own reading of Plato’s text into its body, making it live 
according to different “rules of the game.” He reconstitutes the reader’s living 
relationship to the written text “as an organism, indefinitely regenerating its 
own tissue behind the cutting trace, the decision of each reading” (1981: 63). 
For Derrida, writing is not dead or barren because it is a copy of an original, 
but instead more lively because it is recombinant.
To further his point, Derrida morphically engages Plato’s analogy between 
technological and reproductive futurity. In contrast to the open- ended pos-
sibilities of living technics figured by the hybrid, regenerative graft, Derrida 
critiques Plato’s idealized image of logos as a “household . . . from which one 
does not escape” (1981: 81), a place of ordered co- habitation, governed by the 
proper laws of kinship as a (patri)lineage. Writing, as Derrida notes, has been 
accorded the status of an orphan in Plato’s kinship system, “deformed by its 
very birth” (148). In Plato’s view, writing is “not well born” both because it is 
“not entirely viable” and because it is “outside of the law” (Derrida 1981: 148). 
The relation of proper speech to this household ought to be properly filial—
the offspring should know their names “by heart.” This is the position Plato 
advocates through his analogy to the serious farmer, who does not waste his 
seed, thus giving rise to the title of Derrida’s response as Dissemination. As 
Derrida summarizes Plato’s (Socrates’s) logic in his account (above) of proper 
planting by the serious farmer, it is a parable of propriety—of proper seeds: 
“Here is the analogy: simulacrum- writing is to what it represents . . . as weak, 
easily exhausted, superfluous seeds giving rise to ephemeral produce (florif-
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erous seeds) are to strong, fertile seeds engendering necessary, lasting, nour-
ishing produce (fructiferous seeds). On the one hand, we have the patient, 
sensible farmer; on the other, the Sunday gardener, hasty, dabbling, and frivo-
lous. On the one hand, the serious; on the other the game and the holiday. 
On the one hand cultivation, agriculture, knowledge, economy; on the other, 
art, enjoyment and unreserved spending” (1981: 150, original Greek terms 
removed). In Derrida’s summation of Plato’s agricultural parable, he em-
phasizes not only the pattern of opposing natural truth to moribund artifice 
that lies at the heart of Platonism, and at the root of logocentrism, but also 
their relationship to technological futurity—imagined through the idioms of 
kinship and procreation, as well as horticulture. Thus, we can interpret the 
analogy to include the proper relation of offspring who answer when their 
names are called, and take root in the correct soil to become well cultivated. 
However, Derrida’s point is that these very distinctions constantly dissolve 
into themselves, relying upon the very terms they imagine as other to them, 
in the process of espousing an imagined transcendence. After all, Plato’s cri-
tique of writing was delivered in writing: “while condemning writing as a lost 
or parricidal son, Plato behaves like a son writing this condemnation,” writes 
Derrida (1981: 153).
Derrida pointedly compares his own analytical process of dissolving 
boundaries (“deconstruction”) to another horticultural practice—to grafting 
(a form of cloning)—in a footnote in Dissemination addressed to the compari-
son of writing and agriculture in Phaedrus:
Within the problematic space that brings together, by opposing them, 
writing and agriculture, it could easily be shown that the paradoxes of 
the supplement . . . are the same as those of the graft, of the operation of 
grafting . . . of the grafter, of the grafting knife and of the scion. It could 
also be shown that all the most modern dimensions (biological, psy-
chical, ethical) of the problem of graft, even when they concern parts 
believed to be . . . perfectly “proper,” . . . are caught up and constrained 
within the graphics of the supplement. (1981: 184–185)
In other words, to write about the dangers of writing is to perform an act that 
undoes its own propriety, because the means by which this end is achieved 
exceed and contradict the logic of its purpose. This is what Derrida refers to as 
“the graphics of the supplement”—a recursive process he compares to graft-
ing in the way a handheld tool connects an “alien” part to the original stem. 
Each part—scion (root), plant (stem), tool (knife), and hand (grafter)—
exists within a larger whole at once “dissolvable” and integral—and regen-
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erative. The graft is not dissimilar to the analogy used by Strathern (1992a) to 
describe merographic thinking—through which a partial connection “from 
another angle” can displace one meaning for another—a process she de-
scribes as substitution in her critique of the metaphysics of nature and cul-
ture. The horticultural analogy of the graft is also familiar from the context of 
embryology, where Strathern’s analogy, like Derrida’s, reverberates (indeed, 
revertebrates).
Both models take on suggestive connotations in the context of Spemann’s 
famous tied embryo—and grafted blastomeres—where a different sort of 
metaphysical principle, of organization, exists in a complex relation to both 
technics and the pursuit of truth. Here, the logic of the supplement is empiri-
cally replicated in the role of artifacts—those scientific results which may 
be the consequence of the experimental apparatus rather than the vital pro-
cesses under investigation. The relevance of this way of “stem thinking” for 
understanding ivF becomes clearer when we recall its origins as a model sys-
tem, used in model organisms, to model biological effects. At once an imita-
tion and a substitute for the in vivo process it models in vitro, ivF graphically 
supplements what is already known about early development by replicating it 
in glass in a manner that both reveals how it works and changes this process 
into something else—by making of it a living supplement to demonstrate the 
laws of life (and indeed to produce new offspring). In a complicated kind of 
grafting, or more accurately transplantation, or forcing, induced pluripotent 
stem (iPS) cells are similarly used to model biological processes such as cel-
lular differentiation—while at the same time rendering them more opaque, 
since the iPS cell is not exactly the same as its unforced equivalent. As in 
the history of much experimental embryology and ivF, the recombinant path 
opened by technological innovation does not necessarily lead directly to ap-
plications, or even to precise questions. The success of the iPS cell could even 
be said to have raised more questions than it answers by dissolving the very 
concepts it reveals.
In vitro fertilization can similarly be described as emerging out of an open- 
ended relationship between technical success and scientific progress, or, as 
Plato might have it, the pursuit of the greatest happiness.1 In vitro fertiliza-
tion was born out of the free play of experimental embryology, and the effort 
to replicate biological mechanisms and pathways, in order both to understand 
and to alter them, using technology to rewrite substance. The evolution of ivF 
technology, while narratable in retrospect as cumulative and even linear, was 
much more haphazard “going forward” toward what remains in many ways a 
barely charted biological frontier. Consistent with Derrida’s textual model of 
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the reinvention of the human via the reinvention of technique, ivF could be 
described as a site of transférance, mutating the Derridean idiom (surely the 
greatest mark of respect) to describe the ambiguity and supplementarity of 
the transfer of this technology “into man.”
Tellingly, it is this tradition of transférance that leads to human embryonic 
stem cell propagation—the forcing of lineages of human cells into new forms 
in the aid of both increasing human knowledge and improving the quality of 
human lives. Conceived as a process of translation, this field of scientific work 
recapitulates precisely the pattern Derrida describes as a revivification of his-
torical inheritance at the level of reinscription. Reprogramming a cell to dif-
ferentiate to order occurs against the backdrop of a constant disorder that is 
carefully managed in a clean room facility such as the one described in chap-
ter 2. The passaging of stem cells is thus literally and technically described as 
the translation of lineages of cells into new kinds of biological life. This dense 
recapitulation, whether it is read as an analogy or not, repeats a distinctive 
pattern of technological recursion, and one that can be traced through em-
bryology, kinship theory, and philosophy alike.
In attempting to reflect on the genealogy of this novel work of transférance, 
this book has sought to widen the models of both biology and technology 
through which we might characterize the condition of being after ivF. Begin-
ning with the question of how we might understand being five million miracle 
babies later, I have argued that this process of remaking life requires us to en-
gage with what is more unusual about this technique than its rapid routiniza-
tion into something regular might suggest. In asking what the view of biology 
or technology, or their evolving kinship with each other, looks like from the 
perspective offered by the ivF window, I have suggested that the looking- 
glass world of ivF has become curiouser and curiouser as well as more nor-
mal, regular, and comfortable. This double aspect of the view from ivF can 
be seen not only from close up, in the experiences of those who undergo this 
procedure or provide ivF services, but from a distance, as the ivF window is 
interfaced to a wider, watching world, for whom the manipulation of human 
embryos is now a generic form of imagery.
In addressing the question of how ivF works, and by investigating its 
mechanisms, the role of other technologies has been foregrounded, in order 
that we can appreciate ivF, in Raymond Williams’s terms, as a cultural form, 
and “in terms of its place in an existing social formation” (1990: 12). From this 
perspective, ivF emerges as a complex of a specific kind, but also as a place-
holder for a larger set of questions I have approached from the point of view of 
technological ambivalence, or ambivalent progress. These observations con-
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tribute to the effort to characterize the condition of biological relativity ivF 
both makes explicit and reproduces—a curiouser and curiouser condition 
ivF substantializes as both a scientific frontier and a lived experience. Here, 
in the complex effort to navigate the topsy- turvy world of ivF, is the moral 
pioneering described by Rayna Rapp (1999) as well as the unfolding question 
of what new biological relations are being forged in the interface between 
ivF and regenerative medicine. On the other side of the hole in the wall is 
an ongoing process of remaking life that requires more complex description 
and analysis, fulfilling Hannah Landecker’s (2007) description of how bio-
technology changes biology, while also demonstrating how technology is be-
coming more biological. At the same time, and like the idiom of the frontier 
itself (and much as Derrida would have predicted), the very distinctions these 
terms rely upon are being dissolved in the context of the retooling of repro-
ductive substance. The ambivalent condition this produces is hardly new: as 
Peletz (2001) argues, it characterizes the anthropological description of kin-
ship as lived relations perhaps more than any other feature. The legacy of this 
ambivalence is captured in the many meanings of “after,” from “behind in 
place or order,” “next to,” “in quest of,” “because of,” “regardless of,” “in imi-
tation of,” “in the style of,” “in honor of,” “with the same name or close to the 
same name as,” “in conformity to,” or “according to the nature or desires of” 
(American Heritage Dictionary). The meaning of being after ivF is similar—it 
describes an ambivalent position that is constantly being reworked, rewrit-
ten, and recomposed. We can understand the relationship between biologi-
cal relativity and technological ambivalence better by tracing them through 
the lens of ivF, which offers a revealing case study of their coproduction. The 
fact that the technological means employed in the pursuit of an imagined ob-
jective may themselves engender changes in how that objective is defined, 
or even reveal new and different objectives, demonstrates that one way tech-
nology reveals itself is as an evolving relationality. Not only objects but also 
subjects are remade along the critical path of technological change, inevitably 
altering a sense of the past as well as the future. To understand technology in 
this way also offers us a different perspective on reproduction; for example, 
one in which there is no such thing as biological reproduction on its own. 
The crucial object lesson offered by the case of ivF, in sum, is a new model of 
reproductivity in which the birth of viable offspring both depends upon and 
changes the social conditions that activate reproductive substance. Ironically, 
in other words, what being after ivF reveals is both the before that an imag-
ined biological naturalism has for so long obscured, and the empty space of 
technological autonomism that remains to be filled. From this point of view, 
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of course, ivF is not so much a vehicle to channel viable gametes into fruition. 
The petri dish is not merely a container in which it is now possible to force 
a new form of biological fertilization into existence. Instead, ivF provides a 
new model of viable reproduction for which relationality must remain both 
the smallest and the largest unit of analysis in order to understand how tech-
nologies make people, how people make technology, and why neither process 
is, in any simple sense, ever only a before or after at all.

aFteRwoRd
By pursuing the question of what it means for the human embryo to have be-
come a tool, I have set a thought experiment in motion that grafts together a 
mosaic of perspectives in order to offer what might be called, following Gina 
Glover, a “plural resolution” on the problem of how to interpret the chang-
ing relationship of biology and technology. The history of ivF, I have argued, 
provides a powerful hermeneutic device for interpreting the question of re-
tooling reproductive substance in particular, and the future of kinship more 
generally. At the interface of ivF and stem cell technology, a unique window 
has been opened up onto both the future of human regenerative medicine 
and the history of the effort to technologize biological reproduction. By trans-
porting this looking glass to a range of other sites and locations, I have offered 
snapshots onto the landscape of being after ivF. By adding the models of tech-
nology and sex from Marx and Foucault to a discussion of ivF, I have argued 
that they offer important resources for charting the bumpy path of this tech-
nique’s emergence, but that they lack adequate capacity to explain what ivF 
is reproducing, exactly, or how it changes the very same biological processes 
it is imagined to imitate. The resources needed to address gender, technology, 
and sex, as well as power and inequality, developed within feminist theory are 
all the more important in the context of addressing reproductive technology, 
which is also why feminist debates on these topics have occupied a major part 
of this book. The complex ambivalence toward ivF first documented by femi-
nist researchers in the 1980s has been extended through an ongoing effort, 
largely within the social sciences, to chart this frontier. This literature now 
constitutes one of the most extended, empirically based, analytical engage-
ments with the question of living the remaking of life that is available today. 
To the extent that, for all of the reasons explored in this book, an enduring 
ambivalence toward this technology would appear to be one of its defining 
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sociological, philosophical, anthropological, and historical characteristics, it 
will repay future analysts of this field to explore it further. The ambivalent 
progress that characterizes ivF is a feature of biological relativity more gen-
erally, and is as legible in the frontier analogy of scientific exploration as it is 
in Gina Glover’s Art of A.R.T. or in the induced pluripotent stem cell.
A different future for speech than the one depicted in Phaedrus is the one 
in which dialogue is not opposed to technics but is instead built into it—
making technics dialogic, as it were. This is the vital sense of dialogue as it is 
espoused by Hannah Arendt (1958) through her concern about ivF and “arti-
ficial life,” and her reminder of the dangers of remaining silent in the face of 
the “banality” of technology. Pertinent though it may be to point out that we 
have not become helpless slaves to our gadgets half a century later (although 
there is certainly ongoing concern about this possibility), and metaphysical 
though her appeal to life itself may have been at the time, it is nonetheless 
such a model of dialogue this book shares. To the extent that the conversa-
tion outlined in this book offers a different set of starting points from which 
to view the remaking of life, that sees in it neither apocalyptic doom nor 
transhumanist evangelism, but instead an ongoing process of navigating the 
same ambivalent relationship to technology that characterizes identity or so-
ciety itself, Biological Relatives has contributed to the kind of dialogue Arendt 
imagined. If this book has introduced useful tools for analyzing biological 
relativity, technological ambivalence, and the condition of being after ivF, so 
much the better for a dialogic future of technics. And if the value of attending 
closely to the experiences of people who inhabit the evolving reproductive 
frontier has been instructive, this too is a contribution to wiser speech and 
thought. The grafting of careful thought into our regenerative relationship to 
biology as technology, to the retooling of reproductive substance, to the hole 
in the wall, and to the open door to the petri dish, is the best contribution 
to the future of kinship we can make, in speech or in writing or in both. It is 




1. The manufacture of “artificial cells” is described, among other things, as a “fron-
tier science,” referring to the moving boundaries between life and nonlife, artifact and 
tool, or nature and artifice. Shinya Yamanaka received the bbva Foundation “Frontiers 
of Knowledge” award in 2010 for his pioneering work on the manipulation of cellular 
differentiation pathways.
2. The proposed use of ivF, which was originally designed as an experimental re-
search technique used in basic scientific research on reproduction and development, 
for human clinical applications generated enormous debate and media coverage as 
early as the 1940s, and throughout the 1960s and 1970s (see, e.g., Edwards 1989). How-
ever, as Robin Marantz Henig (2004: 173–176) chronicles in one of the few histories 
of this technique available, the story of ivF in the two decades following its success 
in 1978 is one of “radical transformation” from distrust to acceptance to not noticing 
at all.
3. Like other social analysts of science and technology, I place a high importance on 
hands- on experiences in the lab, where learning what is involved in various techniques 
and procedures greatly increases the ability to “see through” such methods, as is dis-
cussed further in chapter 2.
4. For a discussion of the methods used to fuse mammalian embryos, see Rafferty 
(1970: 54–55), and for the classic account of the importance of these tools to develop-
mental biology, see McLaren (1976).
5. Clarke (1998: 276) attributes the neglect of attention to the reproductive sci-
ences—in both the academic and popular literature—in part to the amount of energy 
and attention directed toward the Human Genome Project.
6. The new kinds of biological relatives produced by ivF include, for example, a 
multiplication of maternities, divided into genetic and gestational branches, as well as 
new types of siblings, such as twins born years apart or donor siblings connected via 
the Internet. These new types of biological relatives have led to changes in the law, and 
newly explicit definitions of parenthood, as well as complex models of biological re-
latedness in various contexts of bioscience and biomedicine.
7. Although there is some debate about whether iPS cells would eliminate the need 
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for human embryos, donated fresh embryos from ivF programs remain the gold stan-
dard in human embryonic stem cell research (see further in Franklin 2006a, 2006b, 
2007b, 2008).
8. I use the term “matrix” to describe ivF both to emphasize its importance as a 
place of technological intersection and because “matrix” refers to “a situation or sur-
rounding substance within which something else originates, develops or is contained.” 
The dictionary definition of “matrix” also refers to “formative cells or tissue” and to 
“the womb.” A matrix is further defined as “ground substance,” a “binding substance” 
(such as concrete), and also as a “mold or dye.” The term derives from Latin to refer to 
“breeding animal” or “mother” (American Heritage Dictionary). I sometimes also refer to 
ivF as a “platform technology” to describe its use as a base for staging various kinds of 
technological deployment. This is somewhat different from, although not incompatible 
with, the concept of “biomedical platforms” developed by Peter Keating and Alfred 
Cambrosio to describe a distinctive series of biotechnical “steps” in a procedure (Keat-
ing and Cambrosio 2003: 3).
9. Foucault published La Volonte de Savoir, Volume 1 of his series on the history of 
sexuality, in 1976.
10. “When we compare these discourses on human sexuality with what was known 
at the time about the physiology of animal and plant reproduction,” Foucault observes, 
“we are struck by the incongruity. Their feeble content from the standpoint of elemen-
tary rationality, not to mention scientificity, earns them a place apart in the history of 
knowledge. They form a strangely muddled zone” (1990: 54).
one miracle Babies
1. The etymological stem of the use of “mere” to mean “alone”—as in “mere bi-
ology”—is the Old French mier, or pure, from the Latin stem merus. The use of “- mere” 
as a suffix, as in “blastomere,” derives from the related Latin stem meros, meaning part. 
In a sense, biological relativity occurs when “mere” in the sense of “only” (merely bio-
logical) is transformed to mean “- mere” in the sense of “part of.”
2. A crucial distinction between Carlson’s and Brand’s versions of the “biology is 
technology” argument or analogy, and those that are used to describe sex or gender as 
technologies, is that the former are seeking to naturalize, in the sense of normalize, 
this conjunction, whereas the latter seek to achieve the reverse effect, of denaturaliz-
ing these same norms.
3. In his discussion of the ambivalence of mimicry in the context of colonization, 
Homi Bhabha uses the expression “almost the same, but not quite” to point to the 
double articulation of imitation, and the extent to which it troubles normalized powers 
and disciplinary knowledges. In his model of ambivalence, imitation produces a “par-
tial presence” that is at one level strategic, but also menacing, by introducing a “stra-
tegic confusion of the metaphoric and metonymic axes of the cultural production of 
meaning” (Bhabha 1984: 129–130). In the context of ivF, the ambivalence of mimicry 
is deepened by the extent to which it “strategically confuses” the biological reproduc-
tion of persons as well.
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4. Foucault’s genealogical method offers a means of tracing the emergence of the 
invisible norms that constitute both individualized subjects and general knowledge 
practices (a process that is described as technological). His methodology has been 
particularly useful in the effort to provide a history for elements of human life that are 
often imagined as ahistorical, such as sexuality or biology. Reproduction, of course, fits 
into this model very naturally. I have expanded on the Foucauldian method by splic-
ing it with an anthropological one, namely Clifford Geertz’s (1973) concept of “thick 
description”—a term he used to resist the call for anthropology to become a normal 
science, arguing it should remain an interpretive one. Biological Relatives, like Dolly 
Mixtures (Franklin 2007b), attempts to provide a thick genealogy for the emergence 
of modern technologies of reproductive substance.
5. Robert Edwards’s declining health prevented his attendance at the Nobel Laure-
ate Award Ceremony in Stockholm, where he was represented by his wife, family, and 
colleagues. See Nobelprize.org, “The Nobel Prize Award Ceremony 2010,” http://www 
.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2010/award- video.html.
6. For useful histories of ivF, see Biggers (1984), Challoner (1999), Edwards (2001), 
Fishel and Symonds (1986), or Henig (2004).
7. Watt’s contribution to the history of energy production is somewhat circuitously 
memorialized as wattage, for example, through the lightbulb (which he did not in-
vent), on which his name, eponymously electrified, appears as a unit of energy. He 
thus belongs to a unique patrilineage of energy units named for famous scientists in-
cluding the farad, after Michael Faraday; the joule, after James P. Joule; the newton, 
after Isaac Newton; and the volt, after Alessandro Volta.
8. Other theorists of technology, such as both the ethnopaleontologist André Leroi- 
Gourhan (1993) and Karl Marx (see below), have argued this watershed was much 
earlier, and have emphasized the crucial influence of human coevolution with tech-
nology dating back to the Paleolithic era. Marx and Leroi- Gourhan’s models are the 
basis for Derrida’s (1974, 1981) conception of “originary technics” (Noland 2009) and 
the recent reinvention of Derrida as a theorist of technology (Stiegler 1998).
9. References to Marx throughout this book refer to Marx/Engels Collected Works 
(mEcw) available online at Marxists Internet Archive, http://www.marxists.org 
/archive/marx/works/cw/index.htm. The Economic Manuscripts of 1861–3, comprising 
the twenty- three notebooks that form the basis for several of his works, contain as 
a lengthy addition to Part 3, on “Relative Surplus Value,” his notes titled “Division of 
Labor and Mechanical Workshop. Tool and Machinery.” This and several other chapters 
are to be found in Volume 33 of mEcw and are cited accordingly. Despite the fact that 
more polished versions of some of the direct quotations from these notebooks used in 
this book can be found, for example, in Volumes 1 and 3 of Capital, I have chosen to use 
the original notebook versions, which are often richer in technical detail and reveal 
Marx’s extensive knowledge of machines, as well as his somewhat surprising fondness 
for Darwin.
10. “Man possessed living automata from the beginning, in the shape of animals, and 
the employment of animal power for the pulling and carrying of burdens, for riding, 
driving, etc., is older than most handicraft instruments. Hence if one wished to char-
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acterise this as the decisive feature, machinery would be further developed among the 
Scythians than the Greeks; at least, the former employed these living locomotives to a 
greater extent” (mEcw, Vol. 33: 391).
11. This description contains Marx’s answer to the question of what distinguishes a 
machine from a tool—a question he pursues in debate with Charles Babbage. “Once 
the tool is itself driven by a mechanism, once the tool of the worker, his implement, of 
which the efficiency depends on his own skill, and which needs his labour as an inter-
mediary in the working process, is converted into the tool of a mechanism, the ma-
chine has replaced the tool. In this case the mechanism must already have attained a 
degree of development which makes it capable of receiving its motive power from a 
mechanically driven prime motor, instead of receiving it as before from a human being 
or an animal, in short from prime motors which possess voluntary movement” (mEcw, 
Vol. 33: 432).
12. For a review of various attempts to theorize “biocapital,” see Helmreich (2008).
13. As I argued in the chapter on “Capital” in Dolly Mixtures (2007b: 46–72) as well 
as in previous publications on stem cells (2001b, 2003a, 2006a, 2006b), theorizing 
biocapital is different from theorizing biocapitalism, which arguably does not yet exist. 
Moreover, theorizing biocapital requires returning to the basic meanings of capital, 
including both livestock and tools. Significantly, the word “capitalism” rarely occurs 
in Marx’s work. He is principally a theorist of the forms of capital that exist before 
capitalism, and the nature of the forces that transform these pre- or protocapitalist 
forms of stock in the context of what he frequently referred to as “bourgeois economic 
 interest.”
14. Darwin relied heavily on the reported observations of his largely male colleagues 
for his meandering account of sexual selection, which is based in no small part on the 
behavior of domesticated livestock, imported birds such as pheasants, and household 
pets. A more intriguing ethological interpretation of “sex work” among animals is the 
more complex (and less predictably Victorian) model of sexual selection offered by 
Bruce Bagemihl (1999) as part of his account of sex not as a biological division but as 
a field of diverse performances and interactions maximizing the adaptive potential of 
sexual reproduction by preserving its diversity—a perspective with a significant prece-
dent in Julian Huxley’s ([1914] 1968) remarkable work on the complex tactical signal-
ing performed by pairs of grebes.
15. See further on the “traffic in nature” and the digital quality of naturalization to 
switch back and forth as a cultural technics in Franklin et al. (2000). This digital func-
tion also characterizes the relationship between the natural, or biological, and the arti-
ficial in the context of experimental science, as is explored further in chapter 3.
16. One way to interpret Foucault’s concept of genealogy is that it relies in a simi-
larly magical manner upon the ability to realign partial and contingent histories in 
retrospect as singular paths stemming from known origins—arguably a core logic of 
kinship and descent systems as well as narratives of technological evolution.
17. In contrast to the incest taboo that is the foundational law engendering the “de-
ployment of alliance,” the modern family is “the most active site of sexuality” where 
“incest . . . is constantly being solicited and refused,” making the family “a hotbed of 
constant sexual incitement” (Foucault 1990: 109).
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18. For an account of the rise of mammalian developmental biology in the United 
Kingdom, see Graham (2000), and more broadly in Alexandre (2001). See also R. G. 
Edwards (2004, 2005) and Johnson (2011).
19. For histories of embryo transfer, see Betteridge (1981, 2003) and Biggers (1984). 
See further in chapter 3.
20. The modern use of high- speed transportation combined with culture and cryo-
preservation methods to enable a complex worldwide trade in human and animal 
germplasm, reproductive substance, and other biological materials extends the long 
history of livestock egg and embryo transfers, some of which as early as the 1950s, were 
cosponsored by commercial airlines such as twa (Chang and Marden 1954). The air-
line industry also features prominently in the online video promoting the American 
Embryo Transfer Association and its goal of “Global Genetic Improvement through 
Embryo Technology” (www.aeta.org).
21. Elsewhere I have used the term “transbiology” to describe this importance of 
transfer to translation (Franklin 2006a, 2010b).
22. This addition, or supplement, of technological assistance neither removes na-
ture from the process of conception nor replaces it by technology: it combines both. 
What Strathern (1992a, 1992b) articulated so clearly was how ivF establishes new roles 
for biology and technology based on their interchangeability. This substitutability, dis-
cussed further in chapter 4, is what, in Strathern’s view (1992a, 1992b), displaces an 
understanding of technology as a set of tools that can be applied to biology or nature. 
In vitro, the distinction between embryo, tool, and experiment disappears. This pro-
cess can also be described as part of the strategic ambivalence that characterizes imita-
tive biotechnologies.
23. For a comparison of stem cell debates internationally, see Geesink et al. (2008), 
and Prainsack et al. (2008). Even in the United States, it should be noted, a majority of 
the population supports stem cell research.
two living tools
1. Haraway’s first book, on the history of embryology, was published in 1976. Her 
influential articles on primatology in Signs (1978a, 1978b), enormously unusual when 
they were first published, and the first to begin to chart the technologies of sex and 
gender at work in the narration of human emergence, were published the same year 
Louise Brown was born. All of the essays in her now- classic volume Simians, Cyborgs, 
and Women, exploring “modern biology as a system of production and reproduction,” 
were written in the late 1970s and 1980s (Haraway 1991: 2).
2. The aim is also to make of human reproductive substance more effective share-
ware: it is estimated that a single human embryonic cell line could produce treatments 
for several million patients.
3. The earlier version of “A Cyborg Manifesto” was titled “The Ironic Dream of a 
Common Language for Women in the Integrated Circuit: Science, Technology, and 
Socialist Feminism in the 1980s or a Socialist Feminist Manifesto for Cyborgs.” This 
version contains all of the hallmarks of the later one, but includes several pages of dis-
cussion of new reproductive technologies including ivF.
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4. In Firestone’s view, as she explains at length, sexual politics would always restrict 
even the seemingly unstoppable Baconian drive for scientific discovery for the very 
simple reason that the drive itself was sexed.
5. This is what the terms “performance” and “performativity” have come to mean 
in science studies or science and technology studies more generally through the work 
of scholars such as Susan Leigh Star (1989, 1995), Mike Lynch (1985), and Andrew 
Pickering (1995), among others.
6. In his definition of labor, Marx is famously insistent on the difference between 
human and animal labor, commenting, for example, “A spider conducts operations that 
resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construc-
tion of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is 
this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality” 
(mEcw, Vol. 35, Capital, Vol. 1, Book 1, C 7, section 1). My purpose in this section, how-
ever, is not to debate Marx’s anthropocentrism, but instead to point to his attention to 
the liveliness of his account of human- tool relations.
7. “Relics of bygone instruments of labour possess the same importance for the in-
vestigation of extinct economic forms of society, as do fossil bones for the determi-
nation of extinct species of animals” (mEcw, Vol. 35, Capital, Vol. 1, Book 1, C 7, sec-
tion 1).
8. Conversely, the capitalist’s ability to turn “dead substance” and “dead labor” into 
capital is described as monstrous reproduction: “By turning his money into commodi-
ties that serve as the material elements of a new product, and as factors in the labour- 
process, by incorporating living labour with their dead substance, the capitalist at the 
same time converts value, i.e., past, materialised, and dead labour into capital, into 
value big with value, a live monster that is fruitful and multiplies” (mEcw, Vol. 35, 
Capital, Vol. 1, Book 1, C 7, section 1).
9. Suction pipettes, although preferred by many embryologists, are no longer 
viable tools in a clean room environment due to rigid anticontamination protocols. 
What Emma is explaining here is that even though her lab has in the past hand- 
manufactured “perfect” pipette templates for stem cell propagation and sent them to 
a company to be manufactured under accredited (sterile) conditions, so they could be 
marketed as a medicinal product in compliance with gmp requirements, not enough 
consumer demand exists at present to sustain the market. Here, as elsewhere, the 
issue of scale is thus a critical factor in the enterprising up of human embryonic stem 
cell production.
thRee embryo Pioneers
1. For a fuller description of the origins of Roosevelt’s request and the origins of 
the “Endless Frontier” report, see Kevles (1977). On the basis of extensive archival re-
search, Kevles argues FDR did not himself write the letter, but that it was penned by 
members of his office in “the President’s style” (Kevles 1977: 17), having as its center-
piece a vision of “a new and humane industrial frontier” (19) upheld by a “magna carta 
of science” (11) intended to protect the urge of “free men everywhere and at all times” 
(13) to pursue knowledge for its own sake.
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2. That the report and subsequent bill to establish the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development later disappointed its author and his staff in some respects is also an 
important legacy of the “Bush Doctrine” and its aftermath, as documented by historian 
Larry Owens (1994).
3. The origins of the use of the term “frontiers of knowledge” are obscure and date 
back at least to the mid- nineteenth century. William Herschel (1830: 6) refers, for 
example, to “the very frontier of knowledge . . . where no human thought has pene-
trated.” The extent to which this is a specifically American use of “frontier” is thus 
debatable. The idiomatic use of “frontier” (which comes from French, meaning front) 
in reference to knowledge does not appear in the Oxford English Dictionary (1985 ed.), 
nor in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, although it is the third of its three definitions in 
the American Heritage Dictionary. “The critical path” refers both to the frontier sense of 
pathfinding and the effort to find critical biological pathways in the causation of illness 
and disease.
4. The older sense of the frontier as a place is not absent from the list of books ap-
pearing on the first page of a search of Amazon.com for the single word “frontier,” 
where there are still frontier explorers, frontier history, and frontier artifacts to be 
found. These, however, are interspersed among frontiers of baking, kayaking, health, 
and personal therapy—as well as knowledge.
5. See Clarke (1998: 40–46) and Rossiter (1979) for histories of agriculture and ani-
mal science in the United States. See Marx (1964) for an account of the American pas-
toral ideal and see Gardner (2002) for an overview of American agricultural history in 
the twentieth century.
6. These universities figure prominently in Bush’s report. See Clarke (2007) and 
Dziuk (1993) for more detailed historical studies of the Society for the Study of Repro-
duction. “Champaign” refers to the large fields (prairies) used for farming in the cen-
tral Illinois region.
7. The use of artificial insemination techniques in livestock to improve breeding 
soundness had become a well- established practice in American agriculture before 
World War II, but was not the focus of concentrated scientific research in the U.S. 
until the postwar period (Clarke 1998: 159). Agricultural research on artificial insemi-
nation in livestock played a crucial role in the development of ivF. Robert Edwards, 
for example, used bovine embryos from the Animal Research Station at Cambridge for 
his early research into fertilization. Reproductive biologist Ian Gordon describes John 
Hammond’s research on embryo transfer in cattle as “a natural follow- on to his pio-
neering efforts with AI” (2003: 4).
8. Both Adele Clarke and Philip Pauly similarly emphasize the importance of hands- 
on exploratory experimentalism to the history of the reproductive sciences, Clarke 
(1998: 18) referring to the “dense situations” that link “the practical value of ‘golden 
hands’” to the formation of disciplinary concerns and Pauly to the importance of the 
history of the breeding arts as comprising a “form of techne, and not a science on the 
academic model” that emphasizes “traditions of skill” and “artisanal goals” over “basic 
principles” (2007: 264).
9. For accounts of how technology influenced scientific understandings of infertility 
and its treatment, see Orland (2001), Marsh and Ronner (1996), and Pfeffer (1993).
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10. As Jane Maienschein (1986: 84) notes, the debates over Roux’s experiments were 
compared by Herbert Spencer Jennings in 1926 to “a Gilbertian comic opera” because 
of their theoretical inconclusiveness.
11. Needham, a biochemist and later historian of biology, borrows the phrase “limit-
ing factors” from physiology. He describes embryology prior to the nineteenth century 
as “a medley of ad hoc hypotheses” (Needham 1935: 17), arguing that even in the twen-
tieth century it lacked a clear conceptual basis. As a result, he claimed, “Experimen-
tal embryology, Morphological embryology, Physiological embryology and Chemical 
embryology form today a vast range of factual knowledge, without one single unifying 
hypothesis” (18).
12. This is also the pattern that characterizes the development of the iPS cell dis-
cussed earlier.
13. This is why the idiom of the frontier remains problematic, invoking as it does 
military origins, the legacies of colonial imperialism, and more recent associations 
with the military- industrial science of nationalist economic and political agendas. The 
goal of progress, and today especially scientific progress, thus remains historically 
linked to the kinds of movement, agency, and activity the frontier analogy presup-
poses—epitomized by pioneers exploring uncharted territory, and the forward march 
of settlement, and thus also the tensions and ambivalences these histories engender. 
As Jasanoff (2007) argues, it has become one of the dominant axioms of “the bio-
society” that public discomfort concerning “the frontiers of science” becomes particu-
larly acute when the territory being domesticated is biological interiority. I return to 
these themes in chapters 6 and 7.
14. The American frontier idiom was famously forged in opposition to the Old 
World traditions of Europe. See further discussion in Franklin (2007b: 131–135).
15. The term “manifest destiny” describes a mid- nineteenth- century American ethos 
justifying territorial expansion in the name of progress, and legitimating progress 
in the name of the already existing evidence of its benefits. Hence, in terms of both 
American political values (the emphasis on liberty) and economic aspirations (the 
benefits of land and resource acquisition through settlement), manifest destiny, like 
the ethos of the frontier, worked as rhetorical devices to align a version of the past (as 
evidence of improvement) with a moral mission for the future (as an imperative to im-
prove)—even when this effort required military force (initially against native peoples 
and later toward other nations).
16. Sir Ian Lloyd (1921–2006) was a conservative mp who came of age himself dur-
ing the era of the scientific frontier manifesto and its expansion. A South African by 
birth, he was also a leading parliamentary spokesperson on science and technology, as 
well as an enthusiast of mechanical engineering, having authored a series of books on 
the history of the Rolls- Royce motor company in the 1970s.
17. The continuities that link nineteenth- century embryology to today’s stem cell 
science are neatly encapsulated by Hopwood, who suggests, “In nineteenth century 
universities and medical schools embryology was a key to the science of life; around 
1900 modern biology was forged within it; and as developmental biology it buzzes 
with excitement today” (2009: 285).
18. Far better and more informed genealogies of embryological technique have been 
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written by more skilled and qualified authors, and hence this chapter should be pri-
marily considered as part of a series of reflections on how technologies work in order 
to better analyze how they intersect and work in and through one another.
19. Monica Casper (1998) usefully develops the concept of “work object” in the con-
text of reproduction, and this term is originally used in the context of Mead’s (1934) 
concept of “social objects.” As Casper shows, work objects, in her case the unborn 
fetus, are constituted in the context of working communities, whose objects thus re-
capitulate existing norms and values (see further in Ehrich et al. [2008] re the human 
embryo as a “moral work object”). My use of the term here extends these arguments by 
suggesting that reproductivity in general becomes one of the work objects of embryol-
ogy, and furthermore that it is in the context of these workings that a distinctive fusion 
of technology and reproductive substance is forged.
20. These events are discussed in much more substantial detail by historians of sci-
ence, who continue to debate the role of technology in the development of embryology. 
See in particular Hopwood (1999, 2000, 2009), Horder et al. (1985), Gilbert (1994), 
Maienschein (2003), Needham (1959), Oppenheimer (1967), and Nyhart (1995).
21. The distinction between mere description and experimentation has been chal-
lenged, not least since experimentation requires careful observation. Roux used a hot 
pin to destroy half of a two- cell embryo in order to test his theory of mosaic develop-
ment.
22. It is also conventional to distinguish between the pre- Darwinian emphasis on 
histogenesis and growth and the late nineteenth- century embryological emphasis on 
morphogenesis, also described as “the origin of form” (cf. Hamburger 1962).
23. It is the transparency of certain organisms (e.g., zebra fish and sea urchins) and 
parts of organisms (e.g., most embryos and egg cells) that increases their utility for ex-
perimentation, which is similarly diminished by opacity, as in the case of canine ova 
(hence the difficulty of dog cloning).
24. Large marine organisms, such as sea urchins, are conveniently possessed of 
transparent bodies, accessible gametes, and rapid reproductive cycles. They are ideal 
organisms for observing and manipulating fertilization in vitro, and their ready avail-
ability has long ensured they remain among the handiest of model organisms for 
embryologists. They also have historic importance to the field. Oscar Hertwig, Ernst 
Haeckel, Hans Driesch, and Theodor Boveri, among others, all undertook influential 
embryological studies of sea urchins that are now considered foundational to develop-
mental biology. While they are the object of study, such model organisms thus also 
perform many other functions, serving, for example, as textbook organisms and tools 
of the trade as well as comprising legacy objects on which certain kinds of classical ex-
periments are performed as part of routine embryological training.
25. Like most scientists, Spemann was part of a team, and much of the work with 
which he is associated was undertaken by his less celebrated coworkers, most notably 
his graduate student Hilde Mangold. This same pattern characterizes the invention of 
technique more generally, which is commonly far less individual than the eponymous 
naming of Bunsens or petris would suggest.
26. See Sander and Faessler (2001: 3).
27. Heape is responsible for the student laboratory manual on rabbit embryo re-
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covery published as an appendix to the second edition of Foster and Balfour’s Elements 
of Embryology in 1883.
28. Heape was elected to the Royal Society in part for his embryo transfer work, and 
Biggers’s (1991) detailed reconstruction of his experiments was written to commemo-
rate the technique’s centenary.
29. Ultimately it would require further experimentation to disprove telegony in the 
form of the Penicuik experiments, conducted in Scotland by James Ewert in 1899.
30. Heape coauthored the second edition of Balfour’s influential embryology 
manual (Foster and Balfour 1874).
31. Heape’s work was primarily in vivo: his transfer was in vivo A to in vivo B, and 
it established their parity. This is one of many ways embryo transfer can be used as an 
exploratory tool, while also serving as a technique of moving material between model 
systems.
32. Gordon, in his comprehensive overview of embryo transfer in cattle, refers to 
“embryo in vitro production technology,” or “ivp,” a term that emphasizes the develop-
ment over time of an increasing number of productive uses for ivF and embryo trans-
fer. I use the terms “platform technology” and “stem technology” to similarly empha-
size the expansion over time of different uses of ivF.
33. Following completion of his PhD at Harvard in 1927, Pincus received a National 
Research Council Fellowship allowing him to conduct research in Cambridge under 
the reproductive physiologist John Hammond and at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute 
in Berlin with the geneticist R. Goldschmidt. He published his “Observations on the 
Living Eggs of the Rabbit” (1930) on the basis of his Cambridge work, marking his first 
major move in the direction of the study of oogenesis, a field of research he would pur-
sue for the rest of his career.
34. Loeb had studied under the Austrian plant physiologist and agriculturalist Julius 
Sachs and had been inspired by the physicist and social reformer Josef Popper- Lynkeus 
(an early advocate of converting the mechanical energy of waterfalls into electricity). 
He was equally influenced by Ernst Mach, the physicist- philosopher for whom scien-
tific concepts were seen as tools for social reform (see further in Maienschein 2009).
35. Indeed it is a truism today that biology is not only a technology, but simply is 
technology, full stop. Such is the raison d’être, for example, of synthetic biology, which 
is based on the premise that we cannot fully understand biological systems, living sys-
tems, until we can build them from scratch (see Keller 2009). This definition of bi-
ology is discussed further in chapter 8.
36. As Chang (1968: 16) points out, technically Pincus did not claim to have defini-
tively achieved fertilization in these experiments.
37. As he states in his preface, “I am possessed by the belief that accurate quantita-
tive observations afford the means for elucidating the nature of biological processes” 
(Pincus 1930: vii–viii).
38. Increasingly, this genealogy is defined not only by certain privileged objects of 
study, such as favored model organisms, or even the techniques used to investigate 
them, but by the relationship between the two—indeed the coevolution of stem tech-
niques and organisms, as well as the core questions and concepts to which they come 
to be attached through repeated application.
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39. The technical evolution, and recapitulation, of techniques such as in vitro cul-
ture for the study of biological development takes on additional interest from the point 
of view of what might be described as the feedback loop, or recursion, between the 
evolving tools of technogenesis (e.g., the adaptation of a technique for a new use) and 
their objects (e.g., the mechanics of development, aka developmental biology). We 
see here again the complex archaeology of the means by which technologies are re-
produced (e.g., embryo transfer) in order to synthesize reproduction (e.g., artificial 
parthenogenesis). This, again, is why the union ivF confirms is not only that of sperm 
and egg, but more broadly the coupling of the reproduction of technique to the techni-
cization of reproduction—which is one reason why reproductive technology is such an 
intriguing, and dense, area of study.
40. If any single sentence recapitulates the union of the premodern natural history 
of observation and description with the postexperimental turn toward intervention as 
understanding, I have not found it yet.
41. Tellingly in this sentence, “its life history” could refer as accurately to “the experi-
mental investigation” as to “the growth and development of the mammalian ovum.”
FouR Reproductive technologies
1. One of the reasons I began my first book on ivF (Franklin 1997) with an exten-
sive discussion of the so- called virgin birth debate in anthropology is because of the 
extent to which this debate endlessly rehearses the obviousness of the very facts whose 
nonobviousness the debate reveals. While it is obviously true that it takes a sperm 
and an egg to make a baby, this explanation only works in retrospect, when there is a 
baby, and does not explain why reproduction sometimes works and sometimes fails. 
As Annette Weiner wrote in the 1970s, once biological reproduction is no longer “the 
axis on which all else turns,” it becomes clear that “the issues are . . . more complex” 
(1978: 238).
2. The argument that kinship systems reproduce themselves for themselves— 
repetitively and in perpetuity—is the condition of reproductivity (culture) that Lévi- 
Strauss argues is made possible, and viable, through the law of exogamy. As we shall 
see in this chapter, the argument that this reproductivity is essentially for itself does 
not require that it be given an arbitrary biological basis in the natural value of women’s 
reproductive capacity. In fact, such a naturalistic claim only obscures and limits the 
most powerful implication of structuralist anthropology, which, as Derrida points 
out, is its persuasive emphasis on the excessive generativity of the technical systems 
through which human sociality reproduces itself (Kirby 2011).
3. Or, more radically, is there a strictly biological sense of the term “reproduction” 
at all?
4. It should be noted that Strathern’s reference to the meroblast is primarily to dis-
tinguish merographic thinking from mereographic thought, although as it turns out 
the fortuitous inclusion of the meroblast is highly apt.
5. It is precisely the technical nature of merographic thinking that underscores the 
similarity between Mol’s (2002) and Strathern’s (1992a) accounts of biomedical objects.
6. That all of the work involved in making ivF work can then be retrospectively (or 
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even prospectively) naturalized as something that would have happened anyway by 
itself is another example of the utility of merographic logic.
7. These various (old and new) kinds of relatives would include those that are bio-
logical before they are cultural, cultural because they are biological, born because they 
are biologically formed, formed because they are biologically cultured, born because 
they are made, made because they will be born, failed because they were not biologi-
cally viable (or unhappily cultured), etc., etc. The merographic move is as useful for 
imagining progress as it is for recomposing failure (it works as an after as well as a 
before). The more of the merographic is, simply, endless. As Strathern notes, “there is 
endless fractal potential for the replication of combinatory phenomena across different 
scales” (2005: 168n).
8. The term “convention” is derived from the Latin conventionalis, meaning agree-
ment, assembly, or covenant. Although according to the Oxford English Dictionary the 
use of the term “social convention” was not taken up in English usage until the eigh-
teenth century, and the use of convention to refer to tradition developed even later, 
these senses of the term are original to it in Latin, so that the term “social convention,” 
for example, is a tautology, or more precisely pleonasm, because it repeats the same 
idea twice. A convention can only be social, and conventionalis originally referred in 
Latin to social activities. In the human sciences, the use of the idea of “convention” as 
a binding or shaping set of rules was taken up particularly widely within psychology 
and sexology in the 1970s. The early use of “gender identity,” for instance, is a classic 
example of the idea of convention being used to describe the powerful molding mecha-
nisms of socialization (to Durkheim, a convention was a contract). Throughout her 
essay, Rubin’s interest is both in how these conventions direct human subjects to be-
come certain kinds of persons (e.g., men or women), and how they require repression: 
“The division of the sexes has the effect of repressing some of the personality charac-
teristics of virtually everyone, men and women” (1975: 180). The mechanics of conven-
tion, in other words its work, is to shape persons—or force them into molds.
9. Lévi- Strauss refers to women’s reproductive capacity variously throughout his 
work, and the references are usually hybrids of the idea of property as a distinctive 
physical characteristic—as in the biological properties of the placenta—and as a valu-
able good in the sense of something that is desirable to others. He refers variously to 
“the quality intrinsic to these women” (Lévi- Strauss 1969: 481), and the “biological 
considerations” as to “the properties of these individuals” (482).
10. This would be the “is female to nurture as male is to culture” counterargument.
11. After all, this was a logic that even Lévi- Strauss himself questioned in his 
famously confused and disingenuous parting comment that (mais bien sur!) “woman 
could never become just a sign and nothing more, since even in a man’s world she is 
still a person, and since in so far as she is defined as a sign she must be recognised as a 
generator of signs” (1969: 496). We might add that since the first and second halves of 
this sentence contradict each other, they only compound the error of the conflation he 
appears to want to qualify by admitting women are still persons. He is in effect saying 
that “woman” is valuable (a) because she is not “just” a sign, but (b) because she will 
generate more signs like her.
12. Wittig’s term for the unexamined and primitive heterosexism of Lévi- Strauss’s 
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account of the exchange of women, “the straight mind” (1992), is a parody of the title 
of his later book The Savage Mind. As Rubin points out, much of Wittig’s (1969) sur-
realist lesbian novella Les guérillères is clearly written as a critique of Lévi- Strauss (and 
Lacan). Jacques Derrida, also a fierce critic of Lévi- Strauss, claimed that his entire 
argument was not only tautological, but symptomatic of the defining logocentrism of 
Western philosophy: “It could perhaps be said that the whole of philosophical concep-
tualization, systematically relating itself to the nature/culture opposition, is designed 
to leave in the domain of the unthinkable the very thing that makes this conceptualiza-
tion possible: the origin of the prohibition of incest” (Derrida 1978: 283–284). Fou-
cault offers yet another view in La Volonté de Savoir, published in nearly the same year 
as Rubin’s essay, 1976, where he argues that it is the positioning of the threat of incest 
at the center of a hyperaffectively charged nuclear family life in the second half of the 
nineteenth century that produces the crucial incitements necessary to the birth of 
modern sexuality (an analysis that remained famously silent on the sex/gender system).
13. Rubin cites the 1972 republication in Macksey and Donato’s anthology The Struc-
turalist Controversy (reprinted in a fortieth anniversary edition in 2007 by Johns Hop-
kins University Press) of “Structure, Sign, and Play,” Derrida’s lengthy critique of 
Lévi- Strauss, first published in 1966. Notably, Derrida’s critique of Lévi- Strauss in this 
essay, one of his earliest, describes the nature- culture dichotomy as “congenital to phi-
losophy” and claims that Lévi- Strauss is using old tools to expose the weaknesses of 
the “old machinery” of which he remains a part. He contrasts the “sterility” of this ap-
proach to monstrous gestation in his conclusion (Derrida 1978: 278–294).
14. By his own admission, Lévi- Strauss was primarily a theorist of myth and myth-
making, and acknowledged not only that his own method was highly speculative but 
that it might itself be mythical. By this he also implies that he himself did not think the 
nature- culture opposition was so much a true ontological fact as a valuable sociological 
method, or decoding device. This is where he parts company with many social anthro-
pologists, many of whom prefer to consume their facts empirically raw rather than 
hermeneutically cooked.
15. These are the very same values, it might be added, that had just begun to be im-
plemented as human ivF at Bourn Hall in Cambridge as Nature, Culture and Gender 
went to press.
16. Readers familiar with Embodied Progress (Franklin 1997) will be aware that some 
of the material rehearsed in this chapter partially resembles the account in that earlier 
book of this debate, where indeed similar arguments are made about employing ivF as 
a “defamiliarizing lens” on technologies of kinship. Since the argument presented here 
both leads in a slightly different direction and is set in the midst of a rather different 
overall structure, I have included this material again despite the risk of appearing to 
repeat myself.
17. Notably, the question of biology was crucial to the women’s health movement 
throughout the 1970s (Our Bodies, Ourselves had begun as the We and Our Biology 
group in Boston in the 1970s), and had been explored in many popular 1970s feminist 
texts, including those of Firestone and Greer (which in turn had been anticipated as 
early as the 1940s by both Ruth Herschberger and Simone de Beauvoir).
18. The rapidly expanding corpus of Melanesian ethnography was, like feminist an-
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thropology, one of the important contexts in which these categories had already been 
substantially challenged and retheorized as part of a shift toward a more reflexive post- 
structuralist anthropology (see for example Wagner 1975).
19. “Dual organizations” were central to the binary precepts of structuralist anthro-
pology, which, following the structure of Hegelian dialectics, released cultural cre-
ativity through a process of opposition and resolution. They were also crucial to the 
models of structural functionalism, which relied on the structure of descent groups as 
a basic principle of social reproduction.
20. The analysis of gender and sex as cultural accomplishments introduced by 
ethnomethodologists such as Harold Garfinkel (1967), like the account of gender as a 
performance by Erving Goffman (1976), are sometimes compared to Butler’s critique 
of gender identity in the context of feminist post- structuralism. Although such ac-
counts, and others in the tradition of sociology, social psychology, and phenomenology 
that approach gender and sex as situated interaction, ritual display, performance, and 
role theory, etc., overlap with both Butler’s account and those derived from feminist 
anthropology, they are very differently oriented, and do not seek to explain either the 
persistence of a natural or biological base for gender and sex, nor the intractability 
of gender inequality. Importantly, it is the role of biological explanations within the 
human sciences, and the critique of identity, that most strongly motivates Butler, while 
it is the role of reproduction in particular that concerns feminist anthropology. The 
word “biology” does not appear in Goffman’s (1976) account of “the moral career” of 
individuals, for example, and neither Garfinkle nor Goffman concerned themselves 
with biological determinism.
21. The point that has been made not only by Strathern (1992a, 1992b) but by many 
other analysts of the digital switching back and forth that characterizes the hybrid 
logic of kinship thinking (both in its Anglophone guise, and more widely) is that this 
kinship model was never reliant on nature per se, but on techniques of naturaliza-
tion that are themselves a cultural technology. This is the meaning of kinship technics 
as they are analyzed, for example, in the “new kinship studies,” to which questions of 
technology have been central (see, e.g., Edwards 2000; Edwards et al. 1993; Edwards 
and Strathern 2000; Edwards and Salazar 2009; Franklin and McKinnon 2001; 
Franklin et al. 2000; Haraway 1997, 2008; and Thompson 2005; as well as Strathern 
1999, 2005).
FiVe living iVF
1. This phrasing deliberately echoes Georges Canguilhem’s insistence upon the in-
divisibility between knowing or analyzing life or living things and the actual living of 
a concrete life: “The universal relation of human knowledge to living organization 
reveals itself through the relation of knowledge to human life” (2008: xix). A kindred 
anthropological axiom would be that to understand technologies of kinship or gender 
it is necessary to understand how they are lived in real life.
2. One of the reasons that feminist debates concerning nrts have only recently 
begun to receive more attention is because of the extent to which they were initially 
seen merely to concern white, Western, middle- class women’s infertility in developed 
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nations—an assumption that overlooks the very extensive use of ivF worldwide and 
the initial trials of clinical ivF in a largely working- class patient cohort in Lancashire.
3. For reviews of the feminist debate over nrts in the 1980s, see Burfoot (1999), 
Donchin (1986, 1989), Farquhar (1996), Lublin (1998), Overall (1987), and Thompson 
(2005). For a Foucauldian analysis, see Sawicki (1991).
4. For example, the entire corpus of Western philosophy could be described as di-
visive, if we understand this term according to its original meaning as “analytic” or 
“making or perceiving distinctions.”
5. If the high regard in which the British parliamentary system is held serves as any 
guide, the ability to maintain highly divisive and acrimonious debate is nothing short 
of a political ideal.
6. The feminist debate over nrts can be read, for example, as anticipating, con-
firming, and extending what Zygmunt Bauman (1993: 10), writing in the 1990s, de-
scribes as “the ambivalence of man- made design” or Ulrich Beck (1992) characterizes 
as “reflexive modernity.” As we see in chapter 7, Beck’s critique of ivF overlapped with 
those of many feminists opposing ivF in this period (and see more pointedly Beck- 
Gernscheim 1989). Like many bioethicists, Beck was more concerned with how ivF 
would affect humanity than women, leading him, like Habermas (2003) and Fuku-
yama (2002), to focus on the eugenic potential of ivF.
7. These volumes emerged out of the June 1979 conference held at Hampshire Col-
lege in Amherst, Massachusetts, titled “Ethical Issues in Human Reproduction Tech-
nology: Analysis by Women,” organized by Helen B. Holmes, a feminist biologist with 
expertise in population genetics, human biology, and bioethics.
8. Hence, Rothman (1984) suggests, the possibility of having much more informa-
tion about the fetus can have the paradoxical effect of making users of amniocentesis 
more conscious of the right not to have certain information, such as ambiguous test 
results or genetic information that could adversely affect their relationships to other 
family members. Choice in this context can also become prescriptive: to the extent she 
can be held liable for a preventable outcome, the choice to undertake amniocentesis 
can become a means of women’s subordination, rather than empowerment.
9. Dworkin’s model of the reproductive brothel is developed in her 1983 book on 
right- wing women.
10. The Feminist International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic 
Engineering, founded in 1985, is discussed further below. It began as the Feminist 
International Network on the New Reproductive Technology (FinnrEt) at the Second 
Interdisciplinary Congress on Women in Groningen, Netherlands, in April 1984. In 
July 1985 an “emergency” conference was held in Vallinge, Sweden, where a more ex-
plicitly oppositional form of the network was accompanied by a name change.
11. Lublin, for example, suggests, “Not only do FinrragE feminists claim that the 
use and development of technology is male dominated, but they allege that men con-
spire to control this arena” (1998: 66), although she later adds that “there is a diversity 
of views within the group” (67).
12. ubinig is a policy and action research organization formed in 1984 by activists 
seeking alternatives to mainstream development programs based in Dhaka. See fur-
ther at www.ubinig.org.
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13. In this case, the three scientists were coauthors, not coeditors.
14. Crowe’s research was not included in Klein’s anthology for the likely reason that 
it was published in a very similar Australian anthology edited by Jocelynne Scutt in 
1990, The Baby Machine.
15. The question of the extent to which being on the “fertility road” or the ivF quest 
can function as a mechanism to repair lost or threatened conjugal or familial identities 
is taken up further in this and later chapters.
16. This finding also points to the question of how ivF can become a duty: precisely 
because you know your chances of actually becoming pregnant through ivF are slim, 
it is crucial to be seen to be pursuing this goal, to which the alternative is “just giving 
up,” and thus being seen not to value the pursuit of children highly enough.
Six iVF live
1. In addition to the early work on ivF in the 1980s discussed in chapter 5, major 
monographs on ivF beginning in the 1990s include Becker (2000), Franklin (1997), 
Inhorn (1994), Kahn (2000), Thompson (2005), and Throsby (2004) as well as Sande-
lowski (1993).
2. Early attention to the importance of achieved parenthood is evident in a range 
of studies from the 1990s onward including, for example, Lewin’s analysis of les-
bian motherhood in which she describes the “crafting” of kin ties as a form of “natu-
ral achievement” (1993: 184). Similarly, Ginsburg (1998: 110) describes a transforma-
tion from ascribed gender identities to achieved identities in the context of struggles 
over reproduction and nurture in her 1989 study of abortion activists. A different kind 
of achieved identity is described in the literature on adoption, particularly by Judith 
Modell (2002: 182, and see also 1994), who refers to “the achievement of identity” and 
to “made” identities, later described by Thompson (as “strategic naturalization” [2005; 
and see also Cussins 1996]). To the extent that this model of achieved identity has be-
come one of the major themes in the literature on ivF, it underscores the point made 
earlier that ivF can enable its users to achieve certain identities by aligning themselves 
with its means even if the end they are intended to enable does not materialize.
3. Given the long association between pilgrimages of various kinds and the quest for 
a child in the context of infertility, it is in some ways surprising that a more systematic 
comparison between these two phenomena has not been undertaken, all the more so 
as such a comparison is frequently either explicitly referred to, or an implicit structural 
analogy, in many ethnographic studies of new reproductive technologies, including my 
own (1997) as well as those of Inhorn (1994), Paxson (2003), and Clarke (2010).
4. The emphasis in the literature on achieved parenthood includes in some of its 
earliest forms, such as the work of Lewin (1993: 164), an almost artisanal view of kin-
ship as the subject, in Lewin’s words, of “curiously crafted strategies.” This emphasis 
on craft, and “recrafting,” is also found in Thompson (2005: 256) alongside the domi-
nant emphasis in her work on making parenthood.
5. Sadly, it is so much the better if the narrative is especially tragic, if the aim is to 
demonstrate devotion and sacrifice.
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6. The steps or stages of ivF are themselves hybrid constructs. Ovulation and fer-
tilization, for example, refer to natural processes that in the context of ivF are tech-
nologically assisted—as evident in other steps of ivF, namely ovarian stimulation, egg 
aspiration, embryo transfer, etc. A result is that ivF elongates the process of concep-
tion, transforming what is biologically a relatively brief period of time (about twenty- 
four hours) into a lengthy procedure normally lasting several weeks (not including the 
period of planning the procedure and arranging it). As noted above, it is not uncom-
mon for the ivF process in total to take place over several years, or even as much as a 
decade.
7. The sociality of the clinic often reproduces the conventional gender division of 
labor common to medical settings of male consultant aided by largely female staff, 
which also exaggerates these gender differences.
8. Although it is increasingly possible for nonnormative kinship and gender identi-
ties to be accommodated within the world of ivF (indeed, some clinics specialize in 
offering fertility services to lesbian and gay consumers), the strain of inhabiting this 
“hypergender- appropriate” world may be severe, as Laura Mamo (2007) shows in her 
important study of lesbians’ exhausting experiences of fertility treatment.
9. The experience of one’s own biology on an ivF program is also, again paradoxi-
cally, most similar, if you are a woman, to the experiences of male patients undergoing 
gender transition by submitting to a hormonal regime that replaces their original and 
familiar one.
10. This form of modern double consciousness associated with technology can be 
closely related to the ambivalence this technology also produces—again, a recursion of 
identity technics in the context of a similarly doubled reproductivity.
11. My thanks to Sara Ahmed for the reference to feminist phenomenology.
12. Another term for this, after Thompson (2005), might be “strategic biologization” 
(also after Spivak’s [1985] “strategic essentialism”)—both in terms of whether some-
thing is biologized or not (e.g., the drive to reproduce) and how it is biologized (e.g., 
in relation to the start of pregnancy). That the amount of strategic adjustment occur-
ring during any art procedure is part of its workload is not in question. However, the 
forms of biological consciousness, biological knowledge, or biological identity oper-
ating here are less well characterized, especially insofar as they are, in effect, novel 
forms of technological consciousness, technical knowledge, and tactical identity in the 
context of ivF.
13. In addition to making it possible to be partially pregnant, ivF has also made it 
more difficult to be, as it were, just or simply pregnant. Various new forms of preg-
nancy have arisen in the wake of ivF. The existence of assisted and achieved pregnancy 
have left in their wake, for example, new categories for previously unmarked forms 
of pregnancy including unassisted, natural, and spontaneous pregnancies. A preg-
nancy that is established by a test result two weeks after embryo transfer may reveal 
a positive pregnancy indicator that is later revealed to have been an artifact of treat-
ment known as a chemical pregnancy—which is such a particularly undesirable form 
of pregnancy that patients are often repeatedly warned in advance to be wary of the 
test result until they have had it confirmed two weeks later (advice it may be easier to 
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follow rationally than emotionally). In vitro fertilization also increases the chances of 
ectopic, or tubal, pregnancies, as well as multiple pregnancy. A pregnancy can also be 
more than one of these types, for example a spontaneous multiple pregnancy.
14. One of the primary meanings of “heroic” is “exaggerated characterization” 
(American Heritage Dictionary). In the Oxford English Dictionary “heroic” is defined as 
“having recourse to bold, daring or extreme measures; boldly experimental, attempting 
great things” (1971: Volume 1, 246). A female hero is of course a heroine—a woman of 
great fortitude who undertakes acts of greatness.
15. A number of excellent studies have documented the globalization of ivF not 
only as a means of family formation but a form of consumer culture. As Marcia Inhorn 
(2003) documents in her study of globalizing reproductive technologies, these means 
bring with them the effects of economic stratification, which can exacerbate, rather 
than relieve, the distress of infertility.
16. Paxson (2004: 214) makes explicit reference to the arguments of Teresa de 
Lauretis’s (1987) model of gender as a technology and points out that Foucault’s ver-
sion of technologies of sex draws on ancient Greek philosophy.
17. It might be said that ivF combines an effect of origin with a means of effecting 
an origin.
18. This was the logic of the right- to- life effort to implicate women in the guilt of 
abortion both by facilitating bonding through ultrasound, and by revulsion at the sight 
of dismembered fetal remains (Petchesky 1987).
19. As both Lisa Cartwright (1995) and Hannah Landecker (2007) have docu-
mented, the history of the cinema has its origins in the effort to explore the mechanics 
of cell biology.
20. The contrast is particularly evident in relation to Nilsson’s photos, the work of 
preparation for which is noticeably absent, as it is only the finished object in the form 
of a photograph he sought to produce.
21. The reliance on microinjection in the context of assisted conception is exempli-
fied by the increasingly routine use of icsi in ivF in order to avoid contamination of 
the egg’s environment during fertilization. Also, icsi is used to avoid sperm cell con-
tamination when performing polar body removal or blastomere biopsy.
SeVen Frontier Culture
1. See Ahmed for an insightful account of “facing” as an orientation that becomes 
“the point from which ‘we’ emerge” (2006: 15).
2. To my knowledge, this is the first publication ever to use this phrase as its title, 
although the expression appears to have been in routine use since at least the mid- 
nineteenth century.
3. Robert Edwin Peary (1856–1920) claimed to have reached the North Pole in 1909, 
the first explorer to do so. An American explorer, a graduate of Bowdoin College, and 
a civil engineer by training, he employed indigenous Inuit techniques to conduct Arc-
tic expeditions. The ship he captained for his most famous expeditions was named 
 Roosevelt.
4. In both the United States and Australia, where the frontier narrative plays a cru-
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cial role in the national imaginary, the “no- man’s- land” (terra nullius) occupied by 
white settler colonists was already occupied by highly civilized people, whose displace-
ment was often brought about by violent and illegal acts of occupation.
5. For an insightful account of this question, see Amy E. Wendling’s (2009) discus-
sion of Marx’s analysis of technology, in which she argues Marx’s model of technology 
changes significantly in the wake of his “energeticist turn,” a view that accords with 
this book’s emphasis on Marx’s technological biologism.
6. As Habermas notes: “Today, in the industrially most advanced systems, an ener-
getic attempt must be made consciously to take in hand the mediation between tech-
nical progress and the conduct of life in the major industrial societies, a mediation that 
has previously taken place without direction, as a mere continuation of natural his-
tory” (2010: 87).
7. “Envisaging the possibility of a technology that would constitute a theory of the 
evolution of technics, Marx [and Engels] outlined a new perspective,” claims Stiegler 
(1998: 2). He cites Marx: “Technology reveals the active relation of man to nature, the 
direct process of the production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare the process of 
the production of the social relations of his life, and of the mental conceptions that 
flow from these relations” (Marx cited in Stiegler 1998: 16). In sum, he argues, Marx 
and Engels offered a technical version of biological evolution, as well as an evolution 
of technics.
8. Theorists in this tradition would include not only Leroi- Gourhan, who is dis-
cussed earlier, and who is closely followed by Lemonnier as well as other anthropolo-
gists and ethnologists of technique, but more recently Tim Ingold. A version of this 
project continues to be advanced under the rubric of anthropological materialism.
9. Bryan Pfaffenberger describes the progressive evolutionary model of need- driven, 
adaptation- oriented, strategic technological advance as the “Standard View,” referring 
in part to its commonsense appeal. Lewis Binford (1965) argues, for example, that the 
primary meaning of technology is always instrumental and pragmatic, after which it 
may acquire a secondary social or cultural meaning. The opposite view, that social and 
cultural meanings are more primary than technology, has been put forward by Sahlins 
(1972, 1976), among others, as well as Lemonnier (1993).
10. The term “contact zone” is also closely associated with the work of Mary Louise 
Pratt (1992: 2) to describe interactions on the colonial frontier. Her use of the term 
“contact” derives from the use of “contact languages,” such as pidgin, to describe hy-
brid or mixed strategies of interaction.
11. Perhaps not surprisingly, the literature which emphasizes that technology is an 
essential, but not determining, variable in the causal histories of social change has 
developed in close partnership with arguments from science studies, such as those 
of Madeleine Akrich (1992) concerning technology transfer, and Bruno Latour (1987, 
1993) emphasizing the dependency of how techniques work not only on factors unre-
lated to their efficiency, but on the viability of social relations and cultural constructs 
that support their coming into being as hybrid entities. This argument is similarly 
prominent in anthropology, as illustrated earlier by Gell (1988) and more recently by 
Lucy Suchman (2007).
12. Such an argument has been made by an increasing number of social theorists, 
332 notEs to chaptEr Eight
including Stefan Helmreich (2008), Vicky Kirby (2011), and Myra Hird (2009). In such 
arguments humans are already a kind of in vitro life contained by the culture medium 
of the technologically saturated milieu. The concept of the “Anthropocene” similarly 
resembles the model of the petri dish, by implying a kind of contamination of the evo-
lutionary process that is “manmade.”
13. Less than twenty years after the publication of Roosevelt’s endless frontier doc-
trine for science, Dwight D. Eisenhower was to publicly express his fears that the so- 
called military- industrial- science complex would alienate the American public from 
the “insidious penetration” of a technoscientific elite. In 1961, in his farewell speech, 
Eisenhower called on Americans to hold science in respect but to beware the “danger 
that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific- technological elite” 
(Eisenhower 1961).
14. Made from the rendered remains of domesticated livestock, emulsion is itself 
a technological substance derived both from the “culture of nature” and denatured 
biology, manifest as media. See further in Shukin (2009: 104–114).
15. This ambivalence is differently evoked in Leo Marx’s (2000) account of the para-
doxes of American pastoralism, an argument that revolves centrally around the contra-
dictory figure of the machine in the garden.
16. The need to colonize people as well as land in the context of frontier expansion 
also has implications for the question of whose biological substance becomes domes-
ticated as a tool—an ongoing question that has been widely debated within anthro-
pology in the context of the Human Genome Project (Goodman et al. 2003).
17. The effort to analyze the highly stratified post- ivF world of reproductive tour-
ism, or “cross- border reproductive care,” which has only recently begun to be pursued 
in a more systematic manner (Inhorn and Gurtin 2011), strongly reinforces the argu-
ment of this book that ivF makes explicit the intersection of what Derrida describes as 
“originary technics,” meaning identity, thought, and language, with the methods more 
commonly associated with technology, including direct manual intervention of the use 
of tools. The models of intersectionality proposed from within feminist theory, includ-
ing Haraway’s (1983, 1985) early work on technology and cyborg politics, make clear 
that the gendering of reproductive substance, or even sex, cannot be separated from 
the technics of race, nationality, or class.
18. Increasingly, bioartists such as Oron Cotts, of the Tissue Culture and Art project, 
have been formally trained in leading scientific labs to learn the techniques they now 
use for bioart. Science is itself a technical art, and the history of experimental science 
is highly reliant upon aesthetic criteria, visual culture, and the skilled handling of 
tools.
eight after iVF
1. As Sara Ahmed notes, “the very possibility of being pointed toward happiness sug-
gests that objects are associated with affects before they are even encountered” (2010: 
27). Happiness, as she notes, is “end orientated” (26).
ReFeRenCeS
Ahmed, Sara. 2006. Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press.
Ahmed, Sara. 2010. The Promise of Happiness. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Akrich, Madeline. 1992. “The De- Scription of Technical Objects.” In Wiebe Bijker and 
John Law, eds., Shaping Technology, Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, 
205–224. Cambridge, MA: mit Press.
Alexandre, H. A. 2001. “History of Mammalian Embryological Research.” International 
Journal of Developmental Biology 45: 457–467.
Anker, Suzanne, and Sarah Franklin. 2011. “Specimens as Spectacles: Reframing Fetal 
Remains.” Social Text 29(1): 103–125.
Anker, Suzanne, and Dorothy Nelkin. 2004. The Molecular Gaze: Art in the Genetic Age. 
Cold Spring Harbour, NY: Cold Spring Harbour Laboratory Press.
Anzaldúa, Gloria. 1987. Borderlands/La Frontera. San Francisco: Spinster’s Ink.
Ardener, Edwin. 1972. “Belief and the Problem of Women.” In J. La Fontaine, ed., The 
Interpretation of Ritual: Essays in Honour of A. I. Richards, 135–158. London: Routledge.
Arditti, Rita, Renate Duelli Klein, and Shelley Minden, eds. 1984. Test- Tube Women: 
What Future for Motherhood? London: Pandora.
Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Austin, C. R. 1961. The Mammalian Egg. Oxford: Blackwell.
Austin, C. R., and R. V. Short, eds. 1972. Reproduction in Mammals, vol. 5: Artificial Con-
trol of Reproduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bagemihl, Bruce. 1999. Biological Exuberance: Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diver-
sity. New York: St. Martin’s.
Bartky, Sandra. 1993. Gender and Domination. London: Routledge.
Bauman, Zygmunt. 1993. “Postmodernity, or Living with Ambivalence.” In J. P. Natoli 
and L. Hutcheon, eds., A Postmodern Reader, 9–24. Albany: State University of New 
York Press.
Bavister, Barry D. 2002. “Early History of In Vitro Fertilization.” Reproduction 124: 
181–196.
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage.
334 rEFErEncEs
Becker, Gay. 2000. The Elusive Embryo: How Women and Men Approach New Reproduc-
tive Technologies. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Becker, Howard S. 1963. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: Free 
Press.
Beck- Gernscheim, Elisabeth. 1989. “From the Pill to Test- Tube Babies: New Options, 
New Pressures in Reproductive Behaviour.” In K. S. Ratcliff, ed., Healing Technology: 
Feminist Perspectives, 23–40. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Beer, Gillian. 1983. Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Elliot and 
Nineteenth- Century Fiction. London: Ark.
Bennett, Jesse Lee. 1925. Frontiers of Knowledge. Chicago: American Library Associa-
tion.
Berer, Marge. 1985. “Breeding Conspiracies: Feminism and the New Reproductive 
Technologies.” Trouble and Strife 6 (summer): 29–35.
Berlant, Lauren. 2006. “Cruel Optimism.” differences 17(3): 20–36.
Betteridge, Keith J. 1981. “An Historical Look at Embryo Transfer.” Reproduction and 
Fertility 62: 1–13.
Betteridge, Keith. 2003. “A History of Farm Animal Embryo Transfer and Some Asso-
ciated Techniques. Animal Production Science 79(3): 203–244.
Bhabha, Homi. 1984. “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.” 
October 28: 125–133.
Biggers, J. D. 1984. “In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in Historical Perspec-
tive.” In Alan Trounson and Carl Wood, eds., In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Trans-
fer, 3–15. London: Churchill Livingstone.
Biggers, J. D. 1991. “Walter Heape, Frs: A Pioneer in Reproductive Biology.” Journal of 
Reproduction and Fertility 93: 173–186.
Binford, Lewis. 1965. “Archeological Systematics and the Study of Culture Process.” 
American Antiquity 31(2): 203–210.
Birke, Lynda. 1986. Women, Feminism and Biology: The Feminist Challenge. London: 
Wheatsheaf.
Birke, Lynda, Sue Himmelweit, and Gail Vines. 1990. Tomorrow’s Child: Reproductive 
Technologies in the 90s. London: Virago.
Bowker, Geoffrey, and Sandra Leigh Star. 1999. Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its 
Consequences. Cambridge, MA: mit Press.
Brand, Stewart. 2010. Whole Earth Discipline. London: Atlantic Books.
Breeze, Nancy. 1984. “Who Is Going to Rock the Petri Dish? For Feminists Who Have 
Considered Parthenogenesis When the Movement Is Not Enough.” In Arditti et al. 
1984, 397–401.
Bullard, Linda. 1987. “Killing Us Softly: Toward a Feminist Analysis of Genetic Engi-
neering.” In Spallone and Steinberg 1987, 110–119.
Bunch, Charlotte. 1982. “Copenhagen and Beyond: Prospects for Global Feminism.” 
Quest: A Feminist Quarterly 5(4): 25–35.
Burchell, Kevin, Sarah Franklin, and Kerry Holden. 2009. Public Culture as Professional 
Science. London: London School of Economics.
Burfoot, Annette, ed. 1999. Encyclopedia of Reproductive Technologies. Boulder, CO: 
Westview.
rEFErEncEs 335
Bush, Vannevar. 1945. “Science: The Endless Frontier.” Transactions of the Kansas 
Academy of Science 48(3): 231–264.
Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: 
Routledge.
Canguilhem, Georges. 2008. Knowledge of Life. New York: Fordham University Press.
Carby, Hazel. 1987. Reconstructing Womanhood: The Emergence of the Afro- American Nov-
elist. New York: Oxford University Press.
Carlson, Robert H. 2010. Biology Is Technology: The Promise, Peril, and New Business of 
Engineering Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Carsten, Janet. 2001. “Substantivism, Antisubstantivism, and Anti- antisubstantivism.” 
In Franklin and McKinnon 2001, 29–53.
Carsten, Janet. 2004. After Kinship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, Lisa. 1995. Screening the Body: Tracing Medicine’s Visual Culture. Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press.
Casper, Monica. 1998. The Making of the Unborn Patient: A Social Anatomy of Fetal Sur-
gery. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Cassidy, Rebecca. 2007. “Introduction: Domestication Reconsidered.” Where the Wild 
Things Are: Domestication Reconsidered. Oxford: Berg.
Cavalli- Sforza, Luigi Luca. 1984. “Isolation by Distance.” In Aravinda Chakravarti, ed., 
Human Population Genetics: The Pittsburgh Symposium, 229–248. New York: Van Nos-
trand Reinhold.
Chadwick, Helen. 1995. Stilled Lives. Edinburgh: Portfolio Gallery.
Challoner, Jack. 1999. The Baby Makers: The History of Artificial Conception. London: 
Macmillan.
Chang, M. C. 1958. “Capacitation of Rabbit Spermatozoa in the Uterus with Special 
Reference to the Reproductive Phases of the Female.” Endocrinology 65: 619–628.
Chang, M. C. 1968. “In Vitro Fertilization of Mammalian Eggs.” Journal of Animal Sci-
ence 27: 15–21.
Chang, M. C., and W. G. R. Marden. 1954. “The Aerial Transport of Fertilized Mam-
malian Ova.” Journal of Heredity 45(2): 75–78.
Chicago, Judy. 1977. Through the Flower: Autobiography of a Feminist Artist. New York: 
Anchor.
Chicago, Judy. 1996. The Dinner Party. New York: Penguin.
Childe, V. Gordon. 1952. “The Birth of Civilization.” Past and Present 2: 1–10.
Clarke, Adele. 1995. “Research Materials and Reproductive Science in the United 
States, 1910–1940.” In Susan Leigh Star, ed., Ecologies of Knowledge: Work and Politics 
in Science and Technology. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Clarke, Adele. 1998. Disciplining Reproduction: Modernity, American Life Sciences and 
“The Problem of Sex.” Berkeley: University of California Press.
Clarke, Adele, and Joan H. Fujimura, eds. 1992. The Right Tools for the Right Job: At Work 
in Twentieth- Century Life Sciences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Clarke, John. 2007. “The History of Three Scientific Societies.” Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 38(2): 340–357.
Clarke, Morgan. 2009. Islam and New Kinship: Reproductive Technology and the Shariah 
in Lebanon. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
336 rEFErEncEs
Clifford, James. 1983. “On Ethnographic Authority.” Representations 1(2): 118–146.
Clifford, James, and George Marcus, eds. 1986. Writing Culture. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Collier, Jane, and Sylvia Yanagisako, eds. 1987a. Gender and Kinship: Essays toward a Uni-
fied Analysis. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Collier, Jane, and Sylvia Yanagisako. 1987b. “Introduction.” In Collier and Yanagisako 
1987a, 1–13.
Corea, Gena. 1985. The Mother Machine: From Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs. 
New York: Harper and Row.
Corea, Gena, Jalna Hanmer, Renate D. Klein, Janice G. Raymond, and Robyn Rowland. 
1987. “Prologue.” In Spallone and Steinberg 1987, 1–12.
Corea, Genoveffa. 1984. “Egg Snatchers.” In Arditti et al. 1984, 37–51.
Crowe, Christine. 1985. “Women Want It: In Vitro Fertilization and Women’s Motiva-
tions for Participation.” Women’s Studies International Forum 8: 547–552.
Crowe, Christine. 1987. “‘Women Want It’: In Vitro Fertilization and Women’s Motiva-
tions for Participation.” In Spallone and Steinberg 1987: 84–93.
Crowe, Christine. 1990. “Bearing the Consequences: Women Experiencing ivF.” In 
Scutt 1990, 58–66.
Cussins, Charis. 1996. “Ontological Choreography: Agency through Objectification in 
Infertility Clinics.” Social Studies of Science 26(3): 575–610.
da Costa, Beatriz, and Kavita Philip, eds. 2008. Tactical Biopolitics: Art, Activism, and 
Technoscience. Cambridge, MA: mit Press.
Darwin, Charles. 1874. The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. 2nd ed. Lon-
don: John Murray.
Davies, Sarah R. 2008. “Constructing Communication: Talking to Scientists about 
Talking to the Public.” Science Communication 29(4): 413–34.
De Chadarevian, Soraya, and Nick Hopwood, eds. 2004. Models: The Third Dimension 
of Science. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Deech, Ruth, and Anna Smajdor. 2007. From ivf to Immortality: Controversy in the Era of 
Reproductive Technology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
de Lauretis, Teresa. 1984. Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema. Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press.
de Lauretis, Teresa. 1987. Technologies of Gender: Essays on Theory, Film, and Fiction. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Department of Health. 2011. Taking Stock of Regenerative Medicine in the United King-
dom. London: hmso.
Derrida, Jacques. 1974. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Spivak. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
Derrida, Jacques. 1978. Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. London: Routledge.
Derrida, Jacques. 1981. Dissemination. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Donchin, Anne. 1986. “The Future of Mothering: Reproductive Technology and Femi-
nist Theory.” Hypatia 1(2): 121–138.
Donchin, Anne. 1989. “The Growing Feminist Debate over the New Reproductive 
Technologies.” Hypatia 4(3): 136–149.
rEFErEncEs 337
Douglas, Mary. 1970. Natural Symbols. London: Barrie and Cresset.
Duden, Barbara. 1993. Disembodying Women: Perspectives on Pregnancy and the Unborn. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dworkin, Andrea. 1983. Right- Wing Women. New York: Perigee Books.
Dyson, Anthony. 1995. The Ethics of ivf. London: Mowbray.
Dziuk, Philip. 1993. “The Society for Reproduction: 25 Years in Retrospect.” Biology of 
Reproduction 48: 28–32.
Edwards, Jeanette. 2000. Born and Bred Oxford: Idioms of Kinship and New Reproductive 
Technologies in England. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Edwards, Jeanette, Sarah Franklin, Eric Hirsch, Francis Price, and Marilyn Strath-
ern. 1993. Technologies of Procreation: Kinship in the Age of Assisted Conception. Man-
chester: Manchester University Press.
Edwards, Jeanette, and Charles Salazar, eds. 2009. European Kinship in the Age of Bio-
technology. Oxford: Berghahn.
Edwards, Jeanette, and Marilyn Strathern. 2000. “Including Our Own.” In J. Carsten, 
ed., Cultures of Relatedness: New Approaches to the Study of Kinship, 149–166. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Edwards, R. G. 2001. “The Bumpy Road to Human In Vitro Fertilization.” Nature Medi-
cine 7(10): 1091–1094.
Edwards, R. G. 2004. “Stem Cells Today: Origin and Potential of Embryo Stem Cells.” 
RBMOnline 8(3): 275–306.
Edwards, R. G. 2005. “Introduction: The Beginnings of In- Vitro Fertilization and Its 
Derivatives.” In Robert Edwards and Francisco Risquez, eds., Modern Assisted Con-
ception, 1–7. Cambridge: Reproductive Healthcare Ltd.
Edwards, R. G., B. D. Bavister, and P. C. Steptoe. 1969. “Early Stages of Fertilization 
In Vitro of Human Oocytes Matured In Vitro.” Nature 221: 632–635.
Edwards, Robert. 1989. Life before Birth: Reflections on the Embryo Debate. London: 
Hutchinson.
Edwards, Robert, and Patrick Steptoe. 1980. A Matter of Life: The Story of a Medical 
Breakthrough. New York: William Morrow.
Ehrich, Kathryn, Clare Williams, and Bobby Farsides. 2008. “The Embryo as Moral 
Work Object: pgd/ivF Staff Views and Experiences.” Sociology of Health and Illness 
30(5): 772–787.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1961. “Farewell Address.” American Rhetoric: Top 100 
Speeches. Accessed November 5, 2011. http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches 
/dwightdeisenhowerfarewell.html.
Eldredge, Niles. 2009. “Experimenting with Transmutation: Darwin, the Beagle and 
Evolution.” Evolution: Education and Outreach 2(1): 35–54.
Engels, Frederick. 1962. “The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to 
Man.” In Selected Works, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, vol. 2. Moscow: Foreign 
Language Publishing House.
Engels, Frederick. (1884) 2010. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. 
London: Penguin.
Fabian, Johannes. 1983. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. New 
York: Columbia University Press.
338 rEFErEncEs
Farquhar, Dion. 1996. The Other Machine: Discourse and Reproductive Technologies. New 
York: Routledge.
Fausto- Sterling, Anne. 1985. Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men. 
New York: Basic Books.
Firestone, Shulamith. 1972. The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution, rev. ed. 
New York: Bantam.
Fishel, Simon, and Malcolm Symonds. 1986. In Vitro Fertilisation: Past, Present, Future. 
Oxford: Blackwell.
Fitzgerald, Deborah. 1990. The Business of Breeding: Hybrid Corn in Illinois, 1890–1940. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Foster, Michael, and Francis Maitland Balfour. 1874. The Elements of Embryology. Lon-
don: Macmillan.
Foucault, Michel. 1973. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New 
York: Vintage (translation of Les mots et les choses, Editions Gallimard, 1966).
Foucault, Michel. 1990. The History of Sexuality, vol. 1: An Introduction. Trans. Robert 
Hurley. New York.: Vintage.
Franklin, Sarah. 1991. “Fetal Fascinations: New Dimensions to the Medical Scientific 
Construction of Fetal Personhood.” In Sarah Franklin, Jackie Stacey, and Celia Lury, 
eds., Off- Centre: Feminism and Cultural Studies, 190–205. London: HarperCollins.
Franklin, Sarah. 1995. “Science as Culture, Cultures of Science.” Annual Review of An-
thropology 24: 163–184.
Franklin, Sarah, ed. 1996. The Sociology of Gender. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
Franklin, Sarah. 1997. Embodied Progress: A Cultural Account of Reproduction. London: 
Routledge.
Franklin, Sarah. 1999. “Dead Embryos: Feminism in Suspension.” In Lynn M. Morgan 
and Meredith W. Michaels, eds., Fetal Subjects, Feminist Positions, 61–82. Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Franklin, Sarah. 2001a. “Biologization Revisited: Kinship Theory in the Context of the 
New Biologies.” In Franklin and McKinnon 2001, 302–322.
Franklin, Sarah. 2001b. “Culturing Biology: Cell Lines for the Second Millennium.” 
Health 5(3): 355–354.
Franklin, Sarah. 2003a. “Ethical Biocapital: New Strategies of Cell Culture.” In 
Franklin and Lock 2003b, 97–128.
Franklin, Sarah. 2003b. “Re- thinking Nature- Culture: Anthropology and the New Ge-
netics.” Anthropological Theory 3(1): 65–85.
Franklin, Sarah. 2006a. “The Cyborg Embryo: Our Path to Transbiology.” Theory, Cul-
ture and Society 23(7–8): 167–188.
Franklin, Sarah. 2006b. “Embryonic Economies: The Double Reproductive Value of 
Stem Cells.” Biosocieties 1(1): 71–90.
Franklin, Sarah. 2006c. “The ivF–Stem Cell Interface.” International Journal of Surgery 
4(2): 86–90.
Franklin, Sarah. 2007a. “Crook Pipettes: Embryonic Emigrations from Agriculture 
to Reproductive Biomedicine.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 38(2): 
358–373.
rEFErEncEs 339
Franklin, Sarah. 2007b. Dolly Mixtures: The Remaking of Genealogy. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press.
Franklin, Sarah. 2008. “Embryo Transfer: A View from the UK.” In Francesca Molfino 
and Flavia Zucco, eds., Women in Biotechnology: Creating Interfaces. Berlin: Springer.
Franklin, Sarah. 2010a. “Revisiting Reprotech: Shulamith Firestone and the Question 
of Technology.” In Mandy Merck and Stella Sandford, eds., The Further Adventures of 
the Dialectic of Sex, 29–60. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Franklin, Sarah. 2010b. “Transbiology: A Feminist Cultural Account.” Scholar Feminist 
Online 9(1–2).
Franklin, Sarah. 2013. “In Vitro Anthropos: New Conception Models for a Recursive 
Anthropology?” Cambridge Anthropology 31(1).
Franklin, Sarah, Charles Hunt, Glenda Cornwell, Valerie Peddie, Paul Desousa, Morag 
Livie, Emma L. Stephenson, and Peter R. Braude. 2008. “hEscco: Development of 
Good Practice Models for hES Derivation.” Regenerative Medicine 3(1): 105–116.
Franklin, Sarah, and Lamprini Kaftantzi. 2008. “Industry in the Middle: Interview 
with Intercytex Founder and cso, Dr Paul Kemp.” Science as Culture 17(4): 449–462.
Franklin, Sarah, and Sharon Kaufman. 2009. “Ethical and Consent Issues in the Repro-
ductive Setting: The Case of Egg, Embryo and Sperm Donation.” In Ruth Warwick, 
Deirdre Fehily, Ted Eastlund, and Scott A. Brubaker, eds., Tissue and Cell Donation: 
An Essential Guide, 222–243. Oxford: Wiley- Blackwell.
Franklin, Sarah, and Margaret Lock. 2003a. “Animation and Cessation: The Remaking 
of Life and Death.” In Franklin and Lock 2003b, 3–22.
Franklin, Sarah, and Margaret Lock, eds. 2003b. Remaking Life and Death: Towards an 
Anthropology of Biomedicine. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press.
Franklin, Sarah, Celia Lury, and Jackie Stacey. 2000. Global Nature, Global Culture. Lon-
don: Sage.
Franklin, Sarah, and Susan McKinnon, eds. 2001. Relative Values: Reconfiguring Kinship 
Studies. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Franklin, Sarah, and Maureen McNeil. 1988. “Reproductive Futures: Recent Literature 
and Current Debates on Reproductive Technologies.” Feminist Studies 14(3): 545–561.
Franklin, Sarah, and Helena Ragoné, eds. 1998. Reproducing Reproduction: Kinship, 
Power and Technological Innovation. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Franklin, Sarah, and Celia Roberts. 2006. Born and Made: An Ethnography of Preimplan-
tation Genetic Diagnosis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Friese, Carrie. 2013. Cloning Wild Life: Making Nature in the Zoo. New York: New York 
University Press.
Fujimura, Joan. 1996. Crafting Science: A Sociohistory of the Quest for the Genetics of Can-
cer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Fukuyama, Francis. 2002. Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology 
Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Gardner, Bruce L. 2002. American Agriculture in the Twentieth Century: How It Flourished 
and What It Cost. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Garfinkel, Harold. 1967. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall.
340 rEFErEncEs
Geertz, Clifford. 1966. “Religion as a Cultural System.” In Michael Banton, ed., Anthro-
pological Approaches to the Study of Religion, 1–66. London: Routledge.
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic 
Books.
Geesink, Ingrid, Barbara Prainsack, and Sarah Franklin. 2008. “Stem Cell Stories: 
1998–2008.” Science as Culture 17(1): 1–11.
Gell, Alfred. 1988. “Technology and Magic.” Anthropology Today 4(2): 6–9.
Genetic Interest Group. 2008. “Background Briefing on Stem Cell Research for Sec-
ond Reading of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill.” Accessed April 11, 
2011. http://www.geneticalliance.org.uk/docs/BriefingStemCellResearch.pdf.
Gilbert, Scott F. 1994. A Conceptual History of Modern Embryology. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Ginsburg, Faye. 1998. Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American Community. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Goffman, Erving. 1976. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York: 
Penguin.
Gonzalez- Santos, Sandra. 2010. “The Sociological Aspects of Assisted Reproduction in 
Mexico.” PhD Dissertation, University of Sussex.
Goodman, Alan H., Deborah Heath, and M. Susan Lindee. 2003. Genetic Nature/Cul-
ture: Anthropology and Science beyond the Two- Culture Divide. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Gordon, Ian R. 2003. Laboratory Production of Cattle Embryos, 2nd ed. Wallingford, 
U.K.: cabi.
Graham, Chris. 2000. “Mammalian Development in the UK (1950–1995).” International 
Journal of Developmental Biology 44: 51–55.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1971. Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics. 
Boston: Beacon.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2003. The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge: Polity.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2010. “Technical Progress and the Social Life- World.” In Craig 
Hanks, ed., Technology and Values: Essential Readings, 169–175. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hacking, Ian. 1983. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of 
Natural Science. Cambridge University Press.
Haldane, J. B. S. 1924. Daedalus; or, Science and the Future. New York: E. P. Dutton and 
Company.
Hamburger, Viktor. 1962. A Manual of Experimental Embryology, rev. ed. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Hamburger, Viktor. 1988. The Heritage of Experimental Embryology: Hans Spemann and 
the Organizer. New York: Oxford University Press.
Haraway, Donna J. 1976. Crystals, Fabrics and Fields: Metaphors of Organicism in 
Twentieth- Century Developmental Biology. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Haraway, Donna. 1978a. “Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic, 
Part I: A Political Physiology of Dominance.” Signs 4(1): 21–36.
Haraway, Donna. 1978b. “Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic, 
Part II: The Past Is the Contested Zone: Human Nature and Theories of Production 
and Reproduction in Primate Behaviour Studies.” Signs 4(1): 37–60.
rEFErEncEs 341
Haraway, Donna. 1979. “The Biological Enterprise: Sex, Mind, and Profit from Human 
Engineering to Sociobiology.” Radical History Review 20: 206–237.
Haraway, Donna. 1981. “In the Beginning Was the Word: The Genesis of Biological 
Theory.” Signs 6(3): 469–481.
Haraway, Donna. 1983. “The Ironic Dream of a Common Language for Women in the 
Integrated Circuit: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s or a 
Socialist Manifesto for Cyborgs.” Accessed March 21, 2011. http://www.molodiez 
.org/net/harraway.pdf.
Haraway, Donna. 1984. “Teddy Bear Patriarchy: Taxidermy in the Garden of Eden, 
New York City, 1908–1936.” Social Text 11: 20–64.
Haraway, Donna. 1985. “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist- 
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century.” Socialist Review 80: 65–108.
Haraway, Donna. 1989. Primate Visions: Gender, Race and Nature in the World of Modern 
Science. New York: Routledge.
Haraway, Donna. 1991. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. Lon-
don: Free Association Books.
Haraway, Donna J. 1997. Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan©_Meets 
_Oncomouse™. New York: Routledge.
Haraway, Donna. 2004a. “Ecce Homo, Ain’t (Ar’n’t) I a Woman, and Inappropriate/d 
Others: The Human in a Post- humanist Landscape.” In The Haraway Reader, 47–62. 
New York: Routledge.
Haraway, Donna. 2004b. “Introduction: A Kinship of Feminist Figurations.” In The 
Haraway Reader, 1–6. New York: Routledge.
Haraway, Donna. 2006. “When We Have Never Been Human, What Is to Be Done: 
Interview with Donna Haraway” [interviewer Nickolas Gane]. Theory, Culture and 
Society 23(7–8): 135–158.
Haraway, Donna. 2008. When Species Meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 1968. What Is Called Thinking? New York: Harper and Row.
Heidegger, Martin. 1982. “Kein Tier hat eine Hand.” In Paramenides. Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, Martin. 1993. Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Think-
ing (1964). Ed. David Farrell Krell. London: Routledge.
Heidegger, Martin. 1995. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Soli-
tude. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Helmreich, Stefan. 2008. “Species of Biocapital.” Science as Culture 17(4): 463–478.
Henig, Robin Marantz. 2004. Pandora’s Baby: How the First Test Tube Babies Sparked the 
Reproductive Revolution. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Herschel, John Frederick William. 1830. Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural 
Philosophy. London.
Hird, Myra J. 2009. The Origins of Sociable Life: Evolution after Science Studies. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Holmes, Helen B., Betty B. Hoskins, and Michael Gross, eds. 1980. Birth Control and 
Controlling Birth: Women- Centered Perspectives. Clifton, NJ: Humana.
Holmes, Helen B., Betty B. Hoskins, and Michael Gross, eds. 1981. The Custom- Made 
Child? Women- Centered Perspectives. Clifton, NJ: Humana.
342 rEFErEncEs
Honigman, David. 2010. “Lunch with the Ft: Stewart Brand.” Financial Times, Janu-
ary 8, 2010.
hooks, bell. 1981. Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism. Boston: South End.
Hopwood, Nick. 1999. “‘Giving Body’ to Embryos: Modeling, Mechanism and the 
Microtome in Late Nineteenth- Century Anatomy.” Isis 90(3): 462–496.
Hopwood, Nick. 2000. “Producing Development: The Anatomy of Human Embryos 
and the Norms of Wilhelm His.” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 74(1): 29–79.
Hopwood, Nick. 2009. “Embryology.” In Peter J. Bowler and John V. Pickstone, eds., 
The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 6: The Modern Biological and Earth Sciences, 
285–315. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horder, T. J., J. A. Witkoski, and C. C. Wylie, eds. 1985. A History of Embryology. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hubbard, Ruth. 1990. The Politics of Women’s Biology. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Uni-
versity Press.
Hull Fertility Services. 2011. “ivF Step 1: Downregulation.” Accessed April 12. http://
www.hullivf.org.uk/treatment/ivf/step1.html.
Hurtado, Aida. 1989. “Relating to Privilege: Seduction and Rejection in the Subordina-
tion of White Women and Women of Colour.” Signs 14(4): 833–855.
Huxley, Julian. (1914) 1968. The Courtship Habits of the Great Crested Grebe: With an 
Addition to the Theory of Sexual Selection. London: Jonathan Cape.
Hynes, H. Patricia. 1987. “A Paradigm for Regulation of the Biomedical Industry: Envi-
ronmental Protection in the United States.” In Spallone and Steinberg 1987, 190–205.
iEts (International Embryo Transfer Society). 1993. “Robert Geoffrey Edwards, cbE, 
Frcog, Frs: Recipient of the 1993 Embryo Transfer Pioneer Award.” Theriogenology 
39(1): 1–4.
Inhorn, Marcia. 1994. Quest for Conception: Gender, Infertility, and Egyptian Medical Tra-
ditions. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Inhorn, Marcia. 1996. Infertility and Patriarchy: The Cultural Politics of Gender and Family 
Life in Egypt. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Inhorn, Marcia C. 2003. Local Babies, Global Science: Gender, Religion and In Vitro Fertil-
ization in Egypt. New York: Routledge.
Inhorn, Marcia C. 2011. “Diasporic Dreaming: Return Reproductive Tourism to the 
Middle- East.” Reproductive Biomedicine Online 23(5): 582–591.
Inhorn, Marcia C., and Zeynep B. Gurtin. 2011. “Cross- Border Reproductive Care: 
A Future Research Agenda.” Reproductive Biomedicine Online 23(5): 665–676.
Jasanoff, Sheila. 2007. Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the 
United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jenkinson, John Wilfred. 1909. Experimental Embryology. Oxford: Clarendon.
Johnson, Martin H. 2010. “Robert Edwards: Nobel Laureate in Physiology or Medi-
cine.” Lecture given at the Nobel Prize Symposium in Honour of Robert G. Edwards, 
December 7, 2010, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm.
Johnson, Martin H. 2011. “Robert Edwards: The Path to ivF.” Reproductive Biomedicine 
Online 23: 245–262.
Johnson, M. H., S. B. Franklin, M. Cottingham, and N. Hopwood. 2010. “Why the mrc 
rEFErEncEs 343
Refused Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe Support for Research on Human Con-
ception in 1971.” Human Reproduction 25: 2157–2174.
Jordanova, Ludmilla. 1980. “Natural Facts: A Historical Perspective on Science and 
Sexuality.” In MacCormack and Strathern 1980, 42–69.
Kahn, Susan Martha. 2000. Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception 
in Israel. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Keating, Peter, and Alberto Cambrosio. 2003. Biomedical Platforms: Realigning the Nor-
mal and the Pathological in Late- Twentieth- Century Medicine. Cambridge, MA: mit 
Press.
Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1982. “Feminism and Science.” Signs 7(3): 589–602.
Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1983. A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClin-
tock. Oxford: Blackwell.
Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1992. Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and 
Science. New York: Routledge.
Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1996a. “The Biological Gaze.” In George Robertson, Melinda Mash, 
Lisa Tickner, Jon Bird, Barry Curtis, and Tim Putnam, eds., FutureNatural: Nature, 
Science and Culture, 107–121. London: Routledge.
Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1996b. Reflections on Gender and Science. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press.
Keller, Evelyn Fox. 2002. The Century of the Gene. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Keller, Evelyn Fox. 2003. Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with 
Models, Metaphors and Machines. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Keller, Evelyn Fox. 2009. “What Does Synthetic Biology Have to Do with Biology?” 
BioSocieties 4: 291–302.
Kevles, Daniel. 1977. “The National Science Foundation and the Debate over Post-
war Research Policy, 1942–1945: A Political Interpretation of Science—the Endless 
Frontier.” Isis 68(1): 4–26.
Kirby, Vicki. 2011. Quantum Anthropologies: Life at Large. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press.
Klein, Renate, ed. 1989. Infertility: Women Speak Out about Their Experiences of Repro-
ductive Medicine. London: Pandora.
Koch, Lene. 1990. “ivF—an Irrational Choice?” Reproductive and Genetic Engineering 
3: 225–232.
Kolodny, Annette. 1975. The Lay of the Land: Metaphor as Experience and History in 
American Life and Letters. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Kolodny, Annette. 1984. The Land Before Her: Fantasy and Experience of the American 
Frontiers, 1630–1860. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Landecker, Hannah. 2007. Culturing Life: How Cells Became Technologies. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Latour, Bruno. 1987. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through 
Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
344 rEFErEncEs
Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. 1979. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific 
Facts. London: Sage.
Leach, Edmund. 1970. Claude Lévi- Strauss. London: Fontana.
Lemonnier, Pierre. 1993. Technological Choices: Transformation in Material Cultures since 
the Neolithic. London: Routledge.
Leroi- Gourhan, André. 1993. Gesture and Speech. Cambridge, MA: mit Press.
Lesnik- Oberstein, Karin. 2008. On Having an Own Child: Reproductive Technologies and 
the Cultural Construction of Childhood. London: Karnac.
Lévi- Strauss, Claude. 1969. The Elementary Structures of Kinship. Boston: Beacon.
Lewin, Ellen. 1993. Lesbian Mothers: Accounts of Gender in American Culture. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.
Lorber, Judith. 1989. “Choice, Gift or Patriarchal Bargain? Women’s Consent to 
In Vitro Fertilization in Male Infertility.” Hypatia 4(3): 23–36.
Lorde, Audre. 1984. Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches. New York: Crossing Press.
Lovelock, James E., and Lynn Margulis. 1974. “Atmospheric Homeostasis by and for the 
Biosphere: The Gaia Hypothesis.” Tellus 26(1–2): 2–10.
Lublin, Nancy. 1998. Pandora’s Box: Feminism Confronts Reproductive Technology. Lan-
ham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Lynch, Michael. 1985. Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science: A Study of Shop Work and 
Shop Talk in a Research Laboratory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
MacCormack, Carol. 1980. “Nature, Culture and Gender: A Critique.” In MacCormack 
and Strathern 1980, 1–24.
MacCormack, Carol, and Marilyn Strathern, eds. 1980. Nature, Culture and Gender. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Macksey, Richard, and Eugenio Donato, eds. 1972. The Structuralist Controversy: The 
Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press.
Maienschein, Jane. 1986. Defining Biology: Lectures from the 1890s. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Maienschein, Jane. 2003. Whose View of Life? Embryos, Cloning and Stem Cells. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mamo, Laura. 2007. Queering Reproduction: Achieving Pregnancy in the Age of Techno-
science. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Marden, W. G., and M. C. Chang. 1952. “The Aerial Transport of Mammalian Ova for 
Transplantation.” Science 115: 705–706.
Margulis, Lynn, and James Lovelock. 1974. “Biological Modulation of the Earth’s Atmo-
sphere.” Icarus 21(4): 471–489.
Marsh, Margaret S., and Wanda Ronner. 1996. The Empty Cradle: Infertility in America 
from Colonial Times to the Present. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Martin, Emily. 1987. The Woman in the Body: A Cultural Analysis of Reproduction. Boston: 
Beacon.
Martin, Emily. 1991. “The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Ro-
mance Based on Stereotypical Male and Female Roles.” Signs 16(3): 485–501.
Marx, Karl. 1990. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. London: Penguin.
rEFErEncEs 345
Marx, Leo. 2000. The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in 
America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mathieu, Nicole- Claude. 1973. “Homme- Culture et Femme- Nature.” L’Homme 13(3): 
101–113.
McKibben, Bill. 2004. Enough: Staying Human in an Engineered Age. New York: St. 
Martin’s.
McLaren, Anne. 1976. Mammalian Chimaeras. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press.
mEcw. “Marx/Engels Collected Works.” Marxists Internet Archive. http://www 
.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/cw/index.htm.
Mies, Maria. 1985. “‘Why Do We Need All This?’: A Call against Genetic Engineering 
and Reproductive Technology.” Women’s Studies International Forum 8(6): 553–560.
Minh- ha, Trinh. 1989. Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Modell, Judith. 1994. Kinship with Strangers: Adoption and Interpretations of Kinship in 
American Culture. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Modell, Judith. 2002. A Sealed and Secret Kinship: A Culture of Policies and Practices in 
American Adoption. Oxford: Berghahn.
Mol, Annemarie. 2002. The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press.
Moraga, Cherríe, and Gloria Anzaldúa, eds. 1981. This Bridge Called My Back: Writings 
by Radical Women of Color. Watertown, MA: Persephone.
Morgan, Lewis Henry. 1877. Ancient Society; or, Researches in the Lines of Human Progress 
from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization. New York: Henry Holt.
Mundy, Liza. 2007. Everything Conceivable: How Assisted Reproduction Is Changing Our 
World. New York: Anchor.
Needham, Joseph. 1935. “Limiting Factors in the Advancement of Science as Observed 
in the History of Embryology.” Yale Journal of Biological Medicine 8(1): 1–18.
Needham, Joseph. 1959. A History of Embryology. New York: Arno.
Noland, Carrie. 2009. Agency and Embodiment: Performing Gestures—Producing Culture. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 2012. Novel Techniques for the Prevention of Mitochon-
drial dnA Disorders: An Ethical Review. June. Accessed May 13, 2012. http://www 
.nuffieldbioethics.org/mitochondrial- dna- disorders.
Nyhart, Lynn K. 1995. Biology Takes Form: Animal Morphology and the German Universi-
ties, 1800–1900. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Oakley, Ann. 1987. “From Walking Wombs to Test- Tube Babies.” In Stanworth 1987, 
36–56.
O’Brien, Keith. 2008. “Easter Sunday Homily.” bbc News, March 21. Accessed Octo-
ber 5, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/7308883.stm.
O’Brien, Mary. 1981. The Politics of Reproduction. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Oppenheimer, Jane M. 1967. Essays in the History of Embryology and Biology. Cambridge, 
MA: mit Press.
346 rEFErEncEs
Orland, Barbara. 2001. “Spuren Einer Entdeckung. (Re- )Konstructionen der Unfrucht-
barkeit im Zeitalter der Fortplanzungsmedizin.” Gesnerus 58: 5–29.
Ortner, Sherry. 1972. “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?” Feminist Studies 1(2): 
5–31.
Ortner, Sherry. 1974. “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?” In Michelle Zimbal-
ist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, eds., Woman, Culture and Society, 67–88. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press.
Overall, Christine. 1987. Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist Analysis. Boston, 
MA: Allen and Unwin.
Owens, Larry. 1994. “The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second 
World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development.” 
Business History Review 68(4): 515–576.
Parkes, Alan S. 1966. Sex, Science and Society: Addresses, Lectures and Articles. London: 
Oriel.
Parkes, Alan S. 1985. Off- Beat Biologist: The Autobiography of Alan S. Parkes. Cambridge: 
Galton Foundation.
Pauly, Philip J. 1987. Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pauly, Philip. 2007. Fruits and Plains: The Horticultural Transformation of America. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Paxson, Heather. 2004. Making Modern Mothers: Ethics and Family Planning in Urban 
Greece. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Peletz, Michael. 2001. “Ambivalence in Kinship since the 1940s.” In Franklin and 
McKinnon 2001, 413–444.
Petchesky, Rosalind Pollack. 1984. Abortion and Women’s Choice: The State, Sexuality, 
and Reproductive Freedom. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
Petchesky, Rosalind Pollack. 1987. “Foetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the 
Politics of Reproduction.” In Stanworth 1987, 57–80.
Pfeffer, Naomi. 1985. “Not So New Technologies.” Trouble and Strife 5 (spring): 46–50.
Pfeffer, Naomi. 1993. The Stork and the Syringe: A Political History of Reproductive Medi-
cine. Cambridge: Polity.
Pfeffer, Naomi, and Anne Woollett. 1983. The Experience of Infertility. London: Virago.
Pickering, Andrew. 1995. The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency and Science. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Pincus, G. 1930. “Observations on the Living Eggs of the Rabbit.” Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London 107(749): 132–167.
Pincus, G. 1936. The Eggs of Mammals. New York: Macmillan.
Pincus, G. 1939a. “The Breeding of Some Rabbits Produced by Recipients of Artificially 
Activated Ova.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 25: 557–559.
Pincus, G. 1939b. “Ovum Culture.” Science 89: 509.
Pincus, G., and E. Enzmann. 1934. “Can Mammalian Eggs Undergo Normal Develop-
ment In Vitro?” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 20: 121–122.
Plato. 2005. Phaedrus. Trans. Christopher Rowe. London: Penguin.
Prainsack, Barbara, Ingrid Geesink, and Sarah Franklin. 2008. “Stem Cell Technolo-
gies 1998–2008: Controversies and Silences.” Science as Culture 17(4): 351–362.
rEFErEncEs 347
Pratt, Mary Louise. 1992. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. New York: 
Routledge.
Rabinow, Paul. 1992. “Artificiality and Enlightenment.” In J. Crary and S. Kwinter, eds., 
Incorporations, 234–252. New York: Zone Books.
Rafferty, Keen A. 1970. Methods in Experimental Embryology of the Mouse. Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Rapp, Rayna. 1999. Testing Women, Testing the Fetus: The Social Impact of Amniocentesis 
in America. New York: Routledge.
Raymond, Janice. 1984. “Feminist Ethics, Ecology and Vision.” In Arditti et al. 1984, 
427–437.
Raymond, Janice. 1993. Women as Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the Battle over 
Women’s Freedom. New York: Harper San Francisco.
Ritvo, Harriet. 1987. The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian 
Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Robertson, John. 1994. Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technolo-
gies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rolt, L. T. C. 1967. The Mechanicals: Progress of a Profession. London: Heinemann.
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1944. “President Roosevelt’s Letter.” National Science Foundation. 
Accessed February 2, 2012. http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm#letter.
Rosaldo, Michelle, and Louise Lamphere, eds. 1974. Woman, Culture and Society. Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Rossiter, Margaret. 1979. “The Organization of the Agricultural Sciences.” In A. Oleson 
and J. Voss, eds., The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1860–1920, 211–
248. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Rothman, Barbara Katz. 1984. “The Meanings of Choice in Reproductive Technology.” 
In Arditti et al. 1984., 23–34.
Rothman, Barbara Katz. 1986. The Tentative Pregnancy: How Amniocentesis Changes the 
Experience of Motherhood. New York: Norton.
Rowland, Robyn. 1992. Living Laboratories: Women and Reproductive Technology. Lon-
don: Octopus.
Rubin, Gayle. 1975. “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex.” In 
Rayna Reiter, ed., Towards an Anthropology of Women, 157–210. New York: Monthly 
Review Press.
Rubin, Gayle. 1992. “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexu-
ality.” In C. S. Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality. New York: 
Pandora.
Russell, Diane E. H., and Nicole Van de Ven. 1976. Crimes against Women: Proceedings of 
the International Tribunal. Milbrae, CA: Les Femmes.
Sahlins, Marshall David. 1972. Stone Age Economics. Chicago, IL: Aldine.
Sahlins, Marshall David. 1976. The Use and Abuse of Biology: An Anthropological Cri-
tique of Sociobiology. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Sandelowski, Margarete. 1990. “Fault Lines: Infertility and Imperiled Sisterhood.” 
Feminist Studies 16(1): 33–51.
Sandelowski, Margarete. 1991. “Compelled to Try: The Never- Enough Quality of Re-
productive Technology.” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 5(1): 29–47.
348 rEFErEncEs
Sandelowski, Margarete. 1993. With Child in Mind: Studies of the Personal Encounter with 
Infertility. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Sander, Klaus, and Peter E. Faessler. 2001. “Introducing the Spemann- Mangold Orga-
nizer: Experiments and Insights That Generated a Key Concept in Developmental 
Biology.” International Journal of Developmental Biology 45: 1–11.
Sawicki, Jana. 1991. Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power and the Body. New York: 
Routledge.
Schneider, David M. 1968. American Kinship: A Cultural Account. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice- Hall.
Schneider, David. 1984. A Critique of the Study of Kinship. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press.
Scutt, Jocelyn, ed. 1990. The Baby Machine: Reproductive Technology and the Commer-
cialisation of Motherhood. London: Merlin.
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. 1990. Epistemology of the Closet. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
Seller, Mary. 2008. “Slipping on the Slippery Slope of Progress.” Tablet, April 5, 2008. 
Accessed October 9, 2010. http://www.thetablet.co.uk/article/11258.
Sennett, Richard. 2008. The Craftsman. London: Penguin.
Shukin, Nicole. 2009. Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Smith, Austin G. 2008. “Embryo- Derived Stem Cells: Of Mice and Men.” Annual Re-
view of Cell and Developmental Biology 17: 435–462.
Smith, Neil, and Phil O’Keefe. 1980. “Geography, Marx and the Concept of Nature.” 
Antipode 12(2): 30–39.
Soames, Gemma. 2009. Sunday Times (London), February 1, 2009. Accessed April 18, 
2011. http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/women/families/article 
5599066.ece.
Solomon, Alison. 1989. “Infertility as Crisis: Coping, Surviving—and Thriving.” In 
Klein 1989, 169–187.
Spallone, Patricia. 1989. Beyond Conception: The New Politics of Reproduction. London: 
Macmillan.
Spallone, Patricia, and Deborah Lynn Steinberg, eds. 1987. Made to Order: The Myth of 
Reproductive and Genetic Progress. London: Pergamon.
Spar, Debora. 2006. The Baby Business: How Money, Science, and Politics Drive the Com-
merce of Conception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Speroff, Leon. 2009. A Good Man: Gregory Goodwin Pincus. Portland, OR: Arnica.
Spillers, Hortense. 1987. “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book.” 
Diacritics 17(2): 65–81.
Spivak, Gayatri. 1985. “Criticism, Feminism and the Institution.” Thesis Eleven 10/11: 
175–187.
Spivak, Gayatri. 1987. In the Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York: 
Methuen.
Squier, Susan Merrill. 1994. Babies in Bottles: Twentieth- Century Visions of Reproductive 
Technology. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
rEFErEncEs 349
Stanworth, Michelle, ed. 1987. Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medi-
cine. Cambridge: Polity.
Star, Susan Leigh. 1989. Regions of the Mind: Brain Research and the Quest for Scientific 
Certainty. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Star, Susan Leigh. 1995. Ecologies of Knowledge: Work and Politics in Science and Tech-
nology. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Stephenson, Emma, Caroline Mackie Ogilvie, Heema Patel, Glenda Cornwell, Laureen 
Jacquet, Neli Kadeva, Peter Braude, and Dusko Ilic. 2010. “Safety Paradigm: Ge-
netic Evaluation of Therapeutic Grade Human Embryonic Stem Cells.” Interface 7 
(Suppl. 6): s677–688.
Stiegler, Bernard. 1998. Technics and Time, I: The Fault of Epimetheus. Trans. Richard 
Beardsworth and George Collins. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Strathern, Marilyn. 1980. “No Nature, No Culture: The Hagen Case.” In MacCormack 
and Strathern 1980, 174–222.
Strathern, Marilyn. 1984. “Marriage Exchanges: A Melanesian Comment.” Annual Re-
view of Anthropology 13: 41–73.
Strathern, Marilyn. 1987. “Producing Difference: Connections and Disconnections 
in Two New Guinea Highland Kinship Systems.” In Collier and Yanagisako 1987a, 
271–300.
Strathern, Marilyn. 1988. The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with 
Society in Melanesia. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Strathern, Marilyn. 1992a. After Nature: English Kinship in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Strathern, Marilyn. 1992b. Reproducing the Future: Anthropology, Kinship and the New 
Reproductive Technologies. New York: Routledge.
Strathern, Marilyn. 1999. Property, Substance and Effect: Anthropological Essays on Per-
sons and Things. London: Athlone.
Strathern, Marilyn. 2005. Kinship, Law and the Unexpected: Relatives Are Always a Sur-
prise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Suchman, Lucy. 1987. Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human- Machine Com-
munication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Suchman, Lucy. 1995. “Making Work Visible.” Communications of the Acm 38(9): 56–64.
Suchman, Lucy. 2007. Human- Machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Actions. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Takahashi, K., and S. Yamanaka. 2006. “Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from 
Mouse Embryonic and Adult Fibroblast Cultures by Defined Factors. Cell 126(4): 
663–676.
Taylor, Gordon Rattray. 1968. The Biological Time Bomb. Cleveland, OH: World.
Thompson, Charis. 2005. Making Parents: The Ontological Choreography; Reproductive 
Technologies. Cambridge, MA: mit Press.
Throsby, Karen. 2004. When ivf Fails: Feminism, Infertility and the Negotiation of Nor-
mality. London: Palgrave.
Turner, Frederick Jackson. 1947. The Frontier in American History. New York: Henry 
Holt.
350 rEFErEncEs
Turner, Frederick Jackson. 1961. Frontier and Section: Selected Essays of Frederick Jackson 
Turner. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall.
Verlinsky, Yury, and Anver Kuliev. 2005. Atlas of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis. Lon-
don: crc Press.
Waddington, Conrad H., and A. J. Waterman. 1933. “The Development In Vitro of 
Young Rabbit Embryos.” Journal of Anatomy 67(3): 355–370.
Wagner, Roy. 1975. The Invention of Culture. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall.
Walker, Alice. 1983. In Search of Our Mother’s Gardens: Womanist Prose. New York: Har-
court Brace Jovanovich.
Warner, Marina. 1996. The Inner Eye: Art beyond the Visible. London: Vintage.
Warnock, Mary. 1985. A Question of Life: The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Weiner, Annette. 1978. “The Reproductive Model in Trobriand Society.” Mankind 11(3): 
175–186.
Wendling, Amy E. 2009. Karl Marx on Technology and Alienation. Houndmills, U.K.: Pal-
grave Macmillan.
White, Leslie. 1959. The Evolution of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the Fall of 
Rome. New York: McGraw- Hill.
Williams, Linda. 1988. “‘It’s Going to Work for Me’: Responses to Failures of ivF.” Birth 
15(3): 131–196.
Williams, Raymond. 1990. Television. London: Routledge.
Winkler, Ute. 1989. “He Called Me Number 27.” In Klein 1989, 90–100.
Wittig, Monique. 1969. Les guérillères. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.
Wittig, Monique. 1992. The Straight Mind. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Yanagisako, Sylvia J. 1985. “The Elementary Structure of Reproduction in Kinship and 
Gender Studies.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropo-
logical Association, Washington, DC.
Yanagisako, Sylvia J., and Jane Collier. 1987. “Toward a Unified Analysis of Gender and 
Kinship.” In Collier and Yanagisako 1987a, 14–52.
Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy 
and Social Theory. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Yoxen, Edward. 1986. The Gene Business: Who Should Control Biotechnology? Oxford: 
Blackwell.
Zvelebil, Marek. 1994. “Plant Use in the Mesolithic and Its Role in the Transition to 
Farming.” Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society 60: 35–74.
abortion, 60, 186, 189, 193, 203, 330n18
accumulated scale: in biomanufacturing, 19, 
56, 70, 95–96, 318n9; of ivF, 32, 37–38, 138, 
148; Marx and Engels on, 42–45, 50; re-
productivity and, 113, 138–39; visualization 
techniques and, 246, 251
after ivF. See condition of being after ivF
After Nature (Strathern), 157
Ahmed, Sara, 216, 330n1, 332n1
Akhter, Farida, 200
Akrich, Madeleine, 331n11
alliance theory, 47–49, 164, 169, 173, 316n17
ambiguous conception, 238–40
ambivalence: bioartistic representation of, 
287, 294–95; experience of ivF and, 7–8, 
34, 156, 206; feminist politics and, 186–89, 
192, 199, 210, 219; frontier and, 9, 290–91, 
320n13; as hopeful, 186; kinship and, 8; 
mimicry and, 314n3, 317n22; modernity 
and, 8, 186, 327n6; of pastoralism, 332n15; 
reproduction and, 49; as strategic, 317n22. 
See also technological ambivalence
American Dream, 240
American Embryo Transfer Association, 
317n20
American Library Association, 260–63, 330n2
Amis, Charles Kingsley, 245
amniocentesis, 7, 185, 191, 193, 205, 219, 296, 
327n8
Anker, Suzanne, 248, 285–86, 294, 295
anthropology, 17, 52, 264–65, 298, 315n4; 
auto- critique of, 169; feminist perspec-
tives in, 20, 25, 159, 162, 166, 179, 326n20; 
frontier models in, 264–68; interpretive/
symbolic perspectives in, 169–72, 176; ma-
terialist perspectives in, 331n8; structural-





Arendt, Hannah, 26–27, 270, 302–3, 312
artifacts, 20, 125, 192, 306, 313n1, 319n4, 
329n13
artificial biology, 237
artificial cell manufacture, 313n1
artificial insemination, 105, 189, 219, 319n7
artificial menopause, 235–37, 329n9
Art of A.R.T., The (Glover), 260, 274, 281–96, 
312
assisted conception unit (acu) (Guy’s Hospi-
tal, London), 9; Glover’s artwork at, 281–
96; hole- in- the- wall design of, 18–19, 20f, 
21f, 24, 26, 53–56, 260
assisted reproductive technology (art): bio-
artistic rendering of, 260, 274–96, 332n18; 
goals of, 229–30; normalization of, 222–
29, 233–34; as ontological quest, 231–42, 
328nn3–5
Audubon, James, 290
Austin, C. R. “Bunny,” 121t, 136–37
Babbage, Charles, 316n11
Baby Business, The (Spar), 22
index
Page numbers followed by f indicate a figure; those followed by t indicate a table.
352 indEx




Bauman, Zygmunt, 186, 327n6
Bavister, Barry, 106, 129–30
Beatty, Alan, 145
Beauvoir, Simone de, 20, 163, 178, 325n17
Beck, Ulrich, 8, 185, 269–72, 327n6
Becker, Gay, 154, 217, 240
Beer, Gillian, 15
Bennett, Jesse Lee, 261–63, 265
Berlant, Lauren, 215–16
Bernal, J. D., 245
Bhabha, Homi, 314n3
Biggers, John, 120t, 126, 128, 322n28
Binford, Lewis, 264, 331n9
bioart, 260, 274–96, 332n18
biocapital, 45, 96, 273, 316n13
biocapitalism, 38, 44–46, 316n13; consumption 
of ivF in, 240; privatization of reproduction 
in, 296; U.K. policy on, 56–58, 60–61, 64
bioethics, 189–90, 268–75, 298–99
biofuturism, 64, 73–74, 245, 266
bioindustry, 18–19, 22, 31; cellular production 
in, 31–32, 38, 44–46; cellular replacement 
therapies and, 37, 54; consumer culture of, 
240, 330n15; financialization and commer-
cialization of, 95–96; globalization of, 271, 
317n20; goals of, 70, 317n2; governance 
of, 70
biological gaze, 70, 248, 279, 294–95
biological plasticity, 50–51, 114, 123, 139, 255
biological relativity, 4, 8–9, 14–19, 26–29, 
308–9; bioartistic rendering of, 260, 274–
96, 332n18; corporealization of, 13; doubled 
consciousness in ivF of, 16, 65, 237–38, 
255–57, 329n10; of economic implications 
of bioknowledge, 38; new kinds of, 148–49, 
152–53, 313n6; relativization of the biologi-
cal in, 222–29; substantialization of, 16–19, 
27; technological ambivalence and, 7–9, 
34–35, 184, 219–20, 255, 274, 299–300, 
307–12, 314n3. See also kinship; offspring 
of ivF
biological reproduction, 14, 46, 151–53
biologization of technology, 3–4, 10, 26–27, 
31–35, 268–74; engineering ideal in, 14–15; 
manufacture of artificial cells as, 313n1; sub-
stantialization of, 33
Biology Is Technology (Carlson), 31, 32, 33–34
biology of the future, 298–309; ethical con-
texts of, 189–90, 268–75, 298–99; legal and 
institutional governance of, 70, 82, 270–72; 
moral pioneering in, 9, 295–96, 308
biomedical platforms, 314n8
biopower, 15–16, 19, 48–50, 100, 267; ethi-
cal contexts of, 273–74; human embryonic 
stem cell (hES) research and, 19, 44, 50, 
70; privatization of reproduction in, 296; 
sex after ivF and, 49–52, 65–66; tactical 
biopolitics of, 295; technologies of self in, 
48–49, 65
biosociality, 100, 219–20. See also lab culture
biotechnology/biotechnicality, 31–34, 50, 249–
50, 273–74; anthropology of, 46; feminist 
politics and, 200, 209; Haraway’s model of, 
13, 68–72, 83; ivF as, 22, 31, 33–34; Lan-
decker’s analysis of, 135, 267, 308; Loeb’s 
pursuit of, 133–36; meaning of biology and, 
125; public unease and, 8, 190; reproduc-
tion and, 32, 113, 239; Thompson’s model 
of, 45–46
Birke, Lynda, 179
Birth Control and Controlling Birth (Holmes 
et al.), 191





Boyle, Danny, 38–39, 60–61, 62
Brand, Stewart: biofuturism of, 64, 266–67, 
271–72, 314n2; on normalizing role of ivF, 
33–34, 65, 244, 262
Braude, Peter, 21f, 53
Brave New World (A. Huxley), 142
Brinster, Ralph, 121t
Brittain, Vera, 245
Brown, Louise, 38, 57–58, 145–49, 184, 191, 
317n1
“Building, Dwelling, Thinking” (Heidegger), 11
Bush, Vannevar, 102–3, 143, 319n2
Butler, Judith, 20; on gender as technology, 
160, 178–81, 183, 246, 326n20; on gender 




Capital (Marx), 12, 42–44, 47, 315n9
capitalism, 13, 43, 46–47, 83, 94, 200. See also 
biocapitalism
Carby, Hazel, 179




Cassidy, Rebecca, 265, 267
Catholic Church, 61–63
cell reprogramming, 37, 54
Chadwick, Helen, 286–87, 294
Chang, Min- Chueh, 120t, 136–37, 142–43, 145, 
322n36
chemistry/biochemistry, 2–3, 94, 268
Chicago, Judy, 289–90, 292–93
Childe, V. Gordon, 265
children: desire for, 18, 212–13, 225–26, 228, 
231, 241; pursuit of, 32, 222, 328n16. See 
also offspring of ivF
chimeras, 246
Chromosome Socks (Glover), 275–81
Church, George, 267
Cixous, Hélène, 197, 198
Clarke, Adele: on disciplining reproduction, 
15, 22, 50, 82, 313n5; on exploratory experi-
mentalism, 319n8; on postwar bioscience, 
104; on scientific entrepreneurs, 147; on 
tools of bioscience, 105–6
Clarke, Morgan, 232
cloning, 23, 223, 246, 272, 305–6
coevolution of substance, technology, and 
knowledge, 54, 138–41, 151, 263–64, 315n8, 
322–23nn38–39
Collier, Jane, 171–72, 180–81, 223
Conceptual History of Embryology, A (Gilbert), 
118
condition of being after ivF, 8–11, 32–35, 307–
9, 312; as doubled consciousness, 16, 65, 
237–38, 255–57, 329n10; as genealogical, 14; 
kinship and parenthood in, 152–55, 298–
309; transformative logic of, 4–6, 33–35, 
49–52, 57–58, 64–67, 97, 183, 186–88, 222, 
228–29, 317n22, 323n6
contact zones, 259, 265–68, 300, 331–32nn10–
12
contraception, 105, 185, 189, 203
conventions, 324n8
conversation and dialogue, 298–302, 312
Corea, Gena, 191–99, 201–2, 209, 213–14, 
270–71
Cotts, Oron, 332n18
Crowe, Christine, 206–7, 212–16, 328n14
Crozier, W. Z., 133, 138
Crystals, Fabrics, and Fields (Haraway), 69
cultural/social matrix of reproductive biomedi-
cine, 9, 18–19, 22–29, 32–35, 70, 307–9, 
314n1, 314n8; constitutive relationalities in, 
86, 148–49; in feminist encounters with 
ivF, 184–99; gender identity and ivF in, 
208, 212–13, 216, 220, 222, 224, 233–35, 
237–38; kinship and parenthood in, 4, 6, 
71–73, 228–42; new models of technologi-
cal change in, 272–74; normalization of art 
in, 222–29; political action and, 200–206, 
211–12, 327nn10–11; political debates on, 
58–63; reflexive modernity in, 269–72, 
327n6; sexual politics in, 184; in stem cell 
derivation labs, 52–56, 77–101, 317n20; 
transformative logic of ivF in, 33–35, 
49–52, 57–58, 64–67, 97, 183, 186–88, 222, 
228–29, 317n22, 323n6; women’s encoun-
ters with ivF in, 184, 205–19, 328n16. See 
also evolution of reproductive biomedicine; 
frontier idioms; lab culture
Custom- Made Child?, The (Holmes et al.), 191
cybrid, the. See human- animal admixed 
 embryos
da Costa, Beatriz, 295
“Daedalus, or Science and the Future” (Hal-
dane), 245
Darwin, Charles, 13, 15–16; on biological plas-
ticity, 50–51; model of heredity of, 115, 
256; model of pangenesis of, 126, 127, 266; 
on natural selection, 40–41, 42, 265–66, 
315n9; on sex and reproduction, 47, 316n14; 
on tools and organs, 49, 263–64
debiologization, 239
de Lauretis, Teresa, 20, 179, 181, 246, 330n16
Derrida, Jacques: critique of Lévi- Strauss of, 
166, 324–25nn12–13; on originary techni-
city, 11, 315n8; on technics and regenera-
tion, 26–27, 302–7, 323n2, 332n17; on tech-
nological assistance, 246
354 indEx
Descent of Man, The (Darwin), 47
designer babies, 223, 272
“Developmental Physiological Studies on the 
Triton Egg” (Spemann), 122–26
“Development In Vitro of Young Rabbit Em-
bryos, The” (Waddington and Waterman), 
131
Dialectic of Sex, The (Firestone), 75
dialogue, 298–302, 312
Dinner Party, The (Chicago), 289–90, 292–93
disciplining of reproduction, 15–16, 22–23, 
50–52, 65, 82–83, 313nn5–6
Disciplining Reproduction (Clarke), 22
dish model of disease, 97–100, 294
Dissemination (Derrida), 304–9
Dolly (the sheep), 37
Dolly Mixtures (Franklin), 9, 23
donor siblings, 37, 231, 313n6
double articulation, 314n3




Dworkin, Andrea, 196–97, 327n9
Dyson, Anthony, 189–90
Dyson, Freeman, 267
economic implications of bioknowledge. See 
biocapitalism
Economic Manuscripts of 1861–3 (Marx), 40–41, 
315n9
ectogenesis, 246
Edwards, Robert, 22, 105, 106, 121t, 281; auto-
biographical account of, 245; embryologi-
cal work of, 145–49; embryo Pioneer Award 
of, 119; Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medi-
cine of, 23, 35–36, 147, 315n5; Pincus and, 
135, 141, 146, 147; social progress goals of, 
135, 145
Edwards, Ruth, 35, 58, 315n5
egg donation, 219
Eggs Donation (Glover), 283–84
Eggs of Mammals, The (Pincus), 138–39, 140f, 
141–42
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 332n13
Elementary Structures of Kinship, The (Lévi- 
Strauss), 48, 111, 154, 161–71, 177–78, 324n9, 
324n11
Embodied Progress (Franklin), 23, 219, 325n16
embryology / embryological research, 23, 
24–25, 113–26; Edwards’s work in, 145–49; 
experimental exploration in, 105–6, 114–15, 
117–18, 143–44, 152, 246, 279–80, 306–7, 
319n8, 320nn10–11, 321nn21–22; frontier 
idioms for, 102–11, 143–45; genealogies of 
tools and techniques in, 10–11, 24, 114–26, 
132–33, 320nn17–18; Heape’s embryo trans-
fer in, 56, 126–29, 131, 148, 266, 321–
22nn27–31; merographic logics in, 157, 182–
83; Needham’s account of, 105, 132, 320n11; 
Pincus’s work in, 131–43, 146–47, 322n33, 
322nn36–37; public opinion on, 61–63, 
271–72, 317n23; Spemann’s contribution to, 
120–26; stem techniques in, 129–33; theori-
zation of reproduction in, 182–83
embryonic stem cells. See human embryonic 
stem cell (hES) research
embryo transfer, 54–56, 126–29, 131
Endy, Drew, 267
Engels, Friedrich: on the hand- tool relation-
ship, 182–83; model of technology of, 9, 
12–13, 64–65, 243–44, 263–64, 315n9, 331n7; 
in Rubin’s analysis, 161–62; on sex and re-
production, 46–47. See also Marx, Karl
Entwicklungsmechanik (Roux), 114
Enzmann, E., 137, 142
eugenic potential of ivF, 327n6
evolution of reproductive biomedicine, 103–
49, 306–7; accidents and serendipity in, 
105–6, 117–18, 143–44; accumulated scale 
in, 138–39; agricultural applications in, 
55, 57–58, 103–5, 317n20, 319n7; Clarke’s 
account of, 15, 50, 147, 319n8; coevolu-
tion of substance, technology, and knowl-
edge in, 54, 138–41, 151, 263–64, 315n8, 
322–23nn38–39; first human ivF in, 130; 
fusion of organisms and tools in, 125; gene-
alogies of tools and techniques in, 111–26, 
132–33, 320nn17–18; Haldane’s account of, 
245; Heape’s embryo transfer in, 126–29, 
131, 148, 266, 321–22nn27–31; interspecific 
technology transfer in, 106; Louise Brown 
in, 145–49; mammalian applications in, 
145; Nilsson’s photography in, 248–51; oral 
contraception in, 141–43; Spemann’s con-
striction experiments of, 122–26, 306; Spe-
mann’s handmade microtools in, 120–22, 
indEx 355
123t, 279–80; stem techniques in, 129–33; 
at University of Illinois, 103–4. See also fron-
tier idioms
Ewart, James, 322n28
Ex Ovo Omnia (Glover), 284–85
Experience of Infertility, The (Pfeffer and Wool-
lett), 207–9
experimental embryology. See embryol-
ogy / embryological research
Experimental Embryology (Jenkinson), 114
face work, 233
Fairburn, William, 40–41
family: definitions of, 195; normative conven-
tions of, 206, 221, 233; pressures from, 222, 
232; structures of, 183, 227, 316n17. See also 
kinship
family planning, 201
fatherless offspring (Pincogenesis), 132–43
Fausto- Sterling, Anne, 179
feminist biology, 179
Feminist International Network of Resistance 
to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering 
(FinrragE), 199–206, 211–12, 327nn10–11
feminist political activism: infertility experi-
ences and, 205–19, 222; opposition to nrts 
in, 199–206; on reproductive empower-
ment and agency, 205–6
feminist scholarship, 9; analysis of technologi-
cal change in, 272–74; on biology of gender, 
179; Butler on technologies of gender in, 
160, 178–81, 183, 213, 242, 326n20; diversity 
of perspective within, 189–92, 199–200, 
205–7, 327nn4–6; on double conscious-
ness, 237–38, 329n10; on female infertility, 
207–19, 222; in Firestone’s new population 
biology, 73–77, 101, 105, 318n4; on the gen-
dered frontier, 290–96; Haraway on en-
gagement with science and technology in, 
76–77, 81–82, 86, 96, 100–101, 265, 318n5; 
Haraway’s cyborg manifesto in, 68–73, 181, 
317n3, 332n17; of ivF and new reproduc-
tive technologies (nrts), 184–99, 326n2; 
on kinship and gender technologies, 155–
84, 228–42; on Lévi- Strauss’s structural-
ist anthropology, 161–70, 324–25nn9–14; 
links with activism of, 199–206, 211–12, 
327nn10–11; on nature- culture dichotomy, 
160; on reproduction and new divisions 
of labor, 32, 45–48, 52, 65; Rubin on sex/
gender systems in, 160–66, 170, 176–79, 
324nn8–9, 324–25nn12–13; science studies 
in, 189; Strathern’s instrumental analysis of 
gender and kinship in, 172–78, 235; Strath-
ern’s merographic thought experiments in, 
155–60, 182–83, 227–28, 306, 323nn4–7; 
technological ambivalence in, 184–99, 255, 
311–12, 327n6, 327n8; on technologies of 
sex and gender, 19–23, 25, 52; on visual 
culture of ivF, 244–45; on women’s ex-
periences of reproductive technology, 23, 
25–26, 159, 184, 205–19, 328n16
fertility anxiety, 223–24
fertility reassurance, 225
fertility tourism, 231, 332n17
fetal photography, 219, 256, 330n18
FinrragE (Feminist International Network 
of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic 
Engineering), 199–206, 211–12, 327nn10–11
Firestone, Shulamith, 20, 24, 66–67, 325n17; 
new population biology of, 73–77, 101, 105, 
318n4; on sexual inequality, 162; on societal 
change, 208
Fitzgerald, Deborah, 103
“Foetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in 
the Politics of Reproduction” (Petchesky), 
197–99
Fortes, Meyer, 172–73
Forum against Oppression of Women, 205
Foucault, Michel, 24; on biopower and tech-
nologies of self, 15–16, 48–49, 50, 65, 273; 
on genealogies of normalization, 6, 34–35, 
49, 315n4, 316n16; on genealogy as technics, 
279, 280; on life itself, 87; on the popula-
tion, 50–51; on the strangely muddled zone 
of technology, 273–74; on technologies of 
sex, 9, 19, 47–49, 51–52, 64–65, 159, 181, 
245–46, 314nn9–10, 324–25n12, 330n16
Frankenstein (Shelley), 244
Freud, Sigmund, 161
“From Walking Wombs to Test- Tube Babies” 
(Oakley), 196–98
frontier idioms, 9, 24–26, 54, 102–11, 143–45, 
221, 258–60, 312, 319nn3–4; accidents and 
indeterminacy in, 105–6, 117–18, 143–44; 
biofuturism and, 265–68; contact zones as,  
259, 265–68, 300, 331–32nn10–12; ethi-
356 indEx
frontier idioms (continued) 
cal contexts of, 268–75; expectation of 
continual progress in, 226–27, 263–64, 
269–70, 295–96, 331n9; fusion of model or-
ganisms in, 125; in Gell’s accounts of tech-
nology, 107–8, 143, 262; gendered spaces of, 
290–96; human- tool relations in, 263–65; 
in the lab’s hole- in- the- wall design, 18–19, 
20f, 21f, 24, 26, 53–56, 260; in New World 
national narratives, 108–10, 134, 262–63, 
320nn13–16, 330n4; as projections into the 
future, 109–11, 143–44, 259, 330n1, 332n1; 
Rapp’s “moral pioneering” as, 9, 295–96, 
308; visual culture of conception and, 243, 
274–96. See also evolution of reproductive 
biomedicine
Frontiers of Knowledge pamphlet (ala), 260–
63, 268–69, 330n2
Fujimura, Joan H., 106, 107
Fukuyama, Francis, 22, 327n6
fusion embryos, 10–11, 24
Garfinkel, Harold, 326n20
Geertz, Clifford, 97, 170, 176, 315n4
Gell, Alfred, 107–8, 143, 150–54, 181–82, 262, 
331n11
Gender and Kinship (ed. Collier and Yanagi-
sako), 172
gender identity, 174–75; Butler’s configuration 
of, 179–80, 213, 233–35, 242; infertility and, 
208, 212–13, 216, 220, 222, 224, 237–38
Gender of the Gift, The (Strathern), 159–60, 173, 
176–78
gender technology. See sex/gender technology




Genetic Interest Group (gig), 63, 66
genetic maternity, 313n6
genomics, 21; biological tools of, 332n16; epi-
genetic reprogramming and gene trans-
fer in, 266–67; Human Genome Project 




Gilbert, Scott, 25, 118
Ginsburg, Faye, 328n2
globalization of ivF, 240, 330n15
Global Nature, Global Culture (Franklin, Lury, 
and Stacey), 23
Glover, Gina, 26, 260, 274–96, 311–12; The Art 
of A.R.T., 260, 274, 281–96, 312; Chromosome 
Socks, 275–81; Eggs Donation, 283–84; Ex 
Ovo Omnia, 284–85; fabrics used by, 287–
89; Nigella, 287, 288f; Seeing Eggs Every-
where, 285; Sperm Morphology, 283f; Very 
Small and Far Away, 282–83; Yes!, 287, 288f
Goffman, Erving, 326n20
Gonzalez- Santos, Sandra, 230–31
good manufacturing practice (gmp), 70, 
82–83, 92, 318n9
Gordon, Ian R., 322n32
Greer, Germaine, 325n17
Griffin, Susan, 194
guérillères, Les (Wittig), 324–25n12
Guy’s Hospital, London, 18; The Art of A.R.T. 
installation at, 260, 274, 281–96; assisted 
conception unit (acu) at, 9, 18–19, 20f, 21f, 
24, 26, 53–56, 260, 281; Chromosome Socks 
installation at, 275–81; cytology lab at, 275–
78; dish model of disease at, 97–100, 294; 
stem cell derivation lab of, 52–56, 77–101. 
See also lab culture
Habermas, Jürgen, 22, 27, 263–64, 270, 302, 
327n6, 331n6
Hacking, Ian, 279
Hagen people, the, 168–69
Haldane, J. D. S., 75, 245
Hamburger, Victor, 124
Hammond, John, 142, 322n33
Hanmer, Jalna, 201–2
Haraway, Donna, 9, 11, 13, 24, 66–67, 151, 
317n1; on analogies in science, 69; on con-
textual engagement with science and tech-
nology, 76–77, 81–82, 86, 96, 100–101, 181, 
265, 300, 318n5; cyborg politics of, 68–73, 
181, 203, 317n3, 332n17; on interpretive/
symbolic anthropology, 170; on scientific 
models, 97–100; on technological ambiva-
lence, 185–86
Harris, Evan, 58, 59f
Harrison, Ross, 130–31, 135
Harstock, Nancy, 198
Heape, Walter, 56, 126–29, 131, 148, 266, 
321–22nn27–31
indEx 357
Heidegger, Martin, 11, 13–14, 66, 302
Helmreich, Stefan, 331–32n12
Henig, Robin Marantz, 22, 313n2
heroism, 240–41, 330n14
Herschberger, Ruth, 20, 325n17
Herschel, William, 319n3
hES research. See human embryonic stem cell 
(hES) research
Hird, Myra, 331–32n12
His, Wilhelm, 114, 125
history of reproductive biomedicine. See evolu-
tion of reproductive biomedicine
hole- in- the- wall lab design, 18–19, 20f, 21f, 24, 
26, 53–56, 260
Holmes, Helen B., 191, 327n7
hope technology, 23, 258–59
Hopwood, Nick, 23, 25, 125–26, 320n17
hormonal enhancement of fertility, 189
Hubbard, Ruth, 179
human- animal admixed embryos, 24; Har-
away’s account of, 68–73; public politi-
cal debates on, 58–63. See also embryol-
ogy / embryological research
Human Condition, The (Arendt), 302–3
human embryonic stem cell (hES) research, 
17–19, 20f, 21f, 38; derivation labs working 
in, 24, 52–56, 77–81, 317n20; derivation of 
cells for, 3, 10, 14, 17, 37f; donated embryos 
in, 70, 313n7; ethical questions in, 270–75; 
legal and institutional governance of, 19, 44, 
50, 56–58, 70, 82, 270–72; normalized ivF 
as model for, 61, 64–66; political debates on, 
58–63; production of cellular products and, 
18–19, 22, 38, 44–46; regenerative (stem 
cell) medicine and, 1–2, 37f, 55, 64, 307; 
U.K. policy on, 52–53, 55–58, 60–61, 64. See 
also biocapitalism; bioindustry; lab culture
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (hFE) 
Acts, 50, 57–63
Human Genome Project, 31–32, 51, 313n5, 
332n16
human hand, the, 91–96, 244
Husserl, Edmund, 302, 303
Huxley, Aldous, 75, 142
Huxley, Julian, 75, 245, 316n14
hybrid contact zones, 259, 267–68, 300, 331–
32nn10–12
hybrids, 246
icsi. See intracytoplasmic sperm injection 
(icsi) process
identity creation through ivF, 230–42
Ilic, Dusko, 97–99
imagery of conception. See visual culture of 
conception
imitation, 13, 294–95, 314n3
incest taboos, 316n17
induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells, 3, 17–18, 
37, 266, 306, 313n7, 320n12
Industrial Revolution, 38–44, 64–65, 147, 244
industry. See bioindustry
infertility, 205–19, 222, 326n2; access to tech-
nology and, 206; art as ontological quest 
and, 231–42, 328nn3–5; causes of, 224–25; 
complex appeal of ivF and, 216–19; gen-
der identity and, 208, 212–13, 216, 220, 222, 
224, 233–35; normalization of art and, 
222–29; women’s experiences of, 212–16
Infertility: Women Speak Out about Their Experi-
ences of Reproductive Medicine (ed. Klein), 
208–12
Ingold, Tim, 331n8
Inhorn, Marcia, 232, 330n15
Inovulation, 145
interpretive/symbolic anthropology, 169–72
interspecific technology transfer, 106
intracytoplasmic sperm injection (icsi) pro-
cess, 105, 248–55, 330n21
in vitro culture methods, 129–33
in vitro fertilization (ivF), 182; as ambivalent 
encounter, 7–9, 34–35, 184, 274, 307–12, 
314n3; as complex or matrix, 4–6, 9, 18–19, 
32–35, 183, 186–88, 307–9, 314n8, 323n6; 
curious legacy of, 1–19, 66–67, 307–9; evo-
lution as a technical platform of, 35–38, 
55–56, 103–49, 306–7; failure rates of, 
154, 217, 221–22, 224, 252; genealogy of 
tools and techniques for, 111–16, 132–33, 
320nn17–18; kinship and, 4, 6, 16, 150–55; 
labor of, 217–18, 231–42; as lens, 26, 131, 
152, 182, 241–42, 244–48, 274, 308, 325n16; 
as looking glass, 2–10, 29, 67, 268, 294, 312; 
micromanipulation procedure in, 248–57; 
as normalized, 4, 6–7, 8, 26, 31–35, 61–64, 
144–45, 221, 222–29, 274; original pur-
pose of, 51–52, 153–55, 313n2; stages of  
conception in, 238–42, 243, 329n6, 329n9, 
358 indEx
in vitro fertilization (ivF) (continued) 
329n13; stem cell research and, 17–19, 20f, 
21f, 54–56; technologies of sex and, 19–22; 
transformational role of, 14–15, 33–35, 37f, 
49–52, 61, 64–66, 97, 222, 306; visual cul-
ture of conception in, 129–33, 229, 243–
55, 307. See also assisted conception unit 
(acu); condition of being after ivF
iPhone, 246–47, 266
“Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?” 
(Ortner), 162–66
“It’s Going to Work for Me” (Williams), 217
iVF, 247f
“ivF—an Irrational Choice” (Koch), 217–18
ivF- stem- cell interface, 14, 18, 54–55, 97, 294, 
312
Jasanoff, Sheila, 320n13
Jenkinson, J. W., 114, 122, 123, 124
Jennings, Herbert Spencer, 320n10
Johnson, Martin, 23, 35, 147
Jordanova, Ludmilla, 168
Kahn, Susan, 232
Kaplan, E. Ann, 198
Keating, Peter, 314n8
Keller, Evelyn Fox: on the biological gaze, 70, 
248, 279–81; on feminist accounts of sex 
and gender, 179; on gendering of science, 
291–92; on making sense of life, 2–3; on 
postwar reproductive bioscience, 104
Kevles, Daniel, 318n1
kinship, 4, 6–8, 26–27, 150–55; in anthropo-
logical study, 52; anxiety of the future and, 
298–309; blood ties in, 16–17; disciplining 
of reproduction and, 15–16, 22–23, 50–52, 
65, 82–83, 313nn5–6; in evolution of tools 
and techniques, 111; Foucault’s account 
of, 48–49, 316n17; Gell’s account of, 107, 
150–51; genealogical translation of, 66–67; 
Haraway’s account of, 71–73; hyperconven-
tional roles in, 234–35, 329n8; ivF as model 
of, 152–55; law of exogamy in, 48–49, 154, 
164–65, 323n2; as mode of production, 165; 
new categories of, 37, 159; ontological quest 
of art and, 231–42, 328nn3–5; reconfigu-
ration of, 23; social aspiration in, 226–28; 
Strathern’s instrumental analysis of, 172–
78; Strathern’s merographic thought experi-
ment with, 155–60, 182–83, 227–28, 306, 
323nn4–7, 326n21; as technology, 9–10, 
15, 25–29, 51, 55, 148–55, 228–31, 326n21; 
Yanagisako and Collier’s practice theory of, 
170–72. See also biological relativity
kinship theory, 150–55, 298–309
Kirby, Vicki, 11, 331–32n12
Klein, Renate, 201–2, 208–12
Koch, Lene, 211–12, 217–18
Kolodny, Annette, 290–92, 296
lab culture, 52–56, 77–101, 317n20; bioartistic 
rendering of, 260, 274–96, 332n18; crafts-
manship in, 83–86; disciplining of repro-
duction in, 82–83; female sociability in, 78; 
gendered divisions of labor in, 329n7; gene-
alogies of tools and techniques in, 111–26; 
hole- in- the- wall frontier in, 18–19, 20f, 21f, 
24, 26, 53–56, 260; human- tool- machine 
synergy in, 86–96, 318nn6–7; passaging 
(propagation) process in, 79–81, 91–94; 
quality control (gmp) practices in, 70, 
82–83, 92, 318n9
labor of ivF, 232–42, 328nn3–5
Lamarck, Jean- Baptiste, 2
Landecker, Hannah, 25, 308, 330n19; on 
biology as engineering, 134–35; on cells as 
living tools, 82, 86, 130–31, 247, 267–68; on 
plasticity and parthenogenesis, 139–41
laparoscopy, 118, 147
Latour, Bruno, 11, 16, 38, 77, 87, 331n11
Leenhardt, Maurice, 111
Lemonnier, Pierre, 264, 331nn8–9
Leroi- Gourhan, André, 11, 303–4, 315n8, 331n8
Lesnik- Oberstein, Karin, 225–26
Lévi- Strauss, Claude, 160, 273; critiques of 
ethnocentrism of, 166, 170, 324–25nn12–13; 
on free play and creativity, 108, 111, 154; on 
kinship technology, 58, 181–82, 323n2; on 
marriage exchange, 173–74; Ortner’s read-
ing of, 163–66, 324nn10–11; Rubin’s analy-
sis of, 161, 163–66, 170, 177, 324nn8–9, 
324–25nn12–13; on social aspiration, 227; 
structuralist anthropology of, 161–70, 177–
78, 324–25nn12–14
Lewin, Ellen, 328n2, 328n4
life. See making sense of life
Lloyd, Ian, 109–10, 320n16
Lock, Margaret, 23, 45–46
indEx 359
Loeb, Jacques, 2, 3, 133–34, 138–39, 227, 266, 
322n34





MacCormack, Carol, 166–69, 180
machine age, 38–44, 64–65, 147, 244
Made to Order: The Myth of Reproductive and 
Genetic Progress (ed. Spallone and Stein-
berg), 196–202, 206–7, 212
Maienschein, Jane, 2, 22, 320n10
Making Parents (Thompson), 26, 217, 240
making sense of life, 2–3, 10–11, 14–15
Malinowski, Bronislaw, 108
Mangold, Hilde, 120–21, 321n25
manifest destiny, 262, 320n15
“Manifesto for Cyborgs, A” (Haraway), 68–73, 
203, 317n3, 332n17
Man Made Women (ed. Corea and Klein), 209
marriage exchange practices, 173–78
Marshall, F. H. A., 128
Martin, Emily, 203, 237–38
Marx, Karl, 273; on early capital and capital-
ism, 94–96, 318n8; on the earth as labor’s 
organism, 87–91, 96; on human- tool- 
machine relations, 40–44, 64–65, 86–91, 
116, 130, 318nn6–7; model of technology of, 
9, 11–14, 24, 45, 68, 181–82, 226–27, 243–
44, 263–64, 303–4, 315–16nn8–11, 316n13, 
331nn5–7; in Rubin’s analysis, 161–62; on 
sex and reproduction, 14, 46–49, 116
Marx, Leo, 332n15
maternal spindle transfer (mst) techniques, 
298–99
Mathieu, Nicole- Claude, 166
matrix (definitions), 314n8. See also cultural/
social matrix of reproductive biomedicine




Mead, George Herbert, 321n19
Mead, Margaret, 194
Mechanistic Conception of Life, The (Loeb), 
133–34
Melanesian practices, 168–69, 173–78, 325n18
Mendel, Gregor, 115, 126
merographic thinking, 155–60, 182–83, 227–
28, 306, 323nn4–7
Michie, Donald, 120t
microtools, 251–52; hand- forging of, 91–92, 
252; micromanipulation of, 248–57, 330n21; 
Spemann’s development of, 111, 112f, 117f, 
120–22, 123t, 279–80
Mies, Maria, 200, 201–2
mimicry, 13, 294–95, 314n3
miracle babies. See offspring of ivF
Mitchison, Naomi, 75, 245
mitochondrial donation, 298–99
Modell, Judith, 328n2
models/modeling, 259; circulatory recycling 
of, 139; dish model of disease as, 97–100, 
294; fusion of organism and tool in, 125; 
Haraway’s account of, 97; imitation with 
purpose in, 294–95, 314n3; ivF as, 33–35, 
37f, 49–52, 61, 64–67, 97, 222–23; of kin-
ship as technology, 152–55; of technological 
change, 272–74
Mol, Annemarie, 17, 237–38, 323n5
Molecular Gaze, The (Anker and Nelkin), 286, 
295
Moor, R. M., 121t
Moore, Neil, 121t
Moraga, Cherrie, 179
moral pioneering, 9, 295–96, 308
Morgan, Lewis Henry, 264
Morgan, T. H., 280
Morton, George Douglas, Lord, 126–27
mosaic of ivF. See cultural/social matrix of re-
productive biomedicine
Mother Machine: From Artificial Insemination 




Muller, H. J., 280
National Science Foundation (nsF), 103, 269
naturalization, 233–42, 330n17
Nature, Culture, and Gender (MacCormack and 
Strathern), 166–69, 325n17
Nebula (Chadwick), 287
Needham, Joseph, 105, 107, 320n11
Nelkin, Dorothy, 286, 295
New Deal, 102–3
360 indEx
new kinship studies, 326n21
new population biology, 74–79
Nigella (Glover), 287, 288f
Nike, 260, 261f, 268–69
Nilsson, Lennart, 248, 250, 330n20
Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, 23, 
35–36, 147, 315n5
normalizing of the new, 144–45; of assisted 
reproductive technology (art), 222–24, 
233–34; Foucault’s genealogies of, 6, 34–35, 
49, 315n4, 316n16; of ivF, 4, 6–7, 8, 26, 
31–35, 61–64, 221, 274; of offspring of ivF, 
33–34, 244, 262; visual media’s role in, 
244–57, 274–96
Oakley, Ann, 196–98
O’Brien, Keith, 61–63, 271
O’Brien, Mary, 194, 198
offspring of ivF, 33–34; as designer babies, 
223, 272; as donor siblings, 37, 231, 313n6; 
first (Louise Brown) of, 38, 57–58, 145–49, 
184, 191, 317n1; normalization of, 33–34, 
244, 262; numbers of, 61, 184, 307; parent-
hood identity and, 222–29, 328n2; pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis of, 23, 





Origin of Species, The (Darwin), 40–41, 42
Ortner, Sherry, 162–66
Our Bodies, Ourselves, 207–8, 325n17
Owens, Larry, 319n2
Pandora’s Baby (Henig), 22
parenthood, 222–29, 298–99, 328n2; as con-
ventional goal, 230–31, 234–35; gender 
identity and, 208, 212–13, 216, 220, 222, 
224, 233–35, 237–38; ontological quest 
of art and, 231–42, 328nn3–5. See also 
 kinship
Parsons, Talcott, 176
parthenogenic reproduction (Pincogenesis), 
132–43
partial pregnancy, 238–39, 329n13
Pasteur pipette, 117f
path dependency, 132–33
Pauly, Philip, 82, 103; on biological modern-
ism, 130–31; on exploratory experimental-
ism, 319n8; on Loeb and parthenogenesis, 
133–34
Paxson, Heather, 240–41, 330n16
Peary, Robert Edwin, 330n3
Peletz, Michael, 8, 308
performance/performativity, 318n5
Petchesky, Rosalind, 193, 197–99
Pfaffenberger, Bryan, 331n9
Pfeffer, Naomi, 204–5, 207–9
Phaedrus (Plato), 299–307, 312
Philip, Kavita, 295
Physiology of Reproduction, The (Marshall), 128
Pickering, Andrew, 132
Pincus, Gregory, 75, 131–43, 146–47, 322n33, 
322n36–37
Pioneer Award of the International Embryo 
Transfer Society (iEts), 118–19, 120–21t







Pratt, Mary Louise, 331n10
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (pgd), 23, 
37f, 98–99, 219, 231
prenatal screening, 7, 185, 191, 193, 205
privatization of reproduction, 296
“Producing Difference: Two New Guinea 
Highlands Kinship Systems” (Strathern), 
172–76
pronuclear transfer (pnt) techniques, 298–99
quality control (gmp) practices, 70, 82–83, 
92, 318n9
Question Concerning Technology, The (Heideg-
ger), 11
quest narratives, 232–33, 328nn3–5
quilting, 289–90
Rabinow, Paul, 170, 219, 256
Radcliffe- Brown, A. R., 169, 172–73
radical feminism, 199–200. See also feminist 
scholarship
Rapp, Rayna, 9, 295–96, 308
rebiologization, 239
recursion/recursivity, 7–8, 13, 22, 25, 125, 151
indEx 361
reflexive modernity, 269–72, 327n6
regeneration, 303–9
regenerative (stem cell) medicine, 1–2, 37f, 
55, 64, 307
relatives. See family; kinship
Remaking Life and Death (ed. Franklin and 
Lock), 45–46
Reproducing Reproduction (Franklin and Ra-
goné), 23
reproduction, 6–7, 11–15; as biocapitalist 
value, 44–46; complex divisions of labor 
of, 32, 45–48, 52, 65; conventional under-
standing of, 14, 46, 151–53; disciplining 
of, 15–16, 22, 23, 50–52, 65, 82, 313nn5–6; 
embryologic viewpoints of, 182–83; in Fire-
stone’s new population biology, 73–77, 105; 
Foucault’s account of, 48–49, 51–52; kin-
ship and gender technologies and, 150–55, 
323nn2–3; Marx’s account of, 14, 46–49; as 
ontological quest, 231–42, 328nn3–5; pri-
vatization of, 295–96; Thompson’s biotech 
mode of, 45–46; visual cultures of, 1, 10, 23, 
26, 70, 116, 243–57. See also biological rela-
tivity; in vitro fertilization (ivF)
Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood, 
and Medicine (ed. Stanworth), 196–99, 
206–7
reproductive tourism, 231, 332n17
reproductive trafficking, 55
research fieldwork, 9–10, 17–19, 313n3
Rich, Adrienne, 194, 207
Richardson, Jo, 57–58
right- to- life movement, 197–98, 330n18
Ringer, Sydney, 130
Risk Society (Beck), 269–72
Ritvo, Harriet, 15
Rolt, L. T. C., 39–42
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 102–3, 104, 143, 262, 
318n1, 332n13
Rose, Molly, 146
Rothman, Barbara Katz: on amniocentesis and 
tentative pregnancy, 191–95, 212, 218–19, 
238–39, 327n8; on use of reproduction 
technology, 208, 211
Roux, Wilhelm, 106, 114–15, 130, 320n10
Rowson, Lionel, 120t
Rubin, Gayle, 25; on convention, 324n8; re-
sponse to Lévi- Strauss’s structuralism of, 
170–71, 324–25nn12–13; on the sex/gen-
der system, 20, 48, 160–66, 170, 176–79, 
226, 235, 324nn8–9; Strathern’s response 
to, 176–79
Sahlins, Marshall David, 331n9
Sandelowski, Margarete, 189, 211, 222, 230–31, 
238–40
Savage Mind, The (Lévi- Strauss), 324n12
savior siblings, 37, 231, 313n6
scale, 138–39
Schneider, David, 170–71, 176, 232
science studies, 265, 331n11
“Science—the Endless Frontier,” 102–3
scientific models, 97–100
Scutt, Jocelynne, 328n14
sea urchins, 115, 321n24
Sedgwick, Eve, 179




sex/gender technology, 9, 23, 25–26, 150–55, 
314n2; biopower and, 49–52, 65–66; Butler 
on technologies of gender in, 160, 179–81, 
183, 213, 242, 326n20; divisions of labor 
and, 32, 45–48, 52, 65; in feminist theory, 
160–69, 222–29; in Firestone’s new popu-
lation biology, 73–77, 105, 318n4; Fou-
cault’s model of, 9, 19, 47–49, 51–52, 64–65, 
159, 181, 245–46, 314nn9–10, 324–25n12, 
330n16; gender identity and ivF, 208, 212–
13, 216, 220, 222, 224, 233–35, 237–38; Har-
away’s account of, 72–73, 76–77; normal-
ization of assisted reproductive technology 
(art) in, 222–29; reproductive value of, 14, 
46; Rubin’s theory of, 20, 48, 160–66, 170, 
176–79, 226, 235, 324nn8–9, 324–25nn12–
13; sexual politics of, 184; Strathern’s instru-
mental analysis of, 172–78, 235; Yanagisako 
and Collier’s practice theory of, 171–72. See 
also kinship
Shelley, Mary, 244
Show Your Support demonstration, 58–60
sibling relationships, 37, 159, 231, 313n6





socialist feminism, 199–200. See also feminist 
scholarship
social theory, 11–13. See also kinship
social understanding. See cultural/social 
matrix of reproductive biomedicine
sociological models of technology, 260
Sociology of Gender, The (ed. Franklin), 23
Socrates, 300–303
Solomon, Alison, 211–12
somatic cell nuclear transfer, 37f
Spallone, Patricia, 196, 199–200
Spar, Debora, 22
Spemann, Hans, 279–80, 321n25; constriction 
experiments of, 122–26, 306; handmade 
microtools of, 120–22, 123t
Spemann micropipettes, 111, 112f
Spencer, Herbert, 127
sperm capacitation, 137






Stanworth, Michelle, 196–97, 206–7
Steinberg, Deborah Lynn, 196, 199–200
stem cell banking, 19, 38, 52, 55–56, 70
stem cell derivation labs. See lab culture
stem cell technology, 307; cell reprogramming 
and, 37, 54; induced pluripotent stem (iPS) 
cells, 3, 17–18, 37, 266, 306, 313n7, 320n12; 
passaging (propagation) process in, 79–81; 
public opinion on, 61–63, 271–72, 317n23. 
See also human embryonic stem cell (hES) 
research; lab culture
stem technologies, 14–15, 129–33, 306
Steptoe, Patrick, 22, 36, 118, 145–49
Stiegler, Bernard, 12–13, 44, 87, 263–64, 331n7
Stilled Lives (Chadwick), 286–87, 332n14
strategic biologization, 329n12
strategic naturalization, 159
Strathern, Marilyn, 15, 20–21, 25, 246, 273, 
296, 317n22; instrumental analysis of gen-
der and kinship of, 172–78, 235; interpre-
tive/symbolic anthropology of, 170; on 
kinship thinking, 183, 229, 326n21; on 
Melanesian sex and gender practices, 168–
69, 173–78, 325n18; merographic thought 
experiment on kinship of, 155–60, 182–83, 
227–28, 255, 306, 323nn4–7; on structural-
ist anthropology, 166–70
structural functionalism, 169, 172–73
structuralist anthropology, 161–70, 177–78, 
326n19
“Structure, Sign, and Play” (Derrida), 325n13
substantialization, 16–19, 27; of biology as 




Suffolk Puffs (Glover), 287, 289f, 290
surgical enhancement of fertility, 189
surrogacy, 189, 219
synthetic biology, 2–3, 21, 266–67, 272, 322n35
tactical biopolitics, 295
Tarkowski, Andrei, 120t
techne (as term), 28
technical activity, 150–51
technics, 279, 280, 331n7, 332n17; Derrida on 
regeneration and, 26–27, 302–7, 332n17; 
dialogic future of, 312
technologia (as term), 28
technological ambivalence, 8–9, 34–35, 184, 
219–20, 307–12, 314n3; diversity of perspec-
tives and, 190; feminist political activism 
and, 199–206, 211–12, 327nn10–11; femi-
nist scholarship on ivF and, 184–99, 255, 
326n2, 327n6, 327n8; gender identity and 
ivF and, 208, 212–13, 216, 220, 222, 224; 
toward future possibilities, 299–300; in 
women’s encounters with ivF, 184, 206–19, 
274, 328n16
technological determinism, 263
technological reproduction, 11–13. See also 
 reproduction
Technologies of Procreation (Edwards et al.), 23
technology, 1–2, 26–29, 314nn9–10; cultural 
matrix of change and, 4–6, 9, 18–19, 22–29, 
32–35, 314n8; definitions of, 28; expecta-
tion of continual progress with, 226–27, 
263–64, 269–70, 295–96, 331n9; Gell’s 
account of, 107–8, 143, 150–51, 181–82; 
Heidegger’s account of, 11, 13–14, 66, 302; 
human inheritance of, 10–13, 27–28, 144; 
kinship identity and, 28–29, 51, 148–55, 
228–42; Marx’s and Engels’s models of, 9, 
indEx 363
11–14, 24, 45, 68, 181–82, 226–27, 243–44, 
263–64, 303–9, 315–16nn8–11, 316n13, 
331nn5–7; original goals of, 10; in Plato’s 
Phaedrus, 299–307, 312; reproduction of 
relationships in, 153–55; of sex, 9, 19–22, 
25, 32–33, 46–49, 51–52, 65–66; sociologi-
cal models of, 9, 260. See also bioindus-
try; biologization of technology; frontier 
idioms; human embryonic stem cell (hES) 
research; in vitro fertilization (ivF)
telegony, 126–27, 322n28
tentative pregnancy, 238–39, 329n13
Tentative Pregnancy: Prenatal Diagnosis and 
the Future of Motherhood, The (Rothman), 
191–95
Test- Tube Women: What Future for Motherhood? 
(ed. Arditti, Klein, and Minden), 191–95, 
196, 199
thick genealogies, 23, 315n4
“Thinking Sex” (Rubin), 179
Thompson, Charis, 6–7, 26, 45–46, 159, 
177–78; on nrts as text for feminist theory, 
186; on ontological choreography of art, 
231, 233–35, 240, 242, 255, 328n2, 328n4, 
329n12; on women’s experiences of ivF, 
215, 217
Through the Flower (Chicago), 292
Tissue Culture and Art project, 332n18
“Tissue Culture Kings” (J. Huxley), 245
Tomorrow’s Child: Reproductive Technologies in 
the 1990s (Birke et al.), 208–9, 328n13
tools and techniques, 3, 19; coevolution of sub-
stance and, 54, 138–41, 151, 263–64, 315n8, 
322–23nn38–39; genealogies of, 116–26, 
132–33, 320nn17–18; hand- tool- embryo re-
lations and, 67, 243, 251, 254; hand- tool re-
lations and, 9, 13–14, 40–45, 65, 89, 116–18, 
182; hand tools and handiwork in, 18, 39, 
42, 83, 95, 106, 305, 318nn8–9, 332n18; 
Haraway’s account of, 72–73, 76–77, 81–82, 
86, 96, 100–101, 318n5; human embryos as, 
57–58, 64, 294; hybrid embryos as, 10–11, 
24, 58–63; machine age of, 38–44, 64–65, 
147, 244; in Marx’s and Engels’s models 
of technology, 9, 11–13, 64–65, 263, 315–
16nn8–11, 316n13; in Marx’s human- tool- 
machine relations, 40–44, 64–65, 86–91, 
116, 130, 244, 318nn6–7; scientific models 
as, 97–100, 279; stem technologies in, 
14–15, 129–33, 306; as substantialized con-
cepts, 13, 64, 66; of in vitro culture meth-
ods, 129–33. See also evolution of reproduc-
tive biomedicine; technology
“Traffic of Women: Notes on the ‘Political 









Turner, Frederick Jackson, 110, 262–63, 290
ubinig, 205–6, 327n12
UK Stem Cell Bank, 19
ultrasound, 219, 330n18
un Decade for Women, 200–201
United Kingdom: biocapitalist policies of, 
56–58, 240; support of stem cell research 
in, 61–63, 268
United States: public opinion on stem cell re-
search in, 317n23; right- to- life movement 
in, 197–98, 330n18; science policy in, 102–
3, 269–70, 332n13
University of Illinois, 103–4
values. See cultural/social matrix of reproduc-
tive biomedicine
Venter, Craig, 267
Very Small and Far Away (Glover), 282–83
virgin birth, 323n1
visual culture of conception, 1, 10, 23, 26, 229, 
243–57, 307; anti- abortion movement’s 
use of, 197–98, 330n18; bioartistic ren-
dering of, 260, 274–96, 332n18; biological 
gaze in, 70, 248, 279–81, 294–95; handheld 
screens in, 246–47; with in vitro culture 
models, 129–33; Nilsson’s work in, 248, 
250, 330n20; optical techniques in, 115–16, 
321nn23–24; in Pincus’s The Eggs of Mam-
mals, 140f, 141–42
Volonté de Savoir, La (Foucault), 324–25n12




Water Babies, The (Amis), 245
Waterman, A. J., 131
Watt, James, 39–40, 42, 44, 315n7
Weber, Max, 176
Weiner, Annette, 32, 323n1
Weismann, August, 115, 126, 127
Wells, H. G., 75, 245
Wendling, Amy E., 331n5
White, Leslie, 264
Whitten, Wes, 121t
Whole Earth Discipline (Brand), 266–67
Whose View of Life? (Maienschein), 22
“Why Do We Need All This?” (Mies), 200
Williams, Linda, 217
Williams, Raymond, 4, 6, 11, 188, 263, 307
Winged Victory of Samothrace sculpture, 260, 
261f, 268–69
Winkler, Ute, 210
With Child in Mind: Studies of the Personal En-
counter with Infertility (Sandelowski), 222
Wittig, Monique, 166, 324n12
Woman in the Body, The (Martin), 203
women’s health movement, 199–219, 325n17, 
328n16
“Women Want It” (Crowe), 212–16
Woolgar, Steve, 38
Woollett, Anne, 207–9
work objects, 113, 321n19
Yamanaka, Shinya, 3, 313n1
Yanagisako, Sylvia, 170–72, 180–81, 223
Yes! (Glover), 287, 288f
Young, Iris Marion, 237–38
Yoxen, Edward, 31
Zvelebil, Marek, 264–65
